Discourses and Enchiridion

Not at all, if I feel that these things are nothing to me: but if I fear any of them, he does threaten me. Who is there left for me to fear, and over what has he control? Over what is in my power? No one controls that. Over what is not in my power? I have no concern in that. Philosophy teaches resistance only when attempt is made to control the will or judgement.'Do you philosophers then teach us to despise kings?' Heaven forbid! Which of us teaches men to resist them in the matters over which they have authority? Take my bit of a body, take my property, take my good name, take my companions. If I try to persuade any of them to resist, I give him leave to accuse me indeed. 'Yes, but I want to command your judgements.' Who has given you this authority? How can you conquer another's judgement? 'I will conquer him', he says, 'by bringing fear to bear on him.'

You are not aware that it was the judgement that conquered itself, it was not conquered by another. The will may conquer itself, but nothing else can conquer it. That is the reason too why the noblest and most just law of God is this: 'Let the better always be victorious over the worse.' Right judgement is invincible.'Ten', you say, 'are better than one.' Better for what? To bind, to slay, to carry off where they will, to take away property. Ten conquer one therefore only in so far as they are better. 'In what then are they worse?' They are worse if the one has right judgements, and the ten have not. I ask you, can they conquer him in this? How can they? If we weigh them in the balance, must not the heavier pull down the scale? 'This is your outcome then, that Socrates should suffer the fate he did at the hands of the Athenians?'

Socrates was killed, but his judgement was victorious.Slave, why do you say, 'Socrates'? State the fact as it really is, That Socrates' vile body should be arrested and haled to prison by those who are stronger, and that some one should give hemlock to Socrates' vile body and it should die of chill—does this seem to you marvellous, does this seem unjust, is it for this you accuse God? Did Socrates then get nothing in exchange? In what did his true good consist? Which are we to attend to? To you or to him? Nay, what does Socrates say? 'Anytus or Meletus can slay me, but they cannot harm me': and again, 'If God so will, so be it.' Prove, I say, that one who has worse judgements gains the mastery over him who is his superior in judgements. You will not prove it: far from it. For the law of nature and of God is this, 'Let the better always come out victor over the worse.' Victorious in what? In that wherein it is better. One body is stronger than another, the majority are stronger than one, the thief stronger than he who is not a thief. The thief who steals my lamp pays for it: the price is his degradation.That is why I too lost my lamp, because in the matter of vigilance the thief was a stronger man than I. But he bought his lamp for this price: for a lamp he became a thief, for a lamp he broke his faith, for a lamp he became a brute. This seemed to his judgement to be profitable.

Very well: but now some one has laid hold on my cloak, and drags me into the market, then others raise a clamour Imprisonment is indifferent to the philosopher, because it is beyond his will.against me, 'Philosopher, what good have your judgements done you? for, see, you are haled to prison, see, you are about to be beheaded.' And what sort of Introduction to philosophy could I have studied, that would save me from being haled off, if a stronger man seizes my cloak, or, if ten men drag me about and cast me into prison, will save me from being cast there? Have I then learnt nothing else? I have learnt to see that everything that happens, if it is beyond the control of my will, is nothing to me. Have you not gained benefit then in this respect? Why do you seek benefit elsewhere than where you learnt that it is to be found? He is content to stay where he is, so long as God wants him,I sit on then in prison and say, 'This person who clamours at me has no ear for the true meaning of things, he does not understand what is said, in a word he has taken no pains to know what philosophers do or say. Let him be.'

But [the answer comes], 'Come out of your prison.' If you have no more need of me in prison, I come out: if you need me again, I will come in. For how long? For as long as reason requires that I should abide by my vile body; but when reason demands it no longer, take it from me and good health to you! Only let me not cast it off without reason or from a faint heart, or for a casual pretext. and to go, if God gives the signal.For again God wills it not: for He has need of a world like this, and of such creatures as ourselves to move upon the earth. But if He give the signal of retreat, as He gave it to Socrates, one must obey His signal as that of the general in command. But there is no need to say this to the multitude.'What then? must I say these things to the multitude?'

Why should you? Is it not sufficient to believe them yourself? For when children come up to us and clap their hands and say, 'A good Saturnalia to you to-day!' do we say 'These things are not good'? Not at all, we clap with them ourselves. So, when you cannot change a man's opinion, recognize that he is a child, clap with him, and if you do not wish to do this, you have only to hold your peace.

When the crisis comes, show that you have learnt your lesson, instead of asking to study longer.These things we must remember, and when called to face a crisis that is to test us we must realize that the moment is come to show whether we have learnt our lesson. For a young man going straight from his studies to face a crisis may be compared to one who has practised the analysis of syllogisms. If some one offers him one that is easy to analyse, he says, 'Nay, propound me one which is cunningly involved, that I may get proper exercise.' And so wrestlers are discontented if put to wrestle with young men of light weight: 'He cannot lift me', one says. Here is a young man of parts, yet when the crisis calls he must needs weep and say, 'I would fain go on learning.' Learning what? If you did not learn your lesson to display it in action, what did you learn it for?

Welcome it, as a gladiator welcomes his turn in the arena.I imagine one of those who are sitting here crying out in the travail of his heart, 'Why does not a crisis come to me such as has come to him? Am I to wear my life out idly in a corner, when I might win a crown at Olympia? When will some one bring me news of a contest like that?' Such ought to be the attitude of you all. Why, among Caesar's gladiators there are some who are vexed that no one brings them out or matches them in fight, and they pray to God and go to the managers and implore them to let them fight; and shall no one of you display a like spirit? That is exactly why I should like to take ship for Rome to see how my wrestler puts his lesson into practice. The student cannot choose what task shall be set him.'I do not want', says he, 'an exercise of this sort.'

What? is it in your power to take the task you choose? No, a body is given you of such a kind, parents of such a kind, brothers of such a kind, a country of such a kind, a position in it of such a kind: and yet you come to me and say, 'Change the task set me.' What! have you not resources, to deal with what is given you? Instead of saying, 'It is yours to set the task, and mine to study it well', He must make the most of it.you say, 'Do not put before me such a syllogism, but such an one: do not impose on me such a conclusion, but such an one.' A time will soon come when tragic actors will imagine that they are merely mask and shoes and robe, and nothing else. Man, you have these things given you as your subject and task. The actor shows what he is by his speech,Speak your part, that we may know whether you are a tragic actor or a buffoon: for except their speech they have all else in common. Does the tragic actor disappear, if you take away his shoes and mask and bring him on the stage in the bare guise of a ghost, or is he there still? If he has a voice he is there still.

and so, in whatever rank of life, we must bear witness to God.So it is in life: 'Take a post of command'; I take it, and taking it show how a philosopher behaves. 'Lay aside the senator's dress, and put on rags and appear in that character.' Very well: is it not given me still to display a noble voice? In what part then do you appear now? As a witness called by God: 'Come and bear witness for me, for I count you worthy to come forward as my witness. Is anything good or evil which lies outside the range of the will? Do I harm any one? Do I put each man's advantage elsewhere than in himself?' If you complain, you dishonour Him.What is the witness you now bear to God? 'I am in danger, O Lord, and in misfortune; no man heeds me, no man gives me anything, all blame me and speak evil of me.' Is this the witness you are going to bear, and so dishonour the calling that he has given you, in that he honoured you thus and counted you worthy to be brought forward to bear such weighty witness?

Plain English · paraphraseAnd so, in whatever place in life we are, we must give witness to God. So it is in life: "Take a position of authority." I take it, and in taking it, I show how a philosopher behaves. "Put aside the clothes of a senator and wear rags, and appear in that way." Very well. Is it not still possible for me to speak with dignity? In what role are you appearing now? As a witness called by God: "Come and give witness for me, for I consider you worthy to step forward as my witness. Is anything good or bad that lies outside the power of the will? Do I harm anyone? Do I place each person's benefit anywhere other than in themselves?" If you complain, you dishonor Him. What witness are you giving to God now? "I am in danger, O Lord, and in trouble; no one pays attention to me, no one gives me anything, everyone blames me and speaks badly of me." Is this the witness you are going to give, and so dishonor the calling He has given you, since He honored you and considered you worthy to be brought forward to give such an important witness?

It matters not if the man in authority calls you 'godless',But suppose that he who has authority pronounces, 'I judge you to be godless and unholy', how does this affect you? 'I am judged to be godless and unholy.' Nothing more? 'Nothing.' If he had been giving judgement on a hypothetical proposition and had declared, 'I judge the proposition "if it be day, there is light" to be false', how would it have affected the proposition? Who is judged here? Who is condemned? The proposition or the man who is deluded about it? Who in the world then is this who has authority to pronounce upon you? Does he know what godliness or ungodliness is? Has he made a study of it? Has he learnt it? Where and with what master?

Plain English · paraphraseIt doesn't matter if the man in authority calls you "godless." Suppose the one with authority says, "I judge you to be godless and unholy," how does that affect you? "I am judged to be godless and unholy." Nothing more? "Nothing." If he had been judging a hypothetical proposition and had declared, "I judge the proposition 'if it is day, there is light' to be false," how would that affect the proposition? Who is being judged here? Who is condemned? The proposition or the man who is mistaken about it? Then, who in the world is this person who has the authority to judge you? Does he know what godliness or ungodliness is? Has he studied it? Has he learned it? Where and with what teacher?

for the philosopher pays no heed to the unenlightened on matters of right and wrong.If a musician pays no heed to him when he pronounces that the lowest note is the highest, nor a geometrician when he decides that the lines from the centre of a circle to the circumference are not equal, shall he who is educated in true philosophy pay any heed to an uneducated man when he gives judgement on what is holy and unholy, just and unjust? What a great wrong for philosophers to be guilty of! Is this what you have learnt by coming to school?

Plain English · paraphraseThe philosopher does not listen to the unenlightened when it comes to right and wrong. If a musician ignores someone who says the lowest note is the highest, and a geometer ignores someone who claims the lines from the center of a circle to the edge are not equal, should the one educated in true philosophy listen to an uneducated man judging what is holy or unholy, just or unjust? What a great wrong for philosophers to commit! Is this what you have learned by coming to school?

Leave discussions to others,Leave other people, persons of no endurance, to argue on these matters to little purpose. Let them sit in a corner and take their paltry fees, or murmur that no one offers them anything, and come forward yourself and practise what you have learnt. For it is not arguments that are wanting nowadays: no, the books of the Stoics are full of them. What then is the one thing wanting? We want the man who will and apply your principles to conduct.apply his arguments, and bear witness to them by action. This is the character I would have you take up, that we may no longer make use of old examples in the school, but may be able to show an example from our own day.

Whose business then is it to take cognizance of these questions? It is for him that has studied at school; for man The philosopher must contemplate the world with an unperturbed spirit,is a creature with a faculty of taking cognizance, but it is shameful for him to exercise it in the spirit of runaway slaves. No: one must sit undistracted and listen in turn to tragic actor or harp-player, and not do as the runaways do. At the very moment one of them is attending and praising the actor, he gives a glance all round, and then if some one utters the word 'master' he is fluttered and confounded in a moment. It is shameful that philosophers should take cognizance of the works of nature in this spirit. showing no fear of death or any other master.For what does 'master' mean? No man is master of another man; his masters are only death and life, pleasure and pain. For, apart from them, you may bring me face to face with Caesar and you shall see what constancy I show. But when he comes in thunder and lightning with these in his train, and I show fear of them, I am only recognizing my master as the runaway does. But so long as I have respite from them I am just like the runaway watching in the theatre; I wash, drink, sing, but do everything in fear and misery. But if I once free myself from my masters, that is from those feelings which make masters formidable, my trouble is past, and I have a master no more.

But he need not proclaim his knowledge, but should treat the ignorant considerately.'Should I then proclaim this to all men?' No! One should study the weakness of the uninstructed and say to them, 'This man advises me what he thinks good for himself, and I excuse him.' For Socrates too excused the gaoler who wept when he was going to drink the poison, and said, 'How nobly he has wept for us!' Does he say to the gaoler, 'That is why we dismissed the women'? No, he says that to his intimate friends, who were fit to hear it, but the gaoler he treats considerately like a child.

Plain English · paraphraseBut he need not announce his knowledge, but should treat the ignorant with consideration. "Should I then announce this to all people?" No! One should understand the weakness of those who are uninstructed and say to them, "This man advises me what he thinks is good for himself, and I excuse him." For Socrates also excused the jailer who wept when he was about to drink the poison, and said, "How nobly he has wept for us!" Does he say to the jailer, "That is why we sent the women away"? No, he says that to his close friends, who were fit to hear it, but the jailer he treats considerately, like a child.

CHAPTER XXX What a man should have ready to hand in the crises of life. In the crises of life you must please God, who watches you.When you appear before one of the mighty of the earth, remember that Another looks from above on what is happening and that you must please Him rather than this man. He that is above inquires of you: 'What did you say in the school about exile and prison and bonds and death and dishonour?' I said they were 'indifferent'. 'What do you call them now, then? Have they changed?' No. 'Have you changed then?' No. 'Tell me then what things are indifferent.' Things which lie outside the will's control. 'Tell me what follows.' Things indifferent concern me not at all. 'Tell me also what you thought were "good things".' A right will and a faculty of dealing rightly with impressions. 'And what did you think was the end?' To follow Thee. 'Do you still say that?' Yes. I say the same now as before.

If you hold fast your principles,Go on then into the palace in confidence and remember these things, and you shall see how a young man who has studied what he ought compares with men who have had no study. Kings' courts lose their terrorsBy the gods I imagine that you will feel thus: 'Why do we make these many and great preparations for nothing? Is this what authority meant? Are the vestibule, the chamberlains, the guards no more than this? Was it for this that I listened to those long discourses? These terrors were naught, and I made ready for them all the time as though they were great matters.'

Plain English · paraphraseIf you hold fast to your principles, go into the palace confidently and remember these things. You will see how a young man who has studied what he should compares with those who have not studied at all. Kings' courts lose their terrors. By the gods, I imagine you will feel like this: "Why do we make so many great preparations for nothing? Is this what authority meant? Are the vestibule, the chamberlains, the guards no more than this? Was it for this that I listened to those long speeches? These terrors were nothing, and I prepared for them as though they were great matters."

BOOK II CHAPTER I That there is no conflict between confidence and caution.

Confidence and caution are not incompatible, Perhaps the contention of philosophers that it is possible in everything we do to combine confidence with caution may appear a paradox, but nevertheless we must do our best to consider whether it is true. In a sense, no doubt, caution seems to be contrary to confidence, and contraries are by no means compatible. But I think that what seems to many a paradox in this subject depends on a confusion, and it is this. If we really called upon a man to use caution and confidence in regard to the same things, they might fairly find fault with us as uniting qualities which cannot be united. if they are exercised in the right spheres. But as a matter of fact there is nothing strange in the statement: for if it is true, as has often been said and often proved, that the true nature of good and also of evil depends on how we deal with impressions, and if things outside the will's control cannot be described as good or bad, Confidence in the region of things outside the will. Caution in the region of things dependent on the will. we cannot surely call it a paradoxical demand of the philosophers if they say, 'Be confident in all that lies beyond the will's control, be cautious in all that is dependent on the will.' For if evil depends on evil choice, it is only in regard to matters of will that it is right to use caution; and if things outside the will's control, which do not depend on us, concern us in no way, we should use confidence in regard to these. And in that way we shall be at once cautious and confident and indeed confident because of our caution. For because we are cautious as to things which are really evil we shall get confidence to face things which are not so.

Plain English · paraphraseConfidence and caution are not incompatible. Perhaps the claim by philosophers that we can combine confidence with caution in everything we do might seem like a paradox, but we must try our best to see if it's true. In a way, caution seems to go against confidence, and opposites are not compatible. But I think the reason many see this as a paradox is because of a confusion. If we asked someone to be both cautious and confident about the same things, they might rightly criticize us for mixing qualities that can't be mixed if used properly. But in reality, there's nothing strange about the statement. If it's true, as often said and proven, that the nature of good and evil depends on how we handle impressions, and if things outside our will's control can't be called good or bad, then confidence in things outside the will and caution in things within the will's control make sense. We can't call it a paradox if philosophers demand, "Be confident in all that lies beyond the will's control, be cautious in all that is within the will's control." If evil comes from bad choices, then caution is only needed in matters of the will. If things outside the will's control don't depend on us, they don't concern us, so we should be confident about them. In this way, we can be both cautious and confident, and in fact, confident because of our caution. Because we are cautious about things that are truly evil, we gain confidence to face things that are not.

As it is, we exercise them in the wrong spheres, However, we behave like deer: when hinds fear the feathers and fly from them, where do they turn, and in what do they take refuge as a safe retreat? They turn to the nets, and so they perish because they confuse objects of fear with objects of confidence.

Plain English · paraphraseAs it is, we train them in the wrong areas. However, we act like deer: when hinds are afraid of feathers and run from them, where do they go, and in what do they find refuge as a safe place? They go to the nets, and so they die because they mix up things to fear with things to trust.

So it is with us. Where do we show fear? In regard to things outside our will's control. Again, when do we behave with confidence as though there were nothing to fear? In matters within the will's control. So if only we are successful in things beyond our will's control we think it is of no consequence to us to be deceived or to act rashly, or to do a shameless deed, or to conceive a shameful desire. But where death or exile or pain or infamy confronts us, there we show the spirit of retreat and of wild alarm. and so our confidence becomes recklessness and our caution cowardice. Wherefore, as is likely with men who are mistaken in the greatest matters, we convert our natural confidence into something bold, desperate, reckless, shameless, whereas we change our natural caution and modesty into a cowardly and abject quality, full of fears and perturbations. For if a man transfers his caution to the region of the will and the operations of the will, with the will to be cautious he will find that the will to avoid lies in his control: while if he turns his caution to what is beyond the control of our will, inasmuch as his will to avoid will be directed to what depends upon others he will of necessity be subject to fear, inconstancy, and perturbation. What we should fear is not death but the fear of death. For it is not death or pain which is a fearful thing, but the fear of pain or death. Therefore men praise him who said

Not death, but shameful death, is to be feared.

We ought then to turn our confidence towards death, and our caution towards the fear of death: what we really do is just the contrary; we fly from death, yet we pay no heed to forming judgements about death, but are reckless and indifferent. Socrates called such fears 'bogies', and rightly too. The fear of death is a bogy. For just as masks seem fearful and terrible to children from want of experience, so we are affected by events for much the same reason as children are affected by 'bogies'. For what makes a child? Want of knowledge. What makes a child? Want of instruction. For so far as a child knows those things he is no worse off than we are. What is death? A bogy. Turn it round and see what it is: you see it does not bite. Death is part of the order of the universe. The stuff of the body was bound to be parted from the airy element, either now or hereafter, as it existed apart from it before. Why then are you vexed if they are parted now? For if not parted now, they will be hereafter. Why so? That the revolution of the universe may be accomplished, for it has need of things present, things future, and things past and done with. What is pain? A bogy. Turn it round and see what it is. The poor flesh is subject to rough movement, then again to smooth. If it is not to your profit, the door stands open: if it is to your profit, bear it. For in every event the door must stand open and then we have no trouble.

Plain English · paraphraseWe should then turn our trust toward death and our care toward the fear of death. But what we actually do is the opposite: we run away from death, yet we pay no attention to thinking about death, and we are careless and indifferent. Socrates called such fears "bogies," and rightly so. The fear of death is a bogy. For just as masks seem frightening and terrible to children because of lack of experience, so we are affected by events for much the same reason as children are affected by "bogies." What makes a child? Lack of knowledge. What makes a child? Lack of instruction. For as far as a child knows those things, he is no worse off than we are. What is death? A bogy. Turn it around and see what it is: you see it does not bite. Death is part of the order of the universe. The material of the body was always going to be separated from the airy element, either now or later, as it was separate from it before. Why then are you upset if they are separated now? For if not separated now, they will be later. Why so? So that the revolution of the universe may be completed, for it needs things present, things future, and things past and done with. What is pain? A bogy. Turn it around and see what it is. The poor flesh is subject to rough movement, then again to smooth. If it is not to your benefit, the door stands open: if it is to your benefit, bear it. For in every event the door must stand open, and then we have no trouble.

The fruit of this belief is tranquillity, What then is the fruit of these judgements? A fruit which must needs be most noble and most becoming to those who are truly being educated—a mind tranquil and fearless and free. For on these matters you must not trust the multitude, who say, 'Only the free may be educated', but rather the philosophers who say, 'Only the educated are free.' 'What do you mean by that?' I mean this. What else is freedom but power to pass our life as we will? 'True.' Tell me, fellow men, do you wish to live doing wrong? 'We do not.' Is no one free who does wrong? 'No one.' Do you wish to live in fear, in pain, in distress of mind? 'By no means.' in which freedom consists. Well, no man who suffers fear or pain or distress of mind is free, but whoever is quit of fears and pains and distresses is by the self-same road quit of slavery. How then shall we go on believing you, dearest lawgivers? Do we allow none but the free to get education? Nay! philosophers say that we do not allow any to be free except those whose education is complete: that is, God does not allow it.

Freedom is not the result of manumission or of paying a tax. 'Well then, when a man turns his slave round before the praetor, does he do nothing?' He does something. 'What?' He turns his slave round before the praetor. 'Nothing else?' Yes, he is bound to pay the twentieth for him. 'What follows? Has not the man to whom this is done gained freedom?' No more than he has gained peace of mind. For do you who can confer this freedom own no master? Have you not a master in money, a girl lover or a boy lover, the tyrant, or a friend of the tyrant? If not, why do you tremble when you go away to face a crisis of this sort? It is to know when to be confident and when to be cautious. Therefore I say many times over: What you must practise and have at command is to know what you ought to approach with confidence, and what with caution; all that is beyond the control of the will with confidence, and what is dependent on the will with caution. Fine phrases must be left to the stupid or to those who have achieved peace of mind. 'But' (says my pupil), 'have I not recited to you? Do you not know what I am doing?'