The First Philosophers of Greece (fragments and testimonia)

Ibid. i. 3; 186a4. To those proceeding after this impossible manner things seem to be one, and it is not difficult to refute them from their own statements. For both of them reason in a fallacious manner, both Parmenides and Melissos ; for they make false assumptions, and at the same time their course of reasoning is not logical. . . . And the same sort of arguments are used by Parmenides, although he has some others of his own, and the refutation consists in showing both that he makes mistakes of fact and that he does not draw his conclusions correctly. He makes a mistake in assuming that being is to be spoken of absolutely, speaking of it thus many times ; and he draws the false conclusion that, in case only whites are considered, white meaning one thing, none the less there are many whites and not one; since neither in the succession of things nor in the argument will whiteness be one. For what is predicated of white will not be the same as what is predicated of the object which is white, and nothing except white will be separated from the object; since there is no other ground of separation except the fact that the white is different from the object in which the white exists. But Parmenides had not yet arrived at the knowledge of this.

and cold first principles; and he calls them fire and earth. Ibid. iti. 6; 207215. Wherefore we must regard Parmenides as a more acute thinker than Melissos, for the latter says that the infinite is the all, but the former asserts that the allis limited, equally distant from the centre [on every side].' Gen. Corr. i. 3; 318b6. Parmenides says that the two exist, both being and not being—i.e. earth and water. Metaph. i. 3; 984b1. None of those who have affirmed that the ail is one have, it happens, seen the nature of such a cause clearly, except, perhaps, Parmenides, and he in so far as he sometimes asserts that there is not one cause alone, but two causes.

Metaph.i.5 ; 986 b18. For Parmenides seemed to lay hold of a unity according to reason, and Melissos according to matter; wherefore the former says it is limited, the latter that itis unlimited. Xenophanes first taught the unity of things (Parmenides is said to have been his pupil), but he did not make anything clear, nor did he seem to get at the nature of either finiteness or infinity, but, looking up into the broad heavens, he said,. the unity is god. These, as we said, are to be dismissed from the present investigation, two of them entirely as being somewhat more crude, Xenophanes and Melissos ; but Parmenides seems to speak in some places with greater care. For believing that not-being does not exist in addition to being, of necessity he thinks that being is one and that there is nothing else, . . . and being compelled to account for phenomena, and assuming that things are one from the standpoint of reason, plural from the standpoint of sense, he again asserts that. there are two causes and two first principles, heat and. 106 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE cold, or, as he calls them, fire and earth ; of these he regards heat as being, its opposite as not-being.

Metaph. ii. 4; 1001a 82. There is nothing different from being, so that it is necessary to agree with the reasoning of Parmenides that all things are one, and that this is being. (c) PASSAGES RELATING TO PARMENIDES IN THE DoxoGRAPHISstTs. Theophrastos, Fr. 6 ; Alexander Metaph. p. 24, 5 Bon.; Dox. 482. And succeeding him Parmenides, son of Pyres, the Eleatic—Theophrastos adds the name of Xenophanes—followed both ways. For in declaring that the all is eternal, and in attempting to explain the genesis of things, he expresses different opinions according to the two standpoints:—from the standpoint of truth he supposes the all to be one and not generated and spheroidal in form, while from the standpoint of popular opinion, in order to explain generation of phenomena, he uses two first principles, fire and earth, the one as matter, the other as cause and agent.

Theophrastos, Fr. 6a; Laer. Diog. ix. 21, 22; Doz. 482. Parmenides, son of Pyres, the Eleatic, was a pupil of Xenophanes, yet he did not accept his doctrines. . . . He was the first to declare that the earth is spheroidal and situated in the middle of the universe. He said that there are two elements, fire and earth; the one has the office of demiurge, the other that of matter. Men first arose from mud; heat and cold are the elements of which all things are composed. He holds that intelligence and life are the same, as Theophrastos records in his book on physics, where he put down the opinions of almost everybody. He said that philosophy has a twofold office, to understand both the truth and also what men believe. Accordingly he says: (Vv. 28-30), ‘ ’Tis necessary for thee to learn all things, both the abiding — essence of persuasive truth, and men’s opinions in which rests no true belief.’ Theoph. Fr. 17; Diog. Laer. viii. 48; Dox. 492. Theophrastos says that Parmenides was the first to call the heavens a universe and the earth spheroidal.

Theoph. de Sens. 3; Dox. 499. Parmenides does not make any definite statements as to sensation, except that knowledge is in proportion to the excess of one of the two elements. Intelligence varies as the heat or the cold is in excess, and it is better and purer by reason of heat; but nevertheless it has need of a certain symmetry. (Vv. 146-149) ‘For,’ he says, ‘as at any time is the blending of very complex members in a man, so is the mind in men constituted; for that which thinks is the same in all men and in every man, viz., the essence of the members of the body; and the element that is in excess is thought.’ He says that perceiving and thinking are the same thing, and that remembering and forgetting come from these! as the result of mixture, but he does not say definitely whether, if they enter into the mixture in equal quantities, thought will arise or not, nor what the disposition should be. But it is evident that he believes sensation to take place by the presence of some quality in contrast with its opposite, where he says that a corpse does not perceive light and heat and sound by reason of the absence of fire, but that it perceives cold and silence and the similar contrasted qualities, and in general that being as a whole has a certain knowledge. So in his statements he seems to do away with what is difficult by leaving it out.

108 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE the first book of his physics Theophrastos gives as the opinion of Parmenides: That which is outside of being is not-being, not-being is nothing, accordingly being is one. Hipp. Phil. 11; Dox. 564. Parmenides supposes that the all is one and eternal, and without beginning and spheroidal in form; but even he does not escape the opinion of the many, for he speaks of fire and earth as first principles of the all, of earth as matter, and of fire as agent and cause, and he says that the earth will come to an end, but in what way he does not say. He says that the all is eternal, and not generated, and spherical, and homogeneous, not having place in itself, and unmoved, and limited.!

Plut. Strom. 5; Dox. 580. Parmenides the Eleatic, the companion of Xenophanes, both laid claim to his opinions, and at the same time took the opposite standpoint. For he declared the all to be eternal and immoyable according to the real state of the case; for it is alone, existing alone, immovable and without beginning (v. 60); but there is a generation of the things that seem to be according to false opinion, and he excepts sense perceptions from the truth. He says that if anything exists besides being, this is not-being, but notbeing does not exist at all. So there is left the being that has no beginning; and he says that the earth was formed by the precipitation of dense air. Epiph. adv. Haer. iii. 10; Dox. 590. Parmenides, the son of Pyres, himself also of the Eleatic school, said that the first principle of all things is the infinite. Cic. de Nat. Deor. i.11; Dowx.584. For Parmenides devised a sort of contrivance like a crown (he applied to it the word oregdyy), an orb of light with continuous heat, which arched the sky, and this he called

god, but in it no one could suspect a divine form or a divine sentiment, and he made many monstrosities of this sort; moreover, he raised to the rank of gods War, Discord, Desire, and many other things which disease or sleep or forgetfulness or old age destroys ; and similarly with reference to the stars he expresses opinions which have been criticised elsewhere and are omitted here. Aet. 1.3; Dox. 284. Parmenides, the Eleatic, son of Pyrrhes, was a companion of Xenophanes, and in his first book the doctrines agree with those of his master ; for here that verse occurs: (v. 60), Universal, existing alone, immovable and without beginning. He said that the cause of all things is not earth alone, as his master said, but also fire. 7; 303. The world is immovable and limited, and spheroidal in form. 24; 320. Parmenides and Melissos did away with generation and destruction, because they thought that the all is unmoved. 25; 321. All things are controlled by necessity ; this is fated, it is justice and forethought, and the producer of the world. Aet. ii. 1; Doz. 327. The world isone. 4; 832. It is without beginning and eternal and indesiructible. 7; 335. Parmenides taught that there were crowns encircling one another in close succession,' one of rarefied matter, another of dense, and between these other mixed crowns of light and darkness; and that which surrounded all was solid like a wall, and under this was a crown of fire; and the centre of all the crowns was solid, and around it was a circle of fire; and of the mixed crowns the one nearest the centre was the source of motion and generation for all, and this ‘the goddess who directs the helm and holds the keys,’* he calls ‘justice and necessity. The air is that which is separated from the earth, being evaporated by the

forcible pressure of the earth; the sun and the circle of the milky way are the exhalation of fire, and the moon is the mixture of both, namely of air and fire. The aether stands highest of all and surrounding all, and beneath this is ranged the fiery element which we call the heavens, and beneath this are the things of earth. 11; 339. The revolving vault highest above the earth is the heavens. 340. The heavens are of a fiery nature. 13; 342. The stars are masses of fire. 15; 345. He ranks the morning star, which he considers the same as the evening star, first in the aether; and after this the sun, and beneath this the stars in the fiery vault which he calls the heavens. 17; 846. Stars are fed from the exhalations of the earth. 20; 349. The sun is of a fiery nature. The sun and the moon are separated from the milky way, the one from the thinner mixture, which is hot, the other from the denser, which is cold. 25; 356. The moon is of a fiery nature. 26; 357. The moon is of the same size as the sun, and derives its light from it. 80; 361. (The moon appears dark) because darkness is mingled with its fiery nature, whence he calls it the star that shines with a false light.

Aet. iii. 1; 865. The mixture of dense and thin gives its milk-like appearance to the milky way. 11; 377.. Parmenides first defined the inhabited parts of the earth by the two tropical zones. 15; 880. Because the earth is equally distant on all sides from other bodies, and so: rests in an equilibrium, not having any reason for swaying one way rather than another ; on this account it only shakes and does not move from its place. Aet. iv. 3; 888. The soul is of a fiery nature.. 5; 891. The reason is in the whole breast. 392. Life and intelligence are the same thing, nor could there be any living being entirely without reason. 9; 397. Sensations arise part by part according to the symmetry of the pores, each particular object of sense being adapted to each sense (organ). 3898. Desire is produced by lack of nourishment. r

Aet. v. 7; 419. Parmenides holds the opposite opinion ; males are produced in the northern part, for this shares the greater density; and females in the southern part by reason of its rarefied state. 420. Some descend from the right side to the right parts of the womb, others from the left to the left parts of the womb; but if they cross in the descent females are born. (11; 422. When the child comes from the right side of the womb, it resembles the father ; when it comes from the left side, the mother. 380; 443. Old age attends the failure of heat. 112 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

Zeno of Elea, son of Teleutagoras, was born early in the fifth century p.c. He was the pupil of Parmenides, and his relations with him were so intimate that Plato calls him Parmenides’s son (Soph. 241). Strabo (vi. 1, 1) applies to him as well as to his master the name Pythagorean, and gives him the credit of advancing the cause of law and order in Elea. Several writers say that he taught in Athens for a while. There are numerous accounts of his capture as party to a conspiracy ; these accounts differ widely from each other, and the only point of agreement between them has reference to his determination in shielding his fellow conspirators. We find reference to one book which he wrote in prose (Plato, Parm. 127 ©), each section of which showed the absurdity of some element in the popular belief. 114 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE (a) Stmpricrus’s AccouNT OF ZENO’S ARGUMENTS, INCLUDING THE TRANSLATION OF THE FRAGMENTS.

30 + 138, 80. For Eudemos says in his Physics, ‘Then does not this exist, and is there any one? This was the problem. He reports Zeno as saying that if any one explains to him the one, what it is, he can tell him what things are. But he is puzzled, it seems, because each of the senses declares that there are many things, both absolutely, and as the result of division, but no one establishes the mathematical point. He thinks that what is not increased by receiving additions, or decreased as parts are taken away, is not one of the things that are.’ It was natural that Zeno, who, as if for the sake of exercise, argued both sides of a case (so that he is called double-tongued), should utter such statements raising difficulties about the one ; but in his book which has many arguments in regard to each point, he shows that a man who affirms multiplicity naturally falls into contradictions. Among these arguments is one by which he shows that if there are many things, these are both:small and great—great enough to be infinite in size, and small enough to be nothing in size. By this he shows that what has neither greatness nor thickness nor bulk could not even be. (Fr. 1)! ‘For if, he says, anything were added to another being, it could not make it any greater; for since greatness does not exist, it is impossible to increase the greatness of a thing by adding to it. So that which is added would be nothing. If when something is taken away that which is left is no less, and if it becomes no greater by receiving additions, evidently that which has been added or taken away is nothing.” ‘These things Zeno says, not denying the one, but holding that each thing has the greatness of

many and infinite things, since there is always something before that which is apprehended, by reason of its infinite divisibility ; and this he proves by first showing that nothing has any greatness because each thing of the many is identical with itself and is one.

Ibid. 30 v 140,27. And why is it necessary to say that there is a multiplicity of things when it is set forth in Zeno’s own book? For again in showing that, if there is a multiplicity of things, the same things are both finite and infinite, Zeno writes as follows, to use his own words: (Fr. 2) ‘If there is a multiplicity of things, it is necessary that these should be just as many as exist, and not more nor fewer. If there are just as many as there are, then the number would be finite. If there is a multiplicity at all, the number is infinite, for there are always others between any two, and yet others between each pair of these. So the number of things is infinite.’ So by the process of division he shows that their number is infinite. Andas to magnitude, he begins with this same argument. For first showing that (Fr.. 3) ‘if being did not have magnitude, it would not exist at all,’ he goes on, ‘if anything exists, it is necessary that each thing should have some magnitude and thickness, and that one part of it should be separated from another. The same argument applies-to the thing that precedes this. That also will have magnitude and will have something before it. The same may be said of each thing once for all, for there will be no such thing as last, nor will one thing differ from another. So if there is a multiplicity of things, it is necessary that these should be great and small—small enough not to have any magnitude, and great enough to be infinite.’ !

Ibid. 180 v 562, 8. Zeno’s argument seems to deny that place exists, putting the question as follows: (Fr. 4) 116 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE ‘If there is such a thing as place, it will be in something, for all being is in something, and that which is in something is in some place. Then this place will be in a place, and so on indefinitely. Accordingly there is no such thing as place.’ Ibid. 131r 568, 17. Eudemos’ account of Zeno’s opinion runs as follows :—‘ Zeno’s problem seemsto come to the same thing. For it is natural that all being should be somewhere, and if there is a place for things, where would this place be? In some other place, and that in another, and so on indefinitely.’

Ibid. 286v. Zeno’s argument that when anything is in a space equal to itself, it is either in motion or at rest, and that nothing is moved in the present moment, and that the moving body is always in a space equal to itself at each present moment, may. I think, be put in a syllogism as follows: The arrow which is moving forward is at every present moment in a space equal to itself, accordingly it is <in a space equal to itself - in all time; but that which is in a space equal to itself in the present moment is not in motion. Accordingly it is in a state of rest, since it is not moved in the present moment, and that which is not moving is at rest, since everything is either in motion or at rest. So the arrow which is moving forward is at rest while it is moving forward, in every moment of its motion. 237r. The Achilles argument is so named because Achilles is named in it as the example, and the argument shows that if he pursued a tortoise it would be impossible for him te overtake it.

255r. Aristotle accordingly solves the problem of Zeno the Hleatic, which he propounded to Protagoras the Sophist.' Tell me, Protagoras, said he, does one grain of millet make a noise when it falls, or does the ten-thousandth part of a grain? On receiving the answer that it does not, he went on: Does a measure of millet grains make a noise when it falls, or not? He answered, it does make a noise. Well, said Zeno, does not the statement about the measure of millet apply to the one grain and the ten-thousandth part of a grain ? He assented, and Zeno continued, Are not the statements as to the noise the same in regard to each? For as are the things that make a noise, so are the noises. Since this is the case, if the measure of millet makes a noise, the one grain and the ten-thousandth part of a grain make a noise.

Phys. iv. 1; 209 a 28. Zeno’s problem demands some consideration ; if all being is in some place, evidently there must be a place of this place, and so on indefinitely. 3; 210 b 22. It is not difficult to solve Zeno’s problem, that if place is anything, it will be in some place ; there is no reason why the first place should not be in something else, not however as in that place, but just as health exists in warm beings as a state while warmth exists in matter as a property of it. Soit is not necessary to assume an indefinite series of places. vi. 2; 233 a 24. (Time and space are continuous . . . . the divisions of time and space are the same.) Accordingly Zeno’s argument is erroneous, that it is not possible to traverse infinite spaces, or to come in contact with infinite spaces successively in a finite time. Both space and time can be called infinite in two ways, either absolutely as a continuous whole, or by division into the smallest parts. With infinites in point of quantity, it is not possible for anything to come in contact in a finite time, but it is possible in the case of the infinites 118 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

reached by division, for time itself is infinite from this standpoint. So the result is that it traverses the infinite in an infinite, not a finite time, and that infinites, not finites, come in contact with infinites.

vi. 9; 2839 b5. And Zeno’s reasoning is fallacious. For if, he says, everything is at rest [or in motion | when it is in a space equal to itself, and the moving body is always in the present moment <in a space equal to itself, » then the moving arrow is still. This is false ; for time is not composed of present moments that are indivisible, nor indeed is any other quantity. Zeno presents four arguments concerning motion which involve puzzles to be solved, and the first of these shows that motion does not exist because the moving body must go half the distance before it goes the whole distance; of this we have spoken before (Phys. vill. 8; 263a5). And the second is called the Achilles argument; it is this :— The slow runner will never be overtaken by the swiftest, for it is necessary that the pursuer should first reach the point from which the pursued started, so that necessarily the slower is always somewhat in advance. This argument is the same as the preceding, the only difference being that the distanée is not divided each time into halves. . . . His opinion is false that the one in advance is not overtaken; he is not indeed overtaken while he is in advance; but nevertheless he is overtaken, if you will grant that he passes through the limited space. These are the first two arguments, and the third is the one that has been alluded to, that the arrow in its flight is stationary. This depends on the assumption that time is composed of present moments; there will be no syllogism if this is not granted. And the fourth argument is with reference to equal bodies moving in opposite directions past equal bodies in the stadium with equal speed, some from the end of the stadium, others from

. THE ELEATIC SCHOOL: ZENO 119 the middle ; in which case he thinks half the time equal to twice the time. The fallacy lies in the fact that while he postulates that bodies of equal size move forward with equal speed for an equal time, he compares the one with something in motion, the other with something at rest. (c) PASSAGES RELATING TO ZENO IN THE DoxOGRAPHISTS. Hpiph. adv. Haer. ii. 11; Dox. 590. Zeno the Eleatic, a dialectician equal to the other Zeno, says that the earth does not move, and that no space is void of content. He speaks as follows :— That which is moved is moved in the place in which it is, or in the place in which it is not; itis neither moved in the place in which it is, nor in the place in which it is not; accordingly it is not moved at all. Galen, Hist. Phil. 8; Dow.601. Zeno the Eleatic is said to have introduced the dialectic philosophy. 7; Doc. 604. He was a skeptic.

Aet. i. 7; Dow. 303. Melissos and Zeno say that the one is universal, and that it exists alone, eternal, and unlimited. And this one is necessity {Heeren inserts here the name Empedokles|, and the material of it is the four eleménts, and the forms are strife and love. He says that the elements are gods, and the mixture of them is the world. The uniform will be resolved into them ;! he thinks that souls are divine, and that pure men who share these things in a pure way are divine. 23; 320. Zeno et al. denied generation and destruction, because they thought that the all is unmoved. 1 Reading mpds radra Avdjoeras, which, as Mr. G. D. Lord suggests to me, is probably the source of the corruption mpoorayAvéfcerar. The Vatican vulgate combines both readings. 120 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

Meuissos of Samos, son of Ithagenes, was a contemporary of Zeno, though he may have been slightly younger. Parmenides is said to have been his teacher, and it is possible that he may have made the acquaintance of Herakleitos. According to Diogenes, he was a respected statesman, and there seems to be good evidence (Plutarch, Perikles 26, after Aristotle) that he commanded the Samian fleet at its victory over the Athe- Literature: The fragments are treated by Brandis, Commen. Eleat. iii. and by Mullach de Melisso X. @. p. 80; Pabst, de Meliss. Fragmentis, Bonn 1889, disputes the authenticity of Fr. 1-5. Spalding, Vindic. philos. Megar. Berlin 1798, first showed that the first two chapters of the book called de Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia, refer to Melissos. Cf. also Fr. Kern, Zur Wiirdigung des Melissos, Festschrift d. stettin. Stadtgym. 1880. Fr. 1-5. The passage giving these fragments, as they have been called, contains little that is not found in the remaining fragments, and in spite of the fact that it is given as a direct quotation, it seems best to regard it as a condensed statement of the opinions of Melissos. V- 122 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE 124 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE Srpricius’s Account OF MELISSOS, INCLUDING THE TRANSLATION OF THE FRAGMENTS.

22; 108, 18. Now let us glance at Melissos’ argument, which we ran across a few lines back. Melissos, making use of the axioms of the physicists, in regard to generation and destruction, begins his book as follows : (Fr. 1) If nothing is, how could this be spoken of as though something is? And if anything is, either it has come into being, or else it always has been. If it came into being, it sprung either from being or from not-being; but it is impossible that any such thing should have sprung from not-being (for nothing else that is could have sprung from it, much less pure being) ; nor could it have sprung from being, for in that case it <would simply be, and > would not have come into existence. So then being is not generated ; being always is, nor will it be destroyed. For being could not be changed into not-being (this also is conceded by the physicists), nor into being; for then it would abide as it is, and would not be destroyed. Accordingly being was not generated, nor will it be destroyed ; so it always was and always will be. (Fr.2) But while that which comes into existence has a beginning, that which does not come into existence does not have a beginning, and being which did not come into existence would not have a beginning. Farther, that which is destroyed has an end ;

but if anything is not subject to destruction, it does not have an end ; and that which has neither beginning nor end is of course infinite ; so being is infinite. (Fr. 3) And if it is infinite, it is one ; for if being were two, both parts could not be infinite, but each would be limited by the other. But being is infinite; there could not be several beings ; accordingly being is one. (Fr. 4) Farther, if being is one it does not move; for the

one is always homogeneous [lit. like itself]; and that which is homogeneous could not perish or become greater or change its arrangement or suffer pain or annoyance. If it experienced any of these things it would not be one ; for that which is moved with any sort of motion changes something from one thing into something different ; but there is nothing else except being, so this will not be moved. (Fr. 5) To follow another line of argument : there is no place void of being, for the void is nothing ; but that which is nothing could not exist; so then being is not moved: it is impossible for it to go anywhere, if there is no void. Nor is it possible for it to contract into itself, for in that case different degrees of density would arise, and this is impossible; for it is impossible that the rare should be as full as the dense ; but the rare is more empty than the dense, and there is no such thing as emptiness. It is necessary to judge whether being is full or not by its capacity to receive something else: if it will not receive anything it is full; if it will receive something it is not full. Now if the void does not exist, it must of necessity be full; and if this is the case it does not move, not because it is impossible for it to move through space already filled, as we say of bodies, but because all being cannot be moved into being (for there is nothing besides itself), nor can being be moved into not-being, for not-being does not exist.

23; 109, 7. Melissos also is blamed because in his frequent references to the beginning he does not use the word to mean a beginning in time which applies to that which comes into existence, but rather to mean a logical beginning which does not apply to the things that are changing collectively. He seems to have seen clearly before Aristotle that all matter, even that which is eternal, being limited has a limited capacity, 126 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

and in itself is always at the end of time, and because of the ever-moving beginning of that which passes, it is always at the beginning, and remains eternal, so that that which has beginning and end in quantity has also beginning and end in time, and the reverse ; for that which has beginning and end in time is not everything simultaneously. So he bases his proof on beginning and end in time. Accordingly he says that that which is not everything—i.e. which is not the whole simultaneously—is not without beginning or end; what applies to things that are indivisible and infinite in their being, applies so much the more to pure being; and that all applies to being. Melissos puts it as follows: (Fr. 7) Since then it did not come into being but is, it always was and always will be, and has neither beginning nor end, but is infinite. For if it had come into existence it would have had a keginning (for that which once came into existence would have a beginning) and an end (for that which once came into existence would come to an end) ; if it neither had a beginning nor came to an end, it always was and always will be; it has not beginning or end; but it is impossible that anything which is not the whole should always a ae 1. 31. (Fr. 8) But as it-always exists, so it is necessary also that it be always infinite in magnitude. 1. 38. (Fr. 15) If being is separated it moves; and that which moves could not exist simultaneously.

24; 110, 1 (Fr. 16) If being exists it must be one, and being one it is necessary that it should not itself have body ; (19; 87, 6) and if it should have thickness, it would have parts and would no longer be a unity. 1. 3 (Fr. 9) Nothing which has beginning and end is either eternal or infinite. 1.5 (Fr. 10) If it were not one, it would be bounded by something else.! ' The paraphrase above (Fr. 3) gives the argument in fuller form.

24; 111, 18. Melissos bringing his previous topic.to a conclusion goes on to consider motion. (Fr. 11) So then the all is eternal and infinite and homogeneous ; and it could neither perish nor become greater nor change its arrangement nor suffer pain or distress. If it experienced any of these things it would no longer be one ; for if it becomes different, it is necessary that being should not be homogeneous, but that which was before must perish, and that which was not must come into existence. If then the all should become different by a single hair in ten thousand years, it would perish in the whole of time. (Fr. 12) And it is impossible for its order to change, for the order existing before does not perish, nor does another which did not exist come into being ; and since nothing is added to it or subtracted from it or made different, how could any of the things that are change their order? But if anything became different, its order would already have been changed. (Fr. 13) Nor does it suffer pain, for the all could not be pained; it would be impossible for anything suffering pain always to be ; nor does it have power equal to the power of what is healthy. It would not be homogeneous if it suffered pain ; it would suffer pain whenever anything was added or taken away, and it would no longer be homogeneous.

Nor could what is healthy suffer a pang of pain, for both the healthy and being would perish, and not-being would come into existence. The same reasoning that applies to pain applies also to distress. (Fr. 14) Nor is there any void, for the void is nothing, and that which is nothing could not be. Nor does it move, for it has nowhere to go to, since it is full; for if there were a void it could go into the void, but since there is no void it has nowhere to go to. It could not be rare and dense, for it is not possible for the rare to be as full as the dense, but the rare is already more empty than the dense.

128 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE This is the test of what is full and what is not full: if it has room for anything, or admits anything into it, it is not full; if it does not have room for anything, or admit anything into it, it is full. If no void exists it must be full; if then it is full it does not move. These are the doctrines of Melissos.

Simpl. de Coelo 187r; Schol. Aristot. 509b; cf. Aristokl. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv.17. (Fr. 17) This argument is the strongest proof that being is one only. And the proofs are as follows: For if a multiplicity of things existed it would be necessary that these things should be just such as I say the one is. For if earth exists, and water and air and iron and gold and fire and the living and the dead and black and white, and everything else which men say is real,—if these things exist and we see and hear them correctly, it is necessary that each thing should be such as we first determined, namely, it should not change its character or become different, but should always be each thing what it is. Now we say that we see and hear and understand correctly ; but it seems to us that hot becomes cold and cold hot, that hard becomes soft and soft hard, that the living being dies and life comes from what is not living; and that all these things become different, and what they are is not like what they were. It seems to us that iron, being hard to the touch, wastes away tbecoming liquefied,t! and so does gold, and rock, and whatever else seems to be strong, so that we conclude that we do not see or know things

that are. And earth and rock arise from water. These things then do not harmonise with each other. Though we said that many things are eternal, and have forms and strength, it seems that they all become different and change their character each time they are seen. Evidently we do not see correctly, nor is the appearance of multiplicity correct; for they would not change their character if they were real, but would remain each thing as it seemed, for nothing is nobler than that which is real. But if they change their character, being perishes and not-being comes into existence. So then if a multiplicity of things exist, it is necessary that they should be such as the one is.

Phys. i. 3; 186 a6. Both Melissos and Parmenides argue fallaciously, and they make false assumptions and their reasonings are not logical; but the argument of Melissos is the more wearisome, for it sets no problem, but granted one strange thing, others follow ; and there is no difficulty in this. The error in the reasoning of Melissos is plain, for he thinks that if everything which has come into being has a beginning, he can assume that that which has not come into being does not have a beginning. This, then, is strange, that ke shou'd think that everything has a beginning except time, and ‘this does not, and that simple generation has no beginning but change alone begins, as though change as a whole did not come into being. Even if the all is a unity, why then should it not move? Why should not the whole be moved even as a part of it which is a unity, namely water, is moved in itself? Tken why should there not be change? It is not possible that being should be one in form, but only in its source. 130 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

Soph. Elen. 5; 163 b 18. The same is true of syllogisms, as for instance in the case of Melissos’ argument that the all is infinite ; in this he assumes that the all is not generated (for nothing is generated from notbeing), and that that which is generated, is generated from a beginning. If then the all was not generated, it does not have a beginning, so itis infinite. Itis not necessary to assent to this, for even if everything which is generated has a beginning, it does not follow that if anything has a beginning it was generated, as a man with a fever is warm, but one who is warm may not have a fever.

Soph. Elen. 6; 164635. Or again, as Melissos assumes in his argument that generation and having a beginning are the same thing, or that that which is generated from equals has the same size. The two statements, that whatis generated has a beginning, and that what has a beginning is generated, he deems equivalent, so that the generated and the limited are both the same in that they each have a beginning. Because what is generated has a beginning, he postulates that what has a beginning is generated, as though both that which is generated and that which is finite were the same in having a beginning. (c) PASSAGES RELATING To MELISSOS IN THE DoxoGRAPHISTs. Epiph. adv. Haer. iii. 12; Dox. 590. Melissos of Samos, son of Ithagenes, said that the all is one in kind, but that nothing is fixed in its nature, for all things are potentially destructible. Aet. Plac. i. 3; Dow. 285. Melissos of Miletos, son of Ithagenes, became his companion, but he did not preserve in its purity the doctrine that was transmitted to

him. For he said in regard to the infinite that the world of those things that appear is limited. i. 7; 303. Melissos and Zeno say that the one is universal, and that it exists alone, eternal, and unlimited. And this unity is necessity [Heeren inserts here the name Empedokles], and the material of which it consists is the four elements, and the forms are love and strife. He calls the elements gods, and the mixture of them the world. And the uniform will be resolved. He thinks that souls are divine, and that pure men who share these things in a pure way are divine. i. 24; 320. Melissos (et al.) deny generation and destruction, because they think that the all is unmoved. Aet. il. 1; 327. Melissos (et al.): The universe is one. 328. The all is infinite, but the world is limited. 4 ; 332. Melissos (et al.): The world is not generated, not to be destroyed, eternal. 132 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

Pyrnacoras; son of Mnesarchos, a native of Samos, left his fatherland to escape the tyranny of Polykrates (5833/2 or 529/88.c.). He made his home for many years in Kroton in southern Italy, where his political views gained control in the city. At length he and his followers were banished by an opposing party, and he died at Metapontum. Many stories are told of his travels into Egypt and more widely, but there is no evidence on which the stories can be accepted. He was a mystic thinker and religious reformer quite as much as a philosopher, but there is no reason for denying that the doctrines of the school originated with him. Of his disciples, Archytas, in southern Italy, and Philolaos and Lysis, at Thebes, are the best known. It is the doctrine of the school, not the teaching of Pythagoras himself, which is known to us through the writings of Aristotle. PassaGEs IN PLATO REFERRING TO THE PyYTHAGOREANS.

Phaedo 623. The saying that is uttered in secret rites, to the effect that we men are in a sort of prison, and that one ought not to loose himself from it nor yet to run away, seems to me something great and not easy to see through ; but this at least I think is well said, that it is the gods who care for us, and we men are one of the possessions of the gods. Kratyl. 400 8. For some say that it (the body) is the tomb of the soul—I think it was the followers of Orpheus in particular who introduced this word—which has this enclosure like a prison in order that it may be kept safe. |

Gorg. 493 a. I once heard one of the wise men say that now we are dead and the body is our tomb, and that that part of the soul where desires are, it so happens, is open to persuasion, and moves upward or downward. And, indeed, a clever man—perhaps some inhabitant of Sicily or Italy—speaking allegorically, and taking the word from credible’ (7é@avos) and ‘persuadable’ (wicteKos), called this a jar (700s) ; and he called those without intelligence uninitiated, and that part of the soul of uninitiated persons where the desires are, he called its intemperateness,'and said it was not watertight, as a jar might be pierced with holes—using the simile because of its insatiate desires. Gorg. 507 x. And the wise men say that one community embraces heaven and earth and gods and men and friendship and order and temperance and righteousness, and for that reason they call this whole a universe, 134 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE my friend, for it is not without order nor yet is there excess. It seems to me that you do not pay attention to these things, though you are wise in regard to them. But it has escaped your notice that geometrical equality prevails widely among both gods and men. PassaGes IN ARISTOTLE REFERRING TO THE PyTHaGOREANS.

Phys. iii. 4; 208321. For all who think they have worthily applied themselves to such philosophy, have discoursed concerning the infinite, and they all have asserted some first principle of things—some, like the Pythagoreans and Plato, a first principle existing by itself, not connected with anything else, but being itself the infinite in its essence. Only the Pythagoreans found it among things perceived by sense (for they say that number is not an abstraction), and they held that it was the infinite outside the heavens. ‘ ili.4; 204 a 33. (The Pythagoreans) both hold that the infinite is being, and divide it. iv. 6; 218 b 22. And the Pythagoreans say that there is a void, and that it enters into the heaven itself from the infinite air, as though it (the heaven) were breathing; and this void defines the natures of things, inasmuch as it is a certain separation and definition of things that lie together; and this is true first in the case of numbers, for the void defines the nature of these. De coel. i. 1; 26810. Foras the Pythagoreans say, the all and all things are defined by threes; for end and middle and beginning constitute the number of the all, and also the number of the triad.

ii. 2; 284 b 6. And since there are some who say that there is a right and left of the heavens, as, for instance, those that are called Pythagoreans (for such is their doctrine), we must investigate whether it is as they say. li. 2; 285a 10. Wherefore one of the Pythagoreans might be surprised in that they say that there are only these two first principles, the right and the left, and they pass over four of them as not having the least validity ; for there is no less difference up and down, and front and back than there is right and left in all creatures. ii. 2; 285 b 23. And some are dwelling in the upper hemisphere and to the: right, while we dwell below and to the left, which is the opposite to what the Pythagoreans say; for they put us above and to the right, while the others are below and at the left.

ii. 9; 290 b15. Some think it necessary that noise should arise when so great bodies are in motion, since sound does arise from bodies among us which are not so large and do not move so swiftly ; and from the sun and moon and from the stars in so great number, and of so great size, moving so swiftly, there must necessarily arise a sound inconceivably great. Assuming these things and that the swiftness has the principle of harmony by reason of the intervals, they say that the sound of the stars moving on in a circle becomes musical. And since it seems unreasonable that we also do not hear this sound, they say that the reason for this is that the noise exists in the very nature of things, so as not to be distinguishable from the opposite silence; for the distinction of sound and silence lies in their contrast with each other, so that as blacksmiths think there is no difference between them because they are accustomed to the sound, so the same thing happens to men. ii. 9; 291a7. What occasions the difficulty and makes the Pythagoreans say that there is a harmony of the bodies as they move, is a proof. Fcr whatever things 136 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

move themselves make a sound and noise; but whatever things are fastened in what moves or exist in it as the parts in a ship, cannot make a noise, nor yet does the ship if it moves in a river. ii. 18; 298219. Theysay that the whole heaven is limited, the opposite to what those of Italy, called the Pythagoreans, say ; for these say that fire is at the centre and that the earth is one of the stars, and that moving in a circle about the centre it produces night and day. And they assume yet another earth opposite this which they call the counter-earth [avriy@wv}, not seeking reasons and causes for phenomena, but stretching phenomena to meet certain assumptions and opinions of theirs and attempting to arrange them in a system. . . . And farther the Pythagoreans say that the most authoritative part of the All stands guard, because it is specially fitting that it should, and this part is the centre; and this place that the fire occupies, they call the guard of Zeus, as it is called simply the centre, that is, the centre of space and the centre of matter and of nature.

ili. 1; 800a15. The same holds true for those who construct the heaven out of numbers; for some construct nature out of numbers, as do certain of the Pythagoreans. Metaphys. i.5; 985 b 23-986b8. With these and before them (Anaxagoras, Empedokles, Atomists) those called Pythagoreans applying themselves to the sciences, first developed them ; and being brought up in them they thought that the first principles of these (i.c. numbers) were the first principles of all things. And since of these (sciences) numbers are by nature the first, in numbers rather than in fire and earth and water they thought they saw many likenesses to. things that are and that are coming to be, as, for instance, justice is such a property of numbers, and soul and mind are such a property, and another is opportunity, and of other things one may say the same of each one.

+And further, discerning in numbers the conditions and reasons of harmonies alsot; since, moreover, other things seemed to be like numbers in their entire nature, and numbers were the first of every nature, they assumed that the elements of numbers were the elements of all things, and that the whole heavens were harmony and number. And whatever characteristics in numbers and harmonies they could show were in agreement with the properties of the heavens and its parts and with its whole arrangement, these they collected and adapted ;- and if there chanced to be any gap anywhere, they eagerly sought that the whole system might be connected with these (stray. phenomena). To give an example of my meaning: inasmuch as ten seemed to be the perfect number and to embrace the whole nature of numbers, they asserted that the number of bodies moving through the heavens were ten, and when only nine were visible, for the reason just stated they postulated the counter-earth as the tenth. We have given a more definite account of these thinkers in other parts of our writings. But we have referred to them here with this purpose in view, that we might ascertain from them what they asserted as the first principles and in what manner they came upon the causes that have been enumerated. They certainly seem to consider number as the first principle and as it were the matter in things and in their conditions and states; and the odd and the even are elements of number, and of these the one is infinite and the other finite, and unity is the product of both of them; for it is both odd and even, and number arises from unity, and the whole heaven, as has been said, is numbers.

A different party in this same school say that the 138 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

first principles are ten, named according to the following table :—finite and infinite, even and odd, one and many; right and left, male and female, rest and motion, straight and crooked, light and darkness, good and bad, square and oblong. After this manner Alkmaeon of Kroton seems to have conceived them, and either he received this doctrine from them or they from him ; for Alkmaeon arrived at maturity when Pythagoras was an old man, and his teachings resembled theirs. For he says that most human affairs are twofold, not meaning opposites reached by definition, as did the former party, but opposites by chance—as, for example, white-black, sweet-bitter, good-bad, small-great. This philosopher let fall his opinions indefinitely about the rest, but the Pythagoreans declared the number of the opposites and what they were. From both one may learn this much, that opposites are the first principles of things; but from the latter he may learn the number of these, and what they are. But how it is possible to bring them into relation with the causes of which we have spoken if they have not clearly worked out; but they seem to range their elements under the category of matter, for they say that being is compounded and formed from them, and that they inhere in it.

987 a 9-27. Down to the Italian philosophers and with the exception of them the rest have spoken more reasonably about these principles, except that, as we said, they do indeed use two principles, and the one of these, whence is motion, some regard as one and others as twofold. The Pythagoreans, however, while they in similar manner assume two first principles, add this which is peculiar to themselves: that they do not think that the finite and the infinite and the one are certain other things by nature, such as fire or earth or any other such thing, but the infinite itself and unity itself are

the essence of the things of which they are predicated, and so they make number the essence of all things. So they taught after this manner about them, and began to discourse and to define what being is, but they made it altogether too simple a matter. For they made their definitions superficially, and to whatever first the definition might apply, this they thought to be the essence of the matter; as if one should say that twofold and two were the same, because the twofold subsists in the two. But undoubtedly the two and the twofold are not the same ; otherwise the one will be many—a consequence which even they would not draw. So much then may be learned from the earlier philosophers and from their successors. i.6; 987b10. And Plato only changed the name, for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by imitation of numbers, but Plato, by sharing the nature of numbers.

i. 6; 987 b 22. But that the one is the real essence of things, and not something else with unity as an attribute, he affirms, agreeing with the Pythagoreans; and in harmony with them he affirms that numbers are the principles of being for other things. But it is peculiar to him that instead of a single infinite he posits a double infinite, an infinite of greatness and of littleness; and it is also peculiar to him that he separates numbers from things that are seen, while they say that numbers are the things themselves, and do not interpose mathematical objects between them. This separation of the one and numbers from things, in contrast with the position of the Pythagoreans, and the introduction of ideas, are the consequence of his investigation by concepts. i. 8; 989 b32-990a 82. Those, however, who carry on their investigation with reference to all things, and divide things into what are perceived and what are not perceived by sense, evidently examine both classes, so 140 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

one must delay a little longer over what they say. They speak correctly and incorrectly in reference to the questions now before us. Now’ those who are called Pythagoreans use principles and elements yet stranger than those of the physicists, in that they do not take them from the sphere of sense, for mathematical objects are without motion, except in the case of astronomyStill, they discourse about everything in nature and study it; they construct the heaven, they observe what happens in its parts tand their states and motionst ; they apply to these their first principles and causes, as though they agreed entirely with the other physicists that being is only what is perceptible and what that which is called heaven includes. But their causes and first principles, they say, are such as to lead up to the higher parts of reality, and are in harmony with this rather than with the doctrines of nature. In what manner motion will take place when finite and infinite, odd and even, are the only underlying realities, they do not say;.nor how it is possible for genesis and destruction to take place without motion and change, or for the heavenly bodies to revolve. Farther, if one grant to them that greatness arises from these principles, or if this could be proved, nevertheless, how will it be that some bodies are light and some heavy ? For their postulates and statements apply no more to mathematical objects than to things of sense;

accordingly they have said nothing at all about fire or earth or any such objects, because I think they have no distinctive doctrine about things of sense. Farther, how is if necessary to assume that number and states of number are the causes of what is in the heavens and what is taking place there from the beginning and now, and that there is no other number than that out of which the world is composed? For when opinion and opportune time are at a certain point in the heavens,

and a little farther up or down are injustice and judgment or a mixture of them, and they bring forward as proof that each one of these is number, and the result then is that at this place there is already a multitude of compounded quantities because those states of number have each their place—is this number in heaven the same which it is necessary to assume that each of these things is, or is it something different ? Plato says it is different ; still, he thinks that both these things and the causes of them are numbers; but the one class are ideal causes, and the others are sense causes. ii. 1; 996a4. And the most difficult and perplexing question of all is whether unity and being are not, as Plato and the Pythagoreans say, something different from things but their very essence, or whether the underlying substance is something different, friendship, as Empedokles says, or as another says, fire, or water, or air. ii. 4; 1001a9. Plato and the Pythagoreans assert that neither being nor yet unity is something different from things, but that it is the very nature of them, as though essence itself consisted in unity and existence.

1086b 17. Soit turns out that many things of which the forms appear different have one form, as the Pythagoreans discovered ; and one can say that there is one form for everything, and the others are not forms; and thus all things will be one. ix. 2; 1053b 11. Whether the one itself is a sort of essence, as first the Pythagoreans and later Plato affirmed. .. xi.7; 1072b 381. And they are wrong who assume, as do the Pythagoreans and Speusippos, that the most beautiful and the best is not in the first principle, because the first principles of plants and animals are indeed causes ; for that which is beautiful and perfect is in what comes from these first principles. 142 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE xii. 4; 1078b21. The Pythagoreans (before Demokritos) only defined a few things, the concepts of which they reduced to numbers, as for instance opportunity or justice or marriage. . .

xii.6; 1080b16. The Pythagoreans say that there is but one number, the mathematical, but things of sense are not separated from this, for they are composed of it; indeed, they construct the whole heaven out of numbers, but not out of unit numbers, for they assume that the unities have quantity; but how the first unity was so constituted as to have quantity, they seem at a loss to say. b 381. All, as many as regard the one as the element and first principle of things, except the Pythagoreans, assert that numbers are based on the unit; but the Pythagoreans assert, as has been remarked, that numbers have quantity.

xii. 8; 1083b9. The Pythagorean standpoint has on the one hand fewer difficulties than those that have been discussed, but it has new difficulties of its own. The fact that they do not regard number as separate, removes many of the contradictions ; but it is impossible that bodies should consist of numbers, and that this number should be mathematical. Nor is it true that indivisible elements have quantity; but, granted that they have this quality of indivisibility, the units have no quantity ; for how can quantity be composed of indivisible elements? but arithmetical number consists of units. But these say that things are number; at least, they adapt their speculations to such bodies as consist of elements which are numbers. xii. 3; 1090a 20. On the other hand the Pythagoreans, because they see many qualities of numbers in bodies perceived by sense, regard objects as numbers, not as separate numbers, but as derived from numbers. And why ? Because the qualities of numbers exist in

harmony both in the heaven and in many other things. But for those who hold that number is mathematical only, it is impossible on the basis of their hypothesis to say any such thing; and it has already been remarked that there can be no science of these numbers. But we say, as above, that there is a science of numbers. LEvidently the mathematical does not exist apart by itself, for in that case its qualities could not exist in bodies. In such a matter the Pythagoreans are restrained by nothing ; when, however, they construct out of numbers physical bodies—out of numbers that have neither weight nor lightness, bodies that have weight and lightness—they seem to be speaking about another heaven and other bodies than those perceived by sense. Eth. i. 4; 1096b5. And the Pythagoreans seem to speak more persuasively about it, putting the unity in the co-ordination of good things. ii. 5; 1106629. The evil partakes of the nature of the infinite, the good of the finite, as the Pythagoreans conjectured. vy. 8; 1132b21. Reciprocity seems to some to be absolutely just, as the Pythagoreans say ; for these defined the just as that which is reciprocal to another.

Mor. i. 1; 1182411. First Pythagoras attempted to speak concerning virtue, but he did not speak correctly ; for bringing virtues into correspondence with numbers, he did not make any distinct. , PyTHAGORAS AND THE PyTHAGOREANS: PASSAGES IN THE DoxoGRAPHISTS. Aet. Plac.i. 8; Doz. 280. And again from another starting-point, Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchos, a Samian, who was the first to call this matter by the name of philosophy, assumed as first principles the numbers and 144 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

the symmetries existing in them, which he calls harmonies, and the elements compounded of both, that are called geometrical. And again he includes the monad and the undefined dyad among the first principles; and for him one of the first principles tends toward the creative and form-giving cause, which is intelligence, that is god, and the other tends toward the passive and material cause, which is the visible universe. And he says that the starting-point of number is the decad; for all Greeks and all barbarians count as far as ten, and when they get as far as this they return to the monad. And again, he says, the power of the ten is in the four and the tetrad. And the reason is this: if any one treturningt from the monad adds the numbers in a series as far as the four, he will fill out the number ten (i.e. 1+2+8+4=10); but if he goes beyond the number of the tetrad, he will exceed the ten. Just as if one should add one and two and should add to these three and four, he will fill out the number ten; so that according to the monad number is in the ten, but potentially in the four. Wherefore the Pythagoreans were wont to speak as though the greatest oath were the tetrad: ‘By him that transmitted to our soul the tetraktys, which has the spring and root of ever-flowing nature.

And our soul, he says, is composed of the tetrad; for it is intelligence, understanding, opinion, sense, from which things come every art and science, and we ourselves become reasoning beings. The monad, however, is intelligence, for intelligence sees according to the monad. As for example, men are made up of many parts, and part by part they are devoid of sense and comprehension and experience, yet we perceive that man as one alone, whom no being resembles, possesses these qualities; and we perceive that a horse is one, but part by part it is without experience.

For these are all forms and classes according to monads. Wherefore, assigning this limit with reference to each one of these, they speak of a reasoning being and a neighing being. On this account then the monad is intelligence by which we perceive these things. And the undefined dyad is science ; fittingly, for all proof and all persuasion is part of science, and farther every syllogism brings together what is questioned out of some things that are agreed upon, and easily proves something else; and science is the comprehension of these things, wherefore it would be the dyad. And opinion as the result of comprehending them is the triad; fittingly, for opinion has to do with many things; and the triad is quantity, as ‘The thrice-blessed Danaoi.’ On this account then he includes the triad. . . . And their sect is called Italic because Pythagoras taught in Italy, for he removed from Samos, his fatherland, because of dissatisfaction with the tyranny of Polykrates.

Aet. i. 7; Dox. 302. Pythagoras held that one of the first principles, the monad, is god and the good, which is the origin of the One, and is itself intelligence; but the undefined dyad is a divinity and the bad, surrounding which is the mass of matter. i. 8; 307. Divine spirits [Saiuoves] are psychical beings; and heroes are souls separated from bodies, good heroes are good souls, bad heroes are bad souls. i. 9; 807. The followers of Thales and Pythagoras and the Stoics held that matter is variable and changeable and transformable and in a state of flux, the whole through the whole. i. 10; 3809. Pythagoras asserted that the so-called forms and ideas exist in numbers and their harmonies, and in what are called geometrical objects, apart from bodies. i. 11; 310. Pythagoras and Aristotle asserted that the first causes are immaterial, but that other causes involve a union or contact with material substance [so that the world is 146 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

material]. i. 14; 812. The followers of Pythagoras held that the universe is a sphere according to the form of the four elements ; but. the highest fire alone is conical. i. 15; 314. The Pythagoreans call colour the manifestation of matter. i.16; 314. Bodies are subject to change of condition, and are divisible to infinity. i. 18; 316. (After quotation from Arist. Phys. iv. 4; 212 a 20) And in his first book on the philosophy of Pythagoras he writes that the heaven is one, and that time and wind and the void which always defines the places of each thing, are introduced from the infinite. And among other things he says that place is the immovable limit of what surrounds the world, or that in which bodies abide and are moved; and that it is full when it surrounds body on every side, and empty when it has absolutely nothing in itself. Accordingly it is necessary for place to exist, and body ; andit is never empty except only from the standpoint of thought, for the nature of it in perpetuity is destructive of the interrelation of things and of the combination of bodies; and motions arise according to place of bodies that surround and oppose each other; and no infiniteness is lacking, either of quantity or of extent. i. 20; 318. Pythagoras said that time is the sphere of what surrounds the world. i. 21; 318. Pythagoras, Plato: Motion is a certain otherness or difference in matter. [This is the common limit of all motion.] i. 24; 820. Pythagoras and all that assume that matter is subject to change assert that genesis and destruction in an absolute sense take place ; for from change of the elements and modification and separation of them there take place juxtaposition and mixture, and intermingling and melting together.

Aet. Plac. ii. 1; 327. Pythagoras first named the circumference of all things the universe by reason of the order in it. ii. 4; 880. Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics

held that the universe is brought into being by god. And it is perishable so far as its nature is concerned, for it is perceived by sense, and therefore material; it will not however be destroyed in accordance with the foreknowledge and plan of god. ii.6; 334. Pythagoras: The universe is made from five solid figures, which are called also mathematical; of these he says that earth has arisen from the cube, fire from the pyramid, air from the octahedron, and water from the icosahedron, and the sphere of the all from the dodecahedron. ii. 9; 338. The followers of Pythagoras hold that there is a void outside the universe into which the universe breathes forth, and from which it breathes in. ii. 10; 839. Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle: The right hand side of the universe is the eastern part from which comes the beginning of motion, and the left hand side is the west. They say the universe has neither height nor depth, in which statement height means distance from below upwards, and depth from above downwards. For none of the distances thus described exist for the universe, inasmuch as it is disposed around the middle of itself, from which it extends toward the all, and with reference to. which it is the same on every side. ii. 12; 340. Thales, Pythagoras, and their followers: The sphere of the whole heaven is divided into five circles, which they call zones;

the first of these is called the arctic zone and is ever visible ; the second the summer solstice, the third the equinoctial, the fourth the winter solstice, and fifth the antarctic zone, which is invisible. And the ecliptic called the zodiac in the three middle ones is projected to touch the three middle ones. And the meridian crosses all these from the north to the opposite quarter at right angles. It is said that Pythagoras was the first to recognise the slant of the zodiacal circle which Oenopides of Chios appropriated as his own disi 2

covery. ii. 18; 848. Herakleides and the Pythagoreans asserted that each world [xdcpos] of the stars is air and aether surrounding earth in the infinite aether. And these doctrines are brought out in the Orphic writings, for they construct each world of the stars. i. 22; 352. The Pythagoreans: The sun is spherical. ii. 23; 353. Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle: The solstices lie along the slant of the zodiacal circle, through which the sun goes along the zodiac, and with the accompaniment of the tropic circles; and all these things also the globe shows. ii.24; 854. Aneclipse takes place when the moon comes past. ii. 25; 857. Pythagoras: The moon is a mirrorlike body. i. 29; 860. Some of the Pythagoreans (according to the Aristotelian account and the statement of Philip the Opuntian) said that an eclipse of the moon takes place, sometimes by the interposition of the earth, sometimes by the interposition of the counter-earth [avrivyOov]. But it seems to some more recent thinkers that it takes place by a spreading of the flame little by little as it is gradually kindled, until it gives the complete full moon, and again, in like manner, it grows less until the conjunction, when it is completely extinguished. ii. 80; 361. Some of the Pythagoreans, among them Philolaos, said that the earthy appearance of the moon is due to its being inhabited by animals and by plants, like those on our earth, only greater and more beautiful; for the animals on it are fifteen times as powerful, not having any sort of excrement, and their day is fifteen times as long as ours. But others said that the outward appearance in the moon is a reflection on the other side of the inflamed circle of the sea that is on our earth. ii. 82; 364. Some regard the greater year... . as the sixty year period, among whom are Oenopides and Pythagoras.

Aet. Plac. iii. 1; Dox.864. Some of the Pythagoreans said that the milky way is the burning of a star that fell from its own foundation, setting on fire the region through which it passed in a circle, as Phaethon was burned. And others say that the course of the sun. arose in this manner at the first. And certain ones say that the appearance of the sun is like a mirror reflecting its rays toward the heaven, and therefore it happens at times to refiect its rays on the rainbow in the clouds. Aet. ili. 2; 366. Some of the followers of Pythagoras say that the comet is one of the stars that are not always shining, but emit their light periodically through a certain definite time; but others say that it is the reflection of our vision into the sun, like reflected images. iii. 14; 378. Pythagoras: The earth, after the analogy of the sphere of the all, is divided into five zones, arctic, antarctic, summer, winter, and equinoctial ; of these the middle one he defines to be the middle of the earth, called for this very reason the torrid zone; but the inhabited one [the one between the arctic and the torrid zones] being well-tempered. .. .

Aet. iv. 2; Dox. 386. Pythagoras holds that number moves itself, and he takes number as an equivalent for intelligence. iv. 4; 889. Pythagoras, Plato: According to a superficial account the soul is of two parts, the one possessing, the other lacking, reason; but according to close and exact examination, of three parts; for the unreasoning part they divide into the emotions and the desires. (Theodor. vy. 20); Dox. 890. The successors of Pythagoras saying that body is a mixture of five elements (for they ranked the aether as ar fifth along with the four) held that the powers of the soul are of the same number as these. And these they name intelligence and wisdom and understanding and opinion and senseperception. iv. 5; 391. Pythagoras: The principle of life is about the heart, but the principle of reason and 150 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

intelligence is about the head. iv.5; 892. Pythagoras et al.: The intelligence enters from without. iv. 7; 392. Pythagoras, Plato: The soul is imperishable. iv. 9; 396. Pythagoras et al.: The sense-perceptions are deceptive. iv. 9; 897. Pythagoras, Plato: Each of the sensations is pure, proceeding from each single element. With reference to vision, it was of the nature of aether ; hearing, of the nature of wind; smell, of the nature of fire; taste, of the nature of moisture; touch, of the nature of earth. iv. 14; 405. The followers of Pythagoras and of the mathematicians on reflections of vision : For vision moves directly as it were against the bronze [of a mirror], and meeting with a firm smooth surface it is turned and bent back on itself, meeting some such experience as when the arm is extended and then bent back to the shoulder. iv. 20; 409. Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle: Sound is immaterial. For it is not air, but it is the form about the air and the appearance [érupaveia| after some sort of percussion which becomes sound ; and every appearance is immaterial ; for it moves with bodies, but is itself absolutely immaterial ;! as in the case of a bent rod the surface-appearance suffers no change, but the matter is what is bent.

Aet. Plac. v.1; 415. Pythagoras did not admit the sacrificial part alone (of augury). v. 3; 417. Pythagoras: The seed is foam of the best part of the blood, a secretion from the nourishment, like blood and marrow. v. 4; 417. Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle: The power of seed is immaterial, like intelligence, the moving power ; but the matter that is poured forth is material. v. 20; 432. Pythagoras, Plato: The souls of animals called unreasoning are reasonable, not however with active reasoning powers, because of an imperfect mixture of the bodies and because they do not have the power of speech, as in the case of apes and dogs; for these have intelligence but not the power of speech. Ar. Did. Ep. Fr. 32; Dox. 467. Apollodoros in the second book Concerning the gods: It is the Pythagorean opinion that the morning and the evening star are the same. Theophr. Phys. Op. Fr. 17; Dox. 492. Favorinus says that he (Pythagoras) was the first to call the heavens a universe and the earth round [otpoyytrn7}.

Cie. de Deor. Nat. i. 11; Philod. piet. Fr. c 4b; Dox. 533. For Pythagoras, who held that soul is extended through all the nature of things and mingled with them, and that from this our souls are taken, did not see that god would be separated and torn apart by the separation of human souls; and when souls are wretched, as might happen to many, then part of god would be wretched ; a thing which could not happen. |

Hippol. Phil. 2; Dox. 555. There is a second philosophy not far distant from the same time, of which Pythagoras, whom some call a Samian, was the first representative. And this they call the Italian philosophy because Pythagoras fled the rule of Polykrates over the Samians and settled in a city of Italy where he spent his life. The successive leaders of this sect shared the same spirit. And he in his studies of nature mingled astronomy and geometry and musie <and arithmetic>. And thus he asserted that god is a monad, and examining the nature of number with especial care, he said that the universe produces melody and is put together with harmony, and he first proved the motion of the seven stars to be rhythm and melody. And in wonder at the structure of the universe, he decreed that at first his disciples should be silent, as it were mystae who were coming into the order of the all ; then when he thought they had sufficient education 152 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

in the principles of truth, and had sought wisdom sufficiently in regard to stars and ‘in regard to nature, he pronounced them pure and then bade them speak. He separated his disciples into two groups, and called one esoteric, and the other exoteric. To the former he entrusted the more perfect sciences, to the latter the more moderate. And he dealt with magic, as they say, and himself discovered the art of physiognomy. Postulating both numbers and measures he was wont to say that the first principle of arithmetic embraced philosophy by combination, after the following manner : ' Number is the first principle, a thing which is undefined, incomprehensible, having in itself all numbers which could reach infinity in amount. And the first principle of numbers is in substance the first monad, which is a male monad, begetting as a father all other numbers. Secondly the dyad is female number, and the same is called by the arithmeticians even. Thirdly the triad is male number; this the arithmeticians have been wont to call odd. Finally the tetrad is a female number, and the same is called even because it is female.

All numbers, then, taken by elasses are fours (for number is undefined in reference to class), of which is composed the perfect number, the decad. For the series, one two three and four, becomes ten, if its own name is kept in its essence by each of the numbers. Pythagoras said that this sacred tetraktys is ‘the spring having the roots of ever-flowing nature’ in itself, and from this numbers have their first principle. For the eleven and the twelve and the rest derive from the ten the first principle of their being. The four parts of the decad, this perfect number, are called number, monad, power, and cube. And the interweavings and minglings of these in the origin of growth are what naturally completes nascent number ; for when a power is multiplied upon itself, it is the power of a power; and when a power is multiplied on a cube, it is the power of a cube; and when a cube is multiplied on a cube, the cube of a cube; thus all numbers, from which arises the genesis of what arises, are seven :—number, monad, power, cube, power of a power, power of a cube, cube of a cube.

He said that the soul is immortal, and that it changes from one body to another ;! so he was wont to say that he himself had been born before the Trojan war as Aethalides, and at the time of the Trojan war as Euphorbos, and after that as Hermotimos of Samos, then as Pyrrhos of Delos, fifth as Pythagoras. And Diodoros of Eretria and Aristoxenos the musician say that Pythagoras had come into Zaratas of Chaldaea ; and he set forth that in his view there were from the beginning two causes of things, father and mother ; and the father is light and the mother darkness; and the parts of light are warm, dry, light, swift; and of darkness are cold, moist, heavy, slow; and of these all the universe is composed, of male and female. And he says that the universe exists in accordance with musical harmony, so the sun also makes an harmonious period. And concerning the things that arise from the earth and the universe they say that Zaratas spoke as follows: There are two divinities, one of the heavens and the other of the earth; the one of the earth produces things from the earth, and it is water; and the divinity of the heavens is fire with a portion of air, warm, and cold ; wherefore he says that none of these things will destroy or even pollute the soul, for these are the essence of all things. And it is said that Zaratas forbade men

154 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE to eat beans because he said that at the beginning and composition of all things when the earth was still a whole, the bean arose. And he says that the proof of this is that if one chews a bean to a pulp and exposes it to the sun for a certain time (for the sun will affect it quickly), it gives out the odour of humanseed. And he says that there is another and clearer proof: if when a bean is in flower we were to take the bean and its flower, and putting it into a pitcher moisten it and then bury it in _ the earth, and after a few days dig it up again, we should seein the first place that it had the form of a womb, and examining it closely we should find the head of a child growing with it.

He perished in a conflagration with his disciples in Kroton in Italy. And it was the custom when one became a disciple for him to burn his property and to - leave his money under a seal with Pythagoras, and he remained in silence sometimes three years, sometimes five years, and studied. And immediately on being released from this he mingled with the others and continued a disciple and made his home with them; otherwise he took his money and was sent off. The esotéric class were called Pythagoreans, and the others Pythagoristae. And those of the disciples who escaped the conflagration were Lysis and Archippos and Zalmoxis the slave of Pythagoras, who is said to have taught the Pythagorean philosophy to the Druids among the Celts.! Itis said that Pythagoras learned numbers and measures from the Egyptians; astonished at the wisdom of the priests, which was deserving of belief and full of fancies and difficult to buy, he imitated it and himself also taught his disciples to be silent, and obliged the student to remain quietly in rooms underneath the earth. ’ PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS 155

the doctrine of the monad and of foreknowledge and the interdict on sacrificing to the gods then believed on, and he bade men not to partake of beings that had life, and to refrain from wine. And he drew a line between the things from the moon upwards, calling these immortal, and those below, which he called mortal; and he taught the transmigration of souls from bodies into bodies even as far as animals and beasts. And he used to teach his followers to observe silence for a period of five years, Finally he named himself a god. Epiph. Haer. i. 8; Dox. 390. Pythagoras the Samian, son of Mnesarchos, said that the monad is god, and that nothing has been brought into being apart from this. He was wont to say that wise men ought not to sacrifice animals to the gods, nor yet to eat what had life, or beans, nor to drink wine. And he was wont to say that all things from the moon downward were subject to change, while from the moon upward they were not. And he said that the soul goes at death into other animals. And he bade his disciples to keep silence for a period of five years, and finally he named himself a god.

Herm. J.G.P.16; Dox. 655. Others then from the ancient tribe, Pythagoras and his fellow-tribesmen, revered and taciturn, transmitted other dogmas to me as mysteries, and this is the great and unspeakable ipsedixit: the monad is the first principle of all things. From its forms and from numbers the elements arose. And he declared that the number and form and measure of each of these is somehow as follows :—Fire is composed of twenty-four right-angled triangles, surrounded by four equilaterals. And each equilateral consists of six right-angled triangles, whence they compare it to the pyramid. Air is composed of forty-eight triangles, surrounded by eight equilaterals. And it is compared to 156 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

the octahedron, which is surrounded by eight equilateral triangles, each of which is separated into six right-angled triangles so as to become forty-eight in all. And water is composed of one hundred and twenty triangles, surrounded by twenty equilaterals, and itis compared to the icosahedron, which is composed of one hundred and twenty equilateral triangles. And aether is composed of twelve equilateral pentagons, and is like a dodecahedron. And earth is composed of forty-eight triangles, and is surrounded by six equilateral pentagons, and it is like a cube. For the cube is surrounded by six tetragons, each of which is separated into eight triangles, so that they become in all forty-eight.

EMpEDoKLEs, son of Meton, grandson of an Empedokles who was a victor at Olympia, made his home at Akragas in Sicily. He was born about 494 z.c., and lived to the age of sixty. The only sure date in his life is his visit to Thourioi soon after its foundation (444). Various stories are told of his political activity, which may be genuine traditions ; these illustrate a democratic tendency. At the same time he claimed almost the homage due to a god, and many miracles are attributed to him. His writings in some parts are said to imitate Orphic verses, and apparently his religious activity was in line with this sect. His death occurred away from Sicily—probably in the Peloponnesos. 158 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE FRAGMENTS OF EMPEDOKLES. EPI ®YTSEQS TPOTOS. 1. And do thou hear me, Pausanias, son of wise Anchites.

2. For scant means of acquiring knowledge are scattered among the members of the body; and many are the evils that break in to blunt the edge of studious thought. And gazing on a little portion of life that is not life, swift to meet their fate, they rise and are borne away like smoke, persuaded only of that on which each one chances as he is driven this way and that, but the whole he vainly boasts he has found. ‘Thus these things are neither seen nor heard distinctly by men, nor comprehended by the mind. And thou, now that thou hast withdrawn hither, shalt learn no more than what mortal 11. But, ye gods, avert the madness of those men from my tongue, and from lips that are holy cause a pure stream to flow. And thee I pray, much-wooed whitearmed maiden Muse, in what things it is right for beings of a day to hear, do thou, and Piety, driving obedient car, conductmeon. Nor yet shall the flowers of honour 160 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE well esteemed compel me to pluck them from mortal hands, on condition that I speak boldly more than is holy and only then sit on the heights of wisdom.

19. But come, examine by every means each thing how it is clear, neither putting greater faith in anything seen than in what is heard, nor in a thundering sound more than in the clear assertions of the tongue, nor keep from trusting any of the other members in which there lies means of knowledge, but know each thing in the way in which it is clear. 24. Cures for evils whatever there are, and protection against old age shalt thou learn, since for thee alone will I accomplish all these things. Thou shalt break the power of untiring gales which rising against the earth blow down the crops and destroy them; and, again, whenever thou wilt, thou shalt bring their blasts back ; and thou shalt bring seasonable drought out of dark storm for men, and out of summer drought thou shalt bring streams. pouring down from heaven to nurture the trees; and thou shalt lead out of Hades the spirit of a man that is dead. 83. Hear first the four roots of all things: bright Zeus, life-giving Hera (air), and Aidoneus (earth), and Nestis who moistens the springs of men with her tears.! 162 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

36. And a second thing I will tell thee: There is no origination of anything that is mortal, nor yet any end in baneful death ; but only mixture and separation of what 40. But when light is mingled with air in human form, or in form like the race of wild beasts or of plants _ or of birds, then men say that these things have come into being; and when they are separated, they call them evil fate; this is the established practice, and I myself also call it.so in accordance with the custom. 45. Fools! for they have no far-reaching studious thoughts who think that what was not before comes into being or that anything dies and perishes utterly. 48. For from what does not exist at all it is impossible that anything come into being, and it is neither possible nor perceivable that being should perish completely; for things will always stand wherever one in 164 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE 51. A man of wise mind could not divine such things as these, that so long as men live what indeed they call life, so long they exist and share what is evil and what is excellent, but before they are formed and after they

55. But for base men it is indeed possible to withhold belief from strong proofs; but do thou learn as the pledges of our Muse bid thee, and lay open her word to 58. Joining one heading to another in discussion, not completing one path (of discourse) . .. for it is right to say what is excellent twice and even thrice. 60. Twofold is the truth I shall speak; for at one time there grew to be one alone out of many, and at another time, however, it separated so that there were many out of the one. Twofold is the coming into being, twofold the passing away, of perishable things ; for the latter (i.e. ‘passing away) the combining of 166 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

EMPEDOKLES 167 all things both begets and destroys, and the former (i.e. coming into being), which was nurtured again out of parts that were being separated, is itself scattered. 66. And these (elements) never cease changing place continually, now being all united by Love into one, now each borne apart by the hatred engendered of Strife, until they are brought together in the unity of the all, and become subject to it. Thus inasmuch as one has been wont to arise out of many and again with the separation of the one the many arise, so things are continually coming into being and there is no fixed age for them; and farther inasmuch as they [the elements] never cease changing place continually, so they always 74, But come, hear my words, for truly learning causes the mind to grow. For as I said before in declaring the ends of my words: Twofold is the truth I shall speak; for at one time there grew to be the one 168 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

alone out of many, and at another time it separated so that there were many out of the one; fire and water and earth and boundless height of air, and baneful Strife apart from these, balancing each of them, and Love among them, their equal in length and breadth. 81. Upon her do thou gaze with thy mind, nor yet sit dazed in thine eyes; for she is wont to be implanted in men’s members, and through her they have thoughts of love and accomplish deeds of union, and call her by the names of Delight, and Aphrodite; no mortal man has discerned her with them (the elements) as she moves on her way. But do thou listen to the undeceiving course of my words.!...

87. For these (elements) are equal, all of them, and of like ancient race; and one holds one office, another another, and each has his own nature. . . . For nothing is added to them, nor yet does anything pass away from them ; for if they were continually perishing they would no longer exist... . Neither is any part of this all empty, nor over full. For how should anything cause this all to increase, and whence should it come? And whither should they (the elements) perish, since no place is empty of them? And in their turn they prevail as the cycle comes round, and they disappear before 170 ‘THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE each other, and they increase each in its allotted turn. But these (elements) are the same; and penetrating through each other they become one thing in one place and another in another, while ever they remain alike (i.e. the same). 110. For they two (Love and Strife) were before and shall be, nor yet, I think, will there ever be an unutterably long time without them both.

96. But come, gaze on the things that bear farther witness to my former words, if in what was said before there be anything defective in form. Behold the sun, warm and bright on all sides, and whatever is immortal and is bathed in its bright ray, and behold the raincloud, dark and cold on all sides; from the earth there proceed the foundations of things and solid bodies. In Strife all things are, endued with form and separate } from each other, but they come together in Love and are desired by each other. 104. For from these (elements) come all things that are or have been or shall be ; from these there grew up trees and men and women, wild beasts and birds and water-nourished fishes, and the very gods, long-lived, highest in honour. 121. And as when painters are preparing elaborate votive offerings—men well taught by wisdom in their EMPEDOKLES 178 art—they take many-coloured pigments to work with, and blend together harmoniously more of one and less of another till they produce likenesses of all things; so let not error overcome thy mind to make thee think there is any other source of mortal things that have likewise come into distinct existence in unspeakable numbers ; but know these (elements), for thou didst hear from

a god the account of them. 130. But come, I will tell thee now the first principle of the sun, even the sources of all things now visible, earth and billowy sea and damp mist and Titan aether 135. Then neither is the bright orb of the sun greeted, nor yet either the shaggy might of earth or sea; thus, then, in the firm vessel of harmony is fixed God, 174 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE 139. But when mighty Strife was nurtured in its members and leaped up to honour at the completion of the time, which has been driven on by them both in turn under a mighty oath..... 142. For the limbs of the god were made to tremble, . all of them in turn. 148. For all the heavy (he put) by itself, the light by itself. 144. Without affection and not mixed together. 145. Heaped together in greatness. 146. If there were no limit to the depths of the earth and the abundant air, as is poured out in foolish words from the mouths of many mortals who see but little of the all. 149. Swift-darting sun and kindly moon. 150. But gathered together it advances around the 151. It shines back to Olympos with untroubled 176 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

152. The kindly light has a brief period of shining. 153. As sunlight striking the broad circle of the 154. A borrowed light, circular in form, it revolves about the earth, as if following the track of a chariot. 156. For she beholds opposite to her the sacred circle 157. And she scatters his rays into the sky above, and spreads darkness over as much of the earth as the 160. And night the earth makes by coming in front of the lights. 161. Of night, solitary, blind-eyed. 162. And many fires burn beneath the earth. N 178 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE 163. (The sea) with its stupid race of fertile fishes. 164. Salt is made solid when struck by the rays of 165. The sea is the sweat of the earth. 166. But air! sinks down beneath the earth with its long roots . . . . For thus it happened to be running at

169. But now I shall go back over the course of my verses, which I set out in order before, drawing my present discourse from that discourse. When Strife reached the lowest depth of the eddy and Love comes to be in the midst of the whirl, then all these things come together at this point so as to be one alone, yet not immediately, but joining together at their pleasure, one from one place, another from another. And as they were joining together Strife departed to the utmost 180 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE nating with those that were mixed, even as many as Strife, remaining aloft, still retained; for not yet had it entirely departed to the utmost boundaries of the circle, but some of its members were remaining within, and others had gone outside. 180. But, just as far as it is constantly rushing forth, just so far there ever kept coming in a gentle immortal stream of perfect Love; and all at once what before I learned were immortal were coming into being as mortal things,' what before were unmixed as mixed, changing their courses. And as they (the elements) were mingled together there flowed forth the myriad species of mortal things, patterned in every sort of form, a wonder to behold.

186. For all things are united, themselves with parts of themselves—the beaming sun and earth and sky and sea—whatever things are friendly but have separated in mortal things. And so, in the same way, whatever things are the more adapted for mixing, these are loved by each other and made alike by Aphrodite. But whatever things are hostile are separated as far as possible from each other, both in their origin and in their mixing and in the forms impressed on them, absolutely unwonted to unite and very baneful, at the suggestion of Strife, since it has wrought their birth. 182 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE 195. In this way, by the good favour of Tyche, all things have power of thought. 196. And in so far as what was least dense came 197. For water is increased by water, primeval fire by fire, and earth causes its own substance to increase, 199. And the kindly earth in its broad hollows received two out of the eight parts of bright Nestis, and four of MHephaistos, and they became white bones, fitted together marvellously by the glues of

208. And the earth met with these in almost equal amounts, with Hephaistos and Ombros and brightshining Aether (i.e. air), being anchored in the perfect harbours of Kypris; either a little more earth, or a little less with more of the others. From these arose blood and various kinds of flesh. 208. . . . glueing barley-meal together with water. 184 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE 210. And if your faith be at all lacking in regard to these (elements), how from water and earth and air and sun (fire) when they are mixed, arose such colours and forms of mortal things, as many as now have arisen under the uniting power of Aphrodite. ... 214. How both tall trees and fishes of the sea (arose). 215. And thusthen Kypris, when she had moistened the earth with water, breathed air on it and gave it to swift fire to be hardened. 217. And all these things which were within were made dense, while those without were made rare, meeting with such moisture in the hands of Kypris. 219. And thus tall trees bear fruit (lit. eggs), first of all olives. 221. Wine is water that has fermented in the wood beneath the bark. 186 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

222. For if thou shalt fix them in all thy close-knit mind and watch over them graciously with pure attention, all these things shall surely be thine for ever, and many others shalt thou possess from them. For these themselves shall cause each to grow into its own character, whatever is the nature! of each. But if thou shalt reach out for things of another sort, as is the manner of men, there exist countless evils to blunt your studious thoughts; fsoon these latter shall cease to live as time goes on, desiring as they do to arrive at the longed-for generation of themselves.f For know that all things have understanding and their share of intelligence. 232. Favor hates Necessity, hard to endure. 233. This is in the heavy-backed shells found in the sea, of limpets and purple-fish and stone-covered tortoises .... there shalt thou see earth lying uppermost on 236. Hair and leaves and thick feathers of birds are the same thing in origin, and reptiles’ scales, too, on strong limbs. 240. Out of which divine Aphrodite wrought eyes 241. Aphrodite fashioning them curiously with bonds of love. 242. When they first grew together in the hands of Aphrodite. 243. The liver well supplied with blood.