Discourses and Enchiridion

What did you see? One mourning at his child's death. Apply the rule: Is death beyond the will, or can the will control it? Death is beyond the will's control. Put it out of the way then! Did a Consul meet you? Apply the rule: What is a consulship? Is it beyond the will's control or within it? Beyond it. Take it away: the coin will not pass; reject it, you have no concern with it. I say, if we did this and trained ourselves on this principle every day from dawn to night, we should indeed achieve something. As it is, we are caught open-mouthed by every impression we meet, and only in the lecture-room, if then, does our mind wake up a little. For want of training we pass wrong judgements. Then we go into the street and if we see a mourner we say, 'He is undone'; if a Consul, 'Lucky man'; if an outlaw, 'Miserable man'; if a poor man, 'Wretched man, he has nothing to buy food with.'

These mistaken judgements we must eradicate, and concentrate our efforts on doing so. For what is weeping and lamenting? A matter of judgement. What is misfortune? Judgement. What is faction, discord, criticism, accusation, irreligion, foolishness? All these are judgements, nothing else, and judgements passed on things beyond the will, as though they were good and evil. Only let a man turn these efforts to the sphere of the will, and I guarantee that he will enjoy peace of mind, whatever his circumstances may be. The soul is like a dish full of water, and the impressions like the rays of light which strike the water. Now when the water is disturbed the light seems to be disturbed too, but it is not really disturbed. So when a man has a fit of dizziness, the arts and virtues are not put to confusion, but only the spirit in which they exist: when this is at rest, they come to rest too.

Plain English · paraphraseWe must get rid of these wrong judgments and focus all our energy on doing that. What is weeping and mourning? It's a judgment. What is bad luck? A judgment. What is conflict, disagreement, blame, accusation, unbelief, or foolishness? All of these are judgments, nothing more, and they are judgments about things that are not up to us, as if they were good or bad. If a person turns his attention to what is within his will, I promise he will find peace of mind, no matter what his situation is. The mind is like a bowl full of water, and thoughts are like the light that shines on the water. When the water is stirred, the light seems to be stirred too, but it is not really disturbed. So when a person has a dizzy spell, the arts and virtues are not confused, only the spirit in which they exist. When this spirit is calm, they are calm too.

CHAPTER IV Against one who was indecorously excited in the theatre. The Procurator who cannot control his feelings has no reason to criticize the people. When the Procurator of Epirus offended decorum by the way he showed interest in a comedian, the people reviled him for this; thereupon when he brought word of this to Epictetus and expressed annoyance at those who reviled him: Why! he said, what harm were they doing? They too showed their interest as you did! 'What!' said he, 'is this the way they show interest?'

Yes, he said, when they saw you, their Governor, the friend and Procurator of Caesar, showing your interest in this way, would you not expect them to do the same? If it is not right to show interest in that way, leave off doing it yourself: but if it is right, why are you angry at their imitating you? For whom else but you, their superiors, have the people to imitate? Whom are they to look to when they come to the theatre but you? 'See', they say, 'how Caesar's Procurator behaves in the theatre. He cries out: then I will cry out too. He jumps from his seat. I will do so too. His claque of slaves shout from their scattered seats: I have no slaves, I will cry as loud as I can to make up for it.' He ought to set an example by keeping his will in accord with nature. You ought to know then that when you enter the theatre you enter it as a pattern and example to all other spectators how to behave. Why then did they revile you? Because every man hates what stands in his way. They wanted So-and-so to be crowned, you wanted another; they stood in your way and you in theirs. You were found to be stronger than they; they did what they could, they reviled what stood in their way. What would you have then? That you should do what you wish, and they should not even say what they wish? Nay, what wonder they should talk so? Do not farmers revile Zeus, when He stands in their way? Do not sailors revile Him? Do they not revile Caesar without ceasing? What follows? Does not Zeus know? Does not Caesar have reported to him what men say? What does he do then? He knows that if he punishes all who revile him he will have no one left to rule over. What is my conclusion? When you enter the theatre you ought not to say, 'Let me have Sophron crowned', but, 'Let me keep my will in accord with Nature in this matter, for no one is dearer to me than myself: it is absurd then that I should be injured, that another may be victorious on the stage.'

Whom then do I want to win? The victor: and so the victory will always be in accordance with my wish. 'But I wish Sophron to be crowned.' Hold as many contests as you please in your own house and proclaim him there victor in the Nemean, Pythian, Isthmian and Olympic games: but in public do not claim more than your share, nor steal what is public property. If you do, you must put up with being reviled: for when you do as the people do, you put yourself on their level.

CHAPTER V Against those who make illness an excuse for leaving the lecture-room. A student who is really learning will not wish to return home. 'I am ill here,' says one, 'and want to go away home.'

What, were you never ill at home? Do you not consider whether you are doing anything here to improve your will, for if you are doing no good, you might just as well never have come? Go away, and attend to your affairs at home: for if your Governing Principle cannot be brought into accord with Nature, no doubt your bit of land will prosper; you will add to your bit of money! You will tend your old father, frequent the market-place, serve as a magistrate, do anything that comes next, poor wretch, in your wretched way. But if you understand that you are getting rid of bad judgements and gaining others in their place, and that you have transferred your attention from things outside the will's control to things within it, and that now if you cry, 'Ah me!' it is not for your father or your brother but for yourself that you cry, then why should you take account of illness any more? Disease and death must come to all. Do you not know that disease and death are bound to overtake us whatever we are doing? They overtake the farmer at his farming, the sailor on the seas. What would you like to be doing when they overtake you? For you must needs be overtaken, whatever you are doing. If you can find anything better than this to be doing when you are overtaken, do it by all means!

Plain English · paraphraseWere you never sick at home? Do you not think about whether you are doing anything here to improve your will? If you are not doing any good, you might as well never have come. Go away and take care of your affairs at home. If your Governing Principle cannot be brought into harmony with Nature, no doubt your small piece of land will prosper. You will add to your small amount of money. You will care for your old father, go to the marketplace, serve as a magistrate, do whatever comes next, poor wretch, in your wretched way. But if you understand that you are getting rid of bad judgments and gaining better ones in their place, and that you have shifted your attention from things outside the will's control to things within it, and that now when you cry, "Ah me!" it is not for your father or your brother but for yourself that you cry, then why should you care about illness any more? Disease and death must come to all. Do you not know that disease and death are bound to catch up with us whatever we are doing? They catch up with the farmer while he is farming, the sailor while he is at sea. What would you like to be doing when they catch up with you? For you must be caught up with, whatever you are doing. If you can find anything better than this to be doing when you are caught up with, do it by all means!

Let them find us occupied in training our will to obey God. For my own part I would wish death to overtake me occupied with nothing but the care of my will, trying to make it calm, unhindered, unconstrained, free. I would fain be found so employed, that I may be able to say to God, 'Did I transgress Thy commands? Did I use the faculties Thou gayest me to wrong purpose? Did I use my senses or my primary notions in vain? Did I ever accuse Thee? Did I ever find fault with Thy ordinance? I fell sick, when it was Thy will: so did others, but I rebelled not. I became poor when Thou didst will it, but I rejoiced in my poverty. I held no office, because it was Thy will: I never coveted office. Didst Thou ever see me gloomy for that reason? Did I ever come before Thee but with a cheerful face, ready for any commands or orders that Thou mightest give? Now it is Thy will for me to leave the festival. I go, giving all thanks to Thee, that Thou didst deign to let me share Thy festival and see Thy works and understand Thy government.' May these be my thoughts, these my studies, writing or reading, when death comes upon me! This is worth more than home comforts. 'But I am ill, and shall not have my mother to hold my head.'

Go to your mother then; for you deserve to be ill, with her to hold your head. 'But I had a nice bed to lie on at home.' Go to your nice bed then; sick or well you deserve to lie on a bed of that sort! Pray do not lose what you can do there. But what does Socrates say? 'As one man', he says, 'delights to improve his field, and another his horse, so I delight in following day by day my own improvement.' 'In what? In paltry phrases?' Man, hold your peace. 'In pretty precepts then?' Enough of that. 'Nay, but philosophers busy themselves with nothing else, so far as I see.'

Plain English · paraphraseGo to your mother then; you deserve to be sick, and she can hold your head. "But I had a nice bed to lie on at home." Then go to your nice bed; whether sick or well, you deserve to lie on a bed like that! Pray, do not waste what you can do there. But what does Socrates say? "As one man delights in improving his field, and another his horse, so I delight in following day by day my own improvement." "In what? In paltry phrases?" Man, be quiet. "In pretty precepts then?" That is enough. "No, but philosophers busy themselves with nothing else, so far as I see."

Is it nothing (do you think?) never to accuse any one, God or man, never to blame any, to go in and out with the same countenance? This, and not phrases or precepts, is the purpose of life. These are the things which Socrates knew, and yet he never said that he knew or taught anything; and if any one asked for phrases or precepts, he would take him away to Protagoras or Hippias. In the same way if any one had come looking for greenstuff, he would have taken him to the gardener. Which of you then makes this the purpose of his life? Why, if you did, you would gladly suffer sickness and hunger and death. If any one of you was ever in love with a pretty girl, he knows that I speak true!

CHAPTER VI Scattered sayings. Progress is proportionate to effort spent. When one of his acquaintances asked why more progress was made in old days, although the processes of reason have been more studied by the men of to-day, he answered, On what has the effort been spent, and in what was the greater progress in the past? For you will find that progress to-day corresponds exactly to the effort spent. The fact is that to-day men have spent their effort on the analysis of syllogisms, and progress is made in that: in old days men spent their effort on maintaining their mind in accord with Nature, and they made progress in that. Therefore do not confound the processes, nor seek to spend effort on one thing and make progress in another. If you look whether any of us who sets himself to keep in accord with Nature and to live his life so, fails to make progress, you will find there is none. The good man can suffer no defeat. 'The good man can suffer no defeat.'

Of course, for he engages in no contest where he is not superior. 'Take my lands, if you will: take my servants, take my office, take my poor body, yet you will not make me fail to get what I will or fall into what I will to avoid.' This is the only contest for which he enters—that which is concerned with the sphere of the will, and therefore he cannot fail to be invincible. When some one asked him what 'general perception' meant, he replied, You might describe the faculty which only distinguishes sounds as 'general' hearing, General sense is the faculty which enables all men to see certain things. but the faculty which distinguishes musical sounds you would not call 'general' but 'technical'. In the same way there are certain things which all men who are not utterly perverted can see in virtue of their general faculties. It is this mental constitution to which the name 'general perception' is given.

Young men must have grit, if they are to be moved, or to hold their own. It is not easy to give stimulus to young men who have no grit: 'you cannot lift a cream-cheese by a hook': but young men of parts hold fast to reason even if you try to deter them. That is why Rufus generally tried to deter them, and made this his test of those who were gifted and those who were not; 'for', said he, 'just as the stone, if you throw it up, will fall to the earth by its own nature, so the gifted soul is all the more inclined towards its natural object, the more you try to beat it off.'

CHAPTER VII Dialogue with the Commissioner of the Free Cities, who was an Epicurean. He asked the Epicurean governor, what was 'the best part' of man, When the Commissioner, who was an Epicurean, came into his lecture-room, It is proper, said Epictetus, that we who are ignorant should inquire of you philosophers what is the Best Thing in the world, just as those who come to a strange city make inquiry of the citizens who know the place; that having learnt what it is we may pursue it for ourselves, and come to the sight of it, as foreigners visit the sights of the cities. For all, one may say, are agreed that man has to do with three things, soul and body and external things; it only remains for you to answer the question, 'What is the best in man?' and elicited the answer, 'Not the flesh', What shall we say to men? Shall we say, 'The flesh'? and was it for this that Maximus sailed as far as Cassiope to see his son on his way? Was it to have pleasure in the flesh? When the Commissioner denied it, saying, 'God forbid!' Epictetus went on, Is it not proper to devote our efforts to what is best in us? 'It is most proper.'

What have we then better than the flesh? 'The soul', he said. And which are better, the goods of the best element in us or the goods of the inferior? 'Those of the best.' but that which gives rational delight to the soul—that is, the good of the soul. Are the goods of the soul in the sphere of the will or beyond it? 'Within the sphere of the will.' Is the pleasure of the soul then within the sphere of the will? 'Yes', he said. And what gives rise to it? Does it arise of itself? That is inconceivable; for we must assume the existence of the good as something which has value in itself, by partaking in which we shall have pleasure in the soul. To this too he agreed.

What then will give rise to this pleasure of the soul in us? If the goods of the soul give rise to it, then the nature of the good is discovered; for it is impossible that the good and that which gives us rational delight should be different from one another, or that the consequence should be good unless that on which it depends is good. For the primary end must be good, if that which follows on it is to be rational. But this is inconsistent with Epicurus' doctrine. But you cannot say this if you have any sense, for you will be saying what is inconsistent with Epicurus, and with the other judgements of your school. You will be reduced to saying that the pleasure of the soul is pleasure in bodily things: these, as it now appears, are of primary value and are identical with the nature of the good.

Therefore Maximus acted foolishly, if he had any motive in sailing but the flesh, that is the highest principle. He acts like a fool too if, as a judge, he refrains from other men's goods when he can take them. If you think fit to do it, the only point for us to look to is that it be done secretly, securely, without any one's knowledge. If you are to be consistent, you must follow the flesh, but in such a way as to escape detection. For even Epicurus himself does not set down stealing as evil, but only detected stealing: and he says 'Do not steal', only because 'it is impossible to be sure of escaping detection'. But I tell you that if it be done cleverly and cautiously, we shall escape detection. Further, we have powerful friends in Rome, both men and women, and the Greeks are feeble folk: no one will have the courage to go to Rome to prosecute. Why do you refrain from your own good? It is foolish and silly. Nay, even if you tell me you refrain, I will not believe you; for just as it is impossible to assent to what appears false and to reject what is true, so it is impossible to hold aloof from what appears good. Now wealth is a good thing, and, so to speak, most productive of pleasure. Why should not one acquire it? Why should we not corrupt our neighbour's wife, if we can do it without detection; and if her husband talks nonsense, why should we not break his neck as well? This, if you wish to be a philosopher of the right sort, to be perfect and consistent with your own judgements. Otherwise you will be no better than we so-called Stoics, If you do not follow the flesh, you will be as inconsistent as we Stoics are. for we too say one thing and do another: we say noble words and do shameful deeds! You will be suffering from the opposite perversion, of uttering shameful judgements, and doing noble deeds!

Before God, I ask you, can you imagine a city of You cannot imagine a city based on Epicurus' principles. Epicureans? 'I shall not marry' (says one). 'Nor shall I,' (says another) 'for it is wrong to marry.' Yes, and it is wrong to get children, and wrong to be a citizen!

What is to happen then? Where will your citizens come from? Who will educate them? Who will be Governor of the Ephebi? Who will manage the Gymnasia? Yes, and what will be their education? Will it be the education the Lacedaemonians or Athenians received? Take me a young man and bring him up in accordance with your judgements. The judgements are bad, subversive of the city, ruinous to family life, not even fit for women. Man, leave these principles alone. As the officer of an imperial city, you must adopt nobler principles. You live in an imperial city: you must hold office, judge justly, refrain from other men's property: no woman but your wife must seem fair in your eyes, no boy, no silver or gold plate. You must look for judgements that will be in keeping with such conduct, and will enable you to refrain with pleasure from things so persuasive to attract and to overcome you. If on the other hand we back up their persuasive power by this philosophy, such as it is, that we have discovered, thrusting us forward and confirming us in the same direction, what is to become of us? What is the best part of a piece of plate, the silver or the art spent on it? The hand in itself is mere flesh, it is the products of the hand that claim precedence. Appropriate actions, So too appropriate actions are of three kinds: the first class relative to mere existence, the second relative to particular conditions, the third commanding and absolute. which are concerned with man's commanding characteristics. On this principle too we ought not to honour man's material being, his rags of flesh, but his leading characteristics. What are these? Citizenship, marriage, procreation of children, worship of God, care of parents, and in general, will to get and to avoid, impulse to act and not to act, each in its proper and natural manner.

What is our nature? To be free, noble, self-respecting. What other animal blushes? What other can have a conception of shame? We must subordinate pleasure to these principles, to minister to them as a servant, to evoke our interests and to keep us in the way of our natural activities. If you pretend to be a philosopher, you must rule men as rational creatures, and win them to emulate your obedience to God. 'But I am rich, and have need of nothing.' Why then do you still pretend to be a philosopher? Gold and silver plate are enough for you: what need have you of judgements? 'Nay, but I also sit as judge over the Greeks.' What! you know how to judge? What made you know that? 'Caesar wrote me a patent.' Let him write to you to judge questions of music: what use will it be to you? But let that pass. How did you get made a judge? Whose hand did you kiss? Was it Symphorus' or Numenius'? In whose antechamber did you sleep? To whom did you send gifts? After all, do you not see that being judge is worth no more nor less than Numenius is worth? 'Well, but I can put any one I wish in prison.' As you may a stone!

Plain English · paraphraseWhat is our nature? To be free, noble, and self-respecting. What other animal blushes? What other can understand shame? We must place pleasure under these principles, let it serve them, to stir our interests and keep us on the path of our natural activities. If you claim to be a philosopher, you must rule people as rational beings, and lead them to follow your obedience to God. "But I am rich and need nothing." Then why pretend to be a philosopher? Gold and silver are enough for you: what need do you have of power? "No, I also sit as a judge over the Greeks." What! Do you know how to judge? What made you know that? "Caesar gave me a patent." Let him give you the right to judge music: what use will that be to you? But forget that. How did you become a judge? Whose hand did you kiss? Was it Symphorus' or Numenius'? In whose waiting room did you sleep? To whom did you send gifts? After all, don't you see that being a judge is worth no more or less than what Numenius is worth? "Well, but I can imprison anyone I want." So can you imprison a stone!

'But I can cudgel to death any one I wish.' As you can an ass! This is not governing men. Govern us as rational creatures by showing us what is expedient, and we will follow it: show us what is inexpedient and we will turn away from it. Make us admire and emulate you, as Socrates made men do. He was the true ruler of men, for he brought men to submit to him their will to get and to avoid, their impulse to act and not to act. 'Do this, refrain from this, or I will put you in prison.' This is not how rational beings are ruled. But, 'Do this as Zeus ordained: if not, you will suffer penalty and harm.' What kind of harm? No harm but that of failing to do your duty: you will destroy the trustworthy, self-respecting, well-behaved man in you. Look not for any greater harm than this!

CHAPTER VIII How we should train ourselves to deal with impressions. As we train ourselves to deal with sophistical questions, so we ought to train ourselves day by day to deal with impressions: for these too propound questions to us. 'The son of So-and-so is dead.' Answer, That is beyond the will, not an evil. 'So-and-so's father has disinherited him: what do you think?' It is outside the will, not an evil. 'Caesar has condemned him.' That is outside the will, not an evil. 'Something has made him grieve.' That is an act of will, and evil. 'He has endured nobly.' That is an act of will, and good. If we acquire this habit, we shall make progress, for we shall never assent to anything but that of which we get a convincing impression. The son dies. What happens? The son dies. Nothing more? Nothing. The ship is lost. What happens? The ship is lost. He is led to prison. What happens? He is led to prison. Each man may add, 'He has fared ill', but if so, that is his own affair. 'Still', you say, 'Zeus does wrong to act so.'

Why? Do you mean because He made you patient, noble-minded, because He saved these things from being evil, because He puts it in your power to endure these troubles and still be happy, because He 'opens the door' to you, when your position is impossible? Leave the scene, man, and do not complain. If you would know the attitude of the Romans to philosophers, listen to this. Italicus, a man of the highest repute as a philosopher among them, in my presence expressed his indignation at his lot, which he thought intolerable, by saying, 'I cannot bear it: you are ruining me, you will make me like him', and pointed to me!

CHAPTER IX To a Rhetor going up to Rome for a trial. A man's judgements determine his success or failure. When a man, who was going to Rome for an action regarding his official position, came in to see him, he inquired the reason for his journey, and when the man went on to ask him his opinion on the matter, 'If you ask me', he said, 'what you will do in Rome, whether you will succeed or fail, I have no precept to offer: but if you ask me how you will do, I can say this, that if your judgements are right you will do well, if wrong, you will do ill. For every man's action is determined by a judgement. What is it that made you desire to be elected patron of the Cnossians?' Judgement. What is the reason you now go to Rome? Judgement. Yes, and in stormy weather and at your own risk and charges? 'Necessity compels me.'

Who tells you this? Your judgement. If then judgements are the cause of everything and a man has bad judgements, the result resembles the cause, whatever this be. Have we all then sound judgements? Have you and your opponent? Then how are you at variance? Have you sound judgements any more than he? Why? You think so. So does he, and so do madmen. Opinion is a bad criterion. No! You should therefore examine your judgements. Show me that you have examined your judgements and paid attention to them. You are now sailing to Rome to be patron of the Cnossians and are not content to stay at home with the honours you had before, but desire some greater and more distinguished honour. When did you ever take the trouble to sail like this in order to examine your judgements and reject any that are bad? Whom have you ever consulted for this purpose? What time or what part of your life have you charged with this duty? Review the seasons of your life in your own mind, if you respect me. Did you examine your judgements when you were a boy? Did not you do what you did then as you do everything now? And when you grew to be a youth and listened to the teachers of rhetoric and wrote declamations of your own, what did you imagine that you lacked? And when in early manhood you began to enter public life and to plead in cases and to have a reputation, did you ever think any one your equal? Would you ever have let any one examine you and show that your judgements were bad? What then would you have me tell you?

'Give me some help in the matter.' The only precept a philosopher can give is: 'Keep your Governing Principle in accord with nature.' I have no precepts to offer for your purpose: and if you have come to me for this, you have come to me as you would come to a greengrocer or a shoemaker and not as to a philosopher. 'For what purpose then have philosophers precepts to offer?' For this: that, whatever the issue may be, we should keep our Governing Principle in accord with Nature to our life's end. Do you think this a small matter? 'No, the greatest of all.' Well then: will a little time suffice for this, and can it be acquired in a passing visit? Acquire it if you can! It is easy to listen for a moment and go away scoffing. Then you will go away and say, 'I met Epictetus, it was like meeting a stone, or a statue.'

Yes, for you just saw me and no more. Man can only meet man properly when he gets to understand his convictions and shows him his own in turn. Get to know my judgements, and show me yours, and then say that you have met me. Let us question one another: if one of my judgements is bad, remove it: if you have anything to say, put it forward. That is how to meet a philosopher. That's not your way, but 'We are passing through: while we wait to charter our ship, we can see Epictetus; let us see what he is saying.' Then when you leave you say, 'Epictetus was nothing: he talked bad Greek, outlandish stuff.' Of course, of what else are you competent to judge, coming in like that? 'But', he goes on, 'if I let myself be absorbed in these things, I shall be like you without land, like you without silver cups, like you without fine cattle.' The philosopher does not feel the need of gold and silver,To this perhaps it is sufficient to answer, I have no need of them: but if you get a large property, you still need something else, and willy-nilly you are poorer than I. 'What do you mean that I need?'