Discourses and Enchiridion

'But I have bought them, and they have not bought me.' Do you see where your eyes are looking? You are looking at the earth, at what is lowest and basest, at these miserable laws of the dead, and you regard not the laws of the gods.

CHAPTER XIV That God beholds all men. God beholds a man's every act because the universe is one,When one asked him how a man may be convinced that every one of his acts is seen by God, Do you not think, he said, that all things are united together? 'I do', he said. Again, do you think that things on earth feel the influence of things in heaven? 'I do', he said.

Whence comes it that in such perfect order as at God's command, when He bids the plants to flower, they flower, when He bids them grow they grow, when He bids them to bear fruit, they bear, when to ripen, they ripen; when again He bids them drop their fruit, they drop it, and when to let fall their leaves, they let them fall, and when He bids them gather themselves up and be still and take their rest, they are still and take their rest? Whence is it that as the moon waxes and wanes and as the sun draws near and departs afar we behold so great a change and transformation of things on the earth? If the plants then and our own bodies for our minds are portions of God's being.are so closely bound up with the universe, and so share its affections, is it not much more so with our minds? And if our minds are so bound up with God and in such close touch with Him as being part and portion of His very being, does not God perceive their every movement as closely akin to Him?

If man can reflect and conceive and combine, much more can God behold all things.Consider this: you, a man, have power to reflect on the divine governance and on each divine operation as well as upon things human, you have the faculty of being moved in your senses and your intelligence by countless objects, sometimes assenting, sometimes rejecting, sometimes doubting; you guard in your own mind these many impressions derived from so many and various objects, and moved by them you conceive thoughts corresponding to those objects which have first impressed you, and so from countless objects you derive and maintain one after another the products of art and memory. All this you do, and is God not able to behold all things and be present with all and to have some communication with all? Why, the sun is able to illuminate so large a part of the universe, and to leave unilluminated only so much as the shadow which the earth makes can cover: and cannot He who has created the sun itself, and who makes it to revolve—a small part of Himself as compared with the whole—has not He, I say, the power to perceive all things?

Plain English · paraphraseIf a human can think, imagine, and bring ideas together, then how much more can God see everything. Think about this: you, a human, have the ability to consider divine rule and each divine action, as well as human matters. You have the ability to be affected in your senses and your mind by many things, sometimes agreeing, sometimes disagreeing, sometimes being uncertain. You keep in your mind many impressions from so many different things, and through these you form thoughts that match the things that first affected you. In this way, from many things you create and remember one after another the works of art and memory. You do all this, and is God not able to see everything, to be with everything, and to have some connection with everything? The sun can light up such a large part of the universe, leaving unlit only what the earth's shadow can cover. And if the sun is only a small part of God, who made the sun and makes it move, then does God not have the power to know all things?

Man is not equal in faculty to Zeus, but he has a guardian genius, who is God within him.'But', says one, 'I cannot comprehend all these things at once.'

Plain English · paraphrasePeople are not equal in power to Zeus, but each person has a guardian spirit, which is God within them. "But," someone says, "I cannot understand all these things at once."

Of course no one tells you that in faculty you are equal to Zeus. Nevertheless He has set by each man his genius to guard him, and committed each man to his genius to watch over, aye and a genius which sleeps not and is not to be beguiled. To what other guardian, better or more attentive, could He have committed each one of us? Therefore, when you close your doors and make darkness within, remembe never to say that you are alone: you are not alone, God is within, and your genius. What need have they of light to see what you are doing? To this God you ought to swear allegiance from the first as the soldiers swear to Caesar. They are paid servants, yet they swear that they will put the safety of Caesar above all things: and shall you not swear too, who have been counted worthy of so many and so great blessings, or having sworn shall you not keep your oath? To God he must take an oath like the soldier, but an oath to respect himself.And what shall your oath be? Never to disobey, never to accuse, never to find fault with any of God's gifts, never to let your will rebel, when you have to do or to bear what necessity demands. Can the soldier's oath be compared with ours? The soldiers swear to respect no man above Caesar, but we to respect ourselves first of all.'

CHAPTER XV What philosophy professes. Philosophy does not profess to control external things. No man can interfere with another's art of living.When a man consulted Epictetus how to persuade his brother to be angry with him no longer, he replied, 'Philosophy does not promise to secure to man anything outside him. If it did it would be admitting something beyond its subject-matter. For as wood is the material dealt with by the carpenter, bronze by the statuary, so the subject-matter of each man's art of living is his own life. What are we to say then of your brother's life? That again is the concern of his art of living: to yours it is a thing external, like land, health, good repute. Philosophy makes no promises about such things. 'In all circumstances' (says philosophy), 'I will keep the Governing Principle in accord with nature.' Whose Governing Principle? 'His, in whom I am.' How then am I to prevent my brother from being angry with me? Bring him to me and I will tell him, but I have nothing to say to you about his anger.

Plain English · paraphraseCHAPTER XV What philosophy professs. Philosophy does not claim to control outside things. No one can interfere with another's way of living. When a man asked Epictetus how to persuade his brother to stop being angry with him, he answered, "Philosophy does not promise to give a man anything outside himself. If it did, it would be admitting something beyond its subject. For just as wood is the material the carpenter works with, and bronze the material the sculptor works with, so the subject of each man's way of living is his own life. What then are we to say about your brother's life? That is the concern of his way of living. To you it is an outside thing, like land, health, good reputation. Philosophy makes no promises about such things. 'In all circumstances' (says philosophy), 'I will keep the Governing Principle in harmony with nature.' Whose Governing Principle? 'His, in whom I am.' How then can I stop my brother from being angry with me? Bring him to me and I will tell him. But I have nothing to say to you about his anger."

In conduct and feeling, as in the natural world, we must expect not rapid change but slow growth.When the man who consulted him said, 'What I am looking for is this—how I may be in accord with nature, even though he be not reconciled with me', he replied, No great thing comes suddenly into being, any more than a cluster of grapes or a fig. If you say to me now, 'I want a fig', I shall answer that it needs time. Let it flower first, then put forth its fruit and then ripen. I say then, if the fig tree's fruit is not brought to perfection suddenly in a single hour, would you gather fruit of men's minds so soon and so easily? I tell you, you must not expect it.

CHAPTER XVI On Providence. The other creatures, unlike man, have their bodily wants suppliedMarvel not that the other creatures have their bodily needs supplied—not only meat and drink, but a bed to lie on—and that they want no shoes nor rugs nor clothes, while we want all these things. For it would not have been a good thing that these creatures, born not for themselves but for service, should have been created liable to wants. Consider what it would be for us to have to take thought not only for ourselves but for sheep and asses, how they were to dress and what shoes they were to put on, and how they should find meat and drink. But just as soldiers when they appear before their general are ready shod, and clothed and armed, and it would be a strange thing indeed if the tribune had to go round and shoe or clothe his regiment, so also nature has made the creatures that are born for service ready and prepared and able to dispense with any attention. So one small child can drive sheep with a rod.

We ought to give thanks for this and other signs of God's providence.Yet we forbear to give thanks that we have not to pay the same attention to them as to ourselves, and proceed to complain against God on our own account. I declare, by Zeus and all the gods, one single fact of nature would suffice to make him that is reverent and grateful realize the providence of God: no great matter, I mean; take the mere fact that milk is produced from grass and cheese from milk and wool from skin. Who is it that has created or contrived these things? 'No one', he says. Oh, the depth of man's stupidity and shamelessness!

We may see it in the hair given man to distinguish him from woman.Come, let us leave the chief works of nature, and behold what she works by the way. Is anything more useless than the hairs upon the chin? Did she not use even these in the most suitable way she could? Did she not by these means distinguish male and female? Does not the nature of each one of us cry aloud from afar, 'I am a man: on these terms approach me and address me; seek nothing else. Behold the signs.' Again, in women nature took the hair from their face, even as she mingled in their voice a softer note. What! You say the creature ought to have been left undistinguished and each of us to have proclaimed, 'I am a man'? Nay, but how noble and comely and dignified is this sign, how much more fair than the cock's crest, how much more magnificent than the lion's mane! Therefore we ought to preserve the signs God has given; we ought not to abandon them, nor, so far as in us lies, to confound the sexes which have been distinguished.

For this and all his gifts we ought to praise God.Are these the only works of Providence in us? Nay, what words are enough to praise them or bring them home to us? If we had sense we ought to do nothing else, in public and in private, than praise and bless God and pay Him due thanks. Ought we not, as we dig and plough and eat, to sing the hymn to God? 'Great is God that He gave us these instruments wherewith we shall till the earth. Great is God that He has given us hands, and power to swallow, and a belly, and the power to grow without knowing it, and to draw our breath in sleep.' At every moment we ought to sing these praises and above all the greatest and divinest praise, that God gave us the faculty to comprehend these gifts and to use the way of reason.

More than that: since most of you are walking in blindness, should there not be some one to discharge this duty and sing praises to God for all? What else can a lame old man as I am do but chant the praise of God? If, indeed, I were a nightingale I should sing as a nightingale, if a swan, as a swan: but as I am a rational creature I must praise God. This is my task, and I do it: and I will not abandon this duty, so long as it is given me; and I invite you all to join in this same song.

Plain English · paraphraseMore than that: since most of you are walking in blindness, should there not be someone to carry out this duty and praise God for all things? What else can an old, crippled man like me do but sing praise to God? If I were indeed a nightingale, I would sing like a nightingale; if a swan, like a swan. But since I am a rational being, I must praise God. This is my task, and I do it. I will not give up this duty as long as it is given to me. And I invite you all to join in this same song.

CHAPTER XVII That the processes of logic are necessary. Logic is necessary.Since it is reason which makes all other things articulate and complete, and reason itself must be analysed and made articulate, what is it that shall effect this? Plainly, reason itself or something else. That something else either is reason or it will be something superior to reason, which is impossible. If it is reason, who again will analyse that reason? For if it analyses itself, so can the reason with which we started. If we are going to call in something else, the process will be endless and unceasing. If it be urged that moral progress is more pressing, the answer is that logic is a necessary test and condition of sound knowledge.'Yes,' says one, 'but the more pressing need is not logic but the discipline of men's thoughts and feelings', and the like.

Plain English · paraphraseCHAPTER XVII That the processes of logic are necessary. Logic is necessary. Since it is reason which makes all other things clear and complete, and reason itself must be examined and made clear, what is it that will do this? Clearly, reason itself or something else. That something else is either reason or it will be something greater than reason, which is impossible. If it is reason, then who again will examine that reason? For if it examines itself, then so can the reason with which we started. If we are going to bring in something else, the process will never end. If it is said that moral progress is more urgent, the answer is that logic is a necessary test and condition of sound knowledge. "Yes," says one, "but the more urgent need is not logic but the discipline of men's thoughts and feelings," and the like.

If you want to hear about moral improvement, well and good. But if you say to me, 'I do not know whether you argue truly or falsely', and if I use an ambiguous word and you say to me 'distinguish', I shall grow impatient and say to you, 'this is the more pressing need.' It is for this reason, I suppose, that men put the processes of logic in the forefront, just as we put the testing of the measure before the measuring of the corn. And if we do not determine first what is the bushel and what is the scale, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything? So in the sphere of thought if we have not fully grasped and trained to perfection the instrument by which we judge other things and understand other things, shall we ever be able to arrive at accurate knowledge? Of course, it is impossible. Logic affords a measure or test of terms, &c.'Yes,' they say, 'but the bushel is a mere thing of wood and bears no fruit.' True, but it can measure corn. 'The processes of logic, too, are unfruitful.'

This we will consider presently: but even if one should concede this, it is enough that logic has the power to analyse and distinguish other things and in fact, as one might say, has the power to weigh and measure. Who asserts this? Is it only Chrysippus and Zeno and Cleanthes? Does not Antisthenes agree? Why, who is it that has written, 'The beginning of education is the analysis of terms'? Does not Socrates too say the same? Does not Xenophon write of him that he began with the analysis of terms, to discover what each means? But it is a much nobler thing to understand Nature.Is this then what you call great and admirable—to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Nay, no one says that. What is admirable then? To understand the will of Nature. Very well: do you understand it of yourself? If so, what more do you need? For if it is true that all error is involuntary and you have learnt the truth, you must needs do rightly hereafter. But who shall interpret Nature? Chrysippus, or his commentator?'But,' you may say, 'I do not understand the will of Nature.'

Who then expounds it? They say 'Chrysippus.' I come and inquire what this interpreter of Nature says. I begin not to understand what he means and I seek some one to interpret. The interpreter says, 'Let us examine the sense of this phrase, as if it were Latin.' The interpreter of Nature is of no good unless he follows Nature—which is the supreme end.Why, pray, should the interpreter put on airs? Even Chrysippus has no right to do so, if he is only expounding the will of Nature, and does not follow it himself: how much less his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but only to enable us to follow Nature: just as we have no need, for himself, of the priest who offers sacrifice, but because we think that through him we shall understand the signs which the gods give of the future, nor do we need the sacrifice for itself, but because through it the sign is given, nor do we marvel at the crow or the raven but at God who gives His signs by them.

The lesson to be learnt from the Divine is the freedom of man in assent,So I come to this interpreter and priest and say, 'Examine the victim's flesh to see what sign is given me.' He takes and opens the flesh and interprets, 'Man, you have a will unhindered and unconstrained by nature. This is written here in the flesh of the sacrifice. I will show you the truth of it first in the sphere of assent. Can any one prevent you from agreeing to what is true? No one. Can any one compel you to accept the false? No one. Do you see that in this sphere your faculty is free from let and hindrance and constraint and compulsion? Is it any different in the sphere of will and impulse? in will and impulse.What, I ask, can overcome impulse except another impulse? And what can overcome the will to get or will to avoid except another will to get or to avoid?' 'If he threatens me with death,' one says, 'he compels Compulsion cannot be put on man from outside. Only his own judgement can compel him.me.'

Plain English · paraphraseThe lesson from the Divine is about human freedom in making choices. So I go to this interpreter and priest and say, "Check the victim's flesh to see what sign is given me." He takes the flesh and examines it, then says, "Human, you have a will that is free and not controlled by nature. This is written here in the flesh of the sacrifice. I will show you the truth of this first in the area of agreement. Can anyone stop you from agreeing to what is true? No one. Can anyone force you to accept what is false? No one. Do you see that in this area your ability is free from obstacles, hindrances, pressure, or force? Is it any different in the area of will and impulse? In will and impulse, what, I ask, can overcome an impulse except another impulse? And what can overcome the will to gain or the will to avoid except another will to gain or to avoid?" "If he threatens me with death," one says, "he compels me." "Compulsion cannot come to a person from the outside," I say. "Only his own judgment can compel him."

No, it is not what he threatens you with which compels you, but your decision that it is better to do what you are bidden than to die. Once more then it is your own judgement which compels you—that is, will puts pressure on will. For if God had so created that portion of His own being which He has taken from Himself and given to us, that it could suffer God could not have made man who shares His nature subject to compulsion.hindrance or compulsion from another, He would cease to be God and to care for us as He must needs do. 'This', says the priest, 'is what I find in the sacrifice: this is God's sign to you: if you will, you are free: if you will, you will blame no one, you will accuse no one: everything shall be in accordance with your own mind and the mind of God.' This is the prophecy which draws me to consult this seer and philosopher, and his interpretation makes me admire not him but the truths which he interprets.

CHAPTER XVIII That we should not be angry at men's errors. All action has its source in feeling, and therefore we must not be angry with the erring multitude.If what philosophers say is true, that in all men action starts from one source, feeling, as in assent it is the feeling that a thing is so, and in denial the feeling that it is not so, yes, by Zeus, and in withholding judgement, the feeling that it is uncertain: so also impulse towards a thing is originated by the feeling that it is fitting, and will to get a thing by the feeling that it is expedient for one, and it is impossible to judge one thing expedient and will to get another, and to judge one thing fitting and be impelled to another. If all this be true, why are we angry with the multitude? 'They are thieves', he says, 'and robbers.' What do you mean by thieves and robbers? 'They are gone astray and know not what is good and what is evil.'

They only need to see their error, to desist.Ought we then to be angry with them or to pity them? Only show them their error and you will see how they desist from their faults. But if their eyes are not opened, they regard nothing as superior to their own judgement. To put them to death is as inhuman as to put to death the blind or the deaf.'What!' you say. 'Ought not this robber and this adulterer to be put to death?'

Plain English · paraphraseThey only need to see their mistake to stop. Should we then be angry with them or pity them? Just show them their mistake, and you will see how they stop their faults. But if their eyes are not open, they think nothing is better than their own judgment. To kill them is as cruel as killing the blind or the deaf. "What!" you say. "Shouldn't this robber and this adulterer be put to death?"

Nay, say not so, but rather, 'Should I not destroy this man who is in error and delusion about the greatest matters and is blinded not merely in the vision which distinguishes white and black, but in the judgement which distinguishes good and evil?' If you put it this way, you will recognize how inhuman your words are; that it is like saying, 'Should I not kill this blind man, or this deaf one?' For if the greatest harm that can befall one is the loss of what is greatest, and a right will is the greatest thing in every one, is it not enough for him to lose this, without incurring your anger besides? Rather pity them.Man, if you must needs harbour unnatural feelings at the misfortune of another, pity him rather than hate him; give up this spirit of offence and hatred: do not use these phrases which the backbiting multitude use, 'These accursed and pestilent fools'. Very well. How are you suddenly converted to wisdom? What an angry temper you show!

We are angry because we set store by material goods.Why then are we angry? Because we admire the material things of which they rob us. For only cease to admire your clothes, and you are not angry with him who steals them: cease to admire your wife's beauty, and you cease to be angry with the adulterer. Know that the thief and adulterer have no place among things that are your own, but only among things that are another's and beyond your power. If we ignore all that is not ours, our anger has no place.If you let them alone and count them as nothing you have no one to be angry with any more. But as long as you admire these things you must be angry with yourself rather than with them. For, look you, you have fine clothes, your neighbour has none: you have a window, you wish to air them. He does not know what is the true good of man, but fancies, as you do too, that it is to have fine clothes. Is he not to come then and carry them off? Why, if you show a cake to greedy men, and gobble it down all to yourself, do you expect them not to snatch at it? Do not provoke them, do not have a window, do not air your clothes.

Plain English · paraphraseWe are angry because we value material things. Why then are we angry? Because we value the material things they take from us. If you stop valuing your clothes, you won't be angry with the one who steals them. If you stop valuing your wife's beauty, you stop being angry with the adulterer. Know this: the thief and the adulterer belong not to your possessions, but to another's, and are beyond your control. If we ignore all that is not ours, our anger has no place. If you leave them alone and consider them as nothing, you have no one left to be angry with. But as long as you value these things, you must be angry with yourself rather than with them. For look, you have fine clothes, your neighbor has none. You have a window, you wish to display them. He does not know what the true good of man is, but believes, as you do, that it is to have fine clothes. Is he not then to come and take them? Why, if you show a cake to hungry men and eat it all yourself, do you expect them not to snatch it? Do not provoke them. Do not have a window. Do not display your clothes.

If your iron lamp is stolen, buy one of earthenware.For my part, yesterday I had an iron lamp beside my household gods, and hearing a noise I rushed to the window. I found the lamp had been carried off. I reasoned with myself, that the man who took it yielded to some plausible feeling. What do I conclude? To-morrow, I say, you will find one of earthenware. A man's losses are limited to his possessions.The truth is, a man loses only what he has. 'I have lost my cloak.' Yes, for you had one. 'I have got a headache.' Have you a horn-ache too? Why then are you vexed? Your losses and your pains are concerned only with what you possess. The tyrant cannot rob you of your will.'But the tyrant will chain me.' Yes, your leg. 'But he will cut off.' What? Your neck. But what will he fail to bind or cut off? Your will. That is why the men of old enjoined 'Know thyself.' What follows? You ought to practise in small things and go on from them to greater. 'I have a headache.' Then do not say, 'Ah me!' 'I have earache.'

Do not say, 'Ah me!' And I do not mean that you may not groan, but do not groan in spirit. And if the boy brings you your leg-bands slowly, do not cry out loud and pull a long face and say, 'Every one hates me.' Who is not likely to hate such an one? Put confidence in these thoughts for the future and walk erect and free, not relying on bulk of body like an athlete. For you do not need to be invincible by brute force like an ass. Practise yourself in small things, that you may be invincible in all trials.Who then is the man who is invincible? He whom nothing beyond his will can dismay. So I go on observing him in each set of circumstances as if he were an athlete. He has overcome the first round. What will he do in the second? What if it be a hot sun, and the struggle is in Olympia?

So it is in life. If you offer a man a trifle of silver, he will scorn it. What will happen if you offer him a young. maid? What if you do it in the dark? What happens if you ply him with reputation, or abuse, or praise, or death? All these he can conquer. What will he do if he is wrestling in the hot sun, I mean, if he has drunk too much? What if he is in a frenzy, or in sleep? The man who can overcome in all these circumstances is what I mean by the invincible athlete.

Plain English · paraphraseSo it is in life. If you offer a man a small amount of silver, he will look down on it. What will happen if you offer him a young girl? What if you do it in the dark? What happens if you try to influence him with reputation, or criticism, or praise, or death? All these he can overcome. What will he do if he is wrestling in the hot sun, I mean, if he has had too much to drink? What if he is in a rage, or asleep? The man who can overcome in all these situations is what I mean by the invincible athlete.