Discourses and Enchiridion

'Did none of us before you talk of "good" or "just," or did we use the terms vaguely and idly without understanding what each of them meant?' Who told you, Theopompus, that we had not natural notions and primary conceptions of each of these? But it is impossible to adjust the primary conceptions to the appropriate facts, without making them articulate and without considering just this—what fact must be ranged under each conception. You may say just the same thing, for instance, to physicians. Which of us did not use the words 'healthy' and 'diseased' before Hippocrates was born? Were those terms we used mere empty sounds? No, we have a conception of 'healthy', but we cannot apply it. Therefore one physician says, 'Take no food', and another 'Give food', and one says, 'Cut the vein', and another, 'Use the cupping-glass.' What is the reason? Nothing but incapacity to apply the conception of 'the healthy' to particulars in the proper way.

Plain English · paraphrase"Did none of us before you talk about 'good' or 'just,' or did we use those terms vaguely and carelessly without understanding what each meant?" Who told you, Theopompus, that we didn't have natural ideas and basic understandings of each of these? But it's impossible to match those basic ideas with the right facts without making them clear and without considering exactly what facts belong under each idea. You could say the same thing, for example, to physicians. Which of us didn't use the words 'healthy' and 'diseased' before Hippocrates was born? Were those terms we used just empty sounds? No, we have an idea of 'healthy,' but we can't apply it. Therefore, one physician says, "Take no food," and another says, "Give food," and one says, "Cut the vein," and another says, "Use the cupping-glass." What is the reason? Nothing but the inability to apply the idea of 'the healthy' to particular cases in the right way."

We talk of 'good' and 'bad' but our conception is not articulate. So it is here in life. Which of us does not talk of 'good' and 'bad', 'expedient' and 'inexpedient'? Which of us has not a primary conception of each of these? Is that conception, then, articulate and complete? Prove it. How am I to prove it? Apply it properly to particular facts. To begin with, Plato makes his definitions conform to the conception of 'the useful', you to the conception of 'the useless'. Is it possible, then, for both of you to be right? Of course not. Does not one man apply his primary conception of 'good' to wealth while another does not? Another applies it to pleasure, another to health. To sum up, if all of us who use these terms really know them adequately as well, and if we need take no pains to make our conceptions articulate, why do we quarrel and make war and criticize one another?

Plain English · paraphraseWe talk about "good" and "bad," but our understanding is not clear or precise. It's the same in life. Who among us does not use words like "good" and "bad," "useful" and "not useful"? Who among us does not have a basic idea of what each of these means? Is that basic idea clear and complete? Prove it. How can I prove it? By applying it correctly to specific situations. For example, Plato bases his definitions on the idea of "useful," while you base yours on "not useful." Can both of you be right? Of course not. One person applies his basic idea of "good" to wealth, while another does not. Another applies it to pleasure, another to health. To sum up, if all of us who use these terms really understood them fully, and if we did not need to work to clarify our ideas, why do we argue, go to war, and criticize each other?

If you could apply your conceptions properly, you would not feel miserable. Indeed, I need not bring forward our contentions with one another and make mention of them. Take yourself alone; if you apply your preconceptions properly, why do you feel miserable and hampered? Let us dismiss for the moment the Second Department of study, that concerned with impulses and with what is fitting in relation to them. Let us dismiss also the Third Department, that of assents. I grant you all this. Let us confine ourselves to the First Department, where we have almost sensible demonstration that we do not apply our preconceptions properly. Do you now will things possible, and possible for you? Why, then, do you feel hindered and miserable? Do you now refuse to shun what is necessary? Why, then, do you fall into trouble and misfortune? Why does a thing not happen when you will it, and happen when you do not will it, for this is the strongest proof of misery and misfortune? I will a thing, and it does not happen; what could be more wretched than I? I will it not and it happens; again, what is more wretched than I?

Plain English · paraphraseIf you used your ideas correctly, you would not feel sad. I don't need to bring up our arguments with each other. Just think about yourself. If you used your preconceptions properly, why do you feel sad and trapped? Let's put aside for now the Second Department of study, which deals with impulses and what is appropriate in relation to them. Let's also put aside the Third Department, which is about agreements. I agree with all this. Let's focus only on the First Department, where we have almost clear proof that we do not use our preconceptions properly. Do you now want things that are possible and possible for you? Then why do you feel blocked and sad? Do you now refuse to avoid what is necessary? Then why do you get into trouble and bad luck? Why does a thing not happen when you want it, and happen when you don't want it? This is the strongest proof of sadness and bad luck. I want something, and it does not happen; what could be more wretched than me? I do not want it, and it happens; again, what is more wretched than me?

Medea's act showed a great nature, astray through ignorance of what it means to realize one's will. It was because she could not endure this that Medea was led to kill her children: and the act showed a great nature; for she had a right conception of what it means for one's will not to be realized. 'Then', said she, 'I shall thus take vengeance on him who did me wrong and outrage. Yet what is the good of putting him in this misery? What am I to do then? I kill my children, but I shall also be punishing myself. What do I care?' This is the aberration of a mind of great force; for she did not know where the power lies to do what we will; that we must not get it from outside, nor by disturbing or disarranging events. Do not will to have your husband, and then nothing that you will fails to happen. Do not will that he should live with you in all circumstances, do not will to stay in Corinth: in a word, will nothing but what God wills. Then who shall hinder you, who compel you? If you identify your will with God's your troubles are at an end. You will be as free as Zeus Himself.

When you have a leader such as this, and identify your will with His, you need never fear failure any more. But, once make a gift to poverty and wealth of your will to get and your will to avoid, and you will fail and be unfortunate. Give them to health and you will be unhappy: or to office, honour, country, friends, children—in a word, if you give them to anything beyond your will's control. But give them to Zeus and to the other gods; hand them to their keeping, let them control them, and command them, and you can never be miserable any more. But if, O man of no endurance, you are envious, pitiful, jealous, timorous, and never go a day without bewailing yourself and the gods, how can you call yourself a philosopher any more? Philosophy indeed! True education consists not in learning syllogisms, but in realizing freedom as the friend of God. Just because you worked at variable syllogisms? Will you not unlearn all this, if you can, and begin at the beginning again, and realize that so far you never touched the matter, and, beginning here, build further on this foundation, so that nothing shall be when you will it not, nothing shall not be when you will it? Give me one young man who has come to school with this purpose, ready to strive at this, like one at the games, saying, 'For my part let all else go for nothing: I am content if I shall be allowed to spend my life unhindered and free from pain, and to lift my neck like a free man in face of facts,

and to look up to heaven as God's friend, fearing nothing that can happen.' Let one of you show himself in this character, that I may say, 'Come to your own, young man: for it is your destiny to adorn philosophy, these possessions are yours, the books and theories are for you.' Then, when he has worked at this subject and made himself master of it, let him come again and say to me, 'I wish to be free from passion and disquiet, and to know in a religious and philosophic and devoted spirit how it is fitting for me to behave towards the gods, towards my parents, my brothers, my country, and towards foreigners.' Enter now on the Second Department: this is yours too. 'Yes, but now I have studied the Second Department; next I should wish to be secure and unshaken, and that not only in my waking hours, but in my sleep and in my cups and when distraught.' Man, you are a god, you have great designs! Mere reading or writing books is of no avail. 'No,' he replies, 'I want to understand what Chrysippus says in his treatise on "The Liar".'

That's your design, is it, my poor fellow? Take it and go hang! What good will it do you? You will read all the treatise with sorrow and repeat it to others with trembling. That is just how you behave. 'Would you like me to read to you, brother, and you to me?' 'Man, you are a wonderful writer': and, 'You have a great turn for Xenophon's style', and, 'You for Plato's', and, 'You for Antisthenes'.' And after all, when you have related your dreams to one another, you return again to the same behaviour as before: the same will to get and will to avoid, the same impulses and designs and purposes, the same prayers, the same interests. Then you never look for any one to remind you of the truth, but are vexed if any one reminds you. Then you say, 'He is an unamiable man; he did not weep when I left home nor say, "What difficulties you are going to! my son, if you return safe, I will light some lamps." This is what an amiable man would say.' Great good you will get if you return safe! It is worth while lighting a lamp for such as you, for you ought no doubt to be free from disease and death!

Philosophy is a serious study, like geometry and music. We must, then, as I say, put off this fancy of thinking that we know anything useful, and we must approach philosophy as we approach the study of geometry and music: otherwise we shall not come near making progress, even if we go through all the Introductions and treatises of Chrysippus and Antipater and Archedemus.

CHAPTER XVIII How we must struggle against impressions.

Habit and faculty are acquired and confirmed by exercise. Every habit and every faculty is confirmed and strengthened by the corresponding acts, the faculty of walking by walking, that of running by running. If you wish to have a faculty for reading, read; if for writing, write. When you have not read for thirty days on end, but have done something else, you will know what happens. So if you lie in bed for ten days, and then get up and try to take a fairly long walk, you will see how your legs lose their power. So generally if you wish to acquire a habit for anything, do the thing; if you do not wish to acquire the habit, abstain from doing it, and acquire the habit of doing something else instead. The same holds good in things of the mind: when you are angry; know that you have not merely done ill, but that you have strengthened the habit, and, as it were, put fuel on the fire. When you yield to carnal passion you must take account not only of this one defeat, but of the fact that you have fed your incontinence and strengthened it. For habits and faculties are bound to be affected by the corresponding actions; they are either implanted if they did not

Plain English · paraphraseHabit and ability are gained and made stronger through practice. Every habit and every ability is made stronger by doing the corresponding actions. The ability to walk is strengthened by walking, the ability to run by running. If you want to develop the ability to read, read; if you want to write, write. If you do not read for thirty days in a row, but do other things, you will see what happens. In the same way, if you stay in bed for ten days and then try to take a long walk, you will see how your legs have lost their strength. So, in general, if you want to develop a habit, do the thing; if you do not want to develop the habit, avoid doing it, and instead develop the habit of doing something else. The same is true for the mind: when you get angry, you must know that you have not only done something bad, but also strengthened the habit, as if you are adding fuel to a fire. When you give in to physical desires, you must consider not only this one failure, but also the fact that you have fed your lack of self-control and made it stronger. For habits and abilities are necessarily affected by the corresponding actions; they are either formed if they did not exist before, or destroyed if they did.

exist before, or strengthened and intensified if they were there already. Unless faults are corrected by reason they are confirmed. This is exactly how philosophers say that morbid habits spring up in the mind. For when once you conceive a desire for money, if reason is applied to make you realize the evil, the desire is checked and the Governing Principle recovers its first power; but if you give it no medicine to heal it, it will not return to where it was, but when stimulated again by the appropriate impression it kindles to desire quicker than before. And if this happens time after time it ends by growing hardened, and the weakness confirms the avarice in a man. For he who has a fever and gets quit of it is not in the same condition as before he had it, unless he has undergone a complete cure. The same sort of thing happens with affections of the mind. They leave traces behind them like weals from a blow, and if a man does not succeed in removing them, when he is flogged again on the same place his weals turn into sores. Do not add fuel to the flames of passion, but check it. If, then, you wish not to be choleric, do not feed the angry habit, do

Plain English · paraphraseIf bad tendencies are not corrected by reason, they become stronger. This is how philosophers say bad habits form in the mind. When you first get a desire for money, if reason shows you it's bad, the desire stops and your inner control returns to normal. But if you don't treat it, it won't go back to how it was. Instead, when the right kind of situation comes along again, the desire flares up faster than before. If this keeps happening, you become hardened, and the weakness turns into greed. A man who has a fever and gets rid of it is not the same as before unless he is fully cured. The same happens with emotions. They leave marks like bruises, and if you don't remove them, when you get hit in the same place again, the bruises turn into sores. Don't add fuel to the fire of passion, but stop it. So if you don't want to be angry, don't feed the habit of anger.

not add fuel to the fire. To begin with, keep quiet, and count the days when you were not angry. I used to be angry every day, then every other day, then every three days, then every four. But if you miss thirty days, then sacrifice to God: for the habit is first weakened and then wholly destroyed.

I kept free from distress to-day, and again next day, and for two or three months after; and when occasions arose to provoke it, I took pains to check it. Know that you are doing well. To check a growing passion is better than refuting a fallacy. To-day when I saw a handsome woman I did not say to myself, 'Would that she were mine!' and 'Blessed is her husband!' For he who says that will say, 'Blessed is the adulterer!' Nor do I picture the next scene: the woman present and disrobing and reclining by my side. I pat myself on the head and say, 'Bravo, Epictetus, you have refuted a pretty fallacy, a much prettier one than the so-called 'Master'. And if, though the woman herself, poor thing, is willing and beckons and sends to me, and even touches me and comes close to me, I still hold aloof and conquer: the refutation of this fallacy is something greater than the argument of 'The Liar', or the 'Resting' argument. This is a thing to be really proud of, rather than of propounding the 'Master' argument.

To do this, you must resolve to be pure before God, How, then, is this to be done? Make up your mind at last to please your true self, make up your mind to appear noble to God; set your desires on becoming pure in the presence of your pure self and God. 'Then when an impression of that sort assails you', says Plato, 'go and offer expiatory sacrifices, go as a suppliant and sacrifice to the gods who avert evil': it is enough even if 'you withdraw to the society of the good and noble' and set yourself to compare them with yourself, or find a pattern among the great heroes, like Socrates. whether your pattern be among the living or the dead. Go to Socrates and see him reclining with Alcibiades and making light of his beauty. Consider what a victory, what an Olympic triumph, he won over himself—and knew it—what place he thus achieved among the followers of Heracles! a victory that deserves the salutation, 'Hail, admirable victor, who hast conquered something more than these worn-out boxers and pancratiasts and the gladiators who are like them!' If you set these thoughts against your impression, you will conquer it, and not be carried away by it. It is a great security not to be hurried away by base impressions. But first of all do not be hurried away by the suddenness of the shock, but say, 'Wait for me a little, impression. Let me see what you are, and what is at stake: let me test you'. And, further, do not allow it to go on picturing the next scene. If you do, it straightway carries you off whither it will. Cast out this filthy impression and bring in some other impression, a lovely and noble one, in its place. I say, if you acquire the habit of training yourself thus, you will see what shoulders you get, what sinews, what vigour; but now you have only paltry words and nothing more.

but this requires training. The man who truly trains is he who disciplines himself to face such impressions. Stay, unhappy man! be not carried away. Great is the struggle, divine the task; the stake is a kingdom, freedom, peace, an unruffled spirit. Remember God, call Him to aid and support you, as voyagers call in storm to the Dioscuri. Can any storm be greater than that which springs from violent impressions that drive out reason? For what is storm itself but an impression? Take away the fear of death, and you may bring as much thunder and lightning as you will, and you will discover what deep peace and tranquillity is in your mind. But if you once allow yourself to be defeated and say that you will conquer hereafter, and then do the same again, be sure that you will be weak and miserable; you will never notice hereafter that you are going wrong, but will even begin to provide excuses for your conduct: and then you will confirm the truth of Hesiod's words, 'A dilatory man is ever wrestling with calamities'.

CHAPTER XIX To those who take up the principles of the philosophers only to discuss them. There are three propositions on the relations of which the 'Master' argument is based. The 'Master' argument appears to have been propounded on some such basis as this.

Plain English · paraphraseCHAPTER XIX To those who take up the principles of the philosophers only to discuss them. There are three propositions about the relationships of which the "Master" argument is based. The "Master" argument seems to have been put forward on a basis like this.

There are three propositions which are at variance with one another—i.e., any two with the third—namely, these: (1) everything true as an event in the past is necessary; (2) the impossible does not follow from the possible; (3) what neither is true nor will be is yet possible. Diodorus, noticing this conflict of statements, used the probability of the first two to prove the conclusion, 'Nothing is possible which neither is nor will be true'. Some one else, however, will maintain another pair of these propositions. 'What neither is nor will be true is yet possible', and, 'The impossible does not follow from the possible', while rejecting the third, 'Everything true in the past is necessary', as appears to be the view of Cleanthes and his school, who have been supported to a large extent by Antipater. Others maintain the third pair, 'What neither is true nor will be is yet possible', and 'Everything true as an event in the past is necessary', and reject 'The impossible does not follow from the possible'. But to maintain all three propositions at once is impracticable, because every pair is in conflict with the third.

If I am asked which view I take of it I enumerate the three views. If, then, some one ask me, 'But which of these do you maintain?' I shall answer him that I do not know, but the account I have received is that Diodorus maintained one pair, and the school of Panthoides and Cleanthes, I fancy, the second, and the school of Chrysippus the third. 'What do you hold then?' I have never given my mind to this, to put my own impression to the test and compare different views and form a judgement of my own on the subject: therefore I am no better than a grammarian. 'Who was Hector's father?' Priam. 'Who were his brothers?' Paris and Deiphobus. 'And who was their mother?' Hecuba. That is the account I have received. 'From whom?' From Homer: and Hellanicus also writes on the same subject, I believe, and others of the same class.

Plain English · paraphraseIf I am asked which view I take, I list the three views. Then, if someone asks me, "But which of these do you support?" I will answer that I do not know. The account I have received is that Diodorus held one view, and the school of Panthoides and Cleanthes, I think, held the second, and the school of Chrysippus held the third. "What do you hold then?" I have never given much thought to this, to test my own impression, compare different views, and form my own judgment on the subject. Therefore, I am no better than a grammarian. "Who was Hector's father?" Priam. "Who were his brothers?" Paris and Deiphobus. "And who was their mother?" Hecuba. That is the account I have received. "From whom?" From Homer. And Hellanicus also writes on the same subject, I believe, and others like him.

So it is with me and the 'Master' argument: I go no further. But if I am a vain person I cause the utmost amazement among the company at a banquet by enumerating those who have written on the subject. 'Chrysippus also has written admirably in the first book of his treatise "On the possible". Cleanthes, too, has written a special book on this, and Archedemus. And Antipater also has written, not only in his book on "The possible", but also specially in his work on 'the Master' argument. Have you not read the treatise?' 'I have not read it.' But mere traditional knowledge is of no use, unless you learn to apply your principles to life. Read it. And what good will he get from it? He will only be more silly and tiresome than he is now. For what have you got by reading it? What judgement have you formed on the subject? You will only tell us of Helen and Priam and the island of Calypso, which never was nor will be. And indeed in the field of literature it does not matter much that you should master the received account and have formed no judgement of your own. But we are much more liable to this fault in matters of conduct than in literary matters.

'Tell me about things good and evil.' Listen. The philosopher quotes ethics as glibly as his Homer, but without realizing it. From Ilion to the Cicones I came, Wind-borne. 'Of things that are, some are good, some bad, some indifferent. The virtues and all that share in them are good, vices and all that share in them are bad, and all that comes between is indifferent—wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, pain.' How do you know?

'Hellanicus says so in his history of Egypt.' For you might just as well say that as say 'Diogenes or Chrysippus or Cleanthes said so in his Ethics'. Life is the test, when the crisis of storm or summons before Caesar comes to us. I ask, have you put any of these doctrines to the test, and formed a judgement of your own? Show us how you are wont to bear yourself in a storm on shipboard. Do you remember this distinction of good and bad when the sail cracks and you cry aloud to heaven, and some bystander, untimely merry, says 'Tell me, by the gods, what have you been telling us lately? Is it a vice to suffer shipwreck? Does it partake of vice?' Will you not take up a belaying pin and give him a drubbing? 'What have we to do with you, fellow? We are perishing, and you come and mock us.' Again, if you are sent for by Caesar and are accused, do you remember the distinction? As you enter with a pale face, and trembling withal suppose some one comes up and says to you, 'Why do you tremble, man? What are you concerned about? Does Caesar put virtue and vice in the hearts of those who come before him?'

'Why do you mock me, as though I had not miseries enough?' Nay, philosopher, tell me why you tremble. Is it not of death you stand in danger, or prison or pain of body or exile or disgrace, nothing else? Is it wickedness, or anything that partakes of wickedness? And what did you tell us that all these were? 'Man, what have I to do with you? My own evils are enough for me.' Well said, indeed: for your own evils are indeed enough—meanness, cowardice, the boasting spirit, which you showed when you sat in the lecture-room. Why did you pride yourself on what was not your own? Why did you call yourself a Stoic?

The occasion will show what school you really belong to. Watch your own conduct thus and you will discover to what school you belong. You will find that most of you are Epicureans and some few Peripatetics, but with all the fibre gone from you. Where have you shown that you really hold virtue to be equal to all else, or even superior? Show me a Stoic if you can! Where or how is he to be found? You can show me men who use the fine phrases of the Stoics, in any number, for the same men who do this can recite Epicurean phrases just as well and can repeat those of the Peripatetics just as perfectly; is it not so? Who then is a Stoic?

Plain English · paraphraseThe situation will reveal which school you truly belong to. Pay attention to your own behavior, and you will see which school you are part of. You will find that most of you are Epicureans, and a few Peripatetics, but without any real strength. Where have you shown that you truly believe virtue is equal to everything else, or even greater? Show me a Stoic if you can! Where or how can he be found? You can show me many people who use the fine words of the Stoics, for the same people who do this can also recite Epicurean phrases just as well and repeat those of the Peripatetics just as perfectly; isn't that true? So then, who is a Stoic?

Show me a man moulded to the pattern of the judgements that he utters, in the same way as we call a statue Phidian that is moulded according to the art of Phidias. Show me one who is sick and yet happy, in peril and yet happy, dying and yet happy, in exile and happy, in disgrace and happy. Show him me. The true Stoic is he whose soul desires to be at one with God. By the gods I would fain see a Stoic. Nay you cannot show me a finished Stoic; then show me one in the moulding, one who has set his feet on the path. Do me this kindness, do not grudge an old man like me a sight I never saw till now. What! you think you are going to show me the Zeus of Phidias or his Athena, that work of ivory and gold? It is a soul I want; let one of you show me the soul of a man who wishes to be at one with God, and to blame God or man no longer, to fail in nothing, to feel no misfortune, to be free from anger, envy, and jealousy—one who (why wrap up my meaning?) desires to change his manhood for godhead, and who in this poor dead body of his has his purpose set upon communion with God. Show him to me. Nay, you cannot. Why, then, do you mock yourselves, and trifle with others? Why do you put on a character which is not your own, and walk about like thieves and robbers in these stolen phrases and properties that do not belong to you?