Early Greek Philosophy (pre-Socratic fragments and testimony)

Blessed is the man who has gained the riches of divine wisdom; wretched he who has a dim opinion of the gods in his heart. R. P. 179. It is not possible for us to set God before our eyes, or to lay hold of him with our hands, which is the broadest way of persuasion that leads into the heart of man. For he is not furnished with a human head on his body, two branches do not sprout from his shoulders, he has no feet, no swift knees, nor hairy parts; but he is only a sacred and unutterable mind flashing through the whole world with rapid thoughts. R. P. 180. This is not lawful for some and unlawful for others; but the law for all extends everywhere, through the wide-ruling air and the infinite light of heaven. R. P. 183. Will ye not cease from this ill-sounding slaughter? See ye not that ye are devouring one another in the thoughtlessness of your hearts? R. P. 184 b.

And the father lifts up his own son in a changed form and slays him with a prayer. Infatuated fool! And they run up to the sacrifices, begging mercy, while he, deaf to their cries, slaughters them in his halls and gets ready the evil feast. In like manner does the son seize his father, and children their <<5>> mother, tear out their life and eat the kindred flesh. R. P. 184 b. Draining their life with bronze. Ah, woe is me that the pitiless day of death did not destroy me ere ever I wrought evil deeds of devouring with my lips! R. P. 184 b. Abstain wholly from laurel leaves. Wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands from beans! Him will the roofed palace of aigis-bearing Zeus never rejoice, nor yet the house of.... Wash your hands, cutting the water from the five springs in the unyielding bronze. R. P. 184 c. Fast from wickedness! R. P. 184 c. Therefore are ye distraught by grievous wickednesses, and will not unburden your souls of wretched sorrows.

But, at the last, they appear among mortal men as prophets, song-writers, physicians, and princes; and thence they rise up as gods exalted in honour, sharing the hearth of the other gods and the same table, free from human woes, safe from destiny, and incapable of hurt. <<5>> R. P. 181 c. ... Earth that envelops the man. Bernays conjectured ῥῆμα, “decree,” for χρῆμα, but this is not necessary. Necessity is an Orphic personage, and Gorgias, the disciple of Empedokles, says θεῶν βουλεύμασιν καὶ ἀνάγκης ψηφίσμασιν (Hel. 6). I retain φόνῳ in v. 3 (so too Diels). The first word of v. 4 has been lost. Diels suggests Νείκεϊ, which may well be right, and takes ἁμαρτήσας as equivalent to ὁμαρτήσας. I have translated accordingly. According to Porphyry, who quotes this line (de Antro Nymph. 8), these words were spoken by the “powers” who conduct the soul into the world (ψυχοπομποὶ δυνάμεις). The “cave” is not originally Platonic but Orphic. This passage is closely modelled on the Catalogue of Nymphs in Iliad xviii. 39 sqq. Chthonie is found already in Pherekydes (Diog. i. 119).

I have retained ἀλλόγνωτι as nearer the MSS., though a little hard to interpret. On the subsequent history of the Orphic chiton in gnostic imagery see Bernays, Theophr. Schr. n. 9. It was identified with the coat of skins made by God for Adam. This is the best μετοίκησις (Ael. Nat. an. xii. 7). The dwellers in the Golden Age. The MSS. of Porphyry have γραπτοῖς τε ζώοισι, which is accepted by Zeller and Diels. The emendation of Bernays (adopted in R. P.) does not convince me. I venture to suggest μακτοῖς, on the strength of the story related by Favorinus (ap. Diog. viii. 53) as to the bloodless sacrifice offered by Empedokles at Olympia. These lines were already referred to Pythagoras by Timaios (Diog. viii. 54). As we are told (Diog. ib.) that some referred the verses to Parmenides, it is clear that no name was given. On frs. 138 and 143 see Vahlen on Arist. Poet. 21. 1547 b 13, and Diels in Hermes, xv. p. 173. [Sidenote: Empedokles and Parmenides.]

106. At the very outset of his poem, Empedokles is careful to mark the difference between himself and previous inquirers. He speaks angrily of those who, though their experience was only partial, professed to have found the whole (fr. 2); he even calls this “madness” (fr. 4). No doubt he is thinking of Parmenides. His own position is not, however, sceptical. He only deprecates the attempt to construct a theory of the universe off-hand instead of trying to understand each thing we come across “in the way in which it is clear” (fr. 4). And this means that we must not, like Parmenides, reject the assistance of the senses. Weak though they are (fr. 2), they are the only channels through which knowledge can enter our minds at all. We soon discover, however, that Empedokles is not very mindful of his own warnings. He too sets up a system which is to explain everything, though that system is no longer a monistic one.

It is often said that this system was an attempt to mediate between Parmenides and Herakleitos. It is not easy, however, to find any trace of specially Herakleitean doctrine in it, and it would be truer to say that it aimed at mediating between Eleaticism and the senses. He repeats, almost in the same words, the Eleatic argument for the sole reality and indestructibility of “what is” (frs. 11-15); and his idea of the “Sphere” seems to be derived from the Parmenidean description of the universe as it truly is. Parmenides had held that the reality which underlies the illusory world presented to us by the senses was a corporeal, spherical, continuous, eternal, and immovable plenum, and it is from this that Empedokles starts. Given the sphere of Parmenides, he seems to have said, How are we to get from it to the world we know? How are we to introduce motion into the immovable plenum? Now Parmenides need not have denied the possibility of motion within the Sphere, though he was bound to deny all motion of the Sphere itself; but such an admission on his part, had he made it, would not have served to explain anything. If any part of the Sphere were to move, the room of the displaced matter must at once be taken by other matter, for there is no empty space. This, however, would be of precisely the same kind as the matter it had displaced; for all “that is” is one. The result of the motion would be precisely the same as that of rest; it could account for no change. But, Empedokles must have asked, is this assumption of perfect homogeneity in the Sphere really necessary? Evidently not; it is simply the old unreasoned feeling that existence must be one. If, instead of this, we were to assume a number of existent things, it would be quite possible to apply all that Parmenides says of reality to each of them, and the forms of existence we know might be explained by the mingling and separation of those realities. The conception of “elements” (στοιχεῖα), to use a later term, was found, and the required formula follows at once. So far as concerns particular things, it is true, as our senses tell us, that they come into being and pass away; but, if we have regard to the ultimate elements of which they are composed, we shall say with Parmenides that “what is” is uncreated and indestructible (fr. 17).

Cf. Emp. frs. 27, 28, with Parm. fr. 8. For the history of the term στοιχεῖον see Diels, Elementum. Eudemos said (ap. Simpl. Phys. p. 7, 13) that Plato was the first to use it, and this is confirmed by the way the word is introduced in Tht. 201 e. The original term was μορφή or ἰδέα. [Sidenote: The “four roots.”]

107. The “four roots” of all things (fr. 6) which Empedokles assumed were those that have become traditional—Fire, Air, Earth, and Water. It is to be noticed, however, that he does not call Air ἀήρ, but αἰθήρ, and this must be because he wished to avoid any confusion with what had hitherto been meant by the former word. He had, in fact, made the great discovery that atmospheric air is a distinct corporeal substance, and is not to be identified with empty space on the one hand or rarefied mist on the other. Water is not liquid air, but something quite different. This truth Empedokles demonstrated by means of the apparatus known as the klepsydra, and we still possess the verses in which he applied his discovery to the explanation of respiration and the motion of the blood (fr. 100). Aristotle laughs at those who try to show there is no empty space by shutting up air in water-clocks and torturing wineskins. They only prove, he says, that air is a thing. That, however, is exactly what Empedokles intended to prove, and it was one of the most important discoveries in the early history of science. It will be convenient for us to translate the αἰθήρ of Empedokles by “air”; but we must be careful in that case not to render the word ἀήρ in the same way. Anaxagoras seems to have been the first to use it of atmospheric air.

Cf. Chap. I. § 27. Arist. Phys. Δ, 6, 213 a 22 (R. P. 159). Aristotle only mentions Anaxagoras by name in this passage; but he speaks in the plural, and we know from fr. 100 that the klepsydra experiment was used by Empedokles. Empedokles also called the “four roots” by the names of certain divinities—“shining Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis” (fr. 6)—though there is some doubt as to how these names are to be apportioned among the elements. Nestis is said to have been a Sicilian water-goddess, and the description of her shows that she stands for Water; but there is a conflict of opinion as to the other three. This, however, need not detain us. We are already prepared to find that Empedokles called the elements gods; for all the early thinkers had spoken in this way of whatever they regarded as the primary substance. We must only remember that the word is not used in its religious sense. Empedokles did not pray or sacrifice to the elements, and the use of divine names is in the main an accident of the poetical form in which he cast his system.

In antiquity the Homeric Allegorists made Hera Earth and Aidoneus Air, a view which has found its way into Aetios from Poseidonios. It arose as follows. The Homeric Allegorists were not interested in the science of Empedokles, and did not see that his αἰθήρ was quite a different thing from Homer’s ἀήρ. Now this is the dark element, and night is a form of it, so it would naturally be identified with Aidoneus. Again, Empedokles calls Hera φερέσβιος, and that is an old epithet of Earth in Homer. Another view current in antiquity identified Hera with Air, which is the theory of Plato’s Cratylus, and Aidoneus with Earth. The Homeric Allegorists further identified Zeus with Fire, a view to which they were doubtless led by the use of the word αἰθήρ. Now αἰθήρ certainly means Fire in Anaxagoras, as we shall see, but there is no doubt that in Empedokles it meant Air. It seems likely, then, that Knatz is right (“Empedoclea” in Schedae Philologicae Hermanno Usenero oblatae, 1891, pp. 1 sqq.) in holding that the bright Air of Empedokles was Zeus. This leaves Aidoneus to stand for Fire; and nothing could have been more natural for a Sicilian poet, with the volcanoes and hot springs of his native island in mind, than this identification. He refers to the fires that burn beneath the Earth himself (fr. 52). If that is so, we shall have to agree with the Homeric Allegorists that Hera is Earth; and there is certainly no improbability in that.

Empedokles regarded the “roots of all things” as eternal. Nothing can come from nothing or pass away into nothing (fr. 12); what is is, and there is no room for coming into being and passing away (fr. 8). Further, Aristotle tells us, he taught that they were unchangeable. This Empedokles expressed by saying that “they are what they are” (frs. 17, 34; 21, 13), and are “always alike.” Again, they are all “equal,” a statement which seemed strange to Aristotle, but was quite intelligible in the days of Empedokles. Above all, the elements are ultimate. All other bodies, as Aristotle puts it, might be divided till you came to the elements; but Empedokles could give no further account of these without saying (as he did not) that there is an element of which Fire and the rest are in turn composed. Arist. de Gen. Corr. Β, 1. 329 b 1. Ibid. Β, 6. 333 a 16.

Ibid. Α, 8. 325 b 19 (R. P. 164 e). This was so completely misunderstood by later writers that they actually attribute to Empedokles the doctrine of στοιχεῖα πρὸ τῶν στοιχείων (Aet. 1. 13, 1; 17, 3). The criticism of the Pythagoreans and Plato had made the hypothesis of elements almost unintelligible to Aristotle, and a fortiori to his successors. As Plato put it (Tim. 48 b 8), they were “not even syllables,” let alone “letters” (στοιχεῖα). That is why Aristotle, who derived them from something more primary, calls them τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα (Diels, Elementum, p. 25).

The “four roots” are given as an exhaustive enumeration of the elements (fr. 23 sub fin.); for they account for all the qualities presented by the world to the senses. When we find, as we do, that the school of medicine which regarded Empedokles as its founder identified the four elements with the “opposites,” the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, which formed the theoretical foundation of its system, we see at once how the theory is related to previous views of reality. To put it shortly, what Empedokles did was to take the opposites of Anaximander and to declare that they were “things,” each of which was real in the Parmenidean sense. We must remember that the conception of quality had not yet been formed. Anaximander had no doubt regarded his “opposites” as things; though, before the time of Parmenides, no one had fully realised how much was implied in saying that anything is a thing. That is the stage we have now reached. There is still no conception of quality, but there is a clear apprehension of what is involved in saying that a thing is. We know from Menon that Philistion put the matter in this way. See p. 235, n. 527.

Aristotle twice makes the statement that, though Empedokles assumes four elements, he treats them as two, opposing Fire to all the rest. This, he says, we can see for ourselves from his poem. So far as the general theory of the elements goes, it is impossible to see anything of the sort; but, when we come to the origin of the world (§ 112), we shall find that Fire certainly plays a leading part, and this may be what Aristotle meant. It is also true that in the biology (§ 114–116) Fire fulfils a unique function, while the other three act more or less in the same way. But we must remember that it has no pre-eminence over the rest: all are equal. Arist. Met. Α, 4. 985 a 31; de Gen. Corr. Β, 3. 330 b 19 (R. P. 164 e). [Sidenote: Strife and Love.]

108. The Eleatic criticism had made it necessary for subsequent thinkers to explain motion. Empedokles starts, as we have seen, from an original state of the “four roots,” which only differs from the Sphere of Parmenides in so far as it is a mixture, not a homogeneous and continuous mass. The fact that it is a mixture makes change and motion possible; but, were there nothing outside the Sphere which could enter in, like the Pythagorean “Air,” to separate the four elements, nothing could ever arise from it. Empedokles accordingly assumed the existence of such a substance, and he gave it the name of Strife. But the effect of this would be to separate all the elements in the Sphere completely, and then nothing more could possibly happen; something else was needed to bring the elements together again. This Empedokles found in Love, which he regarded as the same impulse to union that is implanted in human bodies (fr. 17, 22 sqq.). He looks at it, in fact, from a purely physiological point of view, as was natural for the founder of a medical school. No mortal had yet marked, he says, that the very same Love which men know in their bodies had a place among the elements. Cf. Introd. § VIII.

It is important to observe that the Love and Strife of Empedokles are no incorporeal forces, but corporeal elements like the other four. At the time, this was inevitable; nothing incorporeal had yet been dreamt of. Naturally, Aristotle is puzzled by this characteristic of what he regarded as efficient causes. “The Love of Empedokles,” he says “is both an efficient cause, for it brings things together, and a material cause, for it is a part of the mixture.” And Theophrastos expressed the same idea by saying that Empedokles sometimes gave an efficient power to Love and Strife, and sometimes put them on a level with the other four. The verses of Empedokles himself leave no room for doubt that the two were thought of as spatial and corporeal. All the six are called “equal.” Love is said to be “equal in length and breadth” to the others, and Strife is described as equal to each of them in weight (fr. 17). Arist. Met. Α, 10. 1075 b 3. Theophr. Phys. Op. fr. 3 (Dox. p. 477); ap. Simpl. Phys. p. 25, 21 (R. P. 166 b).

The function of Love is to produce union; that of Strife, to break it up again. Aristotle, however, rightly points out that in another sense it is Love that divides and Strife that unites. When the Sphere is broken up by Strife, the result is that all the Fire, for instance, which was contained in it comes together and becomes one; and again, when the elements are brought together once more by Love, the mass of each is divided. In another place, he says that, while Strife is assumed as the cause of destruction, and does, in fact, destroy the Sphere, it really gives birth to everything else in so doing. It follows that we must carefully distinguish between the Love of Empedokles and that “attraction of like for like” to which he also attributed an important part in the formation of the world. The latter is not an element distinct from the others; it depends, we shall see, on the proper nature of each element, and is only able to take effect when Strife divides the Sphere. Love, on the contrary, is something that comes from outside and produces an attraction of unlikes. Arist. Met. Α, 4. 985 a 21; Γ, 4. 1000 a 24; b 9 (R. P. 166 i). [Sidenote: Mixture and separation.]

109. But, when Strife has once separated the elements, what is it that determines the direction of their motion? Empedokles seems to have given no further explanation than that each was “running” in a certain direction (fr. 53). Plato severely condemns this in the Laws, on the ground that no room is thus left for design. Aristotle also blames him for giving no account of the Chance to which he ascribed so much importance. Nor is the Necessity, of which he also spoke, further explained. Strife enters into the Sphere at a certain time in virtue of Necessity, or “the mighty oath” (fr. 30); but we are left in the dark as to the origin of this. Plato, Laws, x. 889 b. The reference is not to Empedokles exclusively, but the language shows that Plato is thinking mainly of him. Arist. de Gen. Corr. Β, 6. 334 a 1; Phys. Θ, 1. 252 a 5 (R. P. 166 k).

The expression used by Empedokles to describe the movement of the elements is that they “run through each other” (fr. 17, 34). Aristotle tells us that he explained mixture in general by “the symmetry of pores.” And this is the true explanation of the “attraction of like for like.” The “pores” of like bodies are, of course, much the same size, and these bodies can therefore mingle easily. On the other hand, a finer body will “run through” a coarse one without becoming mixed, and a coarse body will not be able to enter into the pores of a finer one at all. It will be observed that, as Aristotle says, this really implies something like the atomic theory; but there is no evidence that Empedokles himself was conscious of that. Another question raised by Aristotle is even more instructive. Are the pores, he asks, empty or full? If empty, what becomes of the denial of the void? If full, why need we assume pores at all? These questions Empedokles would have found it hard to answer. They point to a real want of thoroughness in his system, and mark it as a mere stage in the transition from Monism to Atomism. Ibid. Α, 8. 324 b 34 (R. P. 166 h). Arist. de Gen. Corr. 326 b 6.

[Sidenote: The four periods.] 110. It will be clear from all this that we must distinguish four periods in the cycle. First we have the Sphere, in which all the elements are mixed together by Love. Secondly, there is the period when Love is passing out and Strife coming in, when, therefore, the elements are partially separated and partially combined. Thirdly, comes the complete separation of the elements, when Love is outside the world, and Strife has given free play to the attraction of like for like. Lastly, we have the period when Love is bringing the elements together again, and Strife is passing out. This brings us back in time to the Sphere, and the cycle begins afresh. Now a world such as ours can exist only in the second and fourth of these periods; and it is clear that, if we are to understand Empedokles, we must discover in which of these we now are. It seems to be generally supposed that we are in the fourth period; I hope to show that we are really in the second, that when Strife is gaining the upper hand.

This is the view of Zeller (pp. 785 sqq.), but he admits that the external testimony, especially that of Aristotle, is wholly in favour of the other. His difficulty is with the fragments, and if it can be shown that these can be interpreted in accordance with Aristotle’s statements, the question is settled. Aristotle was specially interested in Empedokles, and was not likely to misrepresent him on such a point. [Sidenote: Our world the work of Strife.]

111. That a world of perishable things arises both in the second and fourth period is distinctly stated by Empedokles (fr. 17), and it is inconceivable that he himself had not made up his mind which of these worlds is ours. Aristotle is clearly of opinion that it is the world which arises when Strife is increasing. In one place, he says that Empedokles “holds that the world is in a similar condition now in the period of Strife as formerly in that of Love.” In another, he tell us that Empedokles omits the generation of things in the period of Love, just because it is unnatural to represent this world, in which the elements are separate, as arising from things in a state of separation. This remark can only mean that the scientific theories contained in the poem of Empedokles assumed the increase of Strife, or, in other words, that they represented the course of evolution as the disintegration of the Sphere, not as the gradual coming together of things from a state of separation. That is only what we should expect, if we are right in supposing that the problem he set himself to solve was the origin of this world from the Sphere of Parmenides, and it is also in harmony with the universal tendency of such speculations to represent the world as getting worse rather than better. We have only to consider, then, whether the details of the system bear out this general view.

Arist de Gen. Corr. Β, 6. 334 a 6: τὸν κόσμον ὁμοίως ἔχειν φησίν ἐπί τε τοῦ νείκους νῦν καὶ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας. Arist. de Caelo, Γ, 2. 301 a 14: ἐκ διεστώτων δὲ καὶ κινουμένων οὐκ εὔλογον ποιεῖν τὴν γένεσιν. διὸ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς παραλείπει τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς φιλότητος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἠδύνατο συστῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐκ κεχωρισμένων μὲν κατασκευάζων, σύγκρισιν δὲ ποιῶν διὰ τὴν φιλότητα· ἐκ διακεκριμένων γὰρ συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος τῶν στοιχείων (“our world consists of the elements in a state of separation”), ὥστ’ ἀναγκαῖον γενέσθαι ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ συγκεκριμένου. It need not mean that Empedokles said nothing about the world of Love at all; for he obviously says something of both worlds in fr. 17. It is enough to suppose that, having described both in general terms, he went on to treat the world of Strife in detail. [Sidenote: Formation of the world by Strife.]

112. To begin with the Sphere, in which the “four roots of all things” are mixed together, we note in the first place that it is called a god in the fragments just as the elements are, and that Aristotle more than once refers to it in the same way. We must remember that Love itself is a part of this mixture, while Strife surrounds or encompasses it on every side just as the Boundless encompasses the world in earlier systems. Strife, however, is not boundless, but equal in bulk to each of the four roots and to Love.

Arist. de Gen. Corr. Β, 6. 333 b 21 (R. P. 168 e); Met. Β, 4. 1000 a 29 (R. P. 166 i). Cf. Simpl. Phys. p. 1124, 1 (R. P. 167 b). In other places Aristotle speaks of it as “the One.” Cf. de Gen. Corr. Α, 1. 315 a 7 (R. P. 168 e); Met. Β, 4. 1000 a 29 (R. P. 166 i); Α, 4. 985 a 28 (R. P. ib.). This, however, involves a slight Aristotelian “development.” It is not quite the same thing to say, as Empedokles does, that all things come together “into one,” and to say that they come together “into the One.” The latter expression suggests that they lose their distinct and proper character in the Sphere, and thus become something like Aristotle’s own “matter.” As has been pointed out (p. 265, n. 586), it is hard for Aristotle to grasp the conception of irreducible elements; but there can be no doubt that in the Sphere, as in their separation, the elements remain “what they are” for Empedokles. As Aristotle also knows quite well, the Sphere is a mixture. Compare the difficulties about the “One” of Anaximander discussed in Chap. I. § 15.

This accounts for Aristotle’s statement, which he makes once positively (Met. Β, 1. 996 a 7) and once very doubtfully (Met. Γ, 4. 1001 a 12), that Love was the substratum of the One in just the same sense as the Fire of Herakleitos, the Air of Anaximenes, or the Water of Thales. He thinks that all the elements become merged in Love, and so lose their identity. In this case, it is in Love he recognises his own “matter.” At the appointed time, Strife begins to enter into the Sphere and Love to go out of it (frs. 30, 31). The fragments by themselves throw little light on this; but Aetios and the Plutarchean Stromateis have between them preserved a very fair tradition of what Theophrastos said on the point. Empedokles held that Air was first separated out and secondly Fire. Next came Earth, from which, highly compressed as it was by the impetus of its revolution, Water gushed forth. From the water Mist was produced by evaporation. The heavens were formed out of the Air and the sun out of the Fire, while terrestrial things were condensed from the other elements. Aet. ii. 6. 3 (Dox. p. 334; R. P. 170).

Empedokles held that the Air when separated off from the original mixture of the elements was spread round in a circle. After the Air, Fire running outwards, and not finding any other place, ran up under the solid that surrounded the Air. There were two hemispheres revolving round the earth, the one altogether composed of fire, the other of a mixture of air and a little fire. The latter he supposed to be the Night. The origin of their motion he derived from the fact of fire preponderating in one hemisphere owing to its accumulation there. Ps.-Plut. Strom. fr. 10 (Dox. p. 582; R. P. 170 a). For the phrase τοῦ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα πάγου cf. Περὶ διαίτης, i. 10, 1, πρὸς τὸν περιέχοντα πάγον. Et. M. s.v. βηλὸς ... τὸν ἀνωτάτω πάγον καὶ περιέχοντα τὸν πάντα ἀέρα. This probably comes ultimately from Anaximenes. Cf. Chap. I. p. 82, n. 162.

The first of the elements to be separated out by Strife, then, was Air, which took the outermost position surrounding the world (cf. fr. 38). We must not, however, take the statement that it surrounded the world “in a circle” too strictly. It appears that Empedokles regarded the heavens as shaped like an egg. Here, probably, we have a trace of Orphic ideas. At any rate, the outer circle of the Air became solidified or frozen, and we thus get a crystalline vault as the boundary of the world. We note that it was Fire which solidified the Air and turned it to ice. Fire in general had a solidifying power. Aet. ii. 31, 4 (Dox. p. 363). Aet. ii. 11, 2 (R. P. 170 c). In its upward rush Fire displaced a portion of the Air in the upper half of the concave sphere formed by the frozen sky. This air then sunk downwards, carrying with it a small portion of the fire. In this way, two hemispheres were produced: one, consisting entirely of fire, the diurnal hemisphere; the other, the nocturnal, consisting of air with a little fire.

The accumulation of Fire in the upper hemisphere disturbs the equilibrium of the heavens and causes them to revolve; and this revolution not only produces the alternation of day and night, but by its rapidity keeps the heavens and the earth in their places. This was illustrated, Aristotle tells us, by the simile of a cup of water whirled round at the end of a string. The verses which contained this remarkable account of so-called “centrifugal force” have been lost; but the experimental illustration is in the manner of Empedokles. [Sidenote: The sun, moon, stars, and earth.]

113. It will be observed that day and night have been explained without reference to the sun. Day is produced by the light of the fiery diurnal hemisphere, while night is the shadow thrown by the earth when the fiery hemisphere is on the other side of it (fr. 48). What, then, is the sun? The Plutarchean Stromateis again give us the answer: “The sun is not fire in substance, but a reflexion of fire like that which comes from water.” Plutarch himself makes one of his personages say: “You laugh at Empedokles for saying that the sun is a product of the earth, arising from the reflexion of the light of heaven, and once more ‘flashes back to Olympos with untroubled countenance.’” Aetios says: “Empedokles held that there were two suns: one, the archetype, the fire in one hemisphere of the world, filling the whole hemisphere always stationed opposite its own reflexion; the other, the visible sun, its reflexion in the other hemisphere, that which is filled with air mingled with fire, produced by the reflexion of the earth, which is round, on the crystalline sun, and carried round by the motion of the fiery hemisphere. Or, to sum it up shortly, the sun is a reflexion of the terrestrial fire.”

Arist. de Caelo, Β, 13. 295 a 16 (R. P. 170 b). The experiment with τὸ ἐν τοῖς κυάθοις ὕδωρ, which κύκλῳ τοῦ κυάθου φερομένου πολλάκις κάτω τοῦ χαλκοῦ γινόμενον ὅμως οὐ φέρεται κάτω, reminds us of the experiment with the klepsydra in fr. 100. [Plut.] Strom. fr. 10 (Dox. p. 582, 11; R. P. 170 c). Plut. de Pyth. Or. 400 b (R. P. 170 c). We must keep the MS. reading περὶ γῆν with Bernardakis and Diels. The reading περιαυγῆ in R. P. is a conjecture of Wyttenbach’s; but cf. Aet. ii. 20, 13, quoted in the next note. Aet. ii. 20, 13 (Dox. p. 350), Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δύο ἡλίους· τὸν μὲν ἀρχέτυπον, πῦρ ὂν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἡμισφαιρίῳ τοῦ κόσμου, πεπληρωκὸς τὸ ἡμισφαίριον, αἰεὶ κατ’ ἀντικρὺ τῇ ἀνταυγείᾳ ἑαυτοῦ τεταγμένον· τὸν δὲ φαινόμενον, ἀνταύγειαν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἡμισφαιρίῳ τῷ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ θερμομιγοῦς πεπληρωμένῳ, ἀπὸ κυκλοτεροῦς τῆς γῆς κατ’ ἀνάκλασιν γιγνομένην εἰς τὸν ἥλιον τὸν κρυσταλλοειδῆ, συμπεριελκομένην δὲ τῇ κινήσει τοῦ πυρίνου. ὡς δὲ βραχέως εἰρῆσθαι συντεμόντα, ἀνταύγειαν εἶναι τοῦ περὶ τὴν γὴν πυρὸς τὸν ἥλιον.

These passages, and especially the last, are by no means clear. The reflexion which we call the sun cannot be in the hemisphere opposite to the fiery one; for that is the nocturnal hemisphere. We must say rather that the light of the fiery hemisphere is reflected by the earth on to the fiery hemisphere itself in one concentrated flash. From this it follows that the appearance which we call the sun is the same size as the earth. We may explain the origin of this view as follows. It had just been discovered that the moon shone by reflected light, and there is always a tendency to give any novel theory a wider application than it really admits of. In the early part of the fifth century B.C., men saw reflected light everywhere; the Pythagoreans held a very similar view, and when we come to them, we shall see why Aetios, or rather his source, expresses it by speaking of “two suns.” It was probably in this connexion that Empedokles announced that light takes some time to travel, though its speed is so great as to escape our perception.

“The moon,” we are told, “was composed of air cut off by the fire; it was frozen just like hail, and had its light from the sun.” It is, in other words, a disc of frozen air, of the same substance as the solid sky which surrounds the heavens. Diogenes says that Empedokles taught it was smaller than the sun, and Aetios tells us it was only half as distant from the earth. Empedokles did not attempt to explain the fixed stars by reflected light, nor even the planets. They were fiery, made out of the fire which the air carried with it when forced beneath the earth by the upward rush of fire at the first separation, as we saw above. The fixed stars were attached to the frozen air; the planets moved freely. Empedokles was acquainted (fr. 42) with the true theory of solar eclipses, which, along with that of the moon’s light, was the great discovery of this period. He also knew (fr. 48) that night is the conical shadow of the earth, and not a sort of exhalation.

Wind was explained from the opposite motions of the fiery and airy hemispheres. Rain was caused by the compression of the Air, which forced any water there might be in it out of its pores in the form of drops. Lightning was fire forced out from the clouds in much the same way. Arist. de Sensu, 6. 446 a 28; de An. Β, 7. 418 b 20. [Plut.] Strom. fr. 10 (Dox. p. 582, 12; R. P. 170 c); Diog. viii. 77; Aet. ii. 31, 1 (cf. Dox. p. 63). Aet. ii. 13, 2 and 11 (Dox. pp. 341 sqq.). Aet. iii. 3, 7; Arist. Meteor. Β, 9. 369 b 12, with Alexander’s commentary. The earth was at first mixed with water, but the increasing compression caused by the velocity of the world’s revolution made the water gush forth, so that the sea is called “the sweat of the earth,” a phrase to which Aristotle objects as a mere poetical metaphor. The saltness of the sea was explained by the help of this analogy. Arist. Meteor. Β, 3. 357 a 24; Aet. iii. 16, 3 (R. P. 170 b). Cf. the clear reference in Arist. Meteor. Β, 1. 353 b 11. [Sidenote: Organic combinations.]

114. Empedokles went on to show how the four elements, mingled in different proportions, gave rise to perishable things, such as bones, flesh, and the like. These, of course, are the work of Love; but this in no way contradicts the view taken above as to the period of evolution to which this world belongs. Love is by no means banished from the world yet, though one day it will be. At present, it is still able to form combinations of elements; but, just because Strife is ever increasing, they are all perishable. The possibility of organic combinations depends upon the fact that there is still water in the earth, and even fire (fr. 52). The warm springs of Sicily were a proof of this, not to speak of Etna. These springs Empedokles appears to have explained by one of his characteristic images, drawn this time from the heating of warm baths. It will be noted that his similes are nearly all drawn from human inventions and manufactures. Seneca, Q. Nat. iii. 24: “facere solemus dracones et miliaria et complures formas in quibus aere tenui fistulas struimus per declive circumdatas, ut saepe eundem ignem ambiens aqua per tantum fluat spatii quantum efficiendo calori sat est. frigida itaque intrat, effluit calida. idem sub terra Empedocles existimat fieri.” [Sidenote: Plants.]

115. Plants and animals were formed from the four elements under the influence of Love and Strife. The fragments which deal with trees and plants are 77-81; and these, taken along with certain Aristotelian statements and the doxographical tradition, enable us to make out pretty fully what the theory was. The text of Aetios is very corrupt here; but it may, perhaps, be rendered as follows:—

Empedokles says that trees were the first living creatures to grow up out of the earth, before the sun was spread out, and before day and night were distinguished; that, from the symmetry of their mixture, they contain the proportion of male and female; that they grow, rising up owing to the heat which is in the earth, so that they are parts of the earth just as embryos are parts of the uterus; that fruits are excretions of the water and fire in plants, and that those which have a deficiency of moisture shed their leaves when that is evaporated by the summer heat, while those which have more moisture remain evergreen, as in the case of the laurel, the olive, and the palm; that the differences in taste are due to variations in the particles contained in the earth and to the plants drawing different particles from it, as in the case of vines; for it is not the difference of the vines that makes wine good, but that of the soil which nourishes them. Aet. v. 26, 4 (R. P. 172).

Aristotle finds fault with Empedokles for explaining the double growth of plants, upwards and downwards, by the opposite natural motions of the earth and fire contained in them. For “natural motions” we must, of course, substitute the attraction of like for like (§ 109). Theophrastos says much the same thing. The growth of plants, then, is to be regarded as an incident in that separation of the elements which Strife is bringing about. Some of the fire which is still beneath the earth (fr. 52) meeting in its upward course with earth, still moist with water and “running” down so as to “reach its own kind,” unites with it, under the influence of the Love still left in the world, to form a temporary combination, which we call a tree or a plant. Arist. de An. Β, 4. 415 b 28. Theophr. de causis plantarum, i. 12, 5.

At the beginning of the pseudo-Aristotelian Treatise on Plants, we are told that Empedokles attributed desire, sensation, and the capacity for pleasure and pain to plants, and he rightly saw that the two sexes are combined in them. This is mentioned by Aetios, and discussed in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise. If we may so far trust that Byzantine translation from a Latin version of the Arabic, we get a most valuable hint as to the reason. Plants, we are there told, came into being “in an imperfect state of the world,” in fact, at a time when Strife had not so far prevailed as to differentiate the sexes. We shall see that the same thing applies to the original race of animals in this world. It is strange that Empedokles never observed the actual process of generation in plants, but confined himself to the statement that they spontaneously “bore eggs” (fr. 79), that is to say, fruit. [Arist.] de plantis, Α, 1. 815 a 15. Alfred the Englishman translated the Arabic version into Latin in the reign of Henry III. It was retranslated from this version into Greek at the Renaissance by a Greek resident in Italy. Α, 2. 817 b 35, “mundo ... diminuto et non perfecto in complemento suo” (Alfred). [Sidenote: Evolution of animals.]

116. The fragments which deal with the evolution of animals (57-62) must be understood in the light of the statement (fr. 17) that there is a double coming into being and a double passing away of mortal things. Empedokles describes two processes of evolution, which take exactly opposite courses, one of them belonging to the period of Love and the other to that of Strife. The four stages of this double evolution are accurately distinguished in a passage of Aetios, and we shall see that there is evidence for referring two of them to the second period of the world’s history and two to the fourth. Aet. v. 19, 5 (R. P. 173). Plato has made use of the idea of reversed evolution in the Politicus myth.

The first stage is that in which the various parts of animals arise separately. It is that of heads without necks, arms without shoulders, and eyes without foreheads (fr. 57). It is clear that this must be the first stage in what we have called the fourth period of the world’s history, that in which Love is coming in and Strife passing out. Aristotle distinctly refers it to the period of Love, by which, as we have seen, he means the period when Love is increasing. It is in accordance with this that he also says these scattered members were subsequently put together by Love. Arist. de Caelo, Γ, 2. 300 b 29 (R. P. 173 a). Cf. de Gen. An. Α, 17. 722 b 17, where fr. 57 is introduced by the words καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς γεννᾷ ἐπὶ τῆς Φιλότητος. Simplicius, de Caelo, p. 587, 18, expresses the same thing by saying μουνομελῆ ἔτι τὰ γυῖα ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Νείκους διακρίσεως ὄντα ἐπλανᾶτο. Arist. de An. Γ, 6. 430 a 30 (R. P. 173 a).

The second stage is that in which the scattered limbs are united. At first, they were combined in all possible ways (fr. 59). There were oxen with human heads, creatures with double faces and double breasts, and all manner of monsters (fr. 61). Those of them that were fitted to survive did so, while the rest perished. That is how the evolution of animals took place in the period of Love. This is well put by Simplicius, de Caelo, p. 587, 20. It is ὅτε τοῦ Νείκους ἐπεκράτει λοιπὸν ἡ Φιλότης ... ἐπὶ τῆς Φιλότητος οὖν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐκεῖνα εἶπεν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπικρατούσης ἤδη τῆς Φιλότητος, ἀλλ’ ὡς μελλούσης ἐπικρατεῖν. In Phys. p. 371, 33, he says the oxen with human heads were κατὰ τῆν τῆς Φιλίας ἀρχήν. The third stage belongs to the period when the unity of the Sphere is being destroyed by Strife. It is, therefore, the first stage in the evolution of our present world. It begins with “whole-natured forms” in which there is not as yet any distinction of sex or species. They are composed of earth and water, and are produced by the upward motion of fire which is seeking to reach its like. Cf. Plato, Symp. 189 e.

In the fourth stage, the sexes and species have been separated, and new animals no longer arise from the elements, but are produced by generation. We shall see presently how Empedokles conceived this to operate. In both these processes of evolution, Empedokles was guided by the idea of the survival of the fittest. Aristotle severely criticises this. “We may suppose,” he says, “that all things have fallen out accidentally just as they would have done if they had been produced for some end. Certain things have been preserved because they had spontaneously acquired a fitting structure, while those which were not so put together have perished and are perishing, as Empedokles says of the oxen with human faces.” This, according to Aristotle, leaves too much to chance. One curious instance has been preserved. Vertebration was explained by saying that an early invertebrate animal tried to turn round and broke its back in so doing. This was a favourable variation and so survived. It should be noted that it clearly belongs to the period of Strife, and not, like the oxen with human heads, to that of Love. The survival of the fittest was the law of both processes of evolution. Arist. Phys. Β, 8. 198 b 29 (R. P. 173 a). Arist. de Part. An. Α, 1. 640 a 19.

117. The distinction of the sexes was an important result of the gradual differentiation brought about by the entrance of Strife into the world. Empedokles differed from the theory given by Parmenides in his Second Part (§ 95) in holding that the warm element preponderated in the male sex, and that males were conceived in the warmer part of the uterus (fr. 65). The fœtus was formed partly from the male and partly from the female semen (fr. 63); and it was just the fact that the substance of a new being’s body was divided between the male and the female that produced desire when the two were brought together by sight (fr. 64). A certain symmetry of the pores in the male and female semen is, of course, necessary for procreation, and from its absence Empedokles explained the sterility of mules. The children most resemble that parent who contributed most to their formation. The influence of statues and pictures was also noted, however, as modifying the appearance of the offspring. Twins and triplets were due to a superabundance and division of the semen. Aet. v. 10, 1; 11, 1; 12, 2; 14, 2. Cf. Fredrich, Hippokratische Untersuchungen, pp. 126 sqq.

As to the growth of the fœtus in the uterus, Empedokles held that it was enveloped in a membrane, and that its formation began on the thirty-sixth day and was completed on the forty-ninth. The heart was formed first, the nails and such things last. Respiration did not begin till the time of birth, when the fluids round the fœtus were withdrawn. Birth took place in the ninth or seventh month, because the day had been originally nine months long, and afterwards seven. Milk arises on the tenth day of the eighth month (fr. 68). Death was the final separation by Strife of the fire and earth in the body, each of which had all along been striving to “reach its own kind.” Sleep was a temporary separation to a certain extent of the fiery element. At death the animal is resolved into its elements, which perhaps enter into fresh combinations, perhaps become permanently united with “their own kind.” There can be no question here of an immortal soul.

Even in life, we may see the attraction of like to like operating in animals just as it did in the upward and downward growth of plants. Hair is the same thing as foliage (fr. 82); and, generally speaking, the fiery part of animals tends upwards and the earthy part downwards, though there are exceptions, as may be seen in the case of certain shell-fish (fr. 76), where the earthy part is above. These exceptions are only possible because there is still a great deal of Love in the world. We also see the attraction of like for like in the different habits of the various species of animals. Those that have most fire in them fly up into the air; those in which earth preponderates take to the earth, as did the dog which always sat upon a tile. Aquatic animals are those in which water predominates. This does not, however, apply to fishes, which are very fiery, and take to the water to cool themselves. Aet. v. 15, 3; 21, 1 (Dox. p. 190). Aet. v. 25, 4 (Dox. p. 437). Aet. v. 19, 5 (Dox. p. 431). Cf. Eth. Eud. Η, 1. 1235 a 11. Arist. de Respir. 14. 477 a 32; Theophr. de causis plant. i. 21.

Empedokles paid great attention to the subject of respiration, and his very ingenious explanation of it has been preserved in a continuous form (fr. 100). We breathe, he held, through all the pores of the skin, not merely through the organs of respiration. The cause of the alternate inspiration and expiration of the breath was the movement of the blood from the heart to the surface of the body and back again, which was explained by the klepsydra. The nutrition and growth of animals is, of course, to be explained from the attraction of like to like. Each part of the body has pores into which the appropriate food will fit. Pleasure and pain were derived from the absence or presence of like elements, that is, of nourishment which would fit the pores. Tears and sweat arose from a disturbance which curdled the blood; they were, so to say, the whey of the blood. Nutrition, Aet. v. 27, 1; pleasure and pain, Aet. iv. 9, 15; v. 28, 1; tears and sweat, v. 22, 1. [Sidenote: Perception.] 118. For the theory of perception held by Empedokles we have the original words of Theophrastos:—

Empedokles speaks in the same way of all the senses, and says that perception is due to the “effluences” fitting into the passages of each sense. And that is why one cannot judge the objects of another; for the passages of some of them are too wide and those of others too narrow for the sensible object, so that the latter either goes through without touching or cannot enter at all. R. P. 177 b. He tries, too, to explain the nature of sight. He says that the interior of the eye consists of fire, while round about it is earth and air, through which its rarity enables the fire to pass like the light in lanterns (fr. 84). The passages of the fire and water are arranged alternately; through those of the fire we perceive light objects, through those of the water, dark; each class of objects fits into each class of passages, and the colours are carried to the sight by effluence. R. P. ib.

But eyes are not all composed in the same way; some are composed of like elements and some of opposite; some have the fire in the centre and some on the outside. That is why some animals are keen-sighted by day and others by night. Those which have less fire are keen-sighted in the daytime, for the fire within is brought up to an equality by that without; those which have less of the opposite (i.e. water), by night, for then their deficiency is supplemented. But, in the opposite case, each will behave in the opposite manner. Those eyes in which fire predominates will be dazzled in the daytime, since the fire being still further increased will stop up and occupy the pores of the water. Those in which water predominates will, he says, suffer the same at night, for the fire will be obstructed by the water. And this goes on till the water is separated off by the air, for in each case it is the opposite which is a remedy. The best tempered and the most excellent vision is one composed of both in equal proportions. This is practically what he says about sight.

Hearing, he holds, is produced by sound outside, when the air moved by the voice sounds inside the ear; for the sense of hearing is a sort of bell sounding inside the ear, which he calls a “fleshy sprout.” When the air is set in motion it strikes upon the solid parts and produces a sound. Smell, he holds, arises from respiration, and that is why those smell most keenly whose breath has the most violent motion, and why most smell comes from subtle and light bodies. As to touch and taste, he does not lay down how nor by means of what they arise, except that he gives us an explanation applicable to all, that sensation is produced by adaptation to the pores. Pleasure is produced by what is like in its elements and their mixture; pain, by what is opposite. R. P. ib.

And he gives a precisely similar account of thought and ignorance. Thought arises from what is like and ignorance from what is unlike, thus implying that thought is the same, or nearly the same, as perception. For after enumerating how we know each thing by means of itself, he adds, “for all things are fashioned and fitted together out of these, and it is by these men think and feel pleasure and pain” (fr. 107). And for this reason we think chiefly with our blood, for in it of all parts of the body all the elements are most completely mingled. R. P. 178.

All, then, in whom the mixture is equal or nearly so, and in whom the elements are neither at too great intervals nor too small or too large, are the wisest and have the most exact perceptions; and those who come next to them are wise in proportion. Those who are in the opposite condition are the most foolish. Those whose elements are separated by intervals and rare are dull and laborious; those in whom they are closely packed and broken into minute particles are impulsive, they attempt many things and finish few because of the rapidity with which their blood moves. Those who have a well-proportioned mixture in some one part of their bodies will be clever in that respect. That is why some are good orators and some good artificers. The latter have a good mixture in their hands, and the former in their tongues, and so with all other special capacities. R. P. ib. That is, watery vapour, not the elemental air or αἰθήρ (§ 107). It is identical with the “water” mentioned below. It is unnecessary, therefore, to insert καὶ ὕδωρ after πῦρ with Karsten and Diels. Beare, p. 96, n. 1. Ibid. p. 133.

Perception, then, is due to the meeting of an element in us with the same element outside. This takes place when the pores of the organ of sense are neither too large nor too small for the “effluences” which all things are constantly giving off (fr. 89). Smell was explained by respiration. The breath drew in along with it the small particles which fit into the pores. From Aetios we learn that Empedokles proved this by the example of people with a cold in their head, who cannot smell, just because they have a difficulty in breathing. We also see from fr. 101 that the scent of dogs was referred to in support of the theory. Empedokles seems to have given no detailed account of smell, and did not refer to touch at all. Hearing was explained by the motion of the air which struck upon the cartilage inside the ear and made it swing and sound like a bell. Aet. iv. 17, 2 (Dox. p. 407). Beare, p. 133. Beare, pp. 161-3, 180-81. Ibid. pp. 95 sqq.

The theory of vision is more complicated; and, as Plato adopted most of it, it is of great importance in the history of philosophy. The eye was conceived, as by Alkmaion (§ 96), to be composed of fire and water. Just as in a lantern the flame is protected from the wind by horn (fr. 84), so the fire in the iris is protected from the water which surrounds it in the pupil by membranes with very fine pores, so that, while the fire can pass out, the water cannot get in. Sight is produced by the fire inside the eye going forth to meet the object. This seems strange to us, because we are accustomed to the idea of images being impressed upon the retina. But looking at a thing no doubt seemed much more like an action proceeding from the eye than a mere passive state. Ibid. pp. 14 sqq. Theophr. de sens. 26.

He was quite aware, too, that “effluences,” as he called them, came from things to the eyes as well; for he defined colours as “effluences from forms (or ‘things’) fitting into the pores and perceived.” It is not quite clear how these two accounts of vision were reconciled, or how far we are entitled to credit Empedokles with the Platonic theory. The statements which have been quoted seem to imply something very like it. The definition is quoted from Gorgias in Plato, Men. 76 d 4. All our MSS. have ἀπορραοὶ σχημάτων, but Ven. T has in the margin γρ. χρημάτων, which may well be an old tradition. The Ionic for “things” is χρήματα. See Diels, Empedokles und Gorgias, p. 439. See Beare, Elementary Cognition, p. 18.

Theophrastos tells us that Empedokles made no distinction between thought and perception, a remark already made by Aristotle. The chief seat of perception was the blood, in which the four elements are most evenly mixed, and especially the blood near the heart (fr. 105). This does not, however, exclude the idea that other parts of the body may perceive also; indeed, Empedokles held that all things have their share of thought (fr. 103). But the blood was specially sensitive because of its finer mixture. From this it naturally follows that Empedokles adopted the view, already maintained in the Second Part of the poem of Parmenides (fr. 16), that our knowledge varies with the varying constitution of our bodies (fr. 106). This consideration became very important later on as one of the foundations of scepticism; but Empedokles himself only drew from it the conclusion that we must make the best use we can of our senses, and check one by the other (fr. 4). Arist. de An. Γ, 3. 427 a 21.

R. P. 178 a. This was the characteristic doctrine of the Sicilian school, from whom it passed to Aristotle and the Stoics. Plato and Hippokrates, on the other hand, adopted the view of Alkmaion (§ 97) that the brain was the seat of consciousness. Kritias (Arist. de An. Α, 2. 405 b 6) probably got the Sicilian doctrine from Gorgias. At a later date, Philistion of Syracuse, Plato’s friend, substituted the ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα (“animal spirits”) which circulated along with the blood. Beare, p. 253. [Sidenote: Theology and religion.] 119. The theoretical theology of Empedokles reminds us of Xenophanes, his practical religious teaching of Pythagoras and the Orphics. We are told in the earlier part of the poem that certain “gods” are composed of the elements; and that therefore though they “live long lives” they must pass away (fr. 21). We have seen that the elements and the Sphere are also called gods, but that is in quite another sense of the word.

If we turn to the religious teaching of the Purifications, we find that everything turns on the doctrine of transmigration. On the general significance of this enough has been said above (§ 42); the details given by Empedokles are peculiar. According to a decree of Necessity, “daemons” who have sinned are forced to wander from their home in heaven for three times ten thousand seasons (fr. 115). He himself is such an exiled divinity, and has fallen from his high estate because he put his trust in raving Strife. The four elements toss him from one to the other with loathing; and so he has not only been a human being and a plant, but even a fish. The only way to purify oneself from the taint of original sin was by the cultivation of ceremonial holiness, by purifications, and abstinence from animal flesh. For the animals are our kinsmen (fr. 137), and it is parricide to lay hands on them. In all this there are, no doubt, certain points of contact with the cosmology. We have the “mighty oath” (fr. 115; cf. fr. 30), the four elements, Hate as the source of original sin, and Kypris as queen in the Golden Age (fr. 128). But these points are neither fundamental nor of great importance. And it cannot be denied that there are really contradictions between the two poems. That, however, is just what we should expect to find. All through this period, there seems to have been a gulf between men’s religious beliefs, if they had any, and their cosmological views. The few points of contact which we have mentioned may have been sufficient to hide this from Empedokles himself.

ANAXAGORAS OF KLAZOMENAI [Sidenote: Date.] 120. All that Apollodoros tells us with regard to the date of Anaxagoras seems to rest upon the authority of Demetrios Phalereus, who said of him, in the Register of Archons, that he began to study philosophy, at the age of twenty, in the archonship of Kallias or Kalliades at Athens (480-79 B.C.). This date was probably derived from a calculation based upon the philosopher’s age at the time of his trial, which Demetrios had every opportunity of learning from sources no longer extant. Apollodoros inferred that Anaxagoras was born in Ol. LXX. (500-496 B.C.), and he adds that he died at the age of seventy-two in Ol. LXXXVIII. 1 (428-27 B.C.). He doubtless thought it natural that he should not survive Perikles, and still more natural that he should die the year Plato was born. We have a further statement, of doubtful origin, but probably due to Demetrios also, that Anaxagoras lived at Athens for thirty years. This may be a genuine tradition; and if so, we get from about 462 to 432 B.C. as the time he lived there.

Diog. ii. 7 (R. P. 148), with the perfectly certain emendation referred to ib. 148 c. The Athens of 480 B.C. would hardly be a suitable place to “begin philosophising”! For the variation in the archon’s name, see Jacoby, p. 244, n. 1. We must read ὀγδοηκοστῆς with Meursius to make the figures come right. On the statements of Apollodoros, see Jacoby, pp. 244 sqq. Diog., loc. cit. In any case, it is not a mere calculation of Apollodoros’s; for he would certainly have made Anaxagoras forty years old at the date of his arrival in Athens, and this would give at most twenty-eight years for his residence there. The trial cannot have been later than 432 B.C., and may have been earlier. There can be no doubt that these dates are very nearly right. Aristotle tells us that Anaxagoras was older than Empedokles, who was born about 490 B.C. (§ 98); and Theophrastos said that Empedokles was born “not long after Anaxagoras.” Demokritos, too, said that he himself was a young man in the old age of Anaxagoras, and he must have been born about 460 B.C. Arist. Met. Α, 3. 984 a 11 (R. P. 150 a). Phys. Op. fr. 3 (Dox. p. 477), ap. Simpl. Phys. p. 25, 19 (R. P. 162 e).

Diog. ix. 41 (R. P. 187). On the date of Demokritos, see Chap. IX. § 171. [Sidenote: Early life.] 121. Anaxagoras was born at Klazomenai, and Theophrastos tells us that his father’s name was Hegesiboulos. The names of both father and son have an aristocratic sound, and we may assume they belonged to a family which had won distinction in the State. Nor need we reject the tradition that Anaxagoras neglected his possessions to follow science. It is certain, at any rate, that in the fourth century he was already regarded as the type of the man who leads the “theoretic life.” Of course the story of his contempt for worldly goods was seized on later by the historical novelist and tricked out with the usual apophthegms. These do not concern us here. Phys. Op. fr. 4 (Dox. p. 478), repeated by the doxographers. Plato, Hipp. ma. 283 a, τοὐναντίον γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ φασὶ συμβῆναι ἢ ὑμῖν· καταλειφθέντων γὰρ αὐτῷ παλλῶν χρημάτων καταμελῆσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι πάντα· οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀνόητα σοφίζεσθαι. Cf. Plut. Per. 16. Arist. Eth. Nic. Κ, 9. 1179 a 13. Cf. Eth. Eud. Α, 4. 1215 b 6 and 15, 1216 a 10.

One incident belonging to the early manhood of Anaxagoras is recorded, namely, his observation of the huge meteoric stone which fell into the Aigospotamos in 468-67 B.C. Our authorities tell us that he predicted this phenomenon, which is plainly absurd. But we shall see reason to believe that it may have occasioned one of his most striking departures from the earlier cosmology, and led to his adoption of the very view for which he was condemned at Athens. At all events, the fall of the stone made a profound impression at the time, and it was still shown to tourists in the days of Pliny and Plutarch. Diog. ii. 10 (R. P. 149 a). Pliny, N.H. ii. 149, gives the date as Ol. LXXVIII. 2; and Eusebios gives it under Ol. LXXVIII. 3. But cf. Marm. Par. 57, ἀφ’ οὗ ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς ὁ λίθος ἔπεσε ... ἔτη ΗΗΠ, ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησι Θεαγενίδου, which is 468-67 B.C. The text of Diog. ii. 11 is corrupt. For suggested restorations, see Jacoby, p. 244, n. 2; and Diels, Vors. p. 294, 28. Pliny, loc. cit., “qui lapis etiam nunc ostenditur magnitudine vehis colore adusto.” Cf. Plut. Lys. 12, καὶ δείκνυται ... ἔτι νῦν. [Sidenote: Relation to the Ionic school.]

122. The doxographers speak of Anaxagoras as the pupil of Anaximenes. This is, of course, out of the question; Anaximenes most probably died before Anaxagoras was born. But it is not enough to say that the statement arose from the fact that the name of Anaxagoras followed that of Anaximenes in the Successions. That is true, no doubt; but it is not the whole truth. We have its original source in a fragment of Theophrastos himself, which states that Anaxagoras had been “an associate of the philosophy of Anaximenes.” Now this expression has a very distinct meaning if we accept the view as to “schools” of science set forth in the Introduction (§ XIV.). It means that the old Ionic school survived the destruction of Miletos in 494 B.C., and continued to flourish in the other cities of Asia. It means, further, that it produced no man of distinction after its third great representative, and that “the philosophy of Anaximenes” was still taught by whoever was now at the head of the society.

Cicero, de nat. D. i. 26 (after Philodemos), “Anaxagoras qui accepit ab Anaximene disciplinam (i.e. διήκουσε)”; Diog. i. 13 (R. P. 4) and ii. 6; Strabo, xiv. p. 645, Κλαζομένιος δ’ ἦν ἀνὴρ ἐπιφανὴς Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ φυσικός Ἀναξιμένους ὁμιλητής; Euseb. P.E. p. 504; [Galen] Hist. Phil. 3; Augustine, de Civ. Dei, viii. 2. Phys. Op. fr. 4 (Dox. p. 478), Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν γὰρ Ἡγησιβούλου Κλαζομένιος κοινωνήσας τῆς Ἀναξιμένους φιλοσοφίας κ.τ.λ. In his fifth edition (p. 973, n. 2) Zeller adopts the view given in the text, and confirms it by comparing the very similar statement as to Leukippos, κοινωνήσας Παρμενίδῃ τὴς φιλοσοφίας. See below, Chap. IX. § 172.

At this point, it may be well to indicate briefly the conclusions to which we shall come in the next few chapters with regard to the development of philosophy during the first half of the fifth century B.C. We shall find that, while the old Ionic school was still capable of training great men, it was now powerless to keep them. Anaxagoras went his own way; Melissos and Leukippos, though they still retained enough of the old views to bear witness to the source of their inspiration, were too strongly influenced by the Eleatic dialectic to remain content with the theories of Anaximenes. It was left to second-rate minds like Diogenes to champion the orthodox system, while third-rate minds like Hippon of Samos even went back to the cruder theory of Thales. The details of this anticipatory sketch will become clearer as we go on; for the present, it is only necessary to call the reader’s attention to the fact that the old Ionic Philosophy now forms a sort of background to our story, just as Orphic and Pythagorean religious ideas have done in the preceding chapters. [Sidenote: Anaxagoras at Athens.]

123. Anaxagoras was the first philosopher to take up his abode at Athens. We are not to suppose, however, that he was attracted thither by anything in the character of the Athenians. No doubt Athens had now become the political centre of the Hellenic world; but it had not yet produced a single scientific man. On the contrary, the temper of the citizen body was and remained hostile to free inquiry of any kind. Sokrates, Anaxagoras, and Aristotle fell victims in different degrees to the bigotry of the democracy, though, of course, their offence was political rather than religious. They were condemned not as heretics, but as innovators in the state religion. Still, as a recent historian observes, “Athens in its flourishing period was far from being a place for free inquiry to thrive unchecked.” It is this, no doubt, that has been in the minds of those writers who have represented philosophy as something un-Greek. It was in reality thoroughly Greek, though it was thoroughly un-Athenian. Holm, Gr. Gesch. ii. 334. The whole chapter is well worth reading in this connexion.

It seems most reasonable to suppose that Perikles himself brought Anaxagoras to Athens, just as he brought everything else he could. Holm has shown with much skill how the aim of that great statesman was, so to say, to Ionise his fellow-citizens, to impart to them something of the flexibility and openness of mind which characterised their kinsmen across the sea. It is possible that it was Aspasia of Miletos who introduced the Ionian philosopher to the Periklean circle, of which he was henceforth a chief ornament. The Athenians in derision gave him the nickname of Nous. Plut. Per. 4 (R. P. 148 c). I follow Zeller, p. 975, n. 1 (Eng. trans. ii. p. 327, n. 4), in regarding the sobriquet as derisive.

The close relation in which Anaxagoras stood to Perikles is placed beyond the reach of doubt by the testimony of Plato. In the Phaedrus he makes Sokrates say: “For all arts that are great, there is need of talk and discussion on the parts of natural science that deal with things on high; for that seems to be the source which inspires high-mindedness and effectiveness in every direction. Perikles added this very acquirement to his original gifts. He fell in, it seems, with Anaxagoras, who was a scientific man; and, satiating himself with the theory of things on high, and having attained to a knowledge of the true nature of intellect and folly, which were just what the discourses of Anaxagoras were mainly about, he drew from that source whatever was of a nature to further him in the art of speech.” 270 a (R. P. 148 c).

A more difficult question is the alleged relation of Euripides to Anaxagoras. The oldest authority for it is Alexander of Aitolia, poet and librarian, who lived at the court of Ptolemy Philadelphos (c. 280 B.C.). He referred to Euripides as the “nursling of brave Anaxagoras.” A great deal of ingenuity has been expended in trying to find the system of Anaxagoras in the choruses of Euripides; but, it must now be admitted, without result. The famous fragment on the blessedness of the scientific life might just as well refer to any other cosmologist as to Anaxagoras, and indeed suggests more naturally a thinker of a more primitive type. On the other hand, there is one fragment which distinctly expounds the central thought of Anaxagoras, and could hardly be referred to any one else. We may conclude, then, that Euripides knew the philosopher and his views, but it is not safe to go further. Gell. xv. 20, “Alexander autem Aetolus hos de Euripide versus composuit”; ὁ δ’ Ἀναξαγόρου τρόφιμος χαιοῦ (so Valckenaer for ἀρχαίου) κ.τ.λ. The question was first raised by Valckenaer (Diatribe, p. 26). Cf. also Wilamowitz, Analecta Euripidea, pp. 162 sqq.

See Introd. p. 12, n. 14. The fragment is quoted R. P. 148 c. The words ἀθανάτου φύσεως and κόσμον ἀγήρω carry us back rather to the older Milesians. R. P. 150 b. [Sidenote: The trial.]

124. Shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the enemies of Perikles began a series of attacks upon him through his friends. Pheidias was the first to suffer, and Anaxagoras was the next. That he was an object of special hatred to the religious party need not surprise us, even though the charge made against him does not suggest that he went out of his way to hurt their susceptibilities. The details of the trial are somewhat obscure, but we can make out a few points. The first step taken was the introduction of a psephism by Diopeithes—the same whom Aristophanes laughs at in The Birds—enacting that an impeachment should be brought against those who did not practise religion, and taught theories about “the things on high.” What happened at the actual trial is very differently related. Our authorities give hopelessly conflicting accounts. It is no use attempting to reconcile these; it is enough to insist upon what is certain. Now we know from Plato what the accusation was. It was that Anaxagoras taught the sun was a red-hot stone, and the moon earth; and we shall see that he certainly did hold these views (§ 133). For the rest, the most plausible account is that he was got out of prison and sent away by Perikles. We know that such things were possible at Athens.

Both Ephoros (represented by Diod. xii. 38) and the source of Plut. Per. 32 made these attacks immediately precede the war. This may, however, be pragmatic; they perhaps occurred earlier. Birds, 988. Aristophanes had no respect for orthodoxy when combined with democratic opinions. Plut. Per. 32 (R. P. 148), where some of the original words have been preserved. The phrase τὰ θεῖα and the word μετάρσια are archaisms from the ψήφισμα. These accounts are repeated by Diog. ii. 12-14. It is worth while to put the statements of Satyros and Sotion side by side in order to show the unsatisfactory character of the biographical tradition:— │ Sotion. │ Satyros. Accuser. │Kleon. │Thoukydides s. of Melesias. Charge. │Calling the sun a red-hot │Impiety and Medism. │mass. │ Sentence. │Fined five talents. │Sentenced to death in absence. Hermippos represents Anaxagoras as already in prison under sentence of death when Perikles shamed the people into letting him off. Lastly, Hieronymos says he never was condemned at all. Perikles brought him into court thin and wasted by disease, and the judges acquitted him out of compassion! The Medism alleged by Satyros no doubt comes from Stesimbrotos, who made Anaxagoras the friend of Themistokles instead of Perikles. This, too, explains the accuser’s name (Busolt, Gr. Gesch. p. 306, n. 3). Apol. 26 d.

Plut. Nic. 23 (R. P. 148 c). Cf. Per. 32 (R. P. 148). Driven from his adopted home, Anaxagoras naturally went back to Ionia, where at least he would be free to teach what he pleased. He settled at Lampsakos, and we shall see reason to believe that he founded a school there. Probably he did not live long after his exile. The Lampsakenes erected an altar to his memory in their market-place, dedicated to Mind and Truth; and the anniversary of his death was long kept as a holiday for school-children, it was said at his own request. See the account of Archelaos in Chap. X. § 191. The oldest authority for the honours paid to Anaxagoras is Alkidamas, the pupil of Gorgias, who said these were still kept up in his own time. Arist. Rhet. Β, 23. 1398 b 15. [Sidenote: Writings.]

125. Diogenes includes Anaxagoras in his list of philosophers who left only a single book, and he has also preserved the accepted criticism of it, namely, that it was written “in a lofty and agreeable style.” There is no evidence of any weight to set against this testimony, which comes ultimately from the librarians of Alexandria. The story that Anaxagoras wrote a treatise on perspective as applied to scene-painting is most improbable; and the statement that he composed a mathematical work dealing with the quadrature of the circle is due to misunderstanding of an expression in Plutarch. We learn from the passage in the Apology, referred to above, that the works of Anaxagoras could be bought at Athens for a single drachma; and that the book was of some length may be gathered from the way in which Plato goes on to speak of it. In the sixth century A.D. Simplicius had access to a copy, doubtless in the library of the Academy; and it is to him we owe the preservation of all our fragments, with one or two very doubtful exceptions. Unfortunately his quotations seem to be confined to the First Book, that dealing with general principles, so that we are left somewhat in the dark with regard to the treatment of details. This is the more unfortunate, as it was Anaxagoras who first gave the true theory of the moon’s light and, therefore, the true theory of eclipses.

Diog. i. 16; ii. 6 (R. P. 5; 153). Schaubach (An. Claz. Fragm. p. 57) fabricated a work entitled τὸ πρὸς Λεχίνεον out of the pseudo-Aristotelian de plantis, 817 a 27. But the Latin version of Alfred, which is the original of the Greek, has simply et ideo dicit lechineon; and this appears to be due to a failure to make out the Arabic text from which the Latin version was derived. Cf. Meyer, Gesch. d. Bot. i. 60. It comes from Vitruvius, vii. pr. 11. A forger, seeking to decorate his production with a great name, would think naturally of the philosopher who was said to have taught Euripides. Plut. de Exilio, 607 f. The words merely mean that he used to draw mathematical figures relating to the quadrature of the circle on the prison floor. Apol. 26 d-e. The expression βιβλία perhaps implies that it filled more than one roll. Simplicius also speaks of βιβλία. [Sidenote: The Fragments.] 126. I give the fragments according to the text and arrangement of Diels, who has made some of them completely intelligible for the first time.

(1) All things were together infinite both in number and in smallness; for the small too was infinite. And, when all things were together, none of them could be distinguished for their smallness. For air and aether prevailed over all things, being both of them infinite; for amongst all things these are the greatest both in quantity and size. R. P. 151. (2) For air and aether are separated off from the mass that surrounds the world, and the surrounding mass is infinite in quantity. R. P. ib. (3) Nor is there a least of what is small, but there is always a smaller; for it cannot be that what is should cease to be by being cut. But there is also always something greater than what is great, and it is equal to the small in amount, and, compared with itself, each thing is both great and small. R. P. 159 a.

(4) And since these things are so, we must suppose that there are contained many things and of all sorts in the things that are uniting, seeds of all things, with all sorts of shapes and colours and savours (R. P. ib.), and that men have been formed in them, and the other animals that have life, and that these men have inhabited cities and cultivated fields as with us; and that they have a sun and a moon and the rest as with us; and that their earth brings forth for them many things of all kinds of which they gather the best together into their dwellings, and use them (R. P. 160 b). Thus much have I said with regard to separating off, to show that it will not be only with us that things are separated off, but elsewhere too.

But before they were separated off, when all things were together, not even was any colour distinguishable; for the mixture of all things prevented it—of the moist and the dry, and the warm and the cold, and the light and the dark, and of much earth that was in it, and of a multitude of innumerable seeds in no way like each other. For none of the other things either is like any other. And these things being so, we must hold that all things are in the whole. R. P. 151. (5) And those things having been thus decided, we must know that all of them are neither more nor less; for it is not possible for them to be more than all, and all are always equal. R. P. 151.

(6) And since the portions of the great and of the small are equal in amount, for this reason, too, all things will be in everything; nor is it possible for them to be apart, but all things have a portion of everything. Since it is impossible for there to be a least thing, they cannot be separated, nor come to be by themselves; but they must be now, just as they were in the beginning, all together. And in all things many things are contained, and an equal number both in the greater and in the smaller of the things that are separated off. (7) ... So that we cannot know the number of the things that are separated off, either in word or deed. (8) The things that are in one world are not divided nor cut off from one another with a hatchet, neither the warm from the cold nor the cold from the warm. R. P. 155 e. (9) ... as these things revolve and are separated out by the force and swiftness. And the swiftness makes the force. Their swiftness is not like the swiftness of any of the things that are now among men, but in every way many times as swift.

(10) How can hair come from what is not hair, or flesh from what is not flesh? R. P. 155 f, n. 1. (11) In everything there is a portion of everything except Nous, and there are some things in which there is Nous also. R. P. 160 b.

(12) All other things partake in a portion of everything, while Nous is infinite and self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing, but is alone, itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything else, it would partake in all things if it were mixed with any; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as has been said by me in what goes before, and the things mixed with it would hinder it, so that it would have power over nothing in the same way that it has now being alone by itself. For it is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest strength; and Nous has power over all things, both greater and smaller, that have life. And Nous had power over the whole revolution, so that it began to revolve in the beginning. And it began to revolve first from a small beginning; but the revolution now extends over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And all the things that are mingled together and separated off and distinguished are all known by Nous. And Nous set in order all things that were to be, and all things that were and are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and the aether that are separated off. And this revolution caused the separating off, and the rare is separated off from the dense, the warm from the cold, the light from the dark, and the dry from the moist. And there are many portions in many things. But no thing is altogether separated off nor distinguished from anything else except Nous. And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it R. P. 155.

(13) And when Nous began to move things, separating off took place from all that was moved, and so far as Nous set in motion all was separated. And as things were set in motion and separated, the revolution caused them to be separated much more. (14) And Nous, which ever is, is certainly there, where everything else is, in the surrounding mass, and in what has been united with it and separated off from it. (15) The dense and the moist and the cold and the dark came together where the earth is now, while the rare and the warm and the dry (and the bright) went out towards the further part of the aether. R. P. 156. (16) From these as they are separated off earth is solidified; for from mists water is separated off, and from water earth. From the earth stones are solidified by the cold, and these rush outwards more than water. R. P. 156. (17) The Hellenes follow a wrong usage in speaking of coming into being and passing away; for nothing comes into being or passes away, but there is mingling and separation of things that are. So they would be right to call coming into being mixture, and passing away separation. R. P. 150.

(18) It is the sun that puts brightness into the moon. (19) We call rainbow the reflexion of the sun in the clouds. Now it is a sign of storm; for the water that flows round the cloud causes wind or pours down in rain. (20) With the rise of the Dogstar men begin the harvest; with its setting they begin to till the fields. It is hidden for forty days and nights. (21) From the weakness of our senses we are not able to judge the truth. (21_a_) What appears is a vision of the unseen. (21_b_) (We can make use of the lower animals) because we use our own experience and memory and wisdom and art. (22) What is called “birds’ milk” is the white of the egg. Simplicius tells us that this fragment was at the beginning of Book I. The familiar sentence quoted by Diog. ii. 6 (R. P. 153) is not a fragment of Anaxagoras, but a summary, like the πάντα ῥεῖ ascribed to Herakleitos (Chap. III. p. 162). Zeller’s τομῇ still seems to me a convincing correction of the MS. τὸ μή, which Diels retains.

I had already pointed out in the first edition that Simplicius quotes this three times as a continuous fragment, and that we are not entitled to break it up. Diels now prints it as a single passage. Simplicius gives fr. 14 thus (p. 157, 5): ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὅσα ἐστί τε κάρτα καὶ νῦν ἐστιν. Diels now reads ὁ δὲ νοῦς, ὃς ἀ<εί> ἐστί, τὸ κάρτα καὶ νῦν ἐστιν. The correspondence of ἀεὶ ... καὶ νῦν is strongly in favour of this. On the text of fr. 15, see R. P. 156 a. I have followed Schorn in adding καὶ τὸ λαμπρόν from Hippolytos. [Sidenote: Anaxagoras and his predecessors.] 127. The system of Anaxagoras, like that of Empedokles, aimed at reconciling the Eleatic doctrine that corporeal substance is unchangeable with the existence of a world which everywhere presents the appearance of coming into being and passing away. The conclusions of Parmenides are frankly accepted and restated. Nothing can be added to all things; for there cannot be more than all, and all is always equal (fr. 5). Nor can anything pass away. What men commonly call coming into being and passing away is really mixture and separation (fr. 17).

This last fragment reads almost like a prose paraphrase of Empedokles (fr. 9); and it is in every way probable that Anaxagoras derived his theory of mixture from his younger contemporary, whose poem was most likely published before his own treatise. We have seen how Empedokles sought to save the world of appearance by maintaining that the opposites—hot and cold, moist and dry—were things, each one of which was real in the Parmenidean sense. Anaxagoras regarded this as inadequate. Everything changes into everything else, the things of which the world is made are not “cut off with a hatchet” (fr. 8) in this way. On the contrary, the true formula must be: There is a portion of everything in everything (fr. 11). This is doubtless the meaning of the words τοῖς ἔργοις ὕστερος in Arist. Met. Α, 3. 984 a 12 (R. P. 150 a); though ἔργα certainly does not mean “writings” or opera omnia, but simply “achievements.” The other possible interpretations are “more advanced in his views” and “inferior in his teaching” (Zeller, p. 1023, n. 2). Arist. Phys. Α, 4. 187 b 1 (R. P. 155 a). [Sidenote: “Everything in everything.”]

128. A part of the argument by which Anaxagoras sought to prove this point has been preserved in a corrupt form by Aetios, and Diels has recovered some of the original words from the scholiast on St. Gregory Nazianzene. “We use a simple nourishment,” he said, “when we eat the fruit of Demeter or drink water. But how can hair be made of what is not hair, or flesh of what is not flesh?” (fr. 10). That is just the sort of question the early Milesians must have asked, only the physiological interest has now definitely replaced the meteorological. We shall find a similar train of reasoning in Diogenes of Apollonia (fr. 2). Aet. i. 3, 5 (Dox. p. 279). See R. P. 155 f and n. 1. I read καρπὸν with Usener.

The statement that there is a portion of everything in everything, is not to be understood as referring simply to the original mixture of things before the formation of the worlds (fr. 1). On the contrary, even now “all things are together,” and everything, however small and however great, has an equal number of “portions” (fr. 6). A smaller particle of matter could only contain a smaller number of portions, if one of those portions ceased to be; but if anything is, in the full Parmenidean sense, it is impossible that mere division should make it cease to be (fr. 3). Matter is infinitely divisible; for there is no least thing, any more than there is a greatest. But however great or small a body may be, it contains just the same number of “portions,” that is, a portion of everything. [Sidenote: The portions.]

129. What are these “things” of which everything contains a portion? It once was usual to represent the theory of Anaxagoras as if he had said that wheat, for instance, contained small particles of flesh, blood, bones, and the like; but we have just seen that matter is infinitely divisible (fr. 3), and that there are as many “portions” in the smallest particle as in the greatest (fr. 6). This is fatal to the old view. If everything were made up of minute particles of everything else, we could certainly arrive at a point where everything was “unmixed,” if only we carried division far enough. This difficulty can only be solved in one way. In fr. 8 the examples given of things which are not “cut off from one another with a hatchet” are the hot and the cold; and elsewhere (frs. 4, 15), mention is made of the other traditional “opposites.” Aristotle says that, if we suppose the first principles to be infinite, they may either be one in kind, as with Demokritos, or opposite. Simplicius, following Porphyry and Themistios, refers the latter view to Anaxagoras; and Aristotle himself implies that the opposites of Anaxagoras had as much right to be called first principles as the “homoeomeries.”

See Tannery, Science hellène, pp. 283 sqq. I still think that Tannery’s interpretation is substantially right, though his statement of it requires some modification. Arist. Phys. Α, 2. 184 b 21, ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ γένος ἔν, σχήματι δὲ ἢ εἴδει διαφερούσας, ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας. Phys. p. 44, 1. He goes on to refer to θερμότητας ... καὶ ψυχρότητας ξηρότητάς τε καὶ ὑγρότητας μανότητάς τε καὶ πυκνότητας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας κατὰ ποιότητα ἐναντιότητας. He observes, however, that Alexander rejected this interpretation and took διαφερούσας ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας closely together as both referring to Demokritos. Phys. Α, 4. 187 a 25, τὸν μὲν (Ἀναξαγόραν) ἄπειρα ποιεῖν τά τε ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ τἀναντία. Aristotle’s own theory only differs from this in so far as he makes ὕλη prior to the ἐναντία. It is of those opposites, then, and not of the different forms of matter, that everything contains a portion. Every particle, however large or however small, contains every one of those opposite qualities. That which is hot is also to a certain extent cold. Even snow, Anaxagoras affirmed, was black; that is, even the white contains a certain portion of the opposite quality. It is enough to indicate the connexion of this with the views of Herakleitos (§ 80). Sext. Pyrrh. i. 33 (R. P. 161 b).

The connexion was already noted by the eclectic Herakleitean to whom I attribute Περὶ διαίτης, i. 3-4 (see above, Chap. III. p. 167, n. 383). Cf. the words ἔχει δὲ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ ὑγρόν· ἔνι γὰρ ἐν πυρὶ ὑγρότης· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ ξηρόν· ἔνι γὰρ καὶ ἐν ὕδατι ξηρόν. [Sidenote: Seeds.]

130. The difference, then, between the theory of Anaxagoras and that of Empedokles is this. Empedokles had taught that, if you divide the various things which make up this world, and in particular the parts of the body, such as flesh, bones, and the like, far enough, you come to the four “roots” or elements, which are, accordingly, the ultimate reality. Anaxagoras held that, however far you may divide any of these things—and they are infinitely divisible—you never come to a part so small that it does not contain portions of all the opposites. The smallest portion of bone is still bone. On the other hand, everything can pass into everything else just because the “seeds,” as he called them, of each form of matter contain a portion of everything, that is, of all the opposites, though in different proportions. If we are to use the word “element” at all, it is these seeds that are the elements in the system of Anaxagoras.

Aristotle expresses this by saying that Anaxagoras regards the ὁμοιομερῆ as στοιχεῖα. We have seen that the term στοιχεῖον is of later date than Anaxagoras, and it is natural to suppose that the word ὁμοιομερῆ is also only Aristotle’s name for the “seeds.” In his own system, the ὁμοιομερῆ are intermediate between the elements (στοιχεῖα), of which they are composed, and the organs (ὄργανα), which are composed of them. The heart cannot be divided into hearts, but the parts of flesh are flesh. That being so, Aristotle’s statement is quite intelligible from his own point of view, but there is no reason for supposing that Anaxagoras expressed himself in that particular way. All we are entitled to infer is that he said the “seeds,” which he had substituted for the “roots” of Empedokles, were not the opposites in a state of separation, but each contained a portion of them all. If Anaxagoras had used the term “homoeomeries” himself, it would be strange that Simplicius should quote no fragment containing it.

Arist. de Gen. Corr. Α, 1, 314 a 18, ὁ μὲν γὰρ (Anaxagoras) τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ στοιχεῖα τίθησιν, οἷον ὀστοῦν καὶ σάρκα καὶ μυελόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἑκάστῳ συνώνυμον τὸ μέρος ἐστίν. This was, of course, repeated by Theophrastos and the doxographers; but it is to be noted that Aetios, supposing as he does that Anaxagoras himself used the term, gives it an entirely wrong meaning. He says that the ὁμοιομέρειαι were so called from the likeness of the particles of the τροφή to those of the body (Dox. 279 a 21; R. P. 155 f). Lucretius, i. 830 sqq. (R. P. 150 a) has a similar account of the matter, derived from Epicurean sources. Obviously, it cannot be reconciled with what Aristotle says. It is more likely that we have a trace of the terminology of Anaxagoras himself in Περὶ διαίτης, 3, μέρεα μερέων, ὅλα ὅλων.

The difference between the two systems may also be regarded from another point of view. Anaxagoras was not obliged by his theory to regard the elements of Empedokles as primary, a view to which there were obvious objections, especially in the case of earth. He explained them in quite another way. Though everything has a portion of everything in it, things appear to be that of which there is most in them (fr. 12 sub fin.). We may say, then, that Air is that in which there is most cold, Fire that in which there is most heat, and so on, without giving up the view that there is a portion of cold in the fire and a portion of heat in the air. The great masses which Empedokles had taken for elements are really vast collections of all manner of “seeds.” Each of them is, in fact, a πανσπερμία. Cf. above, p. 305.

Arist. de Gen. Corr. Α, 1. 314 a 29. The word πανσπερμία was used by Demokritos (Arist. de An. 404 a 8; R. P. 200), and it occurs in the Περὶ διαίτης (loc. cit.). It seems natural to suppose that it was used by Anaxagoras himself, as he used the term σπέρματα. Much difficulty has been caused by the apparent inclusion of Water and Fire among the ὁμοιομερῆ in Arist. Met. Α, 3. 984 a 11 (R. P. 150 a). Bonitz understands the words καθάπερ ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ to mean “as we have just seen that Fire and Water do in the system of Empedokles.” In any case, καθάπερ goes closely with οὕτω, and the general sense is that Anaxagoras applies to the ὁμοιομερῆ what is really true of the στοιχεῖα. It would be better to delete the comma after πῦρ and add one after φησι, for συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει μόνον is explanatory of οὕτω ... καθάπερ. In the next sentence, I read ἁπλῶς for ἄλλως with Zeller (Arch. ii. p. 261). See also Arist. de Caelo, Γ, 3. 302 b 1 (R. P. 150 a), where the matter is very clearly put. [Sidenote: “All things together.”]

131. From all this it follows that, when “all things were together,” and when the different seeds of things were mixed together in infinitely small particles (fr. 1), the appearance presented would be that of one of what had hitherto been regarded as the primary substances. As a matter of fact, they did present the appearance of “air and aether”; for the qualities (things) which belong to these prevail in quantity over all other things in the universe, and everything is most obviously that of which it has most in it (fr. 12 sub fin.). Here, then, Anaxagoras attaches himself to Anaximenes. The primary condition of things, before the formation of the worlds, is much the same in both; only, with Anaxagoras, the original mass is no longer the primary substance, but a mixture of innumerable seeds divided into infinitely small parts.

This mass is infinite, like the air of Anaximenes, and it supports itself, since there is nothing surrounding it. Further, the “seeds” of all things which it contains are infinite in number (fr. 1). But, as the innumerable seeds may be divided into those in which the portions of cold, moist, dense, and dark prevail, and those which have most of the warm, dry, rare, and light in them, we may say that the original mass was a mixture of infinite Air and of infinite Fire. The seeds of Air, of course, contain “portions” of the “things” that predominate in Fire, and vice versa; but we regard everything as being that of which it has most in it. Lastly, there is no void in this mixture, an addition to the theory made necessary by the arguments of Parmenides. It is, however, worthy of note that Anaxagoras added an experimental proof of this to the purely dialectical one of the Eleatics. He used the klepsydra experiment as Empedokles had done (fr. 100), and also showed the corporeal nature of air by means of inflated skins. Arist. Phys. Γ, 5. 205 b 1 (R. P. 154 a).

Phys. Ζ, 6. 213 a 22 (R. P. 159). We have a full discussion of the experiments with the klepsydra in Probl. 914 b 9 sqq., a passage which we have already used to illustrate Empedokles, fr. 100. See above, p. 253, n. 565. [Sidenote: Nous.]

132. Like Empedokles, Anaxagoras required some external cause to produce motion in the mixture. Body, Parmenides had shown, would never move itself, as the Milesians had supposed. Anaxagoras called the cause of motion by the name of Nous. It was this which made Aristotle say that he “stood out like a sober man from the random talkers that had preceded him,” and he has often been credited with the introduction of the spiritual into philosophy. The disappointment expressed both by Plato and Aristotle as to the way in which Anaxagoras worked out the theory should, however, make us pause to reflect before accepting too exalted a view of it. Plato makes Sokrates say: “I once heard a man reading a book, as he said, of Anaxagoras, and saying it was Mind that ordered the world and was the cause of all things. I was delighted to hear of this cause, and I thought he really was right.... But my extravagant expectations were all dashed to the ground when I went on and found that the man made no use of Mind at all. He ascribed no causal power whatever to it in the ordering of things, but to airs, and aethers, and waters, and a host of other strange things.” Aristotle, probably with this passage in mind, says: “Anaxagoras uses Mind as a deus ex machina to account for the formation of the world; and whenever he is at a loss to explain why anything necessarily is, he drags it in. But in other cases he makes anything rather than Mind the cause.” These utterances may well suggest that the Nous of Anaxagoras did not really stand on a higher level than the Love and Strife of Empedokles, and this will only be confirmed when we look at what he himself has to say about it.

Arist. Met. Α, 3. 984 b 15 (R. P. 152). Plato, Phd. 97 b 8 (R. P. 155 d). Arist. Met. Α, 4. 985 a 18 (R. P. 155 d). In the first place, Nous is unmixed (fr. 12), and does not, like other things, contain a portion of everything. This would hardly be worth saying of an immaterial mind; no one would suppose that to be hot or cold. The result of its being unmixed is that it “has power over” everything, that is to say, in the language of Anaxagoras, it causes things to move. Herakleitos had said as much of Fire, and Empedokles of Strife. Further, it is the “thinnest” of all things, so that it can penetrate everywhere, and it would be meaningless to say that the immaterial is “thinner” than the material. It is true that Nous also “knows all things”; but so, perhaps, did the Fire of Herakleitos, and certainly the Air of Diogenes. Zeller holds, indeed, that Anaxagoras meant to speak of something incorporeal; but he admits that he did not succeed in doing so, and that is historically the important point. Nous is certainly imagined as occupying space; for we hear of greater and smaller parts of it (fr. 12).