Bhagavad Gita

Having started this proposition in the words " he slays not, nor is he slain" (ii. 19), having stated in ii. 20 as the reason theretor the immutability of the Self, having in the beginning of the sastra (ii. 21) briefly taught that to a wise man there is no need for works, and having introduced the subject here and there in the middle and expatiated upon it, the Lord now concludes it in the words that the wise man " kills not, nor is he bound," with a view to sum up the teaching of the sastra. Thus in the absence of the egotistic feeling of embodied existence, the sawmyasins renounce all avidya-generated action, and it is therefore right to say that the threefold fruit of action " evil, good and mixed" (xviii. 12J, does not accrue to the sawnyasins ; and the further conclusion also is inevitable that quite the reverse is the lot of others. This teaching of the Gitas^stra has been concluded here. To show that this essence of the whole Vedic Teaching should be investigated and understood by wise men of trained intelligence, it has been expounded by us here and there in several sections in accordance with the Scripture (sastra) and reason.

The impulses to action. Now will be mentioned the impulses to action : iS. Knowledge, the object known, the knower, (form) the threefold impulse to action ; the organ, the end, the agent, form the threefold basis of action. Knowledge : any knowledge, knowledge in general. Similarly the object kmuni refers to objects in general, to all objects of knowledge. The hioivey : the experiencer, partaking of the nature of the upadhi, a creature of avidya. This triad forms the threefold impulse to all action, to action in general. Indeed, performance of action with a view to avoid a thing or to obtain another and so on is possible only when there is a conjunction of the three, — knowledge, etc. The actions accomplished by the five (causes of action),— by the body, &c., — and grouped into three classes according to their respective seats — speech, mind, body, — are all traceable to the interplay of the organ, &c, ; and this is taught in the second part of the verse. The organ : that by which something is done ; the external organs being the organ of hearing, &c., and the internal organs being buddhi (intelligence), &c. The end : that which is sought for, that which is reached through action by the agent. The agent : he who sets the organs going, partaking of the nature of the upadhi (in which he works). In these three all

4l6 THE PHAGAVAD-GITA [DiS. XVIII. action inheres, and they are therefore said to form the threefold basis of action. The Impulses are threefold according to the gunas. Inasmuch as action, the several factors of action, and the fruit, are all made up of the gu;;as, the Lord now proceeds to teach the threefold distinction of each, according to the three distinct gu;/as, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas : ig. Knowledge and action, and the agent, are said in the science of the guwas to be of three kinds only, according to the distinction in guwas. Hear thou duly of them. Action (ka.Tc ma.) : 'karma' here means action (kriya). It is not used in the technical sense of the word denoting the object of an action, what is sought to be attained by means of action. Agent : the performer of acts. They are of three kinds only. — This restriction is intended to imply the absence of distinctions other than that caused by the gu/^as. — Gunas : such as Sattva. The science of the gunas here referred to is Kapila's system of philosophy. — Even Kapilas science of gu»as is certainly an authority so far as it concerns the gu-'ias and their experiencer (bhoktn). Though they are opposed to us as regards the supreme truth, viz., the oneness or non-duality of Brahman, still the followers of Kapila are of acknowledged authority in the exposition of the functions of the gu;ias and of their products, and their science is therefore accepted here as an authority as serving to extrol the teaching which follows. Hence no inconsistency. Hear, &=€ : Pay attention to the teaching which follows here, concerning knowledge and the rest, as well as their various distinctions caused by different gu»as,

as I describe them duly, according to the science, according to reason. Here follows the threefold character of knowledge : 20. That by which a man sees the one Indestructible Reality in all beings, inseparate in the separated, — that knowledge know thou as Sattvic. Reality (Bhava) : the one Self. Indestructible : which cannot be exhausted either in itself or in its properties ; Ku^astha or immutable. All beings: from Avyakta, or the unmanifested matter, down to the sthavara or unmoving objects. That Reality, the Self, is not different in different bodies ; like the akasa, the Self admits of no division. Know thou this direct and right perception of the non-dual Self as Sattvic. The dualistic fallacious systems of philosophy are Rajasic and Tamasic, and therefore they cannot directly bring about the cessation of sawsara. 21. But that knowledge which, by differentiation, sees in all the creatures various entities of distinct kinds, that knowledge know thou as Rajasic. By differentiation : regarding them as different in different bodies. Entities : Selfs. Which sees, &c. : This should be interpreted to mean ' by which one sees,' since knowledge cannot be an agent. 22. But that which clings to one single effect

4l8 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. XVIII- as if it were all, without reason, having no real object, and narrow, that is declared to be Tamasic. Tamasic knowledge is engrossed in one single effect, — such as the body or an external idol — as though it is all-comprehensive, thinking ' this body is the Self ' or ' that is God', and that there is nothing higher than that. Jiva (soul), for example, dwelling in the body is regarded by the naked 5rama7?akas", etc., as being of the size of that body ; and the Isvara is regarded (by some) to be the mere stone or piece of wood f . This knowledge is not founded on reason and does not perceive things as they are. Because it is not founded on reason, it is narrow, as extending over a limited area, or as producing very small results. This knowledge is said to be Tamasic, because it is found only in Tamasic beings possessing no faculty of discrimination. The threefold nature of action is next described : 23. An action which is ordained, which is free from attachment, which is done without love or hatred by one not desirous of the fruit, that action is declared to be Sattvic.

Ordained : Obligatory (nitya). It is not an action done by one impelled by love or hatred. 24. But the action which is done by one longing for pleasures or done by the egotistic, costing much trouble, that is declared ito be Rajasic. * The Jains. Some MSS. read Ksha- \ The material of which the image is Pleasures : as fruits of action. The Egotistic : not as distinguished from one who has reaHsed the true nature of the Self (who is absokiteiy free from egotism), but as distinguished from one who is free from pride, in the sense in which an ordinary srotriya (a devotee of the Vedic Religion) of the world is expected to be free from egotism. For, he who is absolutely without egotism, i.e., one who has realised the Self, cannot even be imagined to long for the fruit ot an action or to do an action costing much trouble. Even the doer of a Sattvic action is ignorant of the Self and is egotistic ; much more so are the Rajasic and Tiimasic doers. In common parlance, a srotriya who is ignorant of the Self is said to be free from egotism ; we say " He is a modest (unegotistic) brahma,';a." It is only from this class of persons that the doer of a Rajasic action is distinguished as being egotistic.

Intellect and Firmness are threefold according to 29. The threefold division of intellect and firmness according to qualities, about to be taught fully and distinctively (by Me), hear thou, O Dhananjaj'a. Qualities : Gu;?as, such as Sattva. The first half of the verse contains in an aphoristic form what is going to be taught. D//a;w/{/'rtjj'^ : the conqueror of wealth. Arjuna is so called because he acquired much wealth, — human and divine, material and spiritual, — durmg his tour of conquest through the four quarters of the earth. 30. That which knows action and inaction, what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, fear and absence of fear, bondage and liberation, that intellect is Sattvic, O Partha. Action (pravntti): the cause of bondage, the karmamarga, the path of action as taught in the sastra. Inaction (nivntti) : the cause of liberation, the path of sawnyasa. — As ' action ' ( pravritti ) and ' inaction ' (nivntti) occur in connection with ' bondage' (bandha) and ' liberation' (moksha), they have been interpreted to mean the paths of action and renunciation (karma and sawmyasa). What... done : the necessity for doing or not doing — by one who relies on the sastra — at particular places and times, actions producing visible or invisible results, according as they are enjoined or prohibited by the scriptural or social ethics. Fear etc. : the cause of fear and the cause of fearlessness,

422 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA, [DiS. XVIII. either visible or invisible. Bondage and libemiion : together with their causes. Knowledge is a v^itti or function or state of intellect (buddhi), whereas intellect is what functions or undergoes change of state. * Even firmness (dhriti) is only a particular function or state of intellect. 31. That by which one wrongly understands dharma and a-dharma, and also what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, that intellect, O Partha, is Rajasic. Dharma is what is ordained in the scriptures and a-dharma is what is prohibited in them. W hat... done : the same th3.t was mentioned already. (xviii.3o).t Wrongly : in opposition to what is determined by all (authorities). 32. That which, enveloped in darkness, sees adharma as dharma and all things perverted, that intellect, O Partha, is Tamasic. It takes quite a perverted view of all things to be known. 33. The firmness which is ever accompanied by Yoga, and by which the activities of thought, of * This is to show how the knowledge of refer to the ' apurva ' i.e., the forms (jnana) whose threefold nature has been which actions assume after their per- described ahready (xviii. 20-22) is differ- formance till their eflects become per-

ent from the intellect (buddhi) whose ceptible; whereas karya and a-karya refer threefold nature is here described.-A. to t)j.e performance or the non-perform- t Dharma and a-dharma here spoken ance of the acts. Hence no tautology. — A. life-breaths and sense-organs, O Partha, are held fast, such a firmness is Sattvic. Yoga : samadhi or concentration of mind. Held fast : restrained from rushing into ways which are opposed to the sastra. It is only Avhen they are restrained by firmness (of the intellect) that they do not rush into ways which are opposed to the sastra. The meaning of the passage is this : He who, by unflinching firmness, restrains the activities of thought(manas), of life-breaths and sense-organs, restrains them by Yoga. * 34. But the firmness with which one holds fast to dharma and pleasures and wealth, desirous of the fruit of each on its occasion, that firmness, O Partha, is Rajasic. Dharma &c. : when a person is firmly convinced at heart that dharma, pleasure and wealth ought always to be secured and is desirous of the fruit of each whenever that one (dharma or pleasure or wealth) occupies his attention, the firmness of such a person is Rajasic.

35. That with which a stupid man does not give up sleep, fear, grief, depression and lust, that firmness, O Partha, is Tamasic. The stupid man holds sensual gratification in high * That is to say, one can restrain these By mere firmness, which is not so accom- activities by that firmness only which is panied by samadhi, one cannot invariably ever accompanied by samadhi, by con- restrain them. — A. centration of mind in the Brahman. -24 THE BHAGAVAD-GiTA. [DiS. XVIII. esteem and never gives up lasciviousness. He regards sleep, etc., as things that ought always to be resorted to. Pleasure is threefold according to gunas. The threefold division of actions and of the several factors (karakas) concerned in action, has been described. Here follows the threefold division of pleasure which is the effect of actions : 36. And now hear from Me, O lord of the Bharatas, of the threefold pleasure, in which one delights by practice and surely comes to the end of pain"^. Hear : Pay steady attention to. Practice : familiarity, frequency. The end : cessation or alleviation. 37. That which is like poison at first, like nectar at the end, that pleasure is declared to be Sattvic, born of the purity of one's own mind.

Like poison at Jirst : on its first occurrence it is attended with pain as it is preceded by much trouble in the acquisition of juana or spiritual knowledge, of vairagya or indifference to worldly objects, of dhyana and samadhi. At the end, the pleasure is like nectar, arising from mature knowledge and indifference to external objects. Declared : by the wise. Born, etc : born of the purity of one's own buddhi or anta/ikara;ja ; or, born of the perfectly clear knowledge of the Self. Being so born, the pleasure is Sattvic. * The second half of this verse is not make it clear how it should bp construed by other commentators, such construed, I have, following Anandagiri, as Sridhara and Madhusudana, with the made the whole verse appear to be a next verse. Though the bhashya does description of the threefold pleasure — Tr. 38. That pleasure which arises from the contact of the sense-organ with the object, at first Hke nectar, in the end Hke poison, that is declared to be Rajasic. In the end like poison : after indulgence, the (sensual) pleasure proves to be like poison, because it leads to deterioration in strength, vigour, colour, wisdom, intellect, wealth and energy ; and because it leads to a-dharma, and, as an effect thereof, to hell (naraka).

39. The pleasure which at first and in the sequel is delusive of the self, arising from sleep, indolence, and heedlessness, that pleasure is declared to be Tamasic. In the sequel : after the termination. No man or god is free from gunas. Here follows the verse which concludes the present subject : 40. There is no being on earth, or again in heaven among the Devas, that can be free from these three gu«as born of Prakriti. Being : animate or inanimate. Gunas : such as Sattva. On cavth : among men. The sequel sums up the whole Doctrine. The whole sawsara, manifested as action, instruments of action, and results, made up of the gu«as (Sattva, Rajas, ^26 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. XVIII. and Tamas), and set up by avidya, — the evil of sa;/zsara has been thus described as well as its root. It has also been figuratively represented as a tree, in xv. i, et seq. It has also been said that after having cut the tree of sa;;/sara asunder Vv-ith the strong sword of non-attachment, "then That Goal should be sought after " (xv. 3, 4). From this it may follow that, as everything is made up of the three gu7;as, a cessation of the cause of sa/wsara cannot be brought about. Now, it is with a view to show how its cessation can be brought about, with a view, further, to sum up the whole teaching of the Gita-sastra, and with a view to show what the exact teaching of the Vedas and the smntis is which should be followed by those who seek to attain the highest end of man, — it is with this view that the next section, from xviii. 41 onward, is commenced.

Duties of the four castes ordained according- to nature. 41. Of Brahma7ias and Kshatriyas and Vaisyas, as also of Sudras, O Parantapa, the duties are divided according to the qualities born of nature. 5udras are separated from others — who are all mentioned together in one compound word— because 5udras are of one birth and are debarred from the study of the Vedas. Divided : the duties are allotted to each class, as distinguished from those pertaining to the other classes. — By what standard ? — -According to the qualities (gu?ias) born of nature. Nature (svabhava) is the Isvara's Praknti, the ^ Maya made up of the three gu;2as. It is in accordance with the gu?;as of the Praknti that duties — such as serenity and the like — are assigned to the Brahma;zas, etc. respectively. Or to explain in another way : The source of the Brrihniawa's nature (svabhava) is the gu//a of Sattva ; the source of the Kshatriya's nature is Rajas and Sattva, the latter being subordinate to the former ; the source of the Vaisya's nature is Rajas and Tamas, the latter being subordinate to the former ; the source of the Sudra's nature is Tamas and Rajas, the latter being subordinate to the former. For, as we see, the characteristic features of their nature are serenity, lordliness, activity, and dullness respectively.

Or to interpret yet in another way : — Nature (svabhava) is the tendency (Sa/ziskara, Vasana) in living beings acquired by them in the past births, and manifesting itself in the present birth by way of being ready to yield its effects : and this nature is the source of thegu»as, it being impossible '/ for the gu«as to manifest themselves without a cause. The assertion that nature (Sawskara, Vasana) is the cause (of the gu;ias) means that it is a kind of specific cause. '■' The duties, such as serenity, are assigned to the four classes in accordance with the guz/as of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, which are brought into manifestation by their respective natural tendencies, and which lead to those duties as their natural effects. (Objection) : — The duties of Brahmauas, S:c., are enjoined by the sastra and are assigned to them by the sastra. How then can it be said that they are divided according to the Sattva and other gu/zas ? [Answer) : — There is no room here for any such objection. By the sastra, too, are the duties — such as serenity — * Ximitta-karan.i or secondary cause, material cause of the gu;ias, namely, as opposed to the Upadana-karana or Prakriti.— A.

^28 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. XVIII. assigned to the Brahma//as, &c., only in accordance with their respective gu-vas, such as Sattva, but not independently of them. Wherefore it is said that duties are assigned according to gunas, though it has also been said that they are assigned by the sastra. What then are those duties ? — The answer follows : 42. Serenity, self-restraint, austerity, purity, forgiveness, and also uprightness, knowledge, wisdom, faith, — these are the duties of the Brahma7zas, born of nature. 'Serenity' and 'self-restraint' have already been explained (xvi. I, 2). Aiisteyity: physical austerity, and so on, mentioned above ( xvii. 14, 15, 16). Ptirity : already explained. Faith : in the teaching of the scriptures. Born of natuve : this means the same here as in the latter portion of xviii. 41. 43. Bravery, boldness, fortitude, promptness, not flying from battle, generosity and lordliness are the duties of the Kshatrij'as, born of nature. Fortitude : that by which upheld one is not subject to depression under any circumstances whatever. Promptness : the performing, without confusion, of duties which present themselves quite unexpectedly and demand ready action. / Not flying from battle : not turning away from the foes. Lordliness : exercise of ruling power over those who are to be ruled.

44. Ploughing, cattle-rearing, and trade are the duties of the Vaisyas, born of nature. And of the nature of service is the duty of the Sudra, born of nature. Devotion to one's own duty leads to perfection. These duties, respectively enjoined on the several castes, lead, when rightly performed, to Svarga as their natural result, as stated in the smritis, such as the following : "Men of several castes and orders, each devoted to his respective duties, reap the fruits of their actions after death, and then by the residual (karma) attain to births in superior countries, castes and families, possessed of comparatively superior dharma, span of life, learning, conduct, wealth, happiness and intelligence. " ( Apastamba-Dharmasutra, 2-2-2, 3 ). And in the Pura/^a also are specified the different results and worlds which the several castes and orders attain. But, from the operation of a new cause -■'• the following result accrues : 45. Devoted each to his own duty, man attains perfection ; how one, devoted to one's own duty, attains success, that do thou hear. Each to his oivn duty : as ordained according to his nature. Man : he who is qualified (for Karma- Yoga). Perfection (sa;«siddhi) : which consists in the body and senses being qualified for the devotion of knowledge (juana-nish^ha) after all their impurities have been washed away by the performance of one's own duty. — Can this perfection be attained directly by the mere performance of one's own dutyf ? —

♦ That is, when the same duties are + The questioner understands ' per- performed, not for the sake of their faction' in the sense of absolute perfection immediate results, but for the sake of i.e., Moksha. It is, of course, impossible Moksha. — A, to attain Moksha by works alone. — A. 430 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. XVIII. No. — How then ? — Learn how it can be attained : 46. Him from whom is the evolution of (all) beings, by whom all this is pervaded, — by worshipping Him with his proper duty, man attains perfection. ' Pravntti ' ( in the text ) may mean either evolution or activity; and it proceeds from the Isvara, the Antaryamin, the Ruler within. Beings : living creatures. His proper duty: each according to his caste, as described above. Worshipping the Lord by performing his duty, man attains perfection, in so far only as he becomes qualified for the devotion of knowledge (juana-nishfha). Such being the case, therefore, 47. Better is one's own duty (though) destitute of merits, t^ian the duty of another well performed. Doing the duty ordained according to nature, one incurs no sin. Just as a poisonous substance does not injure the worm born in that substance, so, he who does the duty ordained according to his own nature incurs no sin.

One ought not to abandon one's own duty. It has been said that he who does the duty ordained according to his nature incurs no sin like a worm born in poison, that the duty of another brings on fear, and that he who does not know the Self cannot indeed remain even for a moment without doing action. Wherefore, 48. The duty born with oneself, O son of Kunti, though faulty, one ought not to abandon ; for, all undertakings are surrounded with evil, as fire with smoke. Born with oneself: born with the very birth of man. Faulty : as everything is composed of the three gu/;as. AH nndevtakings : whatever the duties are; by context, one's own as well as other's duties ; for, the reason here assigned is that they are all made up of the three gu«as. Though a man may perform another's duty, abandoning what is called his own duty, the duty born with himself, he is not free from fault ; and another's duty brings on fear.'" And since it is not possible for any man who does not know the Self to give up action entirely, therefore he ought not to abandon action (karma).

Is entire renunciation of action possible ? (Now, let us enquire) : Is it because of the impossibility of entire abandonment of action that no one ought to renounce one's own ( nature-born ) duty, or is it because some sin f accrues from the abandoning of the duty born with oneself? {Question) : — Now, of what good is this enquiry ? (Ansicer) : — In the first place, if the duty born with oneself ought not to be abandoned (merely) because of the impossibility of renouncing action entirely, then it would follow that there can be nothing but merit in renouncing it entirely. * Therefore, it is not right to do neglect of the duty enjoined in the sruti another's duty.— A. as obligatory.— A. f The sin ( pratyavaya) arising from the 432 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA [DiS. XVIII. The Sankhya, Buddhistic and Vaiseshika theories. ( Objection ) : — Yes ; but an entire renunciation is not possible. — Is the soul (Purusha) always mobile like the gu;fas of the Sankhyas ? Or, is action itself the actor (soul), like the five Skandhas of the Buddhists, undergoing destruction every moment ? In either case, an entire renunciation of action is impossible."

Now there is also a third theory : — When the thing (soul) acts, then it is active ; when it does not act, then it is actionless. Such being the case, it is possible to renounce action entirely. And there is this peculiarity in this theory : neither is the thing (soul) ever mobile, nor is action itself the actor ( the soul ) ; but it is a permanent fixed substance, wherein action which was non-existent before arises, and wherein action which has been existent ceases while the substance remains pure (actionless), with the potentiality (of the activity) in it, and as such forms the actor. — Thus say the followers of Ka/!ada. What objection is there to this theory ? Refutation of the Vaiseshika theory. [Answer) : — There is certainly this objection, that it is contrary to the Lord's teaching. — How do you know ? — For, the Lord has said ' there can be no existence of the non-existent ' (ii. i6) and so on. But according to the followers of Ka/^ada, the non-existent comes into existence, and the existent becomes non-existent. Wherefore their theory is contrary to the Lord's teaching. {Objection) : — How can it be objected to if it agrees with

* Inasmuch as it would imply that the soul undergoes change in its very nature, — A, reason, though it may be opposed to the Lord's teaching ? {Ansivcr) : — We reply : This view is certainly objectionable, because it is opposed to all evidence. — How ? — If a dvya;mka (an aggregate of two atoms) or other substance is absolutely non-existent before its production, and if, remaining for a time after production, it again becomes non-existent, then it follows that what was non-existent becomes existent, and v/hat is existent will become non-existent ; that non-entity becomes an entity and an entity becomes non-entity. In that case it must be that a non-entity ( abhava ) which is to become an entity (bhava) is like a rabbit's horn before becoming an entity, and that it becomes an entity by the action of the threefold cause, — of the material, the non-material or accidental, and the efiicient causes, (samavayi-asamavayi-nimitta -kiira/zas). Now, it is not possible to hold (in the present case)that a non-entity is born and needs a cause ; for, it does not apply to other non-entities, such as a rabbit's horn. If a pot or the like, which is to be produced (as an effect), be of the nature of an entity, then we can understand that when it is to be produced as an effect, it needs a cause so far merely as regards its manifestation.

Moreover, if the non-existent should become existent and the existent should become non-existent, then nobody can be certain as to anything whatsoever in matters of evidence and things ascertainable by evidence, inasmuch as there can be no certainty that the existent will continue to be existent and the non-existent will continue to be nonexistent. Moreover, when they (the followers of Kaz/ada) say that a dvya/mka or such other substance is produced as an eflect, 434 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. XVIII. they speak of it as connected with its cause and as existent. Having been non-existent before production, it becomes, in virtue of the operation of its cause, connected with that cause — the ultimate atoms — and with existence, by the relation known as samavaya, i. e., intimate or inseparable relation. When (thus)related, i.e., when it is inseparably connected with the cause, it becomes existent. Here they may be asked to explain how the non-existent can have a cause of its own. We cannot indeed think of a thing which can cause the birth of a barren woman's son or his relation to anything else. {Objection) : — The Vaiseshikas do not hold that the nonexistent is related to anything. It is substances, such as dvya;mkas, that are said to be intimately related to their causes.

(Answer): — No; because they are not supposed to exist prior to this relation. — The Vaiseshikas do not argue that a pot or the like exists prior to the action of the potter, the potter's stick and wheel. Neither do they hold that clay assumes by itself the form of a pot. Wherefore, as the only other alternative, they have to admit that the non-existent (pot) becomes related (to the cause). (Objection) : — It is not opposed to reason to hold that, though non-existent, it may be related by samavaya or intimate relation (to the cause). (Ansmey) : — Not so; for, no such thing can be admitted in the case of a barren woman's son. — If we are to hold that the antecedent non-existence ( pragabhava ) of a pot or the like becomes related to the cause, but not the barren woman's son, notwithstanding that both are alike nonentities (abhava), it is necessary to show how one non-entity can be distinguished from the other. Non-existence of one, non-existence of two, non-existence of all, antecedent nonexistence ( pragabhiiva ), non-existence after destruction (pradhvaw/sabhava), mutual non-existence (anyonyabhava) absolute non-existence (atyantabhava), — nobody can point out any definite distinction among these in themselves. In the absence of a distinction, it is unreasonable to hold that only the antecedent non-existence of a pot becomes a pot through the action of a potter, &c., that it becomes related to a cause of its own, viz., the pot-shreds which are existent, that when thus related it can very well be spoken of as being produced and so on, but that such is not the case with regard to the non-existence after destruction (pradhvawsabhava) of the same pot, though both alike are non-existent.

It is unreasonable to hold that other nonexistences (abhavas), such as non-existence after destruction, can never become ( an existent effect ) and so on, whereas antecedent non-existence alone, such as that of dvya?aika and the like substances, can become (an existent effect) and so on, though it is an abhava or non-existent quite as much as non-existence after destruction or absolute non-existence.

{Objection) : — We do not hold that the non-existent becomes the existent. {Ansiver): — Then the existent becomes existent, — for instance, a pot becomes a pot, a cloth becomes a cloth. This, too, is opposed to all evidence, like the theory that non-existent becomes existent. Refutation of the Parinama-Vada. As the Pari»ama (transformation) theory of the SA,nkhyas, even that theory does not differ from the theory of the 436 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. XVIII. Vai^eshikas, Inasmuch as it postulates the production of properties non-existent before, as well as their destruction. Even admitting their explanation that by manifestation or disappearance (an effect is said to come into existence or undergo destruction), the theory is all the same opposed to evidence, as may be found if we enquire whether the manifestation and disappearance are previously existent or non-existent. For the same reason, we have to condemn that theory also which says that production, etc., of an effect, are only different states of the cause itself. The Lord's theory of illusion. ■ As the only other alternative, there remains this theory, that the One Existence, the sole Reality, is', by avidya, imagined variously, as so many things undergoing production, destruction and the like changes, like an actor on the stage. This doctrine of the Lord has been stated in ii. 16; the consciousness of the existent (sat) being constant and the consciousness of all the rest being inconstant.

The enlightened alone can renounce action entirely. {Objection): — Then, the Self being immutable, where is the impossibility of renouncing all action entirely ? [Ansivey): — Action is the property or attribute of the gu;;as, be they regarded as real things, or as things set up by avidya. It is ascribed to the Self through avidya, and it has therefore been said that no ignorant man (avidvan) can renounce action entirely even for a moment (iii. 5). On the other hand, he who knows the Self is able to renounce action entirely, inasmuch as avidya has been expelled by vidya or wisdom ; for, there can be no residue left of what is ascribed by avidya. Indeed, no residue is left of the second moon created by the false vision of the ////u'm-atTected eye, even after the removal of timira. Such being the case, the statements contained in v. 13, xviii. 45, 46 are quite reasonable. Perfection in Karma-Yoga leads to absolute Perfection. It has been said that the perfection reached by means of Karma- Yoga consists in becoming qualified for j?/ananish/ha, the Path of Wisdom ; and it is with a view to describe, as the fruit thereof, the naishkarmyasiddhi, — perfection in the form of absolute freedom from action, known as j«ana-nish/h;\, — that the Lord now proceeds to teach as follows :

49. He whose reason is not attached anywhere, whose self is subdued, from whom desire has fled, he by renunciation attains the supreme state of freedom from action. He whose reason (buddhi, anta/^-karaz/a) is free from attachment to sons, wife, and other objects of attachment, whose self (antaZ;-kara»a) is brought under his own control,! from whom desire for the body, for life, and for pleasures has fled, — a person of this sort who knows the Self attains to the supreme perfection, to absolute freedom from action (naishkarmyasiddhi), by sawnyasa. In virtue of his knowledge of the unity of the actionless (nishkriya) Brahman and the Self, all actions have fled from him. This is known as the state of absolute freedom from action ; and it is a siddhi or pev^QCtiony^Naishkarmyasiddhi may also mean 438 THE BHAGAVAD-GiTA. [DiS. XVIII. the attainment (siddhi) of naishkavjiiya, the state in which one remains as the actionless Self. It is supreme as distinguished from the perfection attainable by Karma- Yoga ; it is the state of immediate liberation (sadyo-mukti). /This state is attained by sa?;myasa or right knowledge, — or better still, by the renunciation of all actions for which one is prepared by his right knowledge, /and so says the Lord in V. 13.

Now, tbe Lord proceeds to teach how a man who, having attained perfection (as described above in xviii. 46) by performing his duty (as taught above) in the service of the Lord, has come by the discriminative knowledge of the Self, can attain the perfection known as naishhavmya or absolute treedom from action, i. e., a firm unswerving stand in the knowledge of the pure Self. 50. How he who has attained perfection reaches Brahman, that in brief do thou learn from Me, O son of Kunti, — that supreme consummation of knowledge. The perfection he has already attained consists in the body and the senses being prepared for devotion to knowledge, as a result of the Grace of the Lord worshipped through his duty. Reference to this (perfection) serves as a prelude to what follows. — What is that perfection to which that reference forms a prelude ? — It is the process of jnananish^ha, or devotion to knowledge, by which he attains Brahman, the Supreme Self. That process, the way to the attainment of j/zana-nish/ha, do thou understand with certainty from my speech. — Is it to be described at length ? — No, says the Lord; it will be described only in brief.

Absolute perfection is the consummation of Self-knowledge. What the attainment of Brahman — referred to in the words " how he reaches Brahman," is, the Lord proceeds to specify in the words " that supreme consummation of knowledge." Consummation (nish/'ha) means perfection, the final or highest stage. * {Question) : — Consummation of what ? (Answey) : — Of Brahma-juana or knowledge of Brahman. (Question) : — Of what nature is the consummation of Brahma-juana ? {Answey) : — Of the same nature as Atmajuana or Selfknowledge. {Question) : — Of what nature is the Self-knowledge ? (Anszi-ey) : — Of the same nature as the Self. {Question) : — Of what nature is the Self ? {Answey) : — Of the nature described by the Lord and in the passages of the Upanishads, and (ascertainable) by nyciya or reasoning (upon the scriptural texts). Is Self-knowledge possible at all ? (Objection) : — Knowledge or cognition (juana) is of the form of its object. But it is nowhere admitted that the Self is an object of cognition or has a form. ♦ The following discussion in the form ledge, and the nature of the Self is de- of questions and answers is intended to fined here in ii. 20 and in the Upanishads;

show that the consummation of know- and it can also be ascertained by rea- ledge is a well-defined end as spoken of soning upon scriptural texts, which here. It is the consummation of Brahma- describe him as "devoid of attachment jnana (knowledge ot Brahman). Brahma- and immutable ".—A. jnana is not different from Self-know- THE BHAGAVAD-GlTA. [DiS. XVIII. (Answev) : — The Self has a form, as taught in the scriptural passages, ' In colour like the sun ' (Sve. Up. 3-8) ; ' Luminous in form' (Chha. Up. 3-14-2) ; ' Self-luminous' (Bn. Up. 4-3-9)- (Objection) : — No ; those passages are intended to remove the idea that the Self is of the nature of darkness (Tamas). — When the Self is said to be neither of the form of a substance nor of an attribute, it would follow that the Self is of the nature of darkness : and the preventing of this idea is the aim of the descriptions such as ' In colour like the sun. ' Form is specifically denied, the Self being described as ' formless ' (Kaifha-Up. 3-15). Neither is the Self an object of cognition, as taught in passages like the following : "His form stands not in (our) ken, nor can any one see Him with the eye " (.Sve. Up. 4-20) ; " Without sound and touch " ( Ka^ha-Up. 3-15). Wherefore it is wrong to speak of a cognition of the form of the Self.

Such being the case, how can there be a cognition of the Self? Indeed, all cognition, whatever be its object, is of the form of that object. And it has been said that the Self is formless. If both the Self and the cognition thereof be formless, how is the constant meditation of Self-knowledge or the consummation thereof to be attained ? The Self reveals Himself in Pure Reason. (Ansti'ei') :— Do not think so ; for, it can be shown that the Self is extremely pure, extremely clear, and extremely subtle. And Buddhi ( reason ) being as pure, etc., as the Self, it can put on the semblance of that aspect of the Self which is manifested as consciousness. Manas puts on a semblance of Buddhi, the sense-organs put on a semblance of Manas, and the physical body again puts on a semblance of the sense-or;,'ans. Wherefore common people look upon the mere physical body as the Self. And the Lokayatikas (materialists) who argue that consciousness is a property of the physical body declare that the Purusha or Soul is identical with the physical body endued with consciousness. Similarly, others argue that consciousness is a property of the senses ; others again argue that consciousness is a property of Buddhi. There are a few who hold that there is something within even beyond the Buddhi, viz., the Avyakta (the Unmanifested) also called the Avyakrita (the UudifTerentiated), in the form of Avidya;

and they say that the Avyaknta is the Self.''' Everywhere, from Buddhi down to the physical body, the cause of illusory identification of each with the Self is its wearing a semblance of the consciousness of the Self ; and it is therefore unnecessary to impart directly a knowledge of the Self. — What then is necessary ? — W'hat is necessary is the mere elimination of the not-Self associated with the Self, — names, forms and the like ; but it is unnecessary to try and teach what the consciousness of the Self is like, inasmuch as it is invariably comprehended in association with all objects of perception which are set up by avidya. Accordingly, the Vijfianavadins, the Buddhistic Idealists, hold that there is nothing real except ideas, and that these ideas require no external evidence(to prove their existence), inasmuch as it is admitted that they are self-cognized. Therefore/we have only to eliminate what is falsely ascribed j to Brahman by avidya ; we have to make no more effort to 1

* Those who study and contemplate the Antaryimin, the Avyakiita endued upou the Cause of the universe regard With cousciousness as the Self.— A. 442 THE bhagavad-gIta. [Dis. XVIII. ' acquire a knowledge of Brahman as He is quite self-evident. Though thus quite self-evident, easily knowable, quite near, and forming the very Self, Brahman appears — to the unenlightened, to those whose reason (Buddhi) is carried away by the differentiated phenomena of names and forms created by avidya — as unknown, difficult to know, very remote, as though He were a separate thing. But to those whose reason (Buddhi) has turned away from external phenomena, who have secured the grace of the Guru and attained the serenity of the self (manas), there is nothing, nothing else so blissful, so well-known, so easily knowable, and quite so near as Brahman. x\ccordingly, the knowledge of Brahman is said to be immediately comprehended and unopposed to dharma. fix. 2.) Some conceited philosophers hold that reason (Buddhi) cannot grasp the Self, as He is formless, and that therefore the Devotion of Right Knowledge is impossible of attainment. ^ True, it is unattainable to those who have not been properly initiated into the traditional knowledge by the Gurus

I (the Great Ones), who have not learned and studied the (teachings of the) Vedanta, whose intellect is quite engrossed in the external objects of senses, and who have not been trained in the right sources of knowledge. But, for those . who are differently situated, [i. e., who have been duly initiated, etc.,), it is quite impossible to believe in the reality of the dual — the perceiver and the perceived — of our external perception, because they perceive no reality other than the consciousness of the Self./ And we have shewn in the preceding sections that this — not the reverse — is the truth, and the Lord also has declared the same in ii. 69. Wherefore it is only a ressation of the perception of the difTerentiated forms uf the external world that can lead to a firm grasp of the real nature of the Self. For^ the Self is not a thing unknown to anybody at any time, is not a thing to be reached or got rid of or acquired. If the Self be quite unknown, all undertakings intended for the benefit of oneself would have no meaning. It is not, indeed, possible to imagine that they are for the benefit of the physical body or the like which has no consciousness ; nor is it possible to imagine that pleasure is for pleasure's sake and pain is for pain's sake. It is, moreover, the Selfknowledge which is the aim of all endeavour.* Wherefore, just as there is no need for an external evidence by which to know one's own body, so there is no need for an external evidence by which to know the Self who is even nearer than the body. Thus it is clear that, to those who can discriminate, the Atma-juana-nish^ha (devotion to Self knowledge) is easy of attainment.^

Cognition and the Cogniser are self-revealed- Those also who hold that cognition (j;/ana) is formless and is not known by immediate perception must admit that, since an object of knowledge is apprehended through cognition, cognition is quite as immediately known as pleasure or the like. Moreover, it cannot be maintained that cognition is a thing which one seeks to know. — If cognition were unknown, * All action enjoined in the sniti is knowledget Fjde, Vedanta-SutrasIII. iv' intended only as a means to Self- 26-27— A. 444 THE bhagavad-gIta. [Dis. XVIII. it would be a thing which has to be sought after just as an object of cognition is sought after. Just as, for example, a man seeks to reach by cognition the cognisable object such as a pot, so also would he have to seek to reach cognition by means of another cognition. But the fact is otherwise. Wherefore cognition is self-revealed, and therefore, also, is the cogniser self-revealed. Therefore it is not for the hioidedge (of Brahman or the Self) that any effort"'' is needed ; it is needed only to prevent us from regarding the not- Self as the Self. Therefore, Devotion to Knowledge (j/jana-nish^ha) is easily attainable.

The Path to Absolute Perfection. How is this consummation of knowledgel to be attained? Listen : 51. Endued with a pure reason, controlling the self with firmness, abandoning sound and other objects, and laying aside love and hatred ; Pun : free from illusion (maya), from doubt and misconception. Reason (buddhi) : the determining faculty. The Self : the aggregate of the body and the senses. A handoning &>€. : ( as we should understand from the context ) all superfluous luxuries, all objects except those only which are necessary for the bare maintenance of the body, and * With a view to bring into existence t A continuous current of the knowsomething that does not already exist by ledge of Brahman ; the reason merging means of an act enjoined in the Sruti. in Brahman through the elimination of _^. all alien attributes ascribed to Him. — A. laying aside love and hatred even for those objects which appear necessary for the maintenance of the body. Then, 52. Resorting to a sequestered spot, eating but little, speech and body and mind subdued, always engaged in meditation and concentration, endued with dispassion ; Resorting, (s^c. : ever accustomed to resort to such sequestred spots as a jungle, the sandbank of a river, the mountain-cave. Eating but little : as conducive to the serenity of thought by keeping off sleep and such other evils. This devotee of wisdom should also restrain his speech, body and mind. With all the senses thus quieted, he should always and devoutly practise Dhyanaov meditation upon the nature of the Self, and Yoga or concentration of the mind on the Self. Ahuays : this implies that he has to do nothing else, no viantrajapa (repetition of chants or mystic formulae), etc. Dispassion : absence of desire for visible and invisible objects. This should be a constant attitude of the mind.

53. Having abandoned egotism, strength, arrogance, desire, enmity, property, free from the notion of " mine," and peaceful, he is fit for becoming Brahman. Egotism : identifying the Self with the body, &c. Strength: that strength which is combined with passion and desire, but not the physical or any other strength : the latter being natural, its abandonment is not possible. Arrogance : which 446 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. XVIII. follows the State of exultation and leads to the transgression of dharma, as said in the sninti : " When a man exults, he becomes arrogant, and when he becomes arrogant, he transgresses dharma " — (Apastamba-Dharmasutra, 1-13-4). Property : though a man is free from all passions of the mind and the senses, he may own so much of external belongings as is necessary for bodily sustenance and for the observance of his duties (dharma) ; but even this the aspirant abandons ; i. e., he becomes a Paramaha;;;sa-Parivrajaka, a sawmyasin of the fourth or highest order. He does not regard even the bodily life as his. Peaceful : free from exultation and care. Such a devotee of wisdom is fit to become Brahman. The consummation of Knowledge attained by Devotion.

54. Becoming Brahman, of serene self, he neither grieves nor desires, treating all beings alike ; he attains supreme devotion to Me. \ He who has reached Brahman and attained self-serenity does not grieve regarding his failure to accomplish an object or regarding his wants. It is not indeed possible to suppose that he who knows Brahman can have a longing for 1 any object unattained/ therefore the words "he neither grieves nor desires " is tantamount to saying that such is the nature of the man who has become Brahman. — Another reading makes the passage mean " he neither grieves nor exults." — Treating all beings alike : he regards the pleasure and pain of all creatures equally with his own, {i.e., that they would affect them just as they affect himself). — It is not meant here that he sees the identity of the Self in all, as this will be mentioned in the next verse. — Such a devotee to wisdom attains highest devotion to Me, the Supreme Lord, — the fourth or the highest of the four kinds of devotion, — vis., the Devotion of Knowledge, — spoken of in vii. i6. 55. By Devotion he knows Me in truth, what and who I am ; then, knowing Me in truth, he forthwith enters into Me.

By Bhakti, by the Devotion of KnowledgQf he knows Me ' as I am in the divers manifestations caused by upadhis. He knows who I am, he knows that I am devoid of all the differences caused by the upadhis, that I am the Supreme Purusha, that I am like imto akasa; he knows Me to be non-dual, the one Consciousness (Chaitanya), pure and, simple, unborn, undecaying, undying, fearless, deathless. Thus knowing Me in truth, he enters into Myself immed- \ lately after attaining knowledge. It is not meant here that the act of knowing and the act of entering are two distinct acts. — What then is the act of entering ? — It is the knowledge itself ; for, there is nothing to be effected ( by knowledge ) other than itself, as the Lord has taught, " Do thou also know Me as Kshetraj»a." (xiii. 2). (Objection) : — The statement that "by the supreme devotion of knowledge he knows Me," involves a contradiction. — 448 THE BHAGAVAD-GiTA [DiS. XVIII. How ? — Thus : when the knowledge of a Certain object arises in the knower, then and then alone the knower knows that object ; no devotion to that knowledge, no repetition of the knowledge, is necessary. Therefore, the statement that " he knows Me, not by knowledge, but by devotion to knowledge, by a repetition of knowledge," involves a contradiction.

{Answer) : — This objection does not apply here'; for, the word " devotion (nishi'ha)" means that the knowledge aided by all the favourable conditions of its rise and development and freed from obstacles culminates in a firm conviction by one's own experience. / When the knowledge of the unity of the individual Self (Kshetraj«a) and the Supreme Self (Paramatman), generated by the teachings of the Scriptures and the master under conditions favourable to the rise and ripening of that knowledge — viz., purity of mind, humility and other attributes (xiii. 7, et seq.), — and accom_panied with the renunciation of all works which are associated with the idea of distinctions such as the agent and other factors of action, culminates in a firm conviction by one's own experience, then the knowledge is said to have attained supreme consummation. ^ This jnana-nish^ha (Devotion of Knowledge) is referred to as the Supreme or fourth kind of Devotion, Bhakti (vii. 17), — supreme as compared with J the remaining three kinds of Devotion, with that of the distressed, &c., (vii. 16). By this supreme devotion the 4 aspirant knows the Lord as He is, and immediatly afterwards all consciousness of difference between the Isvara and the Kshetraj;/a disappears altogether. ,Thus there is no contradiction involved in the statement that "by the Devotion of Knowledge (the aspirant knows) Me. "

Renunciation of all works is necessary for Then alone can the well-ascertained teacliing of all scriptures— viz.y the Upanishads, Itihasas, Pura«as and Snintis — enjoining retirement have a meaning. The scriptural texts are such as the following : " Knowing It, they renounce and lead a mendicant life.'-(BH. Up. 3-5-9). "Wherefore they say that renunciation is excellent among these austerities." — (Yajiliki-Up. 79). " Renuncidtion excels." — {Ibid. 78). " Sa7/myasa is the renunciation of actions." "Having abandoned Vedas, this world and the next," etc. — (Apastamba-Dharmasiitra, 2-23-13). " Renounce dharma and a-dharma." And so on. Here, in the Gitii also, passages of similar import (such as v. 12) occur. It cannot be held that these passages are meaningless. Nor can it be held that they are arthavddas, mere explanatory or incidental remarks (not meant as obligatory injunctions) ; for, they occur in the sections which specially treat of renunciation. Moreover ,/(renunciation of works is necessary) because 1 Moksha consists in the realisation of the immutability of | one's own Inner Self. He who wishes to reach the eastern sea should not indeed travel in the opposite direction, i. c, by the same road that the man who wishes to go to the western sea chooses. And the Devotion of Knowledge (juananish^hn) consists in an intent effort to establish a continuous , current of the idea of the Inner Self (Pratyagatman) ; and

450 THE BHAGAVAD-GiTA. [DiS. XVIII. there would be a conflict if that devotion were to be conjoined with ritual (karma), which is like going towards the western sea. It is a firm conviction of philosophers that the difference between the two is as wide as that between a mountain and a mustard seed. Hence the conclusion that the Devotion of Knowledge (jnana-nishi^ha ) should be practised by renouncing all action. Devotion to the Lord by works enjoined. The perfection accruing as the fruit of that Bhakti-Yoga which consists in worshipping the Lord through one's own duties qualifies the aspirant for the Devotion of Knowledge which culminates in moksha. This Bhakti-Yoga, the Yoga of Devotion to the Lord, is extolled here, in this section which sums up the teaching of the sastra, with a view to firmly impress that teaching. 56. Doing continually all actions whatsoever, taking refuge in Me, — by My Grace he reaches I the eternal undecaying Abode. Doing all actions including even the prohibited actions, whoso seeks refuge in Me, Vasudeva, the Lord, with his whole self centred in Me, reaches the eternal Abode of Vish;m by the Grace of the Lord. 57. Mentally resigning all deeds to Me, regarding Me as the Supreme, resorting to mental concentration, do thou ever fix thy heart in Me. [

Mentally : with discriminative faith.''' All actions : pro- * i. e., the faith that knowledge alone not works, finally leads to salvation. — A obtain able by the Lord's Grace, — but ducing visible and invisible results. Me : the Lord. As taught in ix. 27, do thou dedicate all thy actions to Me. Regarding : regarding Me, \'asudeva, as the highest goal ; his whole self centred in Me. Resorting, &.c : resorting to the Buddlii-Yogd (samahita-buddhitva, steady- mindedness, firm faith) as thy sole refuge. 58. Fixing thy heart in Me, thou shalt, by My Grace, cross over all difficulties ; but if from egotism thou wilt not hear (Me), thou shalt perish. Difficulties : the impassable obstacles arising from(avidya), the cause of sawsara. Egotism : the idea that thou art a learned man. If thou wilt not abide by my advice, then thou shalt be ruined. Neither shouldst thou think, " I am independent ; why should I obey the dictates of another" ? 59. If, indulging egotism, thou thinkest ' I will not fight,' vain is this, thy resolve ; nature will constrain thee. Tkinhst, resolvest. Vain : for, thy nature as a Kshatriya will constrain thee to do so. Also because,

60. Bound (as thou art}, O son of Kunti, by thy own nature-born act, that which from delusion thou likest not to do, thou shalt do, though against thy will. Nature-born : such as prowess, &c., mentioned above (xviii. 43). Against thy mil : in subjection to some external force. 61. The Lord dwells in the hearts of all beings, 452 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. XVIII. O Arjuna, whirling by Maya all beings (as if) mounted on a machine. The Lord {isYSLva.) : the Ruler, Naraya/za. Arjitna: pure in the internal self, of a pure antaA-karana. The word " arjuna " is used in the sense of ' pure ' in the i?ig-Veda, " The dark day and the //^//i day." (6-9-1). He causes all beings to revolve as if — ' as if ' being understood — mounted on machines, like wooden dolls mounted on a machine. By Maya: by causing illusion. ' Whirling' should be construed with ' dwells,' 62. Fly unto Him for refuge with all thy being, O Bharata ; by His Grace shall thou obtain supreme peace (and) the eternal resting place. Seek thou that Lord as thy sole Refuge with thy whole being for relief from the distress of sa;«sara. Then, by His Grace, thou shalt obtain supreme peace and attain to My — i. e., Vishjai's — ^Supreme Eternal Abode.

63. Thus has wisdom, more secret than all that is secret, been declared to thee by Me; reflect. thou over it all and act as thou pleasest. Me : the Omniscient Lord. It : the Sastra, the teaching declared above. All : everything that has been taught. Devotion to the Lord is the Secret of success in Karma- Yoga. Listen to what I am again going to say : 64. Hear thou again My word supreme, the most secret of all ; because thou art My firm friend, therefore will I tell thee what is good. Again : thou^'h it has been more than once declared. I do not tell thee either from fear or from hope of reward ; thou art My firm friend, thou art ever beloved of Me ; and for this reason I shall tell thee of the supreme good, the means of attaining knowledge. This last is, indeed, the highest of all kinds of good. What is it ? — The Lord says: 65. Fix thy thought on Me, be devoted to Me, worship Me, do homage to Me. Thou shalt reach Myself. The truth do I declare to thee ; (for) thou art dear to Me.

TJioii shalt reach Myself: thus acting — i. e., looking up to Vasudeva alone as thy aim, means, and end — thou shalt come to Me. In this matter I make a solemn promise. — The meaning of the verse is this : Thus, knowing that the Lord's declarations are true, and being convinced that moksha is a necessary result of devotion to the Lord, one should look to the Lord as the highest and sole Refuge. Right Knowledge and Renunciation. *Kiving taught in conclusion that the supreme secret of the Devotion of Karma- Yoga, is the regarding of the Lord as the sole Refuge, the Lord now proceeds to speak of the Right Knowledge, the fruit of the Devotion of KarmaYoga, as taught in the essential portions of all the Vedantas (Upanishads) : 66. Abandoning all righteous deeds, seek Me as thy sole Refuge ; I will liberate thee from all sins ; do thou not grieve. Righteous deeds (dharma) : including unrighteous deeds 454 THE BHAGAVAD-GlTA. [DiS. XVIII. (a-dharma) also, since naishkarmya or freedom from all action is intended to be taught here. Here may be cited such passages of the sruti and the smnti as the following :

" Not he who has not abstained from evil deed... can attain It."— (Ka^ha-Up. 1-2-24) " Abandon dharma and a-dharma." So, the passage means " renouncing all works." Me alom : the isvara, the Self of all, dwelling the same in diW. /Seek Me as thy sole Refuge : in the belief " I myself am that : tsvara ;" i.e., do thou understand that there is naught else except Me. When thou art firm in this faith, I shall liberate thee from all sins, from all bonds of dharma and a-dharma, by manifesting Myself as thy own Self. ^So it has been already said here, " I destroy the darkness born of ignorance by the luminous lamp of wisdom, abiding in their self." — (x. II.) Wherefore do thou not grieve. What is the means to the Highest Bliss, — Knowledge What has been determined in this GitS.-sristra as the means of attaining the Highest Bliss (nis-sreyasa) ? Is it Knowledge (Jfiana), or Works (Karma), or both together? ^^^hence this doubt ? It has been said " Knowing which one attains the Immortal" (xiii. 12), and " Then knowing Me in truth, he forthwith enters into Me" (xiii. 55) : these and other passages teach that the Highest Bliss is attained by mere knowledge. Such passages again as " Thy concern is with action alone" (ii. 47), and " Do thou also perform

action," (iv. 15), teach that performance of works is (juite obligatory. Since it has been taught that both knowledge and works are obligatory, there may arise a doubt as to whether also the two conjoined may not constitute the means to the Highest Bliss. What is the good of this enquiry at all ? It is this, viz., to determine which one of them forms the means to the Highest Bliss. Wherefore, the subject is very wide and is worth investigating. Self = Knowledge alone is the means to the Highest /Pure Self-knowledge alone is the means to the Highest Bliss ; for, as removing the notion of variety, it culminates in liberation (kaivalya). Avidya is the perception of variety involving actions, factors of action, and the ends of actions. It is always present in the Self. " Mine is action ; I am the agent ; I do this act for such and such a result :" in this form, avidya has been active in time without a beginning. The remover of this avidya is the knowledge of the Self arising in the following form, "Here I am, free, a non -agent, actionless, devoid of results"; for such a knowledge removes the notion of variety which causes one to engage in action./ — The word " alone " (in the opening line of this paragraph) is intended to exclude the two other alternatives : neither by works alone, nor by works and knowledge conjoined together, is the Highest Bliss attained. Since, moreover, the Highest Bliss is not an effect to be accomplished by action, works cannot be the means to it. Indeed, the Eternal Reality is not produced either by knowledge or by works.

456 THE BHAGAVAD-GiTA. [DiS. XVIII. {Objection) : — Then, even the pure knowledge serves no purpose ! [Answer) : — Not so ; for, by removing avidya, it culminates in emancipation, which is a visible result. — We know from experience that knowledge which removes the darkness of avidya culminates in emancipation as its result ; for instance, in the case of a rope (mistaken for a serpent), as soon as the light of the lamp removes the darkness which caused the error, the rope is no longer mistaken for a serpent. The result of illumination culminates indeed in the emancipation of the rope, in freeing the rope from the various mistaken notions of serpent, etc., which then cease altogether. So, too, as regards the Self-knowledge. Knowledge cannot be conjoined with Works. Now, when the agent and other factors of action are operating in the act of cutting or in the act of churning fire, — each act producing a visible result, — they cannot ('at the same time) operate in another act productive of another result different from severance or the kindling of a fire ; so also when the agent and other factors of action are concerned in the act of knowledge-devotion (juana-nish^ha), — whereof alike the result is visible, — they cannot at the same time operate to bring about another act productive of a result other than the emancipation of the Self. Wherefore, the Devotion of Knowledge cannot be conjoined with works.

{Objection) : — They may be conjoined, just as the act of eating and the acts of fire-worship (agnihotra), &c., are conjoined. {Answer) : — No ; for, emancipation being the result of knowledge, (the devotee of knowledge) cannot desire the result of works. — When there is an all-spreading flood of water close by nobody would ever think of constructing wells and tanks to any purpose. So also when knowledge leading to emancipation as its result has been attained, nobody would ever desire any other result or seek to do an act by which to obtain that other result. He who is engaged in an act by which he hopes to ac(pire a whole kingdom will not certainly engage in an act which can at best secure for him a piece of land, nor will he cherish a desire for it. Therefore, -works are not the means to the Highest Bliss. Neither is a conjunction of knowledge and works possible. Nor can it be held that knowledge which leads to emancipation requires the aid of works ; for, as removing avidya, knowledge is opposed to works. Indeed, darkness cannot remove darkness. Therefore, knowledge alone is the means to the Highest Bliss. /

Refutation of the theory that salvation is attained by works alone. (Objection) : — No. For, by neglect of iiitya or obligatory works one incurs sin (pratya%'aya) ; and kaivalya or emancipation is eternal. {To explain) : — It is wrong to say that emancipation is attained by knowledge alone ; for, by neglect of the nitya-karma or obligatory works enjoined in the sruti, a man incurs sin which leads him to hell, etc. [Conntev-objection) : — Thus, then, since moksha is not to be attained by works, there can be no hope of attaining moksha at all. 458 THE bhagavad-gIta. [Dis. XVIII. {Rejoindev) : — There is no room for any such objection, inasmuch as mokshais eternal. The sin of omission (pratyavaya) is avoided by the observance of the nitya-karma or obligatory works ; by avoiding the prohibited acts, no obnoxious bodies are generated; by 2i\o\di\ng\hek(imya-kavmaot interested acts no desirable body either is generated ; and when the present body perishes on the exhaustion of the fruits of the works which have given rise to the body, no more causes ' then exist which can generate another body ; and^vhen attachment and other passions are expunged from the heart, the emancipation of the Self — i. e., the realisation by the

I Self of His own true nature — is attained without any effort. ^ {Countey-ohjection) : — Those of the acts done in the past innumerable births, which have not yet begun their effects, and of which some lead to heaven and others to hell, and so on, have not been extinguished, because their effects have not been enjoyed. [Rejoinder): — No ; for we argue that the fruits of those works are reaped in the form of the trouble and pain involved in the performance of the nitya-karma. Or, the nitya-karma may, like the priiyaschitta or expiatory act, serve to destroy past sins. The works which have begun their effects being exhausted by the enjoyment of their fruits, and no new works being undertaken, it follows that emancipation is attained without any effort. [Answer): — No; for the sruti says that there exists no other road to moksha than knowledge : " Knowing Him alone, one crosses beyond death ; there exists no other road to the Abode" (5vet. Up. 3-8). The Sruti says, further, that moksha is as impossible for the unwise man as it is impossible for men to compress the akasa Hke leather {Ibid. 6 — 20). And the Pura;nc tradition also says that ' one attains emancipation by knowledge.'

Moreover, the good deeds (pu«ya-karma) which have not yet begun their effects cannot be said to have been exhausted. Just as the existence of sins which have not begun their effects is possible, so also the existence of good (pu;?ya) deeds which have not yet begun their effects is possible ; and as these cannot be exhausted without gencrating another body, moksha is not possible. Neither is it possible to generate no new merit and demerit (dharma and adharma in this body), inasmuch as destruction of love and hatred and delusion whicli lead to acts of merit and demerit cannot be effected except by means of Self-knowledge. Because the sruti says that the nityn-karma produces merit (pu«ya) as its result, and because the smriti says that, by performing their proper duties, the several castes and orders attain to a high immeasurable happiness, the exhaustion of works is not possible. Refutation of the theory that the Nitya Karma leads to no future births. Now, as to the contention : As painful in itself, the nityakarma is itself the fruit of sinful deeds committed in the past ; apart from itself, the nitya-karma bears no distinct fruit, because the sruti speaks nowhere of its fruits, the mere circumstance of a man being alive forming a sufficient ground for its necessary performance.

We say, no ; for, it is impossible for those deeds to yield their fruits which have not yet begun to work out their 460 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. XVIII. effects. Neither can there be any variety in the pain (involved in the performance of the nitya-karma). {To explain) : — It is wrong to say that the fruits of the sinful deeds committed in the past births are reaped in the form of the trouble and pain involved in the performance of the nitya-karma. We cannot indeed understand how the fruit of the deeds which did not sprout up for fruition at the time of death can be reaped in the birth caused by another set of deeds. Otherwise, there would be nothing unreasonable in the supposition that infernal suffering is possible in the very birth that has been generated by Agnihotva (firesacrifice) for the enjoyment of the fruit thereof /.f., for the enjoyment of heaven (svarga). Moreover, the pain involved in the performance of the nitya-karma cannot answer to that variety of suffering (which should result from the variety) of acts of sin. While many acts of sin productive of as many distinct kinds of suffering may possibly exist, to suppose that their effects consist in the mere trouble and pain involved in the observance of the nitya-karma would lead to the further supposition — which it is impossible to hold — that the suffering inflicted by the pairs of opposites, diseases and the like, has no cause of its own, and that the trouble and pain involved in the observance of the nitya-karma is alone the effect of past sins, but not the pain of carrying stones on the head or the like.

Besides, it is irrelevant to say that the trouble and pain involved in the observance of the nitya-karma constitutes the result of the sinful, deeds done in tlie past.— How ? — It has been urged that no extinction of the past sin which has not begun to bear fruit is possible ; whereas you say that the fruit of the deed which has begun to bear fruit — not the fruit of the deed which has not begun to bear fruit — is reaped in the form of the trouble and pain involved in the observance of the nitya-karma. If, on the other hand, you mean that the whole sin committed in the past has begun to bear fruit, then there is no ground for the specification that the mere trouble and pain involved in the observance of the nityakarma are the fruits (of those sinful deeds which have not begun to produce their effects). It would then also follow that the enjoining of the nitya-karma has no purpose to serve ; for, the sinful deeds which have begun their effects can be extinguished by merely undergoing the effects so produced. Moreover, if pain be the result of the nitya-karma enjoined in the sruti, that pain may arise from the trouble involved in the observance of the nitya-karma itself as from any other active exercise : it is therefore unreasonable to suppose that it is the result of another action.

Again, as enjoined on a man on the mere ground of his being alive, the nitya-karma cannot be, any more than a prayaschitta or expiatory act, the effect of sins committed in the past. An expiatory act, enjoined by reason of a certain act of sin having been committed, is not the fruit of that sinful act. If, on the other hand, the pain of the expiatory act be the effect of the very sinful act which forms its occasion, then, it would follow that the trouble and pain involved in the performance of the nitya-karma occasioned by the man's being alive, &c., is the effect of that very state of being alive which has occasioned the necessity ; the nitya-karma and prayaschitta being alike necessitated by the particular occasions respectively. Moreover, the trouble and pain involved in the pe) [ormance of a nitya-agnihotm (five-worship done as a dutj and a kdmya-agnihotva (fire-worship done with a motivf being equal, and no special reason being found as to wh the trouble and pain involved in the performance of th' nitya-karma alone should constitute the result of sins con mitted in the past, but not the trouble and pain involve in the performance of the kamya-karma, it would follo^; that the latter also is the result of sins committed in th; past. Such being the case, it is wrong to infer, on th" ground of consistency (arthapatti), that because no mentio is made in the sruti of the nitya-karma's results and becaus the injunction thereof is otherwise inexplicable, the troub and pain involved in the performance of the nitya-karrr is the result of sins committed in the past. The injunctio being otherwise inexplicable, we should even infer that th nitya-karma is productive of results distinct from the pai and trouble involved in its performance.

The opponent is also guilty of inconsistency. When is once admitted that through the performance of thenityj karma the fruit of another deed is reaped, this reapin forms itself the fruit of the nitya-karma, and it is therefoi inconsistent to hold at the same time that the nitya-karm produces no fruits of its own. Moreover, when the kamya-agnihotra is performed, th nitya-agnihotra is also said to have been performed simult? neously, as included in that self-same act ; and therefore th fruit of the kamya-agnihotra should become exhausted wit the trouble and pain involved in the nitya-agnihotra, inaJ much as the kamya-agnihotra is not a distinct act from th nitya-agnihotra. If, on the other hand, the effect of th amya-agnihotra be something distinct, such as svarga, len it would follow that the trouble and pain of its perirmance must also be distinct ; but it is not so, for it is pposed to facts. In point of fact, the trouble and pain ivolved in the performance of the nitya-karma is not istinct from that of the kamya-karma. Furthermore, an action which is neither enjoined nor rohibited (in the sruti) is productive of immediate results ; nt an act which is enjoined or prohibited by the sastra innot be productive of immediate result. If this latter were 'oductive of immediate results, then no effort would be ade with a view to attain an unseen result, even though it 3 svarga or

the like, so long as it is held that in the case of gnihotra or the like — despite the absence of all distinction I the nature of the act — the fruits of the act when perrmed as a nitya-karma are reaped in the form of the mere ouble and pain involved in its performance, whereas hen performed as a kamya-karma the self-same act roduces a superior result — such as svarga — merely because lere is a longing for its results, although the latter act is 5t superior to the former in any of the subsidiary parts or . the mode of performance. Wherefore it is in no way ;asonable to contend that the nitya-karma does not lead to isults in the unseen future.

The Paths of Knowledge and Works are meant for distinct classes of aspirants. So*, knowledge alone can cause total destruction of * Dticause the nitya-karma, like tlie it is not intended for the removal of sins ; iiiya-karma, yields its fruits in the in- and therefore Self-knowledge alone, it sible future by way of taking the de- must be admitted, conduces to that end. tee to the regions of Pitris and the like, —A. 464 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA [DiS. XVIII. good or evil deeds caused by avidya — not the performance of the nitya-karma. For,avidya and kama (nescience and desire) constitute the seed of all action. Accordingly it has been declared that Karma- Yoga pertains to the ignorant and that Jwana-nish^ha or knowledge-devotion accompanied with renunciation of all works pertains to the wise. Vide ii. ig, 21 ; iii. 3, 26, 28 ; v. 8, 13 ; vii. 18 ; ix. 21, 22 ; X. 10. From the last verse here quoted it should be inferred that ignorant men who are devoted to action cannot approach the Lord. And therefore, notwithstanding that ignorant men, who are followers of works, are most devout, rendering service to the Lord, they resort only to one of the several paths mentioned (xii. 6-1 1) in their descending order, the lowest of them being that which consists in abandoning the fruits of action. But as regards those who are devoted to the Undefinable and the Indestructible, the attributes, they cultivate are mentioned m xii.

13-20; and their path of knowledge is also described in the three discourses commencing with the (thirteenth) discourse on the Kshetra'". The triple result of action. — such as the evil, good and mixed fruit, — (xviii. 12) does not accrue to those who have renounced all works generated by the five causes such as the body (xviii. 14), who know that the Self is one and non-agent, who are engaged in the higher devotion of knowledge, who have known the true nature of the Lord, — to the Paramaha/zzsa-Parivrajakas (i. c, the sawmyasins of the fourth or highest order) who have obtained refuge in the unity of the Self and the Divine Being. But it does accrue to others who are ignorant, who follow the path of

* Vide xiii. 7-11, siv. 22-26, sv 3-5. — A, works, who are not sawnyasins. Thus should we assign the paths of duty taught in the Gita-sastra. Action is a creature of Avidya. {Objection) : — It cannot be proved that all action is caused by avidya. (AnsKxy) : — No ; it can be proved, as in the case of brahmanicide (brahmahatya). — The nitya-karma is no doubt taught in the sastra ; but it concerns the ignorant alone. Just as the act of brahmanicide, which, as prohibited in the sastra, is known to be a source of evil, is committed only by him who is ignorant and influenced by passion and other evil tendencies, — his concern in it being otherwise inexplicable — so also, all nitya, naimittika, and kamya karmas, i. e., all works comprising the constant and occasional duties as well as all interested sacrificial rites, concern only him who is ignorant (of the Self). {Objection) : — So long as it is not known that the Self is distinct from the body, it is not likely that any man would undertake to perform the nitya-karma, etc. {Answer) : — Not so ; for, we see that a man engages in an act thinking " I do" the act, v.-hich, being of the nature of motion, is really done by the agency of the not-Self, (of the body, etc.).

{Objection) :— The regarding of the aggregate of the body, etc., as the Self is only a gau/za-pratyaya or a figuratively expressed notion ; it is not an illusion (mithya). {Answcy) : — Not so ; for, then its effects, too, must be gau»a, must have been figuratively spoken of. 466 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. XVIII. {To ex plain the objection) : — When we speak of the aggregate of the body, etc., — which are things belonging to the Self, — as the Self, our words should be understood in a figurative sense, as when, for instance, addressing the father the sruti says " thyself art he who is spoken of as thy son.'' In common parlance, too, we say " this cow is my very life." In the present case there is certainly no mithyapratyaya or illusory notion. It is only when the distinction between the two is not perceived, — as when a pillar is mistaken for a man, that we have an instance of illusion. {To explain the ansivey) : — Not so. A gau;ia-pratyaya cannot lead to a real effect ; for, a figurative expression, — the sign of similarity being understood, — is merely intended to extol the subject. For example, such expressions as "Devadatta is a lion" and " the student is fire" are intended merely to extol the subjects, Devadatta and the student, because of their respective resemblance to the lion and fire in point of fierceness and yellomshness ; but no effect of the existence of a real lion or of a real fire is accomplished in virtue of that figurative expression or idea. On the other hand, one actually experiences the evil effects of an illusory notion.

Furthermore, one knows what the subject in reality is when it is figuratively spoken of as some other thing ; one knows that Devadatta is no lion and that the student is no fire. So also, if the bodily aggregate be figuratively spoken of as the Self, the act done by the bodily aggregate would not be regarded as an act done in reality by the Self, by the real subject of the notion " I." Indeed, no act done by a gau;/a (figurative) lion or fire can become an act done by a real lion or fire. Neither is any purpose whatever of an actual lion or fire served by fierceness or yellowishness, it being merely intended to extol (the subject). Moreover, he who is thus praised knows that he is not a lion, that he is not fire ; he never regards an act of a lion or of fire as his. So, (if, in the present case, the bodily aggregate were figuratively spoken of as the Self), one would think rather that the act of the (bodily) aggregate "is not mine," i. c, not the real Self's, than that " I am the agent, mine is the action."

And as regards the theory that the Self actually does an act, — his memory, desire and effort forming causes of action, — we say that such is not the case, because they proceed from illusion. In fact, memory, desire and effort proceed from impressions produced by the experience of desirable and undesirable effects of actions set up by illusion. Just as in this birth dharma and a-dharma and the experience of their fruits are due to the identifying of the Self with the aggregate of the body, &c., to affection and aversion and so on, so also in the last previous birth and in the birth previous to that, and so on. Thus we are to infer that sa;;;sara, past and future, is caused by avidya and is without a beginning. Wherefore it follows that the final cessation of sawsara is attained through devotion to knowledge accompanied with renunciation of all works. Because attachment to the body is an aspect of avidya, therefore, when avidyil ceases, the body also must cease to be, and then sa;«sara necessarily ceases. — The identifying of the Self vvith the aggregate of the body, etc., is an aspect of avidya ; for, nobody in the world who knows that he is distinct from a cow, &c., and that the cow, &c., are distinct

468 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. XVIII. from him, regards them as himself. Only an ignorant man identifies the Self with the aggregate of the body, etc., for want of discrimination, in the same way that one mistakes the branchless trunk of a tree for a man; — but not he who knows the truth by discrimination. As to the son being spoken of as the father himself in the sruti, " thyself art he who is spoken of as thy son," it is a gau7/a-pratyaya, a figuratively expressed notion, because of their relation as the generator and the offspring. By what is only figuratively spoken of as the Self, no real purposes of the true Self can be accomplished, any more than the son can eat for the father. No real purposes, for instance, of a real lion and a real fire can be achieved by what are only figuratively spoken of as a lion and fire. {Ohjedion) : — Since the scriptural ordinances are of undisputed authority in the transcendental matters, the purposes of the Self can certainly be achieved by what are figuratively spoken of as the Self — viz., the body, the senses, and so on. {AnsTx'cr) : — No; for, they are selfs set up by avidya. The body and the senses and the like are not figuratively spoken of as the Self. On the other hand, being really not-Self, they are regarded as selfs by illusion; for, they are regarded as the Self so long as there is illusion, and they cease to be regarded as the Self when illusion disappears. It is only children, the ignorant people, who, for want of knowledge, think, " I am tall, I am yellowish," and thus regard the aggregate of the body, etc., as the Self. On the other hand, those who can discriminate and understand that " I am distinct from the

aggregate of the body,'' &c., do not identify themselves with the aggregate of the body, &c. This notion of identity is therefore — because it does not exist in the absence of illusion — caused by illusion ; and it is not a gau;?a-pratyaya. It is only when similarity and difference are distinctly seen between two things — as between a lion and Devadatta, or between a student and fire, — that those two things may be figuratively spoken of in word as identical or so regarded in thought, but not when similarity and difference are not perceived. And as regards the appeal made to the authority of 5ruti, we say that no such appeal should be made, inasmuch as sruti is an authority in transcendental matters, in matters lying beyond the bounds of human knowledge. 5ruti is an authority only in matters not perceived by means of ordinary instruments of knowledge, such as pratyaksha or immediate perception; — i.e., it is an authority as to the mutual relation of things as means to ends, but not in matters lying within the range of pratyaksha ; indeed, sruti is intended as an authority only for knowing what lies beyond the range of human knowledge. Wherefore it is not possible to suppose that the notion of " I " which arises in connection with the aggregate of the body, etc., and which is evidently due to illusion, is only a figurative idea. A hundred srutis may declare that fire is cold or that it is dark ; still they possess no authority in the matter. If sruti should at all declare that fire is cold or that it is dark, we would still suppose that it intends quite a difTerent meaning from the apparent one ; for, its authority cannot otherwise be maintained ; we should in no way attach to sruti a meaning which is opposed to other authorities or to its own declaration.

THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. XVIII. The theory of Avidya does not militate against the authority of Karma-Kanda. {Ohjedion) : — As a man does an action only when he is subject to illusion, it would follow that when he ceases to be an agent* the sruti ( which treats of works ) would prove false. {Answer): No; for, sruti .s still true in the matter of Brahma -vidya. [Objection) : — If the sruti which treats of works sliould be no authority, the sruti which teaches Brahmavidya, too, can be no authority. (Answer) : — Not so ; for, there can arise no notion that can remove (Brahmavidya). — The notion that the Self is identical with the aggregate of the body, etc., is removed when the true nature of the Self is known from the sruti which teaches Brahmavidya ; but not so can this knowledge of the true Self be ever removed in any way by anything whatsoever : for, knowledge of the Self is necessarily associated with its result(?. e., the absence of avidya)like the knowledge that fire is hot and luminous. Our theory, moreover, does not drive us to the conclusion that the sruti teaching works proves useless ; for, by restraining the first natural activities one by one and thereby gradually inducing fresh and higher activities, it serves to create an aspiration to reach the Innermost Self. Though the means is mithya or illusory, still it is true, because the end is true, as in the case oF the arthavadas or

* I. e., on the cessation of avidya. — A. explanatory statements subsidiary to a main injunction. And even in ordinary affairs, when we have to induce a child or a lunatic to drink milk or the like, we have to tell him that thereby his hair will grow,' and so on.— Or, we may even argue that the sruti treating of works is an authority in itself'' under other circumstances {i. e., before the attainment of Self-knowledge), just as pratyakshaor sense-perception caused by attachment to the body is held to be authoritative prior to (the attainment of) Self-knowledge, Refutation of the theory of the Self's agency by mere presence. AiwtJur theory runs as follows : — Though not directly engaged in action, the Self does act by mere presence. This by itself constitutes the real agency of the Self. A king, for instance, though himself not acting, is said to fight w'hen his soldiers fight, in virtue of his mere presence, and he is said to be victorious or defeated. Similarly the commander of an army acts by mere word. And we find that the king and the commander are connected with the results of the act. To take another example : the acts of the ritviks or officiating priests are supposed to belong to the yajamana or sacrificer. So the acts of the body, etc., we may hold, are done by the Self, inasmuch as their results accrue to the Self. To take yet another example : since the loadstone or magnet makes a piece of iron revolve, real agency may rest with what is not actually engaged in an act. And so also in the case of the Self.

{]Ve reply) : — It is not right to say so ; for it would be ' Sdkshdt, directly, ». «.. independently of Brahinavidya— A. 472 THE bhagavad-gitA. [Dis. XVIII. tantamount to saying that that which does not act is -a, karaka or an agent. {The opponent says): — Yes, karaka or agency may be of various kinds. {We reply) : — No ; for, we find that the king, &c., (as instanced above), are direct agents also. In the first place, the king may be personally engaged in fighting. He is a direct agent as causing others to fight, as paying them wages, and also as reaping the fruits accruing from success and defeat. The sacrificer, too, is a real agent as offering the main oblation and as giving presents. Wherefore, we should understand that to speak, by courtesy, of a man as an agent when he is not actually engaged, amounts to a figure of speech. If real agency, which consists in one being actually engaged in the act, were not found in the case of such agents as the king and the sacrificer, then we might suppose that even agency by mere presence constitutes real agency, as in the case of a magnet causing a piece of iron to revolve. On the contrary, we do find the king and the sacrificer actually engaged in some acts. Wherefore agency by mere presence is merely a gau«a or figurative agency. Such being the case, even the connection with results can only be gau/^a or unreal. By a gau/m or figurative agent no real action is performed. Therefore it is quite unreasonable to say that the activity of the body, etc., makes the actionless Self a real doer and enjoyer.

The theory of Avidya concluded. But all this becomes explicable when traced to illusion as its cause, as in the case of dreams and the juggler's art (may a). And no agency or enjoy ership or any other evil of th ^ sort is experienced in sleep, samadhi and similar states in which there is a break in the continuity of the illusory notions identifying the Self with the body, etc. Wherefore the illusion of sa?«sara is due solely to an illusory notion and is not absolutely real. Therefor© we conclude that Right Knowledge conduces to absolute cessation of sawsara. Qualification for instruction in the Qita Doctrine. Having concluded the whole doctrine of the Gita-sastra in this discourse, and having also briefly and conclusively stated the doctrine especially here at the end to impress it the more firmly, the Lord proceeds now to state the rule as to the handing down of the instruction. 67. This (which has been taught) to thee is never to be taught to one who is devoid of austerities, nor to one who is not devoted, nor to one who does not do service,* nor to one who speaks ill of Me. This sastra has been taught to you by Me for your good, for the destruction of sawsara. Not devoted : without devotion to the Guru and to the Deva. Never : under no circumstances whatever. It should not be declared to him who, devoted and full of austerities as he may be, renders no service. One who speaks ill of Me : he who looks upon Me, VS,sudeva, as an ordinary man, and who in his ignorance

* •' Susrusba " literally means ' one who desires t declares Me guilty of self-adulation and does not like to be told that I am the Isvara, He, too, is not fit ; and the sastra should not be taught to him. By implication we should understand that the sastra is to be taught to him who does not speak ill of the Lord, who is a man of austerities, who is devoted, and who renders service. Now, as it has been elsewhere said that it should be taught " either to a man of austerities, or to an intelligent man," it should be declared to a man of austerities who is devoted and renders service, or to an intelligent man possessed of the two attributes ; it should not be taught to a man of austerities or to an intelligent man if he is not devoted and does not render service. It should not be taught to him who is jealous of the Lord, though he may be possessed of all attributes. It should be taught to one who is devoted and renders service to the Guru. This is the rule as to how the sastra should be handed down.

The merit of teaching the Doctrine. Now the Lord proceeds to state what fruits will accrue to him who hands down the instruction : 68. He who with supreme devotion to Me will teach this Supreme Secret to My devotees, shall doubtless come to Me. This Supreme Secret : the Secret Doctrine taught above in the form of a dialogue between Kesava and Arjuna. It is Supreme because it conduces to the Highest Bliss. Teach : establish by teaching both the text itself and the doctrine, as I have established it by teaching it to thee. By repetition of ' devotion ' here, it is meant that by devotion alone one becomes worthy of being taught thesastra. — How should he teach it ? — In the faith that he is thus doing service to the Eternal Lord, to the Parama-Guru, the Supreme Teacher. As the fruit of this act, such a teacher will go to the Lord, he will be liberated. 69. Nor is there any among men who does dearer service to Me than he ; nor shall there be another on earth dearer to Me than he. Nor, &c. : There is none in the present generation. He : the man who hands down the sastra. Shall be : in future time. On earth : in this world.

70. And he who will study this sacred dialogue of ours, by him I shall have been worshipped by the sacrifice of wisdom, I deem. Dialogue : this work which is in the form of a dialogue. Of the four kinds of sacrifice such as vidhi or ritual, Japa or a loud prayer, upamsn or a prayer uttered in a low voice, indnasa or a prayer offered with the mind. The jniina-yajna or wisdom-sacrifice comes under the head of nuinasa and is therefore the highest. Thus the Gita-5astra is extolled as a jnana-yajna. Or, we may regard this passage as revealing what the real effect (of the act enjoined here) is, viz., that the act will produce an effect equal to that of wisdom-sacrifice of the contemplation of a Devata or the like. 476 THE bhagavad-gIta. [Dis. XVIII. The merit of hearing the Doctrine. The benefit accruing to the hearer is stated as follows : 71. And the man also who hears, full of faith and free from malice, even he, liberated, shall attain to the happy worlds of the righteous. Even he : much more so he who understands the doctrine. Liberated : from sin. The righteous : those who have performed Agnihotra or such other sacrifices.

The Lord assured by Arjuna of his grasp of the Teaching. The Lord now asks with a desire to know whether the pupil has understood or not the teaching of the sastra, the object of the question being that He might make the pupil understand the teaching by some other means, if the latter be found to have not understood it. And this is to show that it is the duty of the teacher to try again to make the pupil understand the teaching and enable him to attain his object. 72. Has it been heard by thee, O Partha, with an attentive mind ? Has the delusion of ignorance been destroyed, O Dhananjaya? It : what I have told thee. Heard : have you heard it without distraction and understood ? Delusion of ignorance : that absence of discrimination which is caused by ignorance and which is natural. Has your delusion been destroyed ? Its destruction is the object of all this exertion on your part to hear the sastra and of the exertion on My part as the teacher. Arjuna said : "j^. Destroyed is delusion, and I have gained recognition through Thy Grace, O Achyuta. I am firm, with doubts gone. I will do Thy word.

Delusion : born of ajuana or ignorance, the cause of the whole evil of saw/sara, hard to cross like the ocean. / : who have sought Thy Grace, Recognition : of the true nature of the Self. When this recognition is obtained, then will all the ties of the heart be loosened. — This questioning and answering about the destruction of delusion shows conclusively what the purpose of a knowledge of the teaching of the whole 5astra is, namely, the destruction of delusion and the attainment of a recognition of the Self. So the sruti (ChhcX. Up. 7-1-3, 26-2) begins with the words " Not knowing the Self, I grieve " and then speaks of the loosening of all ties by means of Self-knowledge. There are also scriptural passages such as " The tie of the heart is broken " (Mwid, Up. 2-2-8) and " To him who sees unity, what delusion is there, what grief? " (Isa. Up. 7). / am fiym : in Thy command. Do thy word: Arjuna means to say " Through Thy Grace I have achieved the end of life ; I have naught to do,' Sanjaya extols the Lord and His teaching'. The teaching of the sPistra is over. Now, in order to connect it with the main narrative, Sanjaya goes on :

Sanjaya said : 74. Thus have I heard this wonderful dialogue 478 THE bhagavad-gIta. [Dis. XVIII. between Vasudeva and the high-souled Partha, which makes the hair stand on end. 75. Through the grace of Vyasa have I heard this Supreme and most secret Yoga direct from Krishna, the Lord of Yoga, Himself declaring it. Through the gtace 0} Vydsa : by obtaining from him the divya-chakshus or divine vision. Yoga : this dialogue ; the Avork is called Yoga because it leads to Yoga. Or, the word may mean Yoga itself. Himself: it is not through mere tradition that I have heard it. 76. O king, remembering every moment this wonderful and holy dialogue between Kesava and Arjuna, I rejoice again and again. King : Dhntarash^ra, Holy : as the mere hearing of it destroys sin. 77. And remembering every moment the most wonderful Form of Hari, great is my wonder, O king ; and I rejoice again and again. Fovm : Visvarupa, the Universal Form. Not to dilate much, 78. Wherever is Krishna, the Lord of Yoga, wherever is Arjuna, the archer, there fortune, victory, prosperity and polity are established, I deem. Wherever : on that side on which. The Lord of Yoga : He is the Lord of all Yogas, since the seed of all Yoga comes forth from Him. Archer : W\e\dmg the bow called the Ghtd\\2i. There : on the side of the Pa«iavas. Prosperity : increase of fortune.

RETURN TO the circulation desk of any University of California Library 1301 South 46th Street To renew or recharge your library materials, you may contact NRLF 4 days prior to due date at (510) 642-6233