Discourses and Enchiridion

If it makes for your good, you will go: if not, you have a place to go to instead of Gyara, a place whither he who is sending you to Gyara will also go whether he will or no. Why then do you go to Rome as though it meant so much? It is not much compared with your preparation for it: so that a youth of fine feeling may say, 'It was not worth this price—to have heard so many lectures and written so many exercises, and sat at the feet of an old man of no great merit.'

The one thing to remember is to keep your own will secure. There is only one thing for you to remember, that is, the distinction between what is yours and what is not yours. Never lay claim to anything that is not your own. Tribunal and prison are distinct places, one high, the other low; but your will, if you choose to keep it the same in both, may be kept the same. So we shall emulate Socrates, but only when we can write songs of triumph in prison. As for our condition up till now, I doubt whether we should have borne with one who should say to us in prison, 'Would you like me to recite to you songs of triumph?' 'Why do you trouble me? Do you not know the ills which beset me? for this is my state.' What is it? 'I am at the point of death.' Yes, but are other men going to be immortal?

Plain English · paraphraseThe one thing to remember is to keep your own will secure. There is only one thing for you to remember: the difference between what is yours and what is not. Never claim anything that is not your own. A tribunal and a prison are different places, one high, the other low; but your will, if you choose to keep it the same in both, can remain the same. So we shall follow Socrates, but only when we can write songs of triumph in prison. As for our condition so far, I doubt whether we would have put up with someone who said to us in prison, "Would you like me to recite songs of triumph to you?" "Why are you troubling me? Don't you know the sufferings I face? This is my situation." What is it? "I am near death." Yes, but are other people going to be immortal?

CHAPTER VII How to consult diviners.

The diviner cannot tell you what is right or wrong. Many of us often neglect acts which are fitting because we consult the diviners out of season. What can the diviner see more than death or danger or disease or generally things of that sort? If then I have to risk my life for a friend, if even it is fitting for me to die for him, how can it be in season for me to consult a diviner? Have I not within me the diviner who has told me the true nature of good and evil, who has expounded the signs of both? What need have I then of the flesh of victims or the flight of birds? Can I bear with him when he says, 'This is expedient for you'? Does he know what is expedient, does he know what is good, has he learnt signs to distinguish between good things and bad, like the signs in the flesh of victims? If he knows the signs of good and evil, he knows also the signs of things noble and shameful, just and unjust. It is yours, man, to tell me what is portended—life or death, poverty or wealth; but whether this is expedient or inexpedient I am not going to inquire of you.

Why do you not lay down the law in matters of grammar? Are you going to do it here then, where all mankind are at sea and in conflict with one another? Therefore that was a good answer that the lady made who wished to send the shipload of supplies to Gratilla in exile, when one said, 'Domitian will take them away': 'I would rather', she said, 'that Domitian should take them away than that I should not send them.' Nothing but cowardice makes us consult them. What then leads us to consult diviners so constantly? Cowardice, fear of events. That is why we flatter the diviners. 'Master, shall I inherit from my father?' 'Let us see: let us offer sacrifice.' 'Yes, master, as fortune wills.' When he says, 'You shall inherit', we give thanks to him as though we had received the inheritance from him. That is why they go on deluding us.

Plain English · paraphraseWhy don't you set down the rules about grammar? Are you going to do it here, where all people are lost and fighting with each other? So the lady gave a good answer when she wanted to send supplies to Gratilla, who was in exile. Someone said, "Domitian will take them away." She said, "I would rather Domitian take them than that I not send them." Only cowardice makes us ask their opinion. What then makes us keep consulting the diviners? Cowardice, fear of what will happen. That is why we flatter the diviners. "Master, will I inherit from my father?" "Let us see: let us make a sacrifice." "Yes, master, if fortune wills." When he says, "You will inherit," we thank him as if we had received the inheritance from him. That is why they keep deceiving us.

We ought to approach God like travellers ready to take what the road may lead to. What must we do then? We must come without the will to get or the will to avoid, just as the wayfarer asks the man he meets which of two ways leads anywhere, not wanting the right hand to be the road rather than the left, for he does not wish to go one particular road, but the road which leads to his goal. We ought to approach God as we approach a guide, dealing with Him as we deal with our eyes, not beseeching them to show us one sort of things rather than another, but accepting the impressions of things as they are shown us. But instead of that we tremble and get hold of the augur and appeal to him as if he were a god and say, 'Master, have pity, suffer me to come off safe.' Slave, do you not wish for what is better for you? Is anything better than what seems good to God? Why do you do all that in you lies to corrupt the judge, and pervert your counsellor?

CHAPTER VIII What is the true nature of the good. The good must partake of the nature of God. God is beneficent, but the good also is beneficent. It is natural therefore that the true nature of the good should be in the same region as the true nature of God. What then is the nature of God? Is it flesh? God forbid. Land? God forbid. Fame? God forbid. It is intelligence, knowledge, right reason. In these then and nowhere else seek the true nature of the good. Do you look for it in a plant? No. Or in an irrational creature? No. If then you seek it in what is rational why do you seek it elsewhere than in what distinguishes it from irrational things? Plants have not the faculty of dealing with impressions; therefore you do not predicate 'good' of them.

It implies power to deal with impressions and to understand them. The good then demands power to deal with impressions. Is that all it demands? If that be all, you must say that other animals also are capable of good and of happiness and unhappiness. But you do not say so and you are right, for whatever power they may have to deal with impressions, they have not the power to understand how they do so, and with good reason, for they are subservient to others, and are not of primary importance.

Plain English · paraphraseIt means having the power to handle impressions and understand them. So, goodness requires the power to deal with impressions. Is that all it requires? If that's all, then you must say that other animals are also capable of goodness, and of happiness and unhappiness. But you don't say that, and you're right. For even if they have some power to deal with impressions, they don't have the power to understand how they do it. And with good reason, because they are controlled by others and are not of primary importance.

Take the ass, for instance, is it born to be of primary importance? No; it is born because we had need of a back able to bear burdens. Nay, more, we had need that it should walk; therefore it has further received the power of dealing with impressions, for else it could not have walked. Beyond that its powers cease. But if the ass itself had received the power to understand how it deals with impressions, then it is plain that reason would have required that it should not have been subject to us or have supplied these needs, but should have been our equal and like ourselves. Man is God's chief work, a portion of God Himself. Will you not then seek the true nature of the good in that, the want of which makes you refuse to predicate good of other things? 'What do you mean? Are not they too God's works?'

Plain English · paraphraseTake the donkey, for instance. Was it born to be of primary importance? No. It was born because we needed a back that could carry burdens. In fact, we needed it to walk; therefore, it was given the power to process sensations, for otherwise it could not have walked. Beyond that, its abilities stop. But if the donkey itself had been given the power to understand how it processes sensations, then it is clear that reason would require it not to be subject to us or to provide these needs, but to be our equal and like ourselves. Man is God's chief work, a part of God Himself. Will you not then seek the true nature of the good in that, the lack of which makes you refuse to call other things good? "What do you mean? Are they not also God's works?"

They are, but not His principal works, nor parts of the Divine. But you are a principal work, a fragment of God Himself, you have in yourself a part of Him. Why then are you ignorant of your high birth? Why do you not know whence you have come? Will you not remember, when you eat, who you are that eat, and whom you are feeding, and the same in your relations with women? When you take part in society, or training, or conversation, do you not know that it is God you are nourishing and training? You bear God about with you, poor wretch, and know it not. Every man carries God about with him, and must see that he defiles Him not.Do you think I speak of some external god of silver or gold? No, you bear Him about within you and are unaware that you are defiling Him with unclean thoughts and foul actions. If an image of God were present, you would not dare to do any of the things you do; yet when God Himself is present within you and sees and hears all things, you are not ashamed of thinking and acting thus: O slow to understand your nature, and estranged from God!

Again, when we send a young man from school to the world of action, why is it that we fear that he may do something amiss—in eating, in relations with women, that he may be humbled by wearing rags, or puffed up by fine clothes?

He does not know the God that is in him, he knows not in whose company he is going. Can we allow him to say, 'I would fain have you with me'? Have you not God there? and, having Him, do you look for any one else? A statue would remember its maker, but man—a far nobler creature—forgets Zeus, who made him. Will He tell you anything different from this? Why, if you were a statue wrought by Phidias—his Zeus or his Athena—you would have remembered what you are and the Craftsman who made you, and if you had any intelligence, you would have tried to do nothing unworthy of him who made you or of yourself, and to bear yourself becomingly in men's eyes. But as it is, do you, whom Zeus has made, for that reason take no thought what manner of man you will show yourself? Yet what comparison is there between the one artificer and the other or the one work and the other? What work of art, for instance, has in itself the faculties of which it gives indication in its structure? Is it not stone or bronze or gold or ivory? Even the Athena of Phidias having once for all stretched out her hand and received the Victory upon it stands thus for all time, but the works of God are endowed with movement and breath, and have the faculty of dealing with impressions and of testing them.

When this Craftsman has made you, do you dishonour his work? Nay, more, He not only made you, but committed you as a trust to yourself and none other. Will you not remember this, but even dishonour the trust committed to you? God trusted you to yourself, to keep unspoiled for Him. If God had committed some orphan to your care, would you have neglected him so? Yet He has entrusted your own self to you and He says, 'I had none other more trustworthy than you: keep this man for me such as he is born to be, modest, faithful, high-minded, undismayed, free from passion and tumult.' After that, do you refuse to keep him so? But they will say, 'Where has this man got his high looks and his lofty countenance?'

Nay, I have not got them yet as I ought: for as yet I have not confidence in what I have learnt and assented to, I still fear my own weakness. Only let me gain confidence and then you shall see a proper aspect and a proper bearing, then I will show you the statue as it is when it is finished and polished. What think you? That this means proud looks? Heaven forbid! Does Zeus of Olympia wear proud looks? No, but his gaze is steadfast, as his should be who is to say: For my word cannot be taken back, nor can it deceive. Such will I show myself to you—faithful, self-respecting, noble, free from tumult. Keep yourself then—not free from death, but ready to die like a god. 'Do you mean, free from death and old age and disease?' No, but as one who dies as a god, and who bears illness like a god. These are my possessions, these my faculties; all others are beyond me. I will show you the sinews of a philosopher. 'What do you mean by sinews?' Will to achieve that fails not, will to avoid that falls not into evil, impulse to act appropriately, strenuous purpose, assent that is not precipitate. This is what you shall see.

CHAPTER IX That we adopt the profession of the philosopher when we cannot fulfil that of a man. Man's calling is to be rational. This marks him out from other animals. It is no ordinary task merely to fulfil man's promise. For what is Man? A rational animal, subject to death. At once we ask, from what does the rational element distinguish us? From wild beasts. And from what else? From sheep and the like. Look to it then that you do nothing like a wild beast, else you destroy the Man in you and fail to fulfil his promise. See that you do not act like a sheep, or else again the Man in you perishes. You ask how we act like sheep? When we consult the belly, or our passions, when our actions are random or dirty or inconsiderate, are we not falling away to the state of sheep? What do we destroy? The faculty of reason. When our actions are combative, mischievous, angry, and rude, do we not fall away and become wild beasts? In a word, some of us are great beasts, and others are small but base-natured beasts, which give occasion to say, 'Nay, rather let me be food for a lion.' All these are actions by which the calling of man is destroyed.

What makes a complex proposition be what it is? It must fulfil its promise: it keeps its character only if the parts it is composed of are true. What makes a disjunctive proposition? It must fulfil its purport. Is not the same true of flutes, lyre, horse, and dog? But man can only keep his true nature by exercising it. Is it surprising then that man too keeps or loses his nature on the same principle? Each man is strengthened and preserved by the exercise of the functions that correspond to his nature, the carpenter by carpentering, the grammarian by studies in grammar. If a man gets the habit of writing ungrammatically, his art is bound to be destroyed and perish. In the same way the modest man is made by modest acts and ruined by immodest acts, the man of honour keeps his character by honest acts and loses it by dishonest. So again men of the opposite character are strengthened by the opposite actions: the shameless man by shamelessness, the dishonest by dishonesty, the slanderous by slander, the ill-tempered by ill-temper, the miser by grasping at more than he gives. That is why philosophers enjoin upon us 'not to be content with learning only, but to add practice as well and then training'. For we have acquired wrong habits in course of years and have adopted for our use conceptions opposite to the true, and therefore if we do not adopt true conceptions for our use we shall be nothing else but interpreters of judgements which are not our own.

Plain English · paraphraseWhat makes a complex proposition what it is? It must keep its promise. It keeps its character only if the parts it is made of are true. What makes a disjunctive proposition? It must keep its meaning. Is this not also true of flutes, lyres, horses, and dogs? But a man can only keep his true nature by using it. Is it surprising then that a man keeps or loses his nature by the same principle? Each man is strengthened and preserved by using the functions that match his nature. The carpenter by carpentry, the grammarian by studying grammar. If a man gets used to writing ungrammatically, his art is bound to be destroyed and die. In the same way, the modest man is made by modest actions and ruined by immodest actions. The man of honour keeps his character by honest actions and loses it by dishonest ones. So again, men of the opposite character are strengthened by opposite actions: the shameless man by shamelessness, the dishonest by dishonesty, the slanderous by slander, the ill-tempered by ill-temper, the miser by grasping more than he gives. That is why philosophers tell us not to be content with learning only, but to add practice and then training. For we have acquired bad habits over the years and have adopted for our use ideas opposite to the true. Therefore, if we do not adopt true ideas for our use, we shall be nothing else but interpreters of judgements which are not our own.

Of course any one of us can discourse for the moment It is easy to expound the principles of our philosophy, on what is good and what is bad: as thus, 'Of things that are, some are good, some bad, some indifferent; good are virtues and things that have part in virtues; evil are the opposite; indifferent are wealth, health, reputation.' And then if some loud noise disturbs us while we are speaking or one of the bystanders laughs at us, we are put out of countenance. but it is useless unless they are wrought into our being. Philosopher, where are those principles you were talking of? Whence did you fetch them forth to utter? From the lips and no further.

Plain English · paraphraseOf course, any one of us can talk about it for the moment. It is easy to explain the principles of our philosophy about what is good and what is bad. For example: "Of the things that exist, some are good, some are bad, some are indifferent. The good are virtues and things that share in virtues. The bad are the opposite. The indifferent are wealth, health, and reputation." And then, if some loud noise interrupts us while we are speaking, or one of the people watching laughs at us, we become embarrassed. But it is useless unless these ideas are truly part of us. Philosopher, where are those principles you were talking about? Where did you bring them from to speak? From your lips, and no further.

These principles are not your own: why do you make a mess of them? Why do you gamble with things of highest moment? It is one thing (to use an illustration) to put bread and wine away into a store-cupboard, and another thing to eat. What you eat is digested and distributed, and is turned into sinews, flesh, bones, blood, complexion, breath. What you store away you have at hand and can show to others at will, but it does you no good except for the mere name of having it. What is the good of expounding these doctrines any more than those of another school? Unless this be done, you are no more Stoic than Epicurean. Sit down now and discourse on the doctrines of Epicurus, and you will soon discourse more effectively than Epicurus himself. Why then do you call yourself a Stoic, why do you deceive the world, why being a Hellene do you act the Jew? Do you not see in what sense a man is called a Jew, in what sense a Syrian, in what an Egyptian? When we see a man trimming between two faiths we are wont to say, 'He is no Jew, but is acting a part', but when he adopts the attitude of mind of him who is baptized and has made his choice, then he is not only called a Jew but is a Jew indeed. So we also are but counterfeit 'baptists', Do not become a philosopher merely because you cannot play the man. Jews in name only, but really something else, with no feeling for reason, far from acting on the principles we talk of, though we pride ourselves on them as though we knew them. So, being unable to fulfil the calling of Man we adopt that of the Philosopher, a heavy burden indeed! It is as though one who could not lift ten pounds were fain to lift the stone of Ajax!

Plain English · paraphraseThese principles are not your own: why do you mess them up? Why do you gamble with the most important things? It is one thing (to use an example) to store bread and wine in a cupboard, and another to eat. What you eat is digested and used, becoming sinews, flesh, bones, blood, complexion, breath. What you store you can show to others when you want, but it does you no good except for the name of having it. What good is it to explain these doctrines more than those of another school? Unless you do this, you are no more Stoic than Epicurean. Sit down now and talk about Epicurus's doctrines, and you will soon speak more effectively than Epicurus himself. Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Why do you deceive the world? Why, being a Hellene, do you act the Jew? Do you not see how a man is called a Jew, a Syrian, or an Egyptian? When we see a man wavering between two beliefs, we say, "He is no Jew, but is acting a part." But when he adopts the mindset of one who has been baptized and made a choice, then he is not only called a Jew but is a Jew indeed. So we also are only counterfeit "baptists." Do not become a philosopher merely because you cannot be a man. Jews in name only, but really something else, with no feeling for reason, far from acting on the principles we talk of, though we pride ourselves on them as though we knew them. So, being unable to fulfill the calling of Man, we adopt that of the Philosopher, a heavy burden indeed! It is as though one who could not lift ten pounds were forced to lift the stone of Ajax!

CHAPTER X How the acts appropriate to man are to be discovered from the names he bears.

Man is fitted by reason to understand the universe. Consider who you are. First, a Man; that is, one who has nothing more sovereign than will, but all else subject to this, and will itself free from slavery or subjection. Consider then from what you are parted by reason. You are parted from wild beasts, you are parted from sheep. On these terms you are a citizen of the universe and a part of it, not one of those marked for service, but of those fitted for command; for you have the faculty to understand the divine governance of the universe and to reason on its sequence. What then is the calling of a Citizen? As a citizen of the universe his calling is to work with nature. To have no personal interest, never to think about anything as though he were detached, but to be like the hand or the foot, which, if they had the power of reason and understood the order of nature, would direct every impulse and every process of the will by reference to the whole. That is why it is well said by philosophers that 'if the good man knew coming events beforehand he would help on nature, even if it meant working with disease, and death and maiming', for he would realize that by the ordering of the universe this task is allotted him, and that the whole is more commanding than the part and the city than the citizen. 'But seeing that we do not know beforehand, it is appropriate that we should hold fast to the things that are by nature more fit to be chosen; for indeed we are born for this.'

Plain English · paraphraseMan is able to understand the universe because of reason. Think about who you are. First, you are a human being; that is, someone who has nothing more powerful than will, but everything else is under this, and will itself is free from being a slave or being controlled. Think then about what you are separated from by reason. You are separated from wild animals, you are separated from sheep. In this way, you are a citizen of the universe and a part of it, not one of those meant to serve, but one of those meant to lead; for you have the ability to understand the divine rule of the universe and to reason about its order. What then is the role of a Citizen? As a citizen of the universe, his role is to work with nature. To have no personal interest, never to think about anything as though he were separate, but to be like the hand or the foot, which, if they had the power of reason and understood the order of nature, would direct every impulse and every action of the will in relation to the whole. That is why it is rightly said by philosophers that "if the good man knew future events beforehand he would help nature, even if it meant working with disease, and death and maiming," for he would realize that by the order of the universe this task is given to him, and that the whole is more important than the part and the city than the citizen. "But since we do not know beforehand, it is right that we should hold fast to the things that are by nature more suitable to be chosen; for indeed we are born for this."

As son, he must obey his father. Next remember that you are a Son. What part do we expect a son to play? His part is to count all that is his as his father's, to obey him in all things, never to speak ill of him to any, nor to say or do anything to harm him, to give way to him and yield him place in all things, working with him so far as his powers allow. As brother, he must be considerate. Next know that you are also a Brother. For this part too you are bound to show a spirit of concession and obedience; and to speak kindly, and not to claim against another anything that is outside the will, but gladly to sacrifice those things, that you may gain in the region where your will has control. For look what a thing it is to gain good nature at the price of a lettuce, if it so chance, or the surrender of a chair: what a gain is that!

Every name he bears suggests the conduct proper to it. Next, if you are a member of a city council, remember that you are a councillor; if young, that you are young; if old, that you are old; if a father, that you are a father. For each of these names, if properly considered, suggests the acts appropriate to it. But if you go and disparage your brother, I tell you that you are forgetting who you are and what is your name. I say, if you were a smith and used your hammer wrong, you would have forgotten To act against the spirit of your name means loss and dishonour. the smith; but if you forget the brother's part and turn into an enemy instead of a brother, are you going to imagine that you have undergone no change? If instead of man, a gentle and sociable creature, you have become a dangerous, aggressive, and biting brute, have you lost nothing? Do you think you must lose cash in order to suffer damage? Does no other sort of loss damage man? If you lost skill in grammar or music you would count the loss as damage; if you are going to lose honour and dignity and gentleness, do you count it as nothing? Surely those other losses are due to some external cause outside our will, but these are due to ourselves. Those qualities it is no honour to have and no dishonour to lose, but these you cannot lack or lose without dishonour, reproach, and disaster.

Plain English · paraphraseEach name he carries points to the behavior it fits. Next, if you are part of a city council, remember you are a councillor; if you are young, remember you are young; if you are old, remember you are old; if you are a father, remember you are a father. Each of these names, when properly considered, points to the actions that fit it. But if you go and look down on your brother, I tell you that you are forgetting who you are and what your name is. I say, if you were a blacksmith and used your hammer wrongly, you would have forgotten the blacksmith. But if you forget the part of a brother and become an enemy instead of a brother, do you imagine you have not changed? If instead of a human being, a gentle and social creature, you become a dangerous, aggressive, and biting brute, have you lost nothing? Do you think you must lose money in order to suffer damage? Is there no other kind of loss that harms a person? If you lost skill in grammar or music, you would count that as a loss. If you are going to lose honor, dignity, and gentleness, do you count that as nothing? Surely those other losses come from some cause outside our will, but these come from ourselves. It is no honor to have those other things and no dishonor to lose them, but these you cannot lack or lose without dishonor, shame, and disaster.

All evil means destruction or loss, What does he lose who is the victim of unnatural lust? He loses his manhood. And the agent of such lust, what does he lose? He loses his manhood like the other, and much besides. What does the adulterer lose? He loses the man of honour and self-control, the gentleman, the citizen, the neighbour. What does the angry man lose? Something else. The man who fears? Something else. No one is evil without destruction and loss. not mere loss of money, but of man's most precious faculties. If on the other hand you look for loss in paltry pence, all the men I have mentioned are without loss or damage, if it so chance, nay they actually receive gain and profit, when they get cash by any of these actions. But notice, that if you make money the standard in everything, you will not count even the man who loses his nose as having suffered injury. 'Yes, I do,' he says, 'for his body is mutilated.' Well, but does the man who has lost, not his nose but his sense of smell, lose nothing? Is there no faculty of the mind, which brings gain to him that gets it and hurt to him that loses it? 'What can possibly be the faculty you mean?'

Have we no natural sense of honour? 'We have.' Does he that destroys this suffer no damage, no deprivation, no loss of what belongs to him? Have we not a natural faculty of trust, a natural gift of affection, of beneficence, of mutual toleration? Are we then to count the man who suffers himself to be injured in regard to these as free from loss and damage? To return evil for evil is only to harm ourselves. 'What conclusion do you draw? Am I not to harm him who harmed me?' First consider what 'harm' means and remember what you heard from the philosophers. For if good lies in the will and evil also lies in the will, look whether what you are saying does not come to this: 'What do you mean? As he harmed himself by doing me a wrong, am I not to harm myself by doing him a wrong?' Why then do we not look at things in this light? When we suffer some loss in body or property, we count it hurt: is there no hurt, when we suffer loss in respect of our will?

Plain English · paraphraseDo we not have a natural sense of honor? "We do." Does the one who destroys this suffer no damage, no loss, no loss of what is his? Do we not have a natural ability to trust, a natural gift of affection, of kindness, of mutual tolerance? Then are we to say that the one who allows himself to be harmed in these things suffers no loss or damage? To respond with evil for evil only harms ourselves. "What conclusion do you draw? Am I not to harm the one who harmed me?" First, consider what "harm" means, and remember what you heard from the philosophers. For if good comes from the will and evil also comes from the will, look whether what you are saying does not amount to this: "What do you mean? As he harmed himself by wronging me, am I not to harm myself by wronging him?" Why then do we not look at things this way? When we suffer some loss in body or property, we call it harm: is there no harm when we suffer loss in regard to our will?