Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato

Ino the first place, because it imitates wholes, and the progression of beings. In the next place, because if the smallest particular Is overlooked in’ the principle, it becomes multiplied as we proceed. And in the third place, the principle or beginning, Is said to be the half of the whole. If however, this be the case, it possesses the createst power, ΠῚ, too, as some say, the principle is something more than’ the whole, it is in an admirable manner said to be the greatest thing. The truth ag this is also. testified by poets who say, ‘that every thine which reecives a good beginning usually ends well.” And moreover, on this account the Athenian euest calls the principle a God, if it obtains that which is fit. For he says, * Principle being established in men as a God, produces all things rightly of it obtains acongruous portion{or the part which ts adapted to "1

But what is the meaning of the words “ according to nature? Is it the receiving every thing which ought to be received, or is it that which first proceeds from things which subsist essentially? Por that which ts last is a principle as with reference to us, but not with reference to nature. The principle therefore according to nature, of the universe indeed, is the final cause, but of demonstrations the hypotheses, and of discussions the definition respecting the form of the doctrine, whether itis to be received as firm, immutable and accurate, or as that which is merely probable, and is not indeed truth, but credible, and assimiJated to truth. “After this manner therefore, we must decide about the image, and the paradigm of it.” These three particulars are connascently consequent to each other, the things, the conceptions, and the words, According to the things and the conceptions therefore, Plato assumes the first hypothesis; but according to the words he makes this definition, Por when he separates that which is generated from being, he adheres to the theory of the things. But when he defines our knowledge according to the objects of it, he adheres to the theory of the conceptions.” And now distributing the words according to the diversity in the knowledge of them, he demonstrates to us their definite nature. Tlence, these are consentaneous to each other; viz. twofold things, being and that which is generated ; twofold knowledges, intelligence and opinion; and twofold words, the stable and the probable, For whence are knowledges derived, except from the objects of knowledge? And whence ts the difference of words derived, except from knowledges ? Some therefore say, that it is the logographic art to define previously what. the mode is of the diction, and what kind of person the auditor of it ought to be; and that Aristotle emulated this, and also many others more recent.

L however should say that the disenssion imitates the fabrication itself of things, [ν᾽ αὐ thatunfolds into lightthe invisible lives of the world, but gives subsistence to that which is apparent, and imparts a boundary to it prior to the whole world, thus also Timwus adheres indeed to the theory of the things ; bat also makes the form of the words to be adapted to the things; and antecedently assumes, and previously defines the mode of the whole theory ofthe discussion, in order that he may dispose the whole ofthe doctrine conformably to this definition, Why therefore does he do this now and not before? Because, after the demonstra- ' In the original, ore ες ras nperepas γνώσεις διοριθει, exe ros πραγμασιν τοιε τῶν νοημάτων, Which is evidently defective, but may be restored to its genuine meaning by reading, ore δε ras ἡμετέρας γνωσεις Sopi2et ene rows πράγμασιν, rns ἀντείχετο Ocwpias των νοηματων. 28. PROCLUS ON THE ἐν ἐς tion, that it is requisite the world should be generated, he necessarily detines what the nature of the discussion about: sensible things ought tg be, but not prior to this, the nature of the universe being unknown, But when he calls the world an image, an image of sucha kind is not ἡ to be assumed, as we conceive that of inanimate * natures to) be, as neither is the paradigm unprolitic and ineflicactous, but an assimilation must be given to this world to the intelligible. Inthe first place indeed, according to the prolific power ot the paradizin 5 for by its very being it produces the image trom itself. In the second place, according to the demiurgic cause, Which renders the universe most similar to the intelligible, by the energies extended to it. And in the third place, according to. the conversion of the world itself to the forming power and participation of intelligibles. Por “itassimilates itself, as the Oracle says, hastening to be invested with the im-

pression of the images which the intelligible Gods extend to it.” “ As words therefore are allied to the things themsclves of whica they As the progression of beings is from the one which is prior’ to the many, and mundane natures proceed from a monad to their proper number, thus also. the. discourse of Timieus, beme assimilated, as he says, to beings, commences from one axiom, and the universal, and thus afterwards introduces division to his words. What therefore is the one common axiom, in the words before us?) That itis necessary language should be allied to the things, of which itis the interpreter. And it seems that the Platonists Albinus and Gaius, and their followers, took occasion from hence to define in how many ways Plato dogmatizes ; and that he does this in a twofold respect, either scientifically, ov from probability, and not according to one mode, nor as if all discussions had one accuracy, whether they are concerning beings, or things which subsist through generation ; but such as is the nature of things, such also is that of the words which are divided) in conJanction with things. Hence they subsist in such a way with respect to accuracy and clearness about the things which are their subjects, that some words assert

the accuracy of the dogmas, but others their probability. For it is necessary that >For ῴνχὼν here, itis necessary to read αψυχων, 2 ΤΙρο is omitted in the original. language should be similar to things ; since it could not otherwise interpret their nature, than by being allied to them, Por it is requisite that what the thing is contractedly, that language should be evolvedly ; in order that it may unfold the thing into Jight, and may be subordinate to the nature of it. Hence, the divine causes of language unfold after this manner the essences of the natures prior to them, and are connascent with them. J the Gods therefore, the angel or messenger of Jupiter (i.e. Hermes), who has the relation of logos to the intellect of his father, announces the will of Jupiter to secondary natures. But in essences, soul which is the logos of intelligibles, unfolds the united cause of wholes which ts in them, she receiving from them her hypostasis."| And in the genera superior to us, the angelic order has the relation of logos to the Gods. Very properly therefore, is it here said, that language is allied to the things of which it is the interpreter. This therefore, must be said to be the one* common axiom, prior to the divided particulars. And Timwus in what follows, distributes different modes of words in conjunction with

the quality of the things. - “ TIence, respecting that which is permanent and stable, and intellectually apparent, it is requisite that the words should be as much as possible permanent, without lapse, irreprehensible and immutable. But in this [stability] the paradigm is in no respect deficient.” Prior to this, Timeus called the paradigm perpetual being, subsisting invariably the same, and apprehended by intelligence ; but now he calls it permanent and stable; the former indeed, instead of perpetual being, and which is apparent in conjunction with intellect, but the latter, instead of that which is apprehended by intelligence. Tle also denominates: the words respecting it permanent, indeed, in order that through the sameness of the name, he may indicate the similitude of them to things; but wethout lapse, in order that they might adumbrate the firmness of the thing. And irreprehensible, in order that they may imitate that which is comprehended by intelligence, and may scientifically accede. For it 15 necessary that words, in order that they may be adapted to intelligibles, should have accuracy and firmness, as being employed about things of this kind. For as the knowledge of eternal natures is without lapse, so likewise is the discourse

* For τὴν υποθεσιν here, it is necessary to read τὴν νποστασιν-. > Ἐν is omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted. 288 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 11. about them. For it is an evolved knowledge. Since, however, it proceeds into multitude, and is allotted a composite nature, and on this account falls short of the union and impartibility of the thing, he densminates the thing itself in’ the singular number permanent and stable, cad intellectually apparent; but the discourse about it in the plural number, calling it stable words, which are without a lapse, and are irreprehensible. And since in language there is a certain: similitude to the paradigm, but there is also a certain dissimilitude, and this abundant, he assumes one word in common ¢he permanent, but the others different. Since also a scientific discourse is irreprehensible, as with reference to our knowledge 3 for there is not any thing ἴῃ ἂς better than science; but is confated by the thing. itself, as not being able to comprehend the nature of it, such as it really is, and. as falling off! from its impartibility,—on this account he adds, δ as much as possible” For science itself, as subsisting in souls, is indeed irreprehepsible, but is reprehended by intellect, for evolving that which is iinpartble, and apprehending that which is simple ina composite manner, For the phantasy also reprehends sense, because its knowledge is in conjunction with passion, according to a commixture, from which the phantasy is purified. But opinion reprehends the phantasy because its knowledge is attended with type and morphe, from Which opinion is. free. Science reprehends opinion, because its Knowledge Is without the explanation of cause, by which science is especially bound. And intellect. as we have said, reprehends science, because it transitively divides the object of knowledge, but intellect’ Knows at once the whole in conjunction with essence. Hence intellect is alone unconquerable, but science, and scientific

discourse, are vanquished by intellect, according to the knowledge of being. “It is necessary however, that words respecting that which 1S assiMllated tothe permanent and stable, but which is the image of being should possess probability [alone).” That the discussion of generated * natures, is a discussion about an image, and" that on this account it is to be called probable, is evident. Perhaps however, some one may inquire what words remain to be assigned to things which are not assimilated to the intelligible, but yet at the same time exist in the universe, such * For axopevos here, 1 read axoornoapevos. > For πρὸ των γενήτων in this place, it is obviously necessary to read πέρι τῶν YORT wr. BOOK 11} ΤΙΜΊΕῦΘ OF PLATO, 249 as we assert conjectural and artificial things tobe, May we not say, that words of a conjectural nature are adapted to these, which words are different from those that are assimilative? For to conjecture is one thing; since this is more obscure than sense; and to assimilate another. For assimilation pertains to the interpreters of the images of being. Artificial, therefore, and conjectural things, are unfolded through conjectural words. Unless other such like words are adapted to things which are truly conjectural; but with respect to artificial things, assimilative or probable words, are adapted to those that are the first from forms, but to those which have a secondary hypostasis, and are the third from truth, such words are adapted as pertain to things conjectural by nature. For conjectural things are the images of sensibles, in the same manner as sensibles are the images of intelligibles. Thus the painted bed is the image of that which is made by the carpenter.

Farther still, this also must be considered, that Plato is now speaking about physical images, and that on this account he gives a twofold division to words. Por things which are assimilated to the intelligible, subsist by nature or naturally ; but this is not the case with things artificial, For the artist does not make that Which he makes, according to certain ideas, though Socrates appears to say this in the Republic. There, however, what is said, is asserted for the sake of the paradigm, and is not concerning ideas themselves. For he says that God is the maker and Demiurgus of things artificial,’ but he is not the Demiurgus of ideas. But in the Protagoras, it is clealy shown by Plato that we do not contain the reasons or productive principles of the arts,* and much less of things artificial, ' See the 10th book of the Republic, where he speaks of the ideas of a bed and a table. Plato, however, did not intend to signify in what he there says, that there is an idea of each of these in the intellect of the Demiurgus of the universe; or, in short, that there are ideas of things artificial; but he calls by the name of idea, the reason or productive and forming principle which subsists in the dianoctic power of the artificer, This reason also he says, is the offspring of deity, because he conceived, that this very artificial principle itsclf, is imparted to souls from divinity, Proclus, in the Parmenides, well observes, that an argument.

of the truth of this may be derived from Β΄ πο, that Piato calls a poet the third from, or with respect to, the truth, placing him analogous to a painter, who does not make a bed, but the image of it. The form of bed, therefore, in the dianoctic part of the artificer, ranks as first with respect to truth; the bed which he makes as second; and that which is printed asthe third. But if there was an idea of bed in the intellect of divinity, the painter would be the fourth, and not the third from truth.

* i.e. The soul dues not essentially contain the reasons of those arts which are solely ministrant to the purposes of the moral life. 290 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ 11, and that neither are the paradigms of them established in the Gods. These therefore were not generated according to the intelligible. Plato, however, now divides words into those which pertain to the discussion of the intelligible, and those which are concerning the image of the intelligible. Hence indicating this he says, that words respecting that which ty assimilated to the permanent and stable, but which is the image of being, should possess probability [alone]. But the works of nature are assimilated to the intelligible, and not the works of art; so. that neither have particulars this assimilation detinitely, but the universals which are in then. We have, however, spoken concerning these things elsewhere. “The latter words having the same relation to the former [as that of an image to its paradigm]. For what essence is to generation, that truth is to faith.” Prior to this, Timaus made two things antecedent, the intelligible and the generated, or the paradigm and the image, and assumed two things as analogous to these, science and probability, or truth and faith: so that as truth is to the intelligible paradigm, so is faith to the generated image. But now alternately he says, as truth is to faith, so is the intelligible to that which Is generated.

And this perfectly well, For he makes the intelligible and truth to be antecedent, but at the same time begins from that which is generated and faith, that he may mingle that which bas a reference to us with the order which is according to nature, and that he may preserve the proper worth of the things, and may argue from what is μόν ἢ to us. Plato, therefore, clearly divides language and knowledge conformably to the objects of knowledge 3 and Parmenides though obscure on account of his writings being poetical, yet at the same time indicating these things, he says, “that truth ts full of splendor and immutable, but that the opinions of mortals have no real credibility.” And again, “ that there are two paths, one of which has a real existence, so that itis not: possible for it ποῖ to exist. But this is the path of Persuasion, and 15 attended by Trath, The other, necessarily has no true caistence. The former of these paths, however, Clough replete with the most perfect persuasion, is unpleasant.” And again, * Neither can you have any knowledge of non-being; for it is not attainable; nor can you make it the subject of discourse." The philosopher therefore says, that there are ἔν ον

* Owing to the obscurity of the original, | have only given the substance of the verses of Parmenides ROOK tJ TIM:ALUS OF PLATO. 204 fold knowledges, of twofold things 5 truth which he calls [full of splendor, as shining with intellectual heht; and faith, from which he takes away stable knowledge. The faith, however, which Plato now mentions appears to be diflerent from that spoken of him in the Republic, in the section of a line, For there the faith is an irrational knowledge ; whence also itis divided from eonjecture, but is arranged according to sense, The faith however of which he now speaks is rational, but is mingled with irrational knowledge, as it employs sense and conjecture. Hence itis filled with much of the unstable. For receiving from sense or conjecture the ors, or (hata thing is, it thus explains causes. But these kinds of knowledge, have much of the confused and unstable. Hence Sucrates in the Phado reprehends sense in many respects, because we neither hear nor see any thing accurately. How, therefore, can the knowledge which originates from sense possess the accurate and the irreprehensible? | For the powers which use science alone, comprehend the whole of the thing known with accuracy ; but those that energize with sense, are deceived, and deviate from accuracy, on account of sense, and because the object of knowledge is unstable. For with respect to that which is material, what can any one say of it, since it is always changing and flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide fora moment, But that which is celestial, in consequence of being remote from us, is not casily known, nor to be apprehended by science, but we must be satistied in the theory of it, with an approximation to the truth, and with probability [instead of certainty}.

For every thing which is in place, requires the being situated there, in order to a perfect knowledge of its nature. The intelligible, however, is nota thing of this kind; since it is not apprehended by us in place. For wherever any one establishes his dianoetic energy, there, truth being every where present, he comes into contact with it. But if it is possible to assert any thing firm and stable about that which is celestial, this also is possible so faras it participates of being, and so far as it can be apprehended by intelligence. For if any thing necessary ean be collected concerning it, it is alone through geometrical demonstrations which are universal. But so far as it is sensible, it is difficult to be apprehended, and difficult to. be surveyed. And thus much concerning there particulars. .

Some one, however, may doubt, how it can be any longer said to be difficult to discover the Demiurgus, and impossible when found to speak of him to all men, since we are able to employ stable, immutable, and irreprehensible language about the paradigm? Or is not that which.is said about the Demiurgus, in a much 292 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 11. greater degree adapted to the paradigm itself? For it is much more difficult to discover the latter than the former, and when found to speak of it to all men. Neither, however, does Plato deny that scientific language may be employed about the Demiurgus, nor about any other of the natures that subsist always invariably the same. For in what does Plato differ from other physiologists, except in exhibiting the science pertaining to divine natures? But if he particularly reminds us of this in the Demiurgic cause, that itis difficult to find it, we ought not to wonder. For he knew, as it appears to me, that other physiologists tronsfer the effective cause to physical powers. Hence that we may not be affected in’ the same way as they were, he shows that the Demiurgic principle is difficult to be found, and difficult tobe known. And this much in answer to the doubt.

Plato however in many places admits the truth of beings, conformably to theologists. For aniform truth (or truth characterized by unity] is of one kind, and is the light proceeding from the good, which, as he says in the Philebus, imparts purity, and as he says in che Republic, union to intelligibles. The truth proceeding from intelligibles, is of another kind, and illuminates the intellectual orders, which the essence that is without figure, without colour, and without contact primarily receives, where, also, as itis written in the Phadrus, the plan of truth is situated. Another kind of truth is that whichis connarcent with souls, which comes into contact with being through intelligence, and is) conjoined through science with the objects of science. For the psychical hight, may be said to be as in the extension of breadth the third from = the intelligible; the intellectual breadth being filled from the intelligible, but the psychical from the intellectual. This truth, therefore, which is in souls, is that, which must now be assumed, since we likewise assume this faith, and not that which is irrational, and separated from all rational animadversion, The one also must be conjoined to intelligibles, but the other to sensibles.

“ You must not wonder, therefore, O Socrates, if asserting many things about many concerning the Gods, and the generation of the universe, I should not be able to employ language in every respect accurate and consistent with itself.” Timeus first exhibits the hypotheses of the whole of physiology, and collects the lemmas pertaining to the theory of it; the latter being three, but the former five. In the second place, he defines the mode of the discussion. And in the third place, he prepares the auditor to receive in a proper manner the discourse which he is about to make. For it is necessary that he should not expect to hear perfectly accurate arguments in’ physical discussions, nor sach as are truly scientific, but such as are assimilated to them. 11 is besides this requisite he should know, that as the world is mingled from physical powers and an intellectual and divine essence; for “ physical works, as the Oracle says, co-subsist with the intellectual light of the father = thus also the disenssion of it, makes a commixture of faith and trath, Por things which are assumed) from sense participate largely of conjectural discussion; but things which commence from intelligibles possess that which ds irreprehensible, avd cannot be confuted. For when we say of the Demiurgus himself, that he consults, that he energizes dianoetically, and that he makes these things prior to those, we relingtish the trath ofthings.

So thatif when speaking of eternal beings, and showing how they provide for the universe, we are compelled to divide that which is impartible, and to inake that which is eternal temporal, much more will the assertions res specting sensibles themselves be deficient in accuracy [and truth]. What then, someone may say, do we not speak accurately concerning the heavens when we say, thatthe circles inthe bisect each other? Butdo we notfall off from accuracy, when we are satisfied, not with the accurate, but with an approximation to it, in consequence of our tmbecility, and not on account of the nature of the thing? Or, also, when we receive indeed, principles from sense, yet is it not from universal reasons? ‘The assertions therefore, respecting the heavens, as in intelligibles, exhibit the irreprehensible; bat as in objects of belief, they also are reprehended through immaterial forms. Consider then this very thing which is now asserted, that the greatest circles in the Heavens bisect each other. [sy it not necessary that the section should be according to points? But a point isimpartible. What, therefore, is there of this kind ina partible nature? What is there without inter yal in a nature distended with interval?) For every thing which subsists in a physical body, is co-divided with its subject. What, then, is there not likewise a physical point? This however relinquishes that which is truly impartible, and is a point indeed, in physical substances, but is not simply a point. So that what is said of a point, is not accurately adapted to a thing of this kind. In short, as the assertions concerning intelligibles, are not adapted to dianoetic objects, so neither is what is said of scientific objects adapted to sensibles. For intelligibles are the paradigms of dianoetic natures, and dianoetic natures of sensibles. For

204 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ “τ. it is soul which adorns the mighty heaven, and adorns it in conjunction with the father. So that when we speak of circles in the heavens, of contacts, bisections, and equalities, we speak accurately, as not speaking about sensibles. Since therefore things of this kind may be asserted of all material natures, the objection is trifling. If, however, some one should.ask us, is not that which is truly equal impartible, and that which is truly a circle, without interval? Por each is a universal; but universal is an impartible reason and form. But the natures in’ the heavens are partible, and not indivisible, and are inasubject, Here again, we do not say that either circles, or equalities, or any thing else of this kind are in sensibles ; and thus we are consistent with ourselves. We summarily, say, therefore, that Plato at one time defines science, by an explanation of causes alone ; at another time, by the subjects of tt, possessing anessence perfectly stable, tovether with an caplanation of cause ; and at another, by the principles not being hypotheses. And according to this last form, indeed, he asserts that there is one science (i.e. dialectic] which ascends as far as to the principle of being. Por this science pre-establishes the principle which is truly principle, to be unhypothetical, Ttalse has for its subject truly exisiting being, and produces its reasonings from cause, But according tothe second form, he also calls dianoetic knowledge science.

And according to the first alone, he allows the appellation of science to be given to phystology. Now therefore looking to the first’ form he thinks fit to call it conjectural knowledye. And thus much in answer to the doubt, the whole of what is here said being attended with difficulty on account of the construction of the words, which may thus be corrected with a small addition. “JA O Socrates, asserting many things about many,” afterwards showing what these many things are, he adds, “ concerning the Gods, and the gencration of the universe. And these are the many he alludes τον. Uf therefore, he says, many things being asscrted about many, concerning the generation of the universe, and the Gods tt contains, cach of these being many, we should not be able to employ accurate language, you must not ΟΝ He says this, however, because itis not w onderful, to be oceupicd in things of a necessary nature, But it is necessary that a discussion should not be accurate in a twofold respect, viz. on account of the thing known, not being stable and clear,

and on aecount of our nature being human. So great therefore is the caution ' Itis evidently necessary instead of Seurepor ertus iv this plece, to read πρωτὸν etSos. Vor diunve- tc hnowledge is by nu means conjectural. ΠΟΟΚ 11. TIMTUs OF PLATO. 295 which Plato employs in what he says. This however is not the case with others. But Heraclitus, by asserting of himself that he knew all things, makes all other mento be destitute of science. And Empedocles announces that he imparts truth herself, and that, in what he writes. ‘To Wisdom’s summit rapidly he leaps. For these assertions are not conformable to philosophic caution. But the Stoics say that there is the same virtue of Gods and men, being very far from emulating the piety of Plato, and the modesty of Socrates. “ Tf therefore we shall afford arguments no less probable than others, it is proper to be satisfied, calling to mind that I who speak, and that: you who are my judges, have the human nature [in common]. 80. that if you reccive a probable narration concerning these things, it is fit to seek for nothing farther than this.” Timeus reminds us ina twofold respect of the privation of stability and aceuracy in physical discussions ; first, from the essence of the things. For from immaterial natures becoming material, from impartble partible, from separate hatures, such as are situated in a foreign seat, and from universal, becoming individual and partial natures, they do not receive the definition of things scientific and irreprehensible, which is adapted to:

immaterial and imparuble forms. But in the second respect, from the imbecility of that by which physical objects are surveyed. For if it be requisite to know any thing concerning them, it is also requisite to embrace a knowledge co-ordinate to them. But this is sense. And if indeed we were in the heavens, we should perhaps be less deceived ; but here dwelling in the last part of the universe, and being most remote from them, we employ sense in a gross and erroncous manner. For we are allotted the human nature. But the human nature brings with ita life which is material and darkened by the body, and which is partible, and in want of irrational knowledge. The Gods, however, know' that which is generated, in a way perfectly remote from generation, that which is temporal, eternally, and that which is contingent, necessarily. For by intellectually perceiving they generate all things, so that they

* The word yeywosover is wanting in the original. intellectually perceive them after the above- mentioned manner. For we must not fancy that knowledge is characterized by the natures of the things known, or that what is not stable is also not stable with the Gods, as the pInlosopher Porphyry says; for this is asserted by lim which it would have been better not to have said ; but we must admit that the mode of knowledge varies with the diversities of gnostic natures. For the same thing is known by divinity indeed unitedly, by intellect totally, by reason universally, by the phantasy morphotically," and by sense passively. Nor does it follow, that because the thing known is one, the knowledge also is one. Farther still, if knowledges are essential in the Gods, and their intellizence is not adventitious, such as they are, such also is their Knowledge. But they are immaterial, eternal, united, and undefiled; and, therefore, they know immaterially, eternally, unitedly, and with uncontaminated purity, Hence they antecedently comprehend that w hich ismaterial, immeatertally 5 dispersed multitude, uniformly ; that which is changed according to time, stably and eternally 5 and every thing preternatural, dark and impure, ina manner ftranscendently luminous and] pure, Would it not therefore be superfluous to add any further contirmation of this truth?

Again however this? may be assumed from what has been said, that the want of accuracy in the theory of the images of being, arises from our imbecility Por to the knowledge of them we require phantasy, sense, and many other organs. But the Gods contractedly comprehend these in their unity, and divine intellection, For in sublunary natures, we are satisfied in apprehending that which for the most part takes place, on account of the instability of their subject matter, But again, in celestial natures, we are filled with much of the conjectoral, through employing sense, and material instruments, On this account, we must he satisticd wath proximity in the apprehension of them, since we dwell remotely, at the bottom, as itis said, of the universe. This also is evident from those that are conversant with them, who collect the same things respecting them from diferent hypotheses 5 some things, indeed, through eccentrics, others through epicyeles, and others through evolvents, (in all these} preserving the phenomena, What then, some one may say, are we to be satisfied with Plato im physiologizing, and in affording us arguments no less probable than others? May we not reply, that it especially becomes prudent men thus to speak about things of this kind, and to pursue the

' The word morphe, as we have elsewhere observed, pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies. Hence, the phantasy perceives morphotically, because its sight 1s a figured perception. ? Yor roec here, it secins necessary to read rovro. Book 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 297 medium between dissimulation and arrogance ; for the latter is to say more, but the former less, than all others, and the medium is to say What is in no respect less. In the next place, the words no less, may not only be said of men in former times, and speculators of nature, but also of the conjectural things themselves. As if he had said, “ Jf therefore, we shall afford arguments no less probable than the things thenselces, and shall not desert the nature of the objects of knowledge, we must be satisfied.” The Gods indeed know these things in a more excellent manner, but we mist be satistied with an approximating knowledze of them. For we are men, are placed in body, and exert a partial form of life, and are filled with much! ofa conjectural nature, Hence, our discourses may be very properly said to resemble fables. For our language, which the word pugog a fable (used here by Plato] indicates, is replete with crassitude and irrationality, and it is necessary to pardon human nature,

* You speak most excellently, O Timawus, and we shall receive what you say, in every respect as you advise. Your preface indeed we wonderfully approve. Proceed therefore, and bring to a conclusion the subsequent melody.” In the Republic, where Socrates disposes the discourse, Timwus was. silently present, not exhibiting bis own judgment about what was said. But) here Socrates, after a certain admirable manner, receives what Timanus says. Por in the things also, of which the persons are images, while secondary natures energize, those that are first are established in themselves, and do not depart from themselves, nor ,verge to inferior natures. But when more divine beings energize, then more subordinate natures are elevated to the participation of them, through the love of all-various wonder. Hence Socrates, in’ what is here said, very properly surrounds Timeus with all possible praise. For through wonder itself, he is in a greater degree united to him. Moreover, the word most excellent” indicates indeed, the perfect, intellectual, and scientific “nature of the doctrine of Timaus. And it also indicates his analogy to the Demi- urgus, For as he is the best of causes in works, thes also Timieus is the best in discourses. ‘The words likewise, “ we shall receive what you say in every respect

' For πηλὸν here, it is necessary to read πολν. * In the teat of Proclus, Aoyor is erroneously printed for sepor. rae > or . o> pp 298 PROCLUS ON THE [ϑοοκ 11. us you advise,” indicate what kind of person he ought to he, who rightly receives discussions concerning divine natures. That he ought assiduously to adhere to the teacher; to perform with all his might that which is ordered by him; and to persuade himself, that it is right to be persuaded by what the teacher says. Farther still the word “ preface” indicates: the comprehension of total conceptions in the hypotheses, All things therefore, are in the preface itself" Por in this preface, it is shown what the form* is of the object of inquiry, on what hypotheses,’ and things previously demonstrated from them it depends, and also what the nature is of the discussion, and what are the requisite qualifications of the auditor. But the word νόμος melody, is assumed from modulations adapted to the harp. These therefore, are certain melodies, some of whieh are Minerval, out others Martial. And some indecd, are entheastic, but others are defamatory ofmanners, Prior, however, to these melodies, itis usaal to arrange the preludes, which also on this account are called precontrectations, From thence therefore, they are assumed, But the word melody contributes to: the thing proposed τὸ be considered, because all the visible partible* order of things, being harmonious, eternally remains, on account of the goodness of its producing causes. And because likewise, It proceeds from, and subsists according to intelleet, and possesses total powers separated from cach other, and arranged in a manner adapted toeach. For melodies are called νομοὺς dacs, because they remain iinmutable, and hecause such things as are fit are distributed from cach,

«“ Tet us narrate then on account of what certain cause, the composing artificer constituted generation, and this universe.” All that has been before said delivers to us preparatives for the whole of physiology. And of these, some through images and symbols, exhibit the theory of the world. A preface also of the whole discussion is prefixed, and of the demonstration through images or symbols; one part of which unfolds the union, but another the separation of mundane natures. Of the prefatory parts also, some are hypotheses, but others are as it were lemmas demonstrated through the hypo- * For cara re re here, it seems requisite to read κατὰ rovro. * Instead of re τὸν ecdous in this place, it is necessary to read re ro ecdos. 5 For cat ποιων υποῦεσεων read καὶ ex nowy νπυθεσεων. * The word pepiorn is omitted in the original, nook uJ TIMLUS OF PLATO. 299 theses. For the particulars respecting the mode of discussion, may be placed among the things demonstrated. For to the demonstration that the world is generated, the assertion that the discussion of it is eikotology [or speaking trom probability], is consequent. But again, these things having received an appropriate end. “Timwus commencing the fabrication of the universe, begins from the good, conceiving that the discovery of the final cause will be to him the imost beautiful incitation. For as the good is the cause of all beings, so likewise it is fit that the generation of the world should proceed from this as the first principle.

For all things are from ¢he good. And of such things indeed, as the demiurgic intellect is not’ the cause, as for instance of matter, of these the good is the cause. And of such things as the paradigm is not hypostatic, these also derive their subsistence from the good. For all things are for the sake of it, and it is the cause of all beautiful things, as it is said in the Epistles. Hence Timieus refers the other causes to this one cause. For having found the form of the world through the hypotheses, and also the paradigmatic, and eflective cause, he now Wishes to assign the most principal, most venerable, and most ancient of causes, the final, which he particularly desires in the fabrication of things. For since the man who lives according to intellect performs every thing for the sake of good, will not intellect itself, and a divine intellect, in a much greater degree fabricate all things for the sake of the final cause? For though the worthy man frequently appears to perform something for the sake of the body, yet this is not the end to him of the thing, nor does he principally regard the good of the subordinate nature ; but he does this also for the sake of a similitude to divinity, and makes that to be his most intentional end. How much more therefore, must the Demiurgus of the universe fabricate for the sake of good, and the final cause?

For he does not energize without design, nor indetinitely. Hence also, as it appears to me, Plato does not investigate inthe beginning, if there is a final cause of the composition of the world, but as if this was acknowledged by all men, he inquires what the final cause is. For the Demiurgus is supposed to be intellect and a God, and not chance, as some say, But if intellect is the maker, there is certainly that for the sake of which in the fabrication of things. For as the soul when it is in an upright condition, performs all things according to intellect, so intellect in fabricating, gives subsister ce to all things conformably to divinity. But this is

the same as conformably to the good. * For oowy μεν ἐστιν aurios here, it is necessary tu read ogwy μη ἐστιν acres, 300 PROCLUS ON THE [noox 1, Whether therefore, it be requisite to follow the Aristotelian problems, after what the universe is, and what kind of a thing itis, 1015 necessary to investigate on what account itis. For it has been said that itis generated indeed, but is the image of being. And itis also requisite besides this to cousider, for the sake of what it was generated. Oraf it be necessary to adoptthe Platonic causes, itis fit after the demiurgic cause and the paradigin, to discover the final cause of the fabrication of the world. Por again, all other causes are suspended from this, ἀπ likewise the divinity of the paradigm, the goodness of the maker, and the perfection of that which is generated. And as far as to this is: the ascent to those who love to conteniplate truth, Tt is ustal however, to call the final cause δέον ot account of which ; the paradigmatic cause ποτ ον wth relation to which, the demiurgic cause vg ov, by which ; Whe instremental cause av ov, (rough which ; form x25 ὁ, accord: mg lo which ; and matter 22 ov, or evan, from which, ov in which, These causes also received the same appellations from Plato limsclt, Por now investigating the final cause he says, on account of what cause. Inquiring conecruing the paradigatic Catse, he says, with relation tow hich of the paradigms. Bat concerning the demiurgic cause, he says, that which is generated, Is from necessity generated by a certain cause, And as we proceed, we shall point out the rest from the words themselves of Plato; except: that at present also it must be said, that these appellations are adapted to the discriminating setenee of the philosopher,

What however is generation, and) what is the universe? Some indeed by generation understanding the sublunary phice, call the universe the whole world, Bat these entirely wander from the meaning of Plato. Por the Detturgus ts hot represented as separately fashioning materkdl natures, aud separately the whole world. And in the next place, generation itself is a part of the aniverse. Iv however, it should be said that Plato calls the heaven the universe, because it Is the greatest part of the world, for the rest is stall ee because itis the most divine and principal part, and as it were the summit of the universe; for the head also is called the whole, as, Peucer, dear Lead ;' and Plato also says, that the world was surrounded with the remaining bulk of body for the sake of this;—yet at the same time, the philosopher is accustomed to call this likewise generation. Others again call matter generation, but that ν iliad, viii. 281. Which is adorned trom matter fas the subject], they denominate the universe, by Whom many things written by Plato, must necessarily be rejected. For he says. that every thing generated, and all generation, is sensible, or tancible, and visible, Farther sal, he gives a division to generation Opposite to that of matter, as when he says, there were these things subsisting separately, being, place, and generation, from which the universe was constituted,

Our preceptor however says, that the fabrication of the world is to be understood ina twofold respeet. For one part of it Consists in the formation of bodies, but the other, in adapting bodies to. the completion of one world, For it is one ‘thing to fashion bodies themselves, through figures, bat another to harmonize them When fashioned, to the universe. Generation therefore, must be said to be the forma: tion of bodies, being a motion [or tendency) by the wholeness and perfection of the τσοὶ, Lor that which is composed from parts has a pre-concetved production of the parts, Ilence the formation,’ which takes place between matter, the whole orderly distribution of things, and the one completion of the universe, must be called generation, τὴ order that it mity bed path to the whole inwhich the parts are comprehended. For this is the universe, being constituted perfect from perfect: parts, according to the one harmony of wholes. Since however, this whole is sensible, and not the intelligible all, or universe: for this was the paradigm 3 nor the intellectual all; for this was demiurgie s on this account. Plato adds the particle dhis, inanifesting by it that which is sensible and partial. For every thing corporeal, though it should be a whole, is partial. But the most principal whole is that which is immaterial and withont interval, and that is traly all whether it) be intellectual or intelligible. And thas much concerning this particular,

But what shail we say is meant by composition? Perhaps it indicates that the world is composed from: many things, and that the generation of it is from dissimilars, Perhaps also, it signifies thatunion and stability accede to it from the total fabrication. For the collocation of ow, with, fin the word σωνιττας IS Significant of union, and of the conspiration of all things to one. But στατις, permanency, Wanitests the firmness and stability of the fabrication of the world. Farther stl, with respeet to the words συνιστὰς and συνεστητάτο [1 ον. he who comjosed and he constituted) employed here by Plato, the former copulates the present and past times, and the Jatter indicates: the perfection cand the perpetuity of the fabrication. For the former of these words manifests continual pro- " ἡ For πάσαν here, it is necessary to read πλασι». 302 PROCLUS ON THE [soon ‘i. duction, and which is always consummately effected with invariable sameness ; but the latter a wholeness which is allotted an existence in fulness. The signifying likewise, both the past and the present time through the same names, Indicates that the divine fabrication proceeds through sameness and similitude. For such as is the nature of that which is efleetive, such also is the energy which it possesses. And as it is, so it fabricates ; because it produces by its very being, and from! its own proper essence.

“fle was good, but in him who is good, no envy is ever ingenerated about any thing.” Those who call the Demiurgus the good, are entirely ridiculous. For the good apd one who is good are not the same. For the former is imparticipable itself by itself, andis exempt from all things; but the latter is good through participation ofthe former. And the one rules over all intelligibles ; but the other, if indeed itis the same with the paradigm, is intelligibles themselves, but is not the sovereign ruler of intelligibles ; and if itis subordinate to the paradigm is in amuch greater degree inferior to the king of all intelligibles. And in’ short, every certain God ts a certain good, one being a demiurgic, another a vivific, and another a perfective good. But the good is nota certain good, but is sinply good, And ifyou say that itis demiurgic, you diminish its subsistence as sinply wood, These distinctions therefore being made, let us neat consider the beginning of whatis here said. In the first place, therefore, as Plato when Investigating the mundane form, and inquiring whether the world was generated, or is unbegotten, adds prior to the whole demonstration, “ if was generated ;” and as when exploring the paradigmatic cause, he previously adds, “if ts manifest to every one, that “ἀρὰς generated with relation to an eternal paradigm,” adducing the conclusion prior to the whole of the reasoning ;—thus also proposing to discover the final cause after all the others, he adds, “ he was good,” imitating intellect through this enunciation, and the at once collected comprehension of. the assertion, For in this colon, the whole of what is Investigated Is comprehended, because goodness is the final cause, whether itis simply so and one, or whether? it is the demiurgic goodness. For as the paradigm is two-fold, the one being intelligible, but the other intellectual ; and as the one is prior to the Demiurgus,

" For avro here, read azo, * Lcre is omitted in the original. SONS TAT ee RE OF TNT τοῦ being primarily eternal and united, and comprehensive of all intelligible animals, but the other which is in the Demiurgus of wholes, unically comprehends the demiurgic number of forms ;—thus also with respect to goodness, one kind is simply so, but another ts in the demiurgic intellect. And the former indeed, is the fountain of all intelligible, intellectual, and supermundane good ; but the latter being a certain goodness, is the cause and fountain of some things, but is allotted an order subordinate to others. For if we wish to explore what it is which makes a God, whether he be intelligible or intellectual, supermundane or mundane, we shall find that it is nothing else than goodness. For what is it that makes each of the bodies that are animated to be so, except the resemblance of soul? What is it which makes intellectual souls to be such, except the intellect that is in them, and which is an illumination of total intellect?) What therefore can deify intellect, and an intelligible essence, except the participation of the first God, and the forerunning illumination that proceeds from him? What therefore is the first? If indeed, he were intelligible "beauty we should say that intellect was a God through beauty. But since the first God is the good, intellect also through participating of goodness is a God. Hence this is the hyparxis of the Gods; and the very essence of the Gods, if it be lawful so to speak, is goodness. According to this likewise, every God exists as a God. And on account of this he has a providential, or a demiurgic, or a vivific, or a connective characteristic. For

‘intellect indeed, so far as intellect, is naturally adapted to have an intellectual perception and knowledge of beings; but to energize providentially is divine. So that the demiurgic intellect likewise, possesses its subsistence as demiurgic, on account of the goodness which it contains. For on account of this, the intellect which is in the Demiurgus, is the maker, and is not only gnostic of being. The being also which is in him, is an efficacious paradigm, and produces by its very existence, and is not alone perfective of intellect. And intellect indeed in making is corroborated by both these; by the paradigm, because it produces with relation to it; and by goodness, because it produces on account of it. But the paradigm is corroborated by unity. You have therefore, these successive, viz. goodness, the paradigm, intellect. And these subsist in one way indeed, in the Demiurgus, and in another prior to the Demiurgus. And if you are willing so to speak, the first goodness is the one, * For nrrey in this place, it is necessary ¢o read γοητον. 304 -PROCLUS ON THE [wook 11: which is beyond even intelligibles themselves: for it 1s imparticipable " goodness. But the paradigm is that intelligible which unitedly comprehends all the number of forms. And the maker is the intellectual intellect which gives subsistence to wholes. So that if Amelius said that there are three demiurgi after this manner, perceiving this triad in the one Demiurgus, he said rightly.

For one of them, says he, makes [as it were] by contrectation, another by mandate, and another by his will alone. And the first indeed, is arranged analogously to the manual artiticer; the second pre-exists conformably to the architect; but the third is established prior to both, analogously to a king, So far therefore, as the Deniturgus is intellect, he produces all things by the intellectual perceptions of himself ; but so Jur asheis intelligible, he makes by his vory being ; and so far as he ix a God, by his willalone. Whowever Amelias divalses the three Deunurgt from the one Demiurous, we must not admit it, while we follow Plato, Por the same Demiurgus Ip cood, so far as he is a God, and on account of goodness he produces all things by his will, and is intellizible ‘intellectually 3 for such is the demiurgic being. Lle is also intellect, the artificer of the world, The words therefore, “ he was good,” have an explanation of this hind: in the term was, the super-plenary, the consummately perfect, and the super-eternal nature of his divine hyparats, being indicated. Lor the term ts, is significant of eternal things ; the term Was, of the super-eternal unities ; and the term WILL BE, Of things which subsist in time. For of the term ws pertains to eternal natures, the term was will be adapted to the natures prior to these, and the term WILL BE, fo the natures posterior to these. But such are the beings which are indigeut of time,

Since however the Demiurgus is good, envy Is never ingenerated in him about any thing. But some one may say, what is there {remarkable} ino intellect: not being envious? For this? does not happen even to men that are moderately good. The term therefore never, is significant of eternal perfection; since souls are at one time passively effected, but at another, recur to impassivity. Bat the term about any thing, is significant of self-suflicieney 5 since we indecd, for the sake of other things, are frequently purified fromenvy, but in those things in which we have less jthan we think we ought to have in these we are filled with envy. What however, ts * For aperafexros here, reac ase Oearos. * Vor vonrws ἐστε γοέρως, tis necessary to read in this place γόητος ἐστι voepws, 2 For rov yap here, it is requisite to read rovro yap. yo ’ 1 yor the meaning of the term ovjeg, none.” Is it because there are many kinds of envy that he adds none? Or is it said through transcendency, in consequence of making a pertect negation of envy?) But what kind of transcendency is it possible to find in assertions concerning the Gods? For all the appellations and words which are employed about them, are beneath their dignity. Is not envy therefore, a pain arising from the goods belonging to others, this passion if us being mingled from pleasure and pain, as Socrates has shown in the Philebus?) Envy likewise, is for a man to be able to benefit, and yet not benetiting, but keeping the good contined tu himself.

And envy ts also the want itself of good ; which the philosopher appears to me especially to assume at present, exterminating it from a divine essence. For it is naturally adapted to be periectly exempt from this alone, since it is essentialized in goodness itself. For to be pained from the goods pertaining to others, is inherent in all good which subsists according to participation, and which is not primarily good. Tor adventitious good is one thing, good according to habit another, and primary good another. For the first is mingled with its contrary, in the same manner as adventitious beauty is mingled with deformity. But the second is wholly boniform, yet is such by participation. And the third, which is primarily good, ts good itself. For as intellect itself is the first intellect, and as the beautiful itself is primarily beautiful, so good itself is primarily good. What therefore is this? It is the deity of each thing, according to which every trulyexisting being is a God. For it differs in no respect from goodness. But if any one ofsecondary natures should be said to be a God, or good, itis among the numher of things deified, and rendered good, and is a God through participation, and not on account of its own proper essence, nor from itself,

This participation therefore, Plato is accustomed to call indigence ;* just as in the Banquet, he calls Love the want of things beautiful and good. Hence, a divine nature, so far as it is divine, is primarily good, and not according to participation ; so that neither is it indigent of good. Hence too, it is superior to all envy. Foras to the sun, which is generative of light, it is impossible for darkness to approach, but it is excluded from itat a great distance, about the cavities of the earth; after the same manner, it is impossible for envy to approach toa divine nature. For what kind of indigence can there be in such transcendent abundance? What imbecility is there in almighty deity?) What participation in the "i.e. Ovders φθόνοι, no envy. > Evéesay is omitted in the original. lim. Plat, Tot. ki 2Q 408 PROCLUS ON THE [5οοκ 1). fountain of good? The Demiurgus therefore, being good by his very being, transcends al! indigence, and all participation which ‘acecdes from another thing, For he is united to the one itself, and does not proceed out of it. Por intellectual union is of one kind, but the union prior to intellect of another, according to which the generative deity of the Demiurgus, and the goodness which connects allthings, ave united to the one itself. Vor this goodness is not a certain power, as some say, but the measure of all power, Nor is it will, but will proceeds from it.

Nor is it a habit; for habit pertains to another! thing different from habit ; but goodness is itself of itself [1 ¢. pertains to itself alone}. Nor, in short, is it an essential hypostasis ; but itis that which unites essence, and is ineffable, connects powers, and is prolific of demiurgic energies. As therefore, every intellect 15 essentialized in existing as intellect, but that which is above intellect is participated by it; and as every soul is essentialized in existing as soul, but intellect 1s participated by it; thus also every God Is essentialized ino being a God, or rather is superessentialized, but there is not any ung Which is participated by him 15 because the Gods are the most ancient and venerable of all things. | Phe demiurvic intellect therefore, so far as it is a God, in-existing as a God iN primarily se, and not according to participation, This however ts the same with good. As therefore, if some one should say that envy is the want of intellect, and a partial intellect is superior to envy, but soul is not superior to it, for itis indigent of intellect, because it is adapted to become intellectual by the participation of intellect;—thus also in goodness, envy > is the indigence of good ; but every thing indigent is not primarily good, Soul indeed and intellect are indigent of good, because they are not primarily good. But a God, so far as a God, being good, is exempt from all envy, and transcends all indigence of whatever kind it may be, whether it subsists according to diminution, or according to deviation. Vor indigence is twofold, one kind as we have said being evil, but the other not.

“ Being therefore entirely void of this, he was willing that all things should become as much as possible similar to himself.” This is consequent to the before-mentioned axioms. For the first colon [or " Por ἀλλο here, itis necessary to read ἀλλον, Male. Every God, so faras he isa God, is a participant of uothing superior to himself, For the procession of the Gods frum the principle of all things, ix nota participation, but an ἀρρήτοις exparou, an ineflable unfolding into light. > Yor agOosos here, read g6ores, nook 11. TIMAUs OF PLATO. 307 part of the sentence] manifested the order, and the hyparxis of the Demiurgus, that he is ἃ αὐ. And since with respect to deity, one God is imparticipable, but another participable, ' he manifests that the Demiurgus is participable. For he does not say that he was goodness, but that he was good. But he who is cood participates of goodness. And goodness itself indeed, is primarily good. But intellect and being are good by participation. Again, the second colon shows that the Demiurgus does not rank among deitied natures. For one thing is entirely imparticipable, such, for instance, as the good ; but another is good by* the participation of some other nature, as every thing which is deified.! But that which is primarily good, isgood itself, And that which is participated, and is the medium of both the before-mentioned natures is of such akind as all the intelligible and intellectual orders of the Gods are suid to be.

But this third colon comprehends the demiurgie pecuharity. For not only to be good, but on account of the super-plenary, and the extended, to proceed to all things, is indicative of the demiurgic and eflective cause, desiring to fill all things with itself, and to benefit all things; in order that all things may become as much as possible similar to itself, by participating of a certain divine nature, and of arcane and ineflable impressions, which accede to them from the whole fabrication of things. If therefore, the maker of the universe is superior to all indigence, he is exempt from all imbecility, and this eternally. For being signifies the eternal; and because he especially benefits all things, he imparts to all things by illumination, the measure of good, a greater thing than which each of the participants is by no means adapted to receive. And this indicates the extension of providence. If likewise, he wished to supply all things with the participation of good, there is nothing in the universe solely evil, so that neither

ois there any thing disorderly, nor without the inspection of providence, nor indefinite; but all things participate of beauty and order, so far as they are naturally adapted to receive them. Tlence he made all things similar to himself, so far as he is a God, benefiting generated natures ; buthe caused them to become other things besides this, according to other paradigmatic reasons. For as Atticus says, as the carpenter makes all that he makes to be artificial, but differ- ' The Demiurgus is a participable deity, because his intellect participates of his goodness, which constitutes his hyparxis. > Instead of ro μετασχεῖν in this place, it is necessary to read ry μέτασχειν- * Thus soul is deified by the participation of intellect as a medium; because deity accedcs to soul through the intervention of intellect; and body 1» deificd by the participation of soul as a medium. 408 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 11. ent things according to a different reason [or productive principle], causing one thing to be aladder, but another a bed; thus also the Demiurgus, so far as he is wood, assimilates all things to himself, rendering them good; but according to forms which distribute their essences, he makes them with relation to paradigmatic causes. Porphyry however, admitting these things, thinks fit to ask what itis by the reception of which genera are good, And he says it is by the reception of harmony, symmetry, and order. For these are beautiful. But every thing [truly] be autiful is good. Plato therefore manifests that good is in these, when he says, “ Zhat God led that which was disorderly into order, through his wish to communicate good.”

From all that has been said, therefore, it is easy to infer, that the Demiurgus produces eternally; that the world is perpe tual, according to a perpetuity which is extended through the whole of time; that it is always generated with arrangement ; and that it rs not always incorruptible, but is always ; generated or becoming to be so, im Consequence of always receiving good. But it is not immediately good like its eenerating father. For in him all things are contained unitedly, {but in the world distributedly],! and not with perfect τὸ ‘ality, as in eternal natures. For if the universe was generated in time, was it from the Demiurgus that it did not e vist before, or from its subject nature being without order? For if from the Demiurgus, was it because he also did not subsist eternally?) Oris it not unlawful to assert this, and in other respects in vain? Por concerning him, there is the same mode of interrogation, and whether shall we make all things generated, or will there be something primarily unbegotten, and the Demiurgus still more so? Let it therefore be admitted, that it was in consequence of the Demiurgus not energizing. Whether then, did he not fabricate, because he was not willing, or because he was not able? If indeed we say it) was because he was not willing, we forget that we thus deprive him of goodness. But if he was not able, itis absurd that he should at one time have power, and at another imbecility.

Por we shall take away the eternal. But if it was from its subject nature that the universe did ποῖ exist before, whether was it from this nature being unadapted or adapted? If therefore it was adapted, it was not this nature which prevented the universe from existing. But if it was unadapted, how being unadapted for an infinite time, came it to Le now changed [into an adapted condition]? Whether did it move itself? But it is not

© The words ev δὲ τῳ κοσμῳ Senpnperws, are omitted in the original. y κοσμῳ διηρὴμ g self-motive. Was it therefore moved by the Demiurgus? And why was it not moved by him before, if he also was then good, and was willing that afl things should become similar to himself?) The extension therefore of providence is suspended from the goodness of the father; but from this the eternal production of the Demiurgus ; and from this, the perpetuity of the universe, which subsists for an infinite time in becoming to be, and is not a stable perpetuity. And the same assertion subverts the perpetuity of the world, and the goodness of him who made it. For if the Demiurgus was good, he always wished to impart good to all things. For as the sun, as long as it exists, illuminates! all things, and fire heats as long as itis fire; for the one is essentially illuminative, bat the other calefactive; thus likewise, that which is always good, always wishes to impart good, lest being willing indeed, but unable, it should sustain the passion of the vilest natures, For neither does the worthy man wish to effect other things than such as he is able to effect. But if the Demiurgus was always able to impart good, he always imparts it in energy, lest he should have an imperfect power. If however, he always imparts good in energy, he always makes that which is good, But if he always makes it, the world is always generated.

Hence the world is perpetual ; for the Demiurgus is always good. The world therefore is perpetual, not being but becoming to be perpetually. lence, as we have said, the perpetuity of the universe is suspended from the goodness of its maker. For the orderly distribution of the universe sufficiently manifests the demiurgic power. — For matter, On account of its privation of form and morphe, has appeared to some to be without God, and the confused and disorderly nature, to be remote from divine providence. Since the universe however, is well-ordered and decorated with beauty, it clearly demonstrates divine production, The visible order of

‘things therefore, being the progeny of the demiurgic cause, is consubsistent: with the goodness of the father, * He therefore, who especially receives this most principal or proper and powerful principle from prudent men, will receive it with the greatest rectitude.” Timeus assigns the final cause which extends itself to the goodness of the Demiurgus, according to which uniting himself to the first, and imitating him, Ὁ For καταλέμπαγει, it is necessary to read καγαλαμπει. he generates all things. For the first principle is that which primarily produces all things, and this ‘Timzus denominates the most proper and powerful principle, because it is motive of causes themselves. For the demiurgic principle moves indeed that which is generated, but is moved from thence [i. 6. from the first principle]. And the paradigmatic principle moves the total fabrication, but is moved by goodness ; because the good indeed, ts prior to intelligibles, but the paradigm is intelligible, and the Demiurgus intellectual, About the good also, all intelligible and intellectual natures subsist: but about the intelligible, the order of intellectuals © subsists. The effective cause therefore, is a principal cause, but the paradigmatic is more principal, and the final is most principal. Por it is that for the sake of which all things subsist, from which other things are suspended, and which is truly the end of fabrication, Hence the world is perfected indeed, on becoming animated and inspired with life; but it is most perfect, so far as 10 participates of good, and of the union which extends through wholes.

Foras the good is the leader of all things, so the goodness which is in each thing has the first dignity in each, On these accounts therefore, he calls the tinal cause the most principal, or the most proper and powerful principle. For the name of principle comprehends also concauses. But by the addition of mos¢ principal, he indicates that which is truly * cause. For the most principal principles are the causes of generated natures τ but concauses are subservient to other things, and are in the effects themselves. It must be said however, that generation and tne world, ἐδ τὸς have before observed, are the path between matter and the whole arrangement of things, and the perfection itself of the universe. Since also in dogmas concerning the highest causes it is necessary that the speaker should have the intellectual habit, and the auditor a prudent judgment, this is especially requisite in’ discussions concerning the good. For intellect subsists on account of the good, and the intellect which is in us, on account of the good which is in-us. Ilence Plato thinks it is necessary, that those who assert something concerning the most proper and powerful principle, should be prudent men, and that their auditors should receive what they say with the greatest) rectitude. What then, may not any casual person say something concerning God and the — final cause? And do we not every day hear the multitude assertmmg that God is good? But God spoken of without true virtue is but a name, as Plotinus says ; and

® Lustead of πέρι δὲ τὸ γοερον, ἢ τῶν γοήτων διακοσμησις in this place, itis necessary to road πέρι δε ro vonror, ἢ των voepwr διακοσμησις. For the intelligible is superior to the intellectual order. > Lor τῆν ovros αἰτίαν here, itis requisite to read τῆν οὕτως αἰτίαν. he ts spoken of by the multitude, not according to wisdom, but according to chance. Do not dwmons also know the goodness of the father, who dance [as it were | round him; and demiurgie angels, who precede as ina solemn procession the paternal production of things; and Gods who receive demiurgic powers from the one fabricative cause? Gods however, possess this knowledge uniformly, anzels intellectualiy, damons with undetiled purity, eternally, and ina way allied to the natures prior to thei, but we must be satisfied with having this knowledge prudently and wisely, since we are in a certain respect media between more divine natures and the multitude, between intellectual beings, and those that are deprived of intellect. Vor such is human prudence, proceeding indeed from intellect and intelligence, but ruling over a life destitute of intellect. Hence, when we speak concerning the most proper principle, what we assert must be received as uttered by prudent men, Jor prudence isa medium between intellect and opinion ; sothat aright judgment will be concordant with it. Hence too, Plato adds, “ he who especially.” For the assertion concerning this principle must be especially received from prudent

men. But from the natures above man, something better than this assertion must be sought ; and from the multitude, a casual assertion, “Por the divinity was willing that all things should be good, and that as much as possible nothing should be evil.” The divine fabrication, and intellectual production proceeds from impartibles to partibles, from things united to such as are multiplied, and from things without interval, to every way extended masses. This also the discourse concerning it adumbrating, in the first place, celebrates the tinal cause apoplithegmatically ; inthe next place, discursively ; and in the third place, it delivers in’ an evolved manner, the whole orderly distribution and progression from it. For the assertion, “he was good,” uniformly comprehends every final and the most divine of causes, But the words, “ Jn him who is good, no envy is ever ingenerated about any thing ; and being entirely void of this, he was willing that all things should become as much as possible similar to himself,” comprehend this cause discursively ;' because, after the one will of intellect, he adds the divided theory of it. And what he now says represents to us intelligence procecding into all multitude, and interval, and evolving all the demiurgic providence, and all the parts of fabrication. The third

* The word διεξοδίκως is omitted in the original, assertion, likewise, is in continuity with the second, and the second with the first. For since the first division was, “ he was good,” onthis account the second begins from good, but proceeds as far as to the will of the father. And the third beginning from his twil/, delivers the whole of his providential energy. For if he was good, he wished to make all things good, But if he wished, he made them to be so, and the universe obtained an elegant arrangement. For providence indeed, is suspended from will, but will from goodness. And thus much concerning the order and connexion of the assertions. Let us however survey what will is, in order that we may understand how it is conjoined with goodness. The super-essential union itse ‘lf, therefore, which 1s oft itself exempt from beings, is one, ineffable, and uncircumse ribed, from ¢he one tself possessing its undetined and incomprehensible nature. Hence, if it be requisite tu survey in this, from what has been said, the triad which is characterized by unity, or which has the form of the one, coodness indeed pre cedes, but the sec “ond is will, and the third is providence 3 goodness producing the perfect, the sufficient, and the desirable ; δια τοῦ! exhibiting the super- -plenary, the evtended, and the generauve; and providence imparting the efficacious, the perfective of works, and the unidefiled.

According however, to this ineffable and united hyparais of the triad, the intelligible also is triply divided, into essence, power, and energy 3 essence indeed, being firmly established in this triad, and existing selfpe rfect; but power possessing anever-failing and infinite progression; and enerzy be inzallotted perfection and essential production, And again, intellect analogously receives a triple diasion, into being, life, and the intellectual. Por the first of these 15. the supplier ofexistence, the second of vitality, and the third) of knowledee. After these, soul likewise is divided) into the object of science, into: science, and’ the scientific. For the first of these indeed, is that which is known, the second is knowledge, and the third is that which receives its completion from both. These triads therefore, being four in number, as goodness is to will, so Is essence to power, being to life, and the object of science to sc ience. And as will is to providence, so is power to energy, life to intellect, and science to that) which is scientific. For essence, being, and the object of science, have an order analogous to goodness. For the eonnective, the stable, the umform, and the perfective, pertain τὸ. goodness. But power, life, and science, are analogous to will, Por the selfbegotten, and that which comprehends and measures all things, belong to will, And energy, intellect, and that which is

scientific, pertain to providence, For the efficacious, and that which proceeds "οὐκ 41.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 313 through and antecedently comprchends all things, are the resemblances of divine providence, Since therefore, the Demiurgus also is a God, and an imparticipable intellect, so faras he is a God indeed, he possesses goodness, will, and proviJence ; but as intelligible, he has essence, power, and energy; and as intellect, ne is, and has life, and a knowledge of wholes. The monad also which he possesses is suspended from unity. And thus much concerning will. Consequent to this, it remains to inquire how the Demiurgus wished all things to be good, and if this is possible, and in what manner. For it may be said, if he was willing that this should be the case, it would be requisite that the progression of things should stop at the Gods and undefiled essences. If, however, he not only fabricated these, but also brutes, and reptiles, and men, and every thing material, he was not willing that all things should be good. For he was not willing that better natures should alone exist, but also fabricated such as are worse. If he had been willing, therefore, that all things should be good, he would have stopped his fabrication at the Gods. We reply, however, that if the progression of things was only as far as to the Gods, all things would not be good. For first natures being allotted the last order, the good would be destroyed;

since being able and willing to generate through their goodness, yet in consequence of an arrangement as the last of things, they would become unprolific and not good. Our opponents therefore say, if all tnings are good, the progression is as far as to the Gods. But we say, if the progression of things extends only as far as to the Gods, all things are not good. For if a divine nature is unprolific how is it good? But it will be unprolific, if it is the last of things. For every thing which generates is better than that which is generated. But the less excellent nature not existing, that which is more excellent will have no subsistence. Let there be the Gods, therefore, and let them have the first order. But after the Gods, let there be a progression’ as far as to matter itself; and let us give a transition to all beings, from the first to the last of things. And neither let there be any thing wanting even of the last of beings, nor any vacuum, For what vacuum can there be when things characterized by itself? have the first subsistence; those that rank as the second proceed from these ; those of the third order proceed from these and

* TIpoogow is omitted in the original. “5 viz. Self-subsistent super-essential natures ; for to these the αὐτο, or tlse//, primarily belongs. The neat to these are intellects, Those in the third rank, are souls, ‘Those in the fourth, the natures that are divided about bodies, And those in the fifth and last rank are bodies. Jim. Plat, ἘΠ fe α ᾿ 22k 314 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 11, others; those in the fourth rank are generated from things characterized by the term another ; and those in the fifth rank being others only ; and on each side of these those natures subsisting which are dissimilarly similar!’ Such, therefore, being the continuity in things, what can be deficient? Immoveable natures being first established, selfmotive natures having the second, and alter-motive natures, the third rank, all of which are the last of things. Por all beings derive their completion from the above-mentioned orders. In short, the production of things may be shown to be continued in many ways; and if you are willing so to speak, analogy subsisting from on high as far as to the last of things, according to the well-ordered progression of all beings from (he one.

Let, therefore, all these things be acknowledged, and let the generation of beings be extended as faras to nothing ; bat whether is there nothing evil in these, or shall we admit that there is in a certain respect, and that there is what is called depravity in bodies, and in souls?) For some have been led by this doubt to take away evil entirely 3 but others have been induced to deny a providence, im consequence of believing, that if providence has a subsistence, all things are “σους, Lor if, indeed, divinity was willing there should be evil, how can he be good? For it is the province of that which is essentially good to benetit every thing, Just as itis of that which is essentially hot, to give heat. Butit is not lawful for (he good to effect any thing else than what is good. And if divinity was not willing there should be evil, how can it have a subsistence? For something will exist contrary to the will of the father of all things. Such therefore is the doubt. We must say, however, conformably to the doctrine of Plato, according to our preceptor, that the habitude of divinity with respeet to things subsists ina different manner from that of ours. And again that the habitude of things with reference to deity is different from their habitude with reference to us. Por wholes have a relation to parts different from that of parts to cach other.

To divinity therefore nothing is evil, not even of the things which are called evil. Por he uses these also toa good purpose. But again, to partial natures there is a certain evil, these being naturally adapted to suffer by it. And the same thing is to a part indeed evil, but to the universe and to wholes is not evil but good. Forso far as itis a being, and so far as it participates of a certain order, itis good. Por this thing which is said to be evil, if you apprehend it to be destitute ofall good, you will

"viz. The one, and matter. ~My 1» wanting iw the original, make it to be beyond even that which in no respect whatever is. For as the good itself is prior to being, so evil itself is posterior to the nothingness of nonentity. Por that which is most distant from the good 15. evil, and not that which has no kind of subsistence.' If, therefore, that which in’ no respect whatever is, has more of subsistence than evil itself, but this is impossible, it is much more impossible that there should be such a thing as evil itself. If, however, that which is entirely evil has no subsistence, but evil is complicated with good, you give ita place among beings, and you make it good to other things, And, indeed, how is it possible it should not, if it ranks among beings ? For that which participates of being, participates also of unity, and that which participates of unity, participates likewise of good. Hence evil, if it is, participates of good ; because evil has not an unmingled subsistence, and is not entirely deprived of order, and indetinite. Who therefore made it to be such? Who imparted to it measure, and order, and bound? It is evident that it is the Demiurgus who rendered all things similar to himself. For he filled both wholes and parts with good. But if he benefits all things, and colours evil itself with good, there is nothing evil according to the power of divinity and of recipients.

For power is twofold, one being that of divinity which benefits the depravity that is so abundantly seen ;* but the other being that of recipients, which participate of the goodness of the Demiurgus according to the measure of their order [in the scale of beings}. In consequence therefore of the Demiurgus being willing that there should be nothing evil, nothing is evil. But if certain persons accuse him as the cause of evil, because he gave subsistence to partial natures, they take away the fabrication of the worid, subvert the prolific power of wholes, and confound the nature of things first and last,

‘That we assert these things, however, conformably to the opinion of Plato, may be easily seen from his writings. For in the Politicus, he clearly says, “ that the world obtained from? its maker all beautiful things, but from its former habit, all such injustice, and evil, as are produced within the heavens.” For because there is generation, and also corruption, that which is preternatural has a subsistence. " The good itself is prior to being. Nothing or non-being is not that which is most distant from the good; for it is that in which the procession of being ends, but that which is most distant from thr good is evil itself. Hence eril itself is posterior to nonentity. τ * For wodvaparoy, it is necessary to read πολυόρατον, ? For rept here, it is requisite to read παρα, 316 PROCLUS ON THE (Book 11. And because the deformity of matter fills partial souls with inelegance, through an association with it, on this account that which is not conformable to reason is allotted a certain resemblance of subsistence. Atthe same time, however, all these particulars become beautiful through the goodness of the maker of the universe. But inthe Republic, Plato assigns no other cause of good than God, and says that certain other causes of evils are to be investigated 5 through which he manifests that evils do not derive their subsistence from divinity, For it is not, says he, the province of fire to refrigerate, nor of snow to heat, nor of that which is all-good to produce evil, And he asserts that certain partial causes of these are to be admitted, and such as are indefinite, For itis not in evils as im things that are wood, viz.

that the one and what is primarily good, precede multltude; and this on account of the indefinite diffusion of evil The words others, therefore, and certain, evince that the Causes of evil are partial and indefinite. But in the Thewtetus he says, thatit is neither possible for evils to be abolished, nor for them to be in the Gods, but that they revolve from necessity about the mortal nature, and this place of our abode.” If, therefore, evil revolyes necessarily in the mortal place, it will not be according to Plato, that which in no respect whatever has a subsistence, and which is exempt from all beings. So that according to him evil exists, is from partial causes, and is benefited through the boniform providence of the Demiurgus, because there Is nothing which is entirely evil, but every thing is in a certain: respect: accomplished contormably to justice and divinity.

For we may make the following division; OF all that the world contains, some things are wholes, but others parts. And of parts, some eternally preserve their own good, such as a partial intellect, and partial dwmons, but others are not always able to preserve their proper good. And of these, some are alter-notive, but others selfmotive. And. of selfmetive natures, some have evil established in their choice; but in others, it terminates in actions. With respect to wholes, therefore, they are perfectly good, supplying not only themselves, but also parts with good. Such things, however, as are parts, and yet preserve their own good, possess good secondarily and partially. But such as are parts, and alter-motive, deriving their subsistence from other things, are suspended from the providence ofthem, and are transmuted in ἃ becoming manner, as is the case with such bodies as are generated and corrupted, For if it is necessary that there should he generation, itis also necessary that there should be corruption, — For genera- ton subsists according to mutation, and is a certain mutation, But if there is βοοκ 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 317 corruption, itis necessary that the preternatural should be secretly introduced, Ags, therefore, that which is corrupted, is indeed corrupted with reference to itself, but is not destroyed with reference to the universe; for it is either air or water, or something else into which it is changed; thus also that which is preternatural, is indeed with respect to itself disordered, but with respect to the universe has an orderly arrangement.

For if though it should be destroyed and entirely deprived of order, it would not dissolve the order of the universe, how is it possible that when having a preternatural subsistence which is of itself nothing when deprived of all order, it can destroy the whole arrangement of things? But again, partial natures which are self-motive indeed, and whose energy is directed to externals, cause that which is effected by their energy to be evil to themselves, yet in a certain respect this also is good, and conformable to divinity. Vor since impulses and actions are from choice, actions follow elections, according to justice, when he who chooses not only deserves the retribution consequent to his choice, but that also which follows from his conduct. And simply, indeed, the action is not good, but to him who chooses a certain thing, and is impelled in a certain way, it is introduced according to justice; and is good to this individual and this particular life. For of goods, some are good to all things, others to such as differ according to species, and others to individuals, so far as they are individuals. For hellebore is not good to all men, nor to all bodies, nor yet to all diseased bodies, but it is good to one who isdiseased in a particular manner, and is salutary from acertain principle. Whether, therefore, the action is intemperate or unjust, to those who perform it indeed it is good, so far as it is conformable to justice, but simply it is not good, nor to those by whom it ts done, but is to them the greatest evil.

And so far as it proceeds from them and is directed to them, it is evil; but so far as it proceeds from the universe to them, itis not evil. And so far as their energy is directed to themselves, they destroy their life, becoming actually depraved ; but so far as they suffer from the universe, they undergo the punishment of their choice (just as it is said, that those who deliberate about betraying a suppliant, subvert divinity); or they suffer the punishment of their will.

Let us, however, direct our attention to what remains, viz. to such partial natures as energize self-motively, and who stop their depravity as far as to their choice. For they suffer the punishment of their cogitation alone. For, as it is said, there is a certain punishment of mere imagination, impulse and will; since the Gods govern us inwardly, and as they reward beneficent choice, so likewise 418 PROCLUS ON THE [soox 11. they punish the contrary. But it may be said, how can choice itself have that which is conformable to justice and divinity? May we not reply, because it is necessary there should be an essence of this kind and a power of an ambiguous nature, and which verges to different lives? If therefore that which has dominion over Choice is from divinity, choice also is from divinity, and if this be the case, it is good. Por the cleeting soul alone is) transferred to another and another order. For all choice either elevates the soul, or draws it downward (to an inferior condition of being}. And if indeed the choice is froma depraved * soul, itisevils but ifit transfers that which chooses to its proper order, itis according to justice and good. For the choice itself introduces punishment to the electing soul. Or rather, the choice becomes punishment in him who chooses, causing the soul tu apostatize from good. For as a beneticent choice becomes truly the reward of itself, so a depraved choice becomes its own punishment. For this is the peculiarity of selfmotive powers. Hence there is no evil, which is not also ina certain respect good ; but all things participate of providence.

If, however, certain persons should ask on what account an evil-producing cause had at first a subsistence, though it should not rank among wholes, but is of a partial nature, to these itmust be said, thatthe progression of beings is continued, and that no vacuum is left among them. Whether, therefore, Is itnecessary that there should not be every self-motive hfe? But we shall thus take away many natures that are divine. Or shall we say it: is necessary there should be wholes that are self-motive, but there is no necessity there should) be selfmotive parts? But how is it possible they should be wholes, if deprived of their proper parts Ἦ And how will the continuity of beings be preserved, if wholes ond selfmotive natures have a prior existence, and also partial and alter-motive natures, but we entirely destroy the intermediate natures, viz. such as are selfmotive indeed, but at the same time partial? And which through the partial form become connected with habitude, but through the selfmotive power, are ata certain time liberated fron habitude, [tis necessary therefore, that there should be this life also, which is a medium in beings, and the bond of things which have as it were an arrangement contrary? to each other. Evil, however, is noton this account natural to the soul ; since she is essentially the mistress of her choice. For the animated body has an

essential tendency to disease ; for it is essentially corruptible ; and yet disease * MoyAnpas is omitted in the original, * For the proper parts of d self-motive whole, are also self-motive, > For aw’ αἰτίαν here, itis necessary to read amerarriws, is not according to nature. Hence, disease is indeed evil to the partial nature which is allotted to connect this particular body, but is ood to. the wholeness of bodies, Por it is necessary that what is generated from other things, should be changed into another thing. As, therefore, to. the nature which isin us, it is good for the nutriment to be changed, in order to the preservation of the animal; thus alse to every nature it is good for a part to be corrupted, in order that the wholes may be preserved, which are always prior to parts. For if parts were generated irom wholes, and the things generated should remain, all things would be rapidly consumed, in consequence of wholes becoming partial natures. For acontinued ablation taking place from things of a finite nature, the whole must necessarily fail, But wholes not existing, either generation will be stopped, or Mutation to partial natures will be derived from other things. Tlence that which is evil to a partial nature is good to the whole life of the world.

Farther still, therefore, resuming the inquiry after another manner frém the beginning, if we are asked whether divinity was willing there should be evil, or was not willing, we reply that he was both. For he was willing, indeed, considered as imparting being to all things. Forevery thing in the universe which has any kind of being proceeds from the demiurgic cause, But he was not "willing, considered as producing all things good. For he concealed evil in the use of good, And if you are willing to argue physically, evil is produced cssentially indeed (roma partial soul, but accidentally from divinity, so far as it is evil, ifit is admitted that divinity gave subsistence to the soul. Evil also, so far as it is essentially good, originates from a divine cause, but accidentally from the soul. Por so far as it subsists according to justice, it possesses good. Again, Plato in the Laws defines what punishment is, viz. that it appears to consume him Who sullers it, and rescmbles the opening of ulcers. And he who is incapable Ὁ of being healed without a certain action, is incited to the performance of it, in order that the soul being liberated from her parturiency and stupid astonishment about that which is base, and repenting of her own evils, may begin to be purified. Por base and unjust actions, when they are the objects of hope, are lovely to those that vehemently admire them, but when accomplished, till those that perform them with repentance. And when, indecd, they are the subjects of meditation, they cause the soul to be latently diseased ; but when they have proceeded into energy, they demonstrate their own imbecility, but liberate the soul from the

* For ro μεν vrapevow in this place, itis uecersary to read, ro μὴ Suvapevor. 410 “PROCLUS ON UTIL [wooK 11. most disgraceful parturition, And some, indeed, exlubit this punisliment accord. ing to the whole of their life; but others according to purtial energies, For he who does any thing irrational, does it from choice, is impelled to that which is the object of his choice, and leads into energy that which pre-existed in his imagination, In short, evil is neither in intellectual natures ; for the whole intellectual genus is free from all evil; nor in whole souls, or whole bodies; for all wholes are exempt from evil, as being perpetual, and always subsisting according to nature, It remains, therefore, that it must be in partial souls, or in partial bodies. But neither js it in the essences of these; for all their essences are derived from divinity ; nor in their powers ; for these subsist according to nature. Hence it remains, thatit must be in their energies. But with respect to souls, itis neither in such as are rational; for all these aspire after good ; nor in such as are irrational; for these energize according to nature. But it subsists in the privation of symmetry ' of these with reference to each other. And in bodies, it is neither in forin; for it wishes to rule over matter; norin matter, for it aspires after the supervening ornaments of form.

Butit consists in the privation of symmetry between form and matter. From which also it is evident, that every thing evil exists according to a parypostasis, or resemblance of subsistence, and that at the same time it is coloured by good ; so that all things are good through the will of divinity, and as much as possible nothing is destitute of good. For it was not possible, that generation existing, evil also should not have a shadowy subsistence, since It is necessary to the perfection of the whole of things. And from what has been said, itis evident, that the will of divinity is not vain. For all things are good with reference to him, and there is not any being which ts not vanquished by a portion of good. Nor are the words, “ as much as possible, written superfluously. For they do not signify an imperfect power, but that power which rules over all things, and benefits all things through an abundance of good.

“Thus receiving every thing that was visible, and which was not in a state of rest, but moved ina confused and disorderly manner, be led it from disorder into order, conceiving that the latter was in every respect better than the former.” ‘ For ovpperpig here, it is uccessary to read, ασυμμετρίῳ. μμετριᾳ 7 ? Plutarch of Cherona and his followers, and also Atticus, understand what is here said literally, as testifying for them the generation of the world froma certain time. They also say that unadorned matter existed prior to the generation of the universe, and likewise a malevolent soul, which moved this matter. For, [they add,] whence was the motion except from soul; and if the motion was disorderly it was froma disorderly soul? It is said therefore, in the Laws, that a beneficent soul instructs in an upright and prudent manner, but that a malevolent soul is moved disorderly, and that what is governed by it is conducted confusedly and inelegantly. They farther add, that when the fabrication of the world by the Demiurgus commenced, matter was brought into a state adapted to the composition of the world, and that the malevolent soul participating of intellect, was rendered prudent, and produced an orderly motion. For the participation of form, and the presence of intellect, brought it into order. Porphyry however, and Tamblichus, and their followers, reprobate this opinion, as admitting in wholes, that which is without, prior to that which has arrangement, the imperfect prior to the perfect, and that which is without intelligence, prior to that which is intellectual.

And [they add], that Plutarch and Atticus are not only guilty of > impiety towards the Demiurgus, but likewise, either entirely subvert his beneficent will, or his prolific power. For both these concurring, it is also necessary that the world should be perpetually fabricated by him. They likewise say, that Plato wishing to indicate the providence proceeding from the Demiurgus into the universe, and also the supply of intellect, and the presence of soul, and the numerous and mighty goods of which they are the causes to the world, previously surveys how the whole corporeal-formed composition is when considered itself by itself, disorderly and confused. And that he does this, in order that by perceiving by itself the arrangement derived from soul, and the demiurgic orderly distribution of things, we may be able to determine what the nature is of the corporealformed essence by itself, and what order it is allotted from fabrication ; the world indeed, always existing, but language dividing that which is generated from its maker, and producing according to time things which are con-subsistent at once, because every thing which is generated is a composite.

We may also observe, in addition to what is here rightly asserted, that since the demiurgic production is twofold, the one being corporeal,’ but the other decora- tive, Plato beginning from the latter, supposes with the greatest propriety, that // * For Lwxparcns here, it is necessary to read cwparins. Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2s ὙΠ τ ὐπαντανα.. ἢ 322 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK It. every thing corporeal is moved in a way perfectly confused and disorderly. For its motion is such, so far as pertains to itself, when it is surveyed as not yet participating of intellect, and animated by an intellectual soul. For when the universe becomes a thing of this kind, then it participates of supernatural powers. But if itis moved, as he says, neither by intellect, nor by a prudent soul, from which order is derived, its motion will be disorderly. A little after this however, Plato delivers to us the demiurgic providence about the fabrication of bodies. For then the Demiurgus is represented as fashioning the whule of a corporeal nature, which Plato now says he assumed 5 the Demiurgus being the maker, the adorner, the artist, and the manual artificer. If therefore, he produces the first bodies, it is evident that the generation of body is a part of his fabrication, the visible nature receiving certain vestiges of forms, which are the forerunners of their distinct subsistence ; each thing when this distinction takes place, being perfectly adorned, and obtaining an appropriate position and order in the universe, And there is no occasion indeed, to say much about that which is moved in a confused and = disorderly manner.

For Plato clearly says, that the Demiurgus fashioned the whole of the corporeal nature within soul. With respect to soul however, itis evident that one thing pertaining to it was not a subject funproduced by the Demiurgus), and that he alone produced its orderly distribution, For he first: constitutes its essence, and the same and the different; of which as elements it consists. Hence, if he produced the elements of soul, and the mixture of these, he produced the whole of it. So that he did not assume one part of it as already existing, and add another. And of soul indeed, which is incorporeal, this is trae. But with respect to body, we have shown how divinity is the cause of the first forms. Concerning matter itself, however, some one may enquire whether it is unbegotten, not being generated by a cause, as Plutarch and Atticus say, or whether it was generated, and if so from what cause. Vor Aristotle indeed, in another way demonstrates that it ts unbegotten, as not being a composite, nor consisting of another matter, nor again, being analyzed into another. The present discussion however, says that it is perpetual, but investigates whether itis unbegotten and not generated by a cause, and whether according to Plato, two principles of wholes are to be admitted, matter and God, neither God producing matter, nor matter God ; in order that the one may be entirely perpetual, and without God, but the other entirely immaterial and simple. This thing therefore, is among the number of those which are very much investigated, and has been considered by us elsewhere. Now, however, it is requisite to exhibit to these men, what the

conception of Plato is on this subject. For that the Demiurgus is mot the first’ who gave subsistence to matter, is evident from what Plato says further on, viz. that these three things preceded the generation of the world, being, place, and generation; and that eeneration is an ofispring, but place a mother. He appears there- fore through these things to divide matter oppositely as it were to the Demiurgus, ἡ according to the maternal and paternal peculiarity, but to produce generation from the Demiurgus and matter. Does he not therefore give subsistence to matter from another order, which has an arrangement prior to the Demiurgus? Iu the Philebus therefore, he clearly writes, “11 say that God" exhibited the bound, and also the infinity of beings, from which bodies andall beings derive their composition.” Hence, if bodies are from bound and infinity, what is the bound in them, and what the infinity? It is evident indeed, that we Say matter is infinity, but form bound. If therefore, as we have said, God gives subsistence to all infinity, he \\ likewise gives subsistence to matter, which is the last infinity. And this indeed, /) is the first and ineffable cause of matter. But since every where sensibles are analogous to intelligible causes, and Plato constitutes the former from the latter ; as for instance, the equal which is here, from the equal itself, the similar, from similitude itself, and after the same manner all sublunary animals and plants,—it is evident, that he hkewise produces the infinity which is here, from the first infinity, Just as he produces the bound which is here from the bound which is there. It has however, been demonstrated by us elsewhere, that he establishes the first infinity which is prior to things that are mingled in thesummitof intelligibles, and from thence

extends its illumination as far as tothe last of things ; so that according to him, mat- \ ter proceeds from the one and being, or if you are willing, from the one being also, [or ) | being characterized by theone|so far as it is being in power. Hence likewise, it is in 1} a certain respect good and infinite, and the most obscure and formless being. On / this account also these are prior to forms, and the evolution of them into light. Orpheus likewise delivers the very same things. For as Plato produces twofold causes from the one, viz. bound and infinity, thus too the theologist gives subsistence to ether and chaos from time ; ether being the cause of bound every where, but chaos of infinity. And from these two principles he generates both the divine and the visible orders of things; from the more excellent principle indeed, producing every thing stable, effective of sameness, and the source of measure and connexion ; but from the less excellent, every thing motive, effective ‘viz. The highest God, or the one. 324 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 11. of difference, never failing progression, the nature which is defined, and connected by other things, and the last infinity by which matter also is comprehended. Hence also matter is dissimilarly assimilated to the firstinfinity.’ And it is indeed a separation (ywpiopa), as being the receptacle (ywza) and place of forms ;

but there is neither bound, nor a bottom, nor a seat about it, as being infinite, unstable, and indefinite. But again, the last infinity may be denominated a perpetual darkness, as being cllotted a formless nature. ence conformably to this assertion, Orpheus produces matter from the first hypostasis of intelligibles, Jur there perpetual darkness* and the infinite subsist. And these indeed, subsist there in a way more excellent than the successive orders of being. In matter however, the umluminated, and the infinite are inherent, through indigence, and not according to a transcendency, but a deficiency of power. Moreover, the tradition of the Egyptians asserts the same things concerning it. For the divine Tamblichus relates that according to Hermes materiality (υλοότη τα) is produced from essentiality? (ex τὴς οὐσιοτητος). It is prohable therefore, that Plato derived from Hermes an opinion of this kind concerning matter. And matter indeed primarily subsists from these principles [bound and infinity]. But Plato also produces it according to second and third principles, viz. intelligible and intellectual, super-celestial and mundane causes. And why do 1 say this of the Gods themselves? For the nature of the universe likewise, produces matter so far as she is [ἃ Goddess]* and according to the hyparxis of herself. For according to this she participates of the first cause. The Demiurgus therefore, according to the unity which he contains, according to which likewise ~ he is a God, is’ also the cause of the last matter; but according to his demiurgic being, he is not the cause of matter, but of bodies so far as they are bodies,

* For xpos eavrny here, it is necessary to read pos avrny, [1, €. πρὸς avrny απειριαν.} * The first hypostasis of intelligibles is being itself, which is mingled from bound and infinity. Per petual darkness therefore, may be said to reside here, because this hypostasis through proximity to the ineffable cause of all becomes Carkened. “ον being very pear, as Damarcius admirably observes, to the immense principle, if it be lawful so to speak, it ἀν εν as it were in the adytum of that truly mystic silence.” This darkness, however, is not any deficiency, but a transcendency of all that is luminous. Yor as there is one kind of ignorance which is below knowledge as being the defect of it, and another which is above knowledge, being that in which our ascent to the ineffable terminates ; thus also, there are two kinds of darkness, the one being below, and the other above light. 3 See lamblic. De Mysterns, p. 159. * The word θέον is omitted in the original, but ought evidently to be inserted, because Proclus in the Introduction to this work observes that Nature is a Goddess through being deified. " For crc bere, it is requisite to read ἐστι,

and of corporeal qualities. Lfence generation is the offspring of being. According to the life which he contains, he is the cause of the animation which pervades through all things; but according to his intellect, he is the cause of the intellectual supply imparted to the universe. And all such things indeed, as he produces according to his secondary powers, he produces in conjunction with those that are primary. For every thing which participates of intellect, participates also of life, of being, and of union, That also which lives is, and is one; and being is connected through its own proper unity. The converse, however, is not. true. For such things as he produces according to the one,’ so many he does not produce according to being. Nor does he give subsistence to as many things according to the fountain of life, as he does according tobeing. Noras many things according to a royal intellect, as he does according to life; but he gives the greatest extent to his providence from his more elevated powers. These things, however, we have elsewhere more fully discussed.* Let us therefore return to the words of Plato, and survey the meaning of each. The word thus then, suspends the whole orderly distribution of things from the goodness of the Demiurgus, viz. from his divinity. But the words, “ every ¢hing that was visible,” in the first place, leave’ nothing solitary; and in the next place, they show that this visible nature is corporeal. For it would not be visible if it was incorporeal and without quality. So that they neither signify matter, nor the \ second subject (i. e. body void of quality]. But the visible nature is that which, τ εν Ἵ

now participates of forms, and possesses certain vestiges, and representations, | being moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For the idolie and indistinct /), : presence of forms produces different motions in it, as Timeus says farther on. |/ , These, however, all the orders of Gods prior to the Demiurgus illuminate; but the paradigm transcendently illuminates them by his very being, and prior to fabrication. For superior energize prior to secondary causes, and the Demiurgus makes in conjunction with the paradigm, but the paradigm, prior to the Demiurgus, and permeates to those things to which the energy of demiurgic providence does not extend. Iftherefore, you wish to disjoin primordial causes, and the things which proceed from them,* you will find that the good which is the cause of 0, all things, is also the cause of matter. On this account it is likewise the cause of | " Instead of cura ro ny here, it is uecessary to read cara ro εν. * For εξησταται here, it is necessary to read εξετασται. > Instead of ἀφιστησιν in this place, it is requisite to read ἀφίησιν. 4 For ra aw avrov bere, read ra ax’ avrwy. “20 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ "1.

its being invested with forms; for every form is a measure ; and of its participation of order. For order is the reason of things that are arranged, ‘Lhe paradigm, /however, is not the cause of matter, but ofthe production of form, and of the order vin forms. But the Demiurgus is the cause of order, Hence also Plato says, that ‘the Demiurgus received matter now advancing to the participation of forms. — Since all causes therefore, subsist always and at once, but of their effects, some "proceeding as far as to things that are last [1. e. to bodies], but others as far as to things which are beyond both, through the extension of superior causes ;—this being the case, the paradigm indeed, receives matter from ¢he good, and invests it with form; for forms, so far as they are forms, are the progeny of the paradigm ; but the Demiurgus receiving forms from the paradigm adorns them with numbers, and inserts in themorder. After this manner therefore, you must conceive, if you disjoincauses. Ifalso you say, that the Demiurgus 15 the one cause of all things, [ he produces indeed in one way according to his goodness [or the good which he | derives from the ineffable], but in another way according to his own paradigmatic, “andas we may say, artificial peculiarity. Ashe produces likewise collectively, atonce, and eternally,diflerent things proceed from a different peculiarity contained in him, | For according to the good, he produces matter, form and order;

but according to the ‘paradigm in him, form; and according to his artificial peculiarity, order. Hence this thing which is invested with form prior to order, has these representations of forms from the paradigm which is in its own nature intelligible | From this order hkewise, the Oracles produce abundantly-various matter. For they say, “ From thence entirely leaps forth the generation of abundantly-various matter.” For the first matter does not possess a great variety ; nor ts there a generation of this, but of that matter which has vestiges the forerunners of forms ; from which it is evident that the paradigm and the Demiurgus differ from each other, since matter indeed participates of the former prior to the fabrication of the world, when according to the hypothesis, the Demiurgus was absent; but it especially receives something from the latter when it is arranged and adorned, and then the Demiurgus is present with it. The word therefore recetving, may be said to indicate the paradigmatic cause which is exempt from the demiurgic providence, from which the Demiurgus receives the subject of things, now variegated with certain vestiges of forms. It may also be said, that a different work participates of a diflerent power, ) though we may survey all powers in the Demiurgus. For he will be the same divinity who receives and who delivers, essentializing, or adorning things by different powers.

But the words, ‘“cehich was not in a state of rest but moved,” show that the 7 hypothesis alone imparts to the subject a nature from which motion is derived. For the nature of it being irrational and not governed by divinity, what kind of) order can it be able to preserve? This however is evident, from the Politicus,! where, separating the Demiurgus from the world, Plato says, that it was moved by a certain fate, and an essentially connascent desire. Hence supposing here in conjunction with fabrication, what he there supposed after it, he introduces the privation of order to the motion of the visible nature, this motion being produced without intellect. And thus much for this particular. Again, the words, “ he led it’ from disorder into order,” signify the participation of intellect, and an intellectual life. But the word conceiving indicates the demiurgic intelligence, which is analogous to his will and power. Previously assuming therefore, will in the ἡ expression “ being willing,” and power in the expression “ as much as possible,” in the third place, he adds intellectual knowledge in the term, “ conceiving.” For in the Laws, he characterizes divine providence by these three things, vis. by goodness, power, and knowledge. And goodness indeed is paternal, and pertains to the first natures; but power is maternal, and ranks in the second place; and intellect, which is gnostic, is the third. Goodness therefore is the first, but power is with him, viz.

with the first of the triad, and intellect, which is from him, is the third. Again, the words, “ that was in every respect better than this,” signify that order is better than disorder. For it was thus said, viz. “ that he led ' it from disorder into order.” "The word this also has an indication of the disorder then present which the Demiurgus received ; buat the word that represents to us the order pre-existent in the Demiurgus, according to which also he is about to arrange disorderly natures. Aristotle therefore, did not know the order which is in the Demiurgus, but that which is in effects. Tle places however, the excellent in both; in order that according to him, intellect may abide in itself, but may in no respect be effective of secondary natures. But Plato following Orpheus, says, that order is firstin the Demiurgus, and the whole prior to parts. For the Demiurgus being ali things intellectually, made all things to exist sensibly. For if he produces by his very being or existence; and it is necessary that he should, in order that we may not ascribe to him deliberate choice, which is an ambiguous tendency ; he either produces by a separation of parts from himself, and by a diminution of his own powers, in the same manner as fire, or abiding such as he is [without any

" For nxev here, itis requisite to read ηγεν. 328 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 11, alteration], he produces successive natures by his very being. It is however, alwurd to say, that he produces by a separation of parts from himself: for neither js nature diminished in producing the hair or teeth, or any other of the parts of the body. Much more therefore, is it fit to preserve an exempt essence, and which gives subsistence to itself, undiminished. But if remaining that which he is, he produces by his very being, through this indeed, he produces that which is similar to himself; but through a separation of parts, he does not ' make that which he produces wholly similar to himself. For that which is diminished, does not make according to the whole of itself. All things therefore, subsist in him primanly. But external natures are the images of his allness, (ravroryros) and order exists in one way in effects, and in another in paradigms. Tor the former is complicated with disorderly natures, but the latter is order itself, subsisting in, and being of itself; that it may be able to arrange things disorderly, and may be exempt from them, and prescrye its Own essence in undefiled purity. And thus much concerning the meaning of the words.

It deserves however not to be omitted, that Plato here imitates the theologists, in supposing the existence of a confused and disorderly nature prior to. the fabrication of the world. For as they introduce the wars and seditions of the Titans against the Olympian Gods. So likewise Plato presupposes these two things, the unadorned and that which is effective of ornament, that the former of these may be adorned, and participate of order, They however speak theologically. For they arrange in opposition to the Olympian Gods, the patrons of bodies. But Plato philosophically transfers order from the Gods to the subjects of their government. In the next place, therefore, let us concisely narrate the sacred conceptions which the philosopher Porphyry here delivers. In the first place, then, he opposes Atticus and his followers, who admit that there are many principles, conjoining to each other the Demiurgus and ideas. These also say, that matter is moved by an unbegotten, but irrational and malevolent: soul, and is borne along in a confused and disorderly manner. That according to time likewise, matter exists prior to that which is sensible, irrationality to reason, and disorder to order, ‘Let there however be, as they say, matter and God, both being without genera-

tion from acause. Hence, the unbegotten is common to them. At the same time, they differ from each other. They differ therefore, by something eise, and not by the unbegotten. Hence, that by which they differ from each other, will | * Instead of καθολον here, it is necessary to read ov καθ᾽ ολον. { wt ervgeut 2 t } ! " vberwnct not be unbegotten. It will therefore be generated. It is impossible, however, that things without generation, should differ by the generated. In the next place, what is the cause to them of their difference, and which makes the one to be preservative, but the other corruptive? For it is absurd to say, that it is the unbegotten; (for either every thing unbegotten is preservative, or every thing unbegotten is corruptive;) if the unbegotten nature of God makes God to be preservative, or the unbegotten nature of matter makes matter to be corruptive. But ifsomething else is the cause of their difference, whether is that something else unbegotten or generated? For if it is generated, it is absurd that it snould be the cause of things unbegotten; or if unbegotten,' that it should be the cause of unbegotten natures. So that again, we must investigate something else prior to these, as the cause of their difference, and the ascent will be ad infinitum. For if there will be no cause of difference to things that differ, so as to render the one preservative, but the other corruptive, the casual will have dominion over the principles ; for cause being subverted, the concurrence of such-like principles will be irrational, and without a cause. :

Farther still, it is absurd to make evil eternal, in the same manner as the good. Por that which is without God, is not similarly honorable with that which is divine; nor is it equally unbegotten, nor, in short, is it to be contrarily divided. Vor why is the one more suflicient to itself, or more immutable, or indestructible, than the other, if each of them is from eternity, and neither is in want of the other? Again, if one of them is adapted to be adorned, but the other to adorn, whence is their aptitude derived? For it is necessary there should be something which connects both, and makes them commensurate to each other. For these principles being divulsed from, and subsisting contrary to.each other, cannot render themselves adapted to coalition. Unless they say, that this also arises from chance. Nor in thus speaking do they attend to the Athenian guest, who says, that this is the fountain of stupid opinion, to assert that the irrational is prior to reason, and that chance has dominion prior to intellectual art. Nor to Socrates in the Republic, who says, that it is not proper to remain in multitude, but to recur from the many to their common monads. . Farther still, it is necessary to characterize the highest principle not by this alone, that it has not another principle ; for this does not yet demonstrate its dignity * [but that it is the prin-

! It is necessary here to supply ἀγένητον των; and therefore instead of reading, as in the original, aire αγενητων ὑντων, We Must read, cire ayernroy των ayeyntwY OVTwY. * For αταξιαν here, it is necessary to read αξιαν. Tim. Plat. Voi. L ; oy 330 ΤΠ PROCLUS ON THE [noo τι. ciple of all principles). But if this be the case, there will not be more [independent) principles than one. For if there were, God will not be the cause of all things, but only of certain things. But if he also rules over matter, there is one principle, and not many principles. Farther still, if the existence of principle consists in this, that it is the principle of certain things, and that it adorns that which is disorderly, it will be simultaneous with the things that proceed from it, and the principle will be no less subverted from things posterior to it not existing, than things posterior tu it when the principle is subverted... But this will be the + ‘ease, since they frequently say, that the principle has its existence in fabricating. “If however this be true, itis not possible for the principle to exist, the world not”

‘lexisting, | But again, asserting differently from what they did before, they say, — that God exists without fabricating. ‘They assert this however, not* knowing ‘that true powers energize by their very being, and that the augmentative and nu- | tritive powers, by their very being, increase and nourish the body. Thus also the soul by its very existence animates, vivifies, and moves its instrament [the body], For the body does not perceive or palpitate in consequence of our pre-deliberation 5 “but the presence of soul alone accomplishes these energies. ) Again, every thing which is always naturally adapted to a certain thing, essentially possesses the power of effecting it; but that which is changed differently at different times, Is adscititious, ΠΟ therefore God always fabricates, he will have a connascent demiurgic power ; but if he does not, lis power will be adscititious. Hlow therefore, from being imperfect, does he become perfect, and from not being artificial, an artificer? The second head therefore after this, is that which shows that Plato refers all things to one principle. And this is evident from the Republic, where he asserts that the sun is the cause of visible, but the good of intelligible natures. Again also, he calls the sun the offspring of the good. ‘This is hkewise evident from his Epistles, in which he says that all things are about the king of all, and that all things are for his sake. For if all things are converted to him, and subsist about him, he is the principle of all, and not only of certain things ; since whatever you may assume will be derived from thence. “This too is manifest from the Philebus, in which dialogue he ciearly says, that all things are from bound and

“ Instead of καὶ order μαλλὸν arnpnpern τῆς ἀρχὴν, ἐκ πκοδων ra per αὐτήν, ἐκ τοντων μὴ οντω), αναιρειται ἡ ἀρχῇ, Ll read, καὶ ονδεν μαλλον ανὴηρημενὴς τὴς ἀρχὴν, €« ποδων τα μετ᾽ αὐτὴν ἡ εκ τύντων, κ. Me Ὁ Οὐχ is omitted here in the original. ΟΟΚ it.J ΤΌΘ OF PLATO. 331 infinity, but that of these principles themselves there is one pre-existent cause, which is God. Hence, there is one principle and many principles ; but these are perfected by the one principle. Prom what is said also in the Philebus this is evident, in which dialogue he confutes those who assert that beings are [alone] many, and likewise those who admit the principle to be being itself. For he deMonstrates, that itis neither proper to begin from the multitude of beings, nor from the one being, but from the one itself, : In the third place, therefore, neither do the principles which they assume_pertainany thing to Plato. For ideas are not separated from intellect, subsisting | by themselves apart from it; but intellect being converted to itself, sees all forms. | Hence the Athenian guest assimilates the energy of intellect to the circulation of an accurately-fashioned sphere. But they introduce ideas as things ineflicacious, resembling in themsclves forms impressed in wax, and situated external to intellect. Nor is the Demiurgus the first God. For the first God is: superior to’ every intellectual essence. Nor does ἃ. certain irrational soul move that— which is borne along in a confused and disorderly manner.

Mor every | soul is the offspring of the Gods. Nor, in short, did the universe, from being | without order, become arranged. For if God was willing to bring 41} things | into order, how was he willing?) Was he always willing, or ata certain time? For if he was willing αἵ acertain time, this was either from himself, or from matter. Bat if from himself, an absurdity follows. For he is always good. Every thing good, however, which always exists, is always effective.’ And if this arose from the resistance of matter, how came it to be now adorned ? Because, say they, it became adapted to receive the demiurgie productive power, For God observed this, viz. the aptitude of tt. Tt is necessary therefore, that it should have been brought into order, not being itself disorderly. For af it had) been disorderly, it would not have been adapted ; since the disorderly motion of it is inaptitude. IIence matter is not the cause of the privation of order and ornament. Moreover, neither is the will of God the cause of this. For he is always good, and therefore the world is always adorned; and the Demiurgus always arranges the contused/ and disorderly nature. On what account, therefore, did Plato hypothetically introduce this privation of order? It was that we might survey how the generation of bodies is one thing, and the order of them when generated, another; bodies indeed existing, but being moved in a disorderly manner. For they are inca-

‘ Instead of ro δε ayaboy war, act ov ποιητικον,, it scems necessary to read ro δε ἀγαθὸν παν ae ον, ace ποιητικοῦ. 332 . PROCLUS ON 'THTE {[woox ir pable of arranging themselves. Hence Plato, wishing to indicate the order which accedes to bodies from something different from themselves, shows that disorder is consubsistent with their motions, without a divine cause. Aristotle, however, blames him who asserts that disorder is assumed prior to order, merely according to hypothe- sis, and says that those things will not follow for which the hypotheses are assumed, as is the case in geometry. For the hypotheses of geometry are of _themselves able to effect geometrical conclusions. To this we reply, that itis not said after this manner according to hypothesis, that the unadorned ought to be admitted prior to the adorned, but that Plato saw that which 1s formless prior - τὸ forms, though it is never separate from them, Thus too, that which is invested with form, though yet without distinction, is assumed prior to order, though it never was prior to it, but is consubsistent with order, The fourth head, in addition to those that have been already considered, is that in which Plato demonstrates the mode of fabrication ; a divine intellect εἰς fecting this by its very being, which he infers through many arguments. For artists are in Want of instruments to their energy, because they have not dominion over every kind of matter, But this is evident from the instruments which they use, in order to.