Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato

But the moon makes western phases, because beinir moved more swiftly than the sim, she is perceived more easterly. Mer cury and Venus however sometimes appear to us in this way, and sometimes in that. Or there is one depth because the planets make apparent stations, advan cing motions, and retrogressions, ;ue diametrically opposed to each oilier, and revolt e in contrary direction - , some beiii'4 moved to the north, but others to the houth. Or in whatever way you are willing to consider this affair; for there arc different opinions on this subject. Or, which may he more truly asserted, be cause. Plato says, the Dcmiur^us ordered the orbs to proceed in a course con trary to each other, he does not mean that the seven are moved MI contrary directions, but the one orb and the seven, on account of their contrary lation. For thus, in what follows, he says, that the planets and the inerratic sphere, are at one and the same time moved with their proper motions, in contrary directions. Plato, however, neither here nor elsewhere makes mention of epioles, or eccen trics; but describes the seven circles about one centre. Hence, he does not add other circles to these; nor dors lie make a mechanical difference of the motions. For inde[x ndently of his omitting to mention these, the hypothesis of epicylts, and of phases, is by no mentis adapted to the circles in the soul.

The circle of the dij/fnul, therefore, is divided into these seven circles, three of which he says revolve with a similar, but the other four, with a dissimilar celerity. For three of them, vi/. the Sun, Mercury and Venus, as it is said in the Republic, are equal in their course; but the otlu r four, viz. the Moon, Saturn, Mars, and Jupiter, are unequal. At the same time, however, all of them revolve in a due proportion, both with reference to each other, and the universe; because the motion of them is evolved according to numbers. [And the periodic circulations of all of them,

1 For 4i'T«<» her«*, il is Ui.«-r*r% lo r<-.ul 7.«»«n. VOOK in.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. |.V. a.ro terminated in a brooming manner.'] It seems also, as is manifest from what <s here s;\i<l, that Plato places the difference of the equality and inequality of the motions in the usihle orbs of the planets, in the unequally moved rireles [i. e. spheres] in which they are carried, prior to the planets themselves. Hence, placing the circles alone in the soul, without the stars, (for these he had not yet consti tuted,) he says that some of these are moved with an equal celerity, luit others with an unequal celerity, both with reference, to the former, and to themselvr*. And these things indeed arc manifest. The assertion, however, that each of the seven circles was divided according to the interval of the double and triple, each of the intervals being three, is literally considered difficult to be understood. At the same time it signifies, that accor ding to each interval o! the double and triple intervals, each being three, (for in four terms there are three intervals) the section was made, which is the same tiling as a division according to length ; in order that in each of the seven circles, there might be all the intervals, and all the ratios. For if the section had been made according to one interval, some of the intervals would, have been distributed into some of the circles, and others into others.

But because the division proceeds according to each, each part is a part of each, and all the circles participate of all the ratios. Unless indeed it may be more truly said, that the circles are divided six times, conformably to the number of the double and triple intervals, these being six. For the intervals being placed successively, and not divided accord ing to depth ; (but I mean by successively, so as to be extended through the whole circle, just as they were arranged through the whole right line, from which l»eing bent the circle was irenerated,)— this being the case, it would l>e ridiculous to make such a section according to depth, as to divide each of the circles in one part.

These things therefore being premised, we shall further observe. l>eginninj from the phenomena, that since the soul of the universe possesses the reasons of all mundane natures, and powers *\hich give subsistence to them, it is neces^arv th:»t it should not only contain the intellectual causes of man, and horse, arid of other animals, hut likewise prior to these, of the whole- parts of the world; I mean of the inerratic and planetary spheres. It is likewise necessary, that from the dund which is in this soul, the heavens should sustain a division into two parts; that prior to the scvm planets, there should pre-exist in it the true hebdomad ; and that it should contain the causes of the dissimilitude ami similitude of the circles. 1 The worth within tlir bracket* an wanting iu tit* original, Imt arc inwrtot fium the Tcrv<m uf "J'liomjtiiv )34 PROCLUSOXTHi: [ROOK in. For at our nature generates according to tin* reasons [or productive forms] in it, two eyes, five fingers, and seven viscera ; for it antecedently comprehends the numlwrs of these parts, on which account it always produces after the same manner, and generates the same form, when the impediments arising from matter do not prevent the generation according to nature from taking place; and as the one sense in us, possessing the causes of these five senses, generates secondarily from itself, the powers which are distributed about the hody; after the same manner also, the circle trf the different, comprehends in itself the primordial causes of the se»en circles [or spheres,] according to which they are adorned, and distrihuted in an orderly manner.

For all heaven participates of hoth the circles; hut the inerratic sphere participates more of the circle of the s<t»ie, and the plane tary sphere, more of the circle of tlit different. Hence the former is indeed un divided, hut the latter is divided. The former also is moved from the east, hut the Utter from the west. For the one indeed imitates the uniform [and intellectual power of the soul, hut the other its multiform powers,1] in consequence of re joicing in motion and variety, though the inerratic sphere also is comprehensive of many dhine animals. The circle of the same, likewise, comprehends the causes of all things, but it in without section ; because all the multitude in it is ronnascent with itself through union, and it is vanquished hy the hond of sameuess. Hence also the inerratic sphere is moved with one lation. But each of the seven spheres, comprehends a multitude of powers, some of which are more total, but others are more partial. Now, however, Tirna-us delivers the unities, and the fn>t comprehensions of them; hut omit* the inexplicable decrements ofthf divine reasons. For the circle [or sphere} vf cue //, is a plenitude of appropriate li/f, which is tithe r of a connectedly containing, or dividing, or binding , or analogic, or of some other sucft-like peculiarity. Many powers likewise contribute to its perfection, some of ifhich are generative of primary and secondary Gods, but others tifd&ntons, and others oj partial souls.

NVhy however, some one may say, did not the Demiurgus produce a peculiar circle of essence, as well as of sameness and difference ? We reply, l>ecause these are opposed to each other, but essence is common to the whole soul. Hence ac cording to this the whole soul is one, but is hiformed according to those; just as of the right lines, one precedes the two. Here likewise the monad precedes* the hehdumad, just as the impartible of the soul, is the leader of the division into ' Here aK<> I lit words within the brackets are wauling in the original, and are supplied from thr veiMon of Thomaeuj; so that in the original aftei ftotortii, the *ords «a« tmpuv TFJI 4v\n* lw*ftur, re, if ru.Wifti £i/>-a/im must be supplied. ' Tor TI* rtj» «/3io^a&>» la-nv in tlm place, it is necessary to read wpo nj« ep^a^oi «rr<>. MIOK HI.] TJM.liUS OF PLATO. LV, seven parts. But the division of the hebdomad into I'onr and three, has a sosquitortian ratio, being the lu>*t of the symphonies, and has also the first numtars of tin' oven and tl.o odd. Of tlie throe [circles] however, one [that of the Sun] rs analogous to truth; another [that of Venus] to beauty; and the third, [th.it of Mercury] to symmetry : these three monads, as we learn from the Philehus, !>eing situated in the vestibules of / he good. But of the other four circles, one [that of Saturn] which is most stable, is analogous to permanency;

another, [that of the Moon] which is moved with the greatest facility, is analogous to motion; an other, [that of Jupiter,] which is of the most excellent temperature, to sameness; and an other [that of Mars,] which is of a most dividing nature, to dif/'crcnct: Why also*, it may be said, did not the Demiurgus place partial forms in the soul of the uni verse, but only the genera of all-various forms ? We reply, because it pertains to total fabrication, to effect the latter. For a distribution of reasons into numerous parts, is the province of partible production. For this receiving each soul divided into the common genera of all beings, gives a distinct subsistence to the variety in them, according to the divine dividing art, and produces the division of each, as far as to individual forms. Hence also, this fabrication is said to be partible, and to be secondary to the total fabrication. A division, therefore, adapted to the total genera of souls is delivered, and likewise a mixture of wholes adapted to the fabrication which is the subject of discussion, and is ' total. These things, how ever, are manifest.

l)nt why, it may be said, do we make the division into the inerratie and plane tary spheres alone, or rather into the paradigmatic causes of these, and not into the four elements ? For the soul of the universe, contains these also by its powers, and leads them by its motions. In answer to this, therefore, it is said by some, that all the quadruple order of the elements, is comprehended in the circle [»r sphere] of the moon. For that which is material is hut small as with reference to the, universe, and is as it were a certain bottom of the world. For thus in the Ho public, 1'lato divides the whole world, into eight whirls, (o-CoviSvXoi) comprehending the whole of a material nature in the ogdoad. These things therefore are srud, and are well said. Again, however, it may be, more perfectly said, that through this monad and heptad of circles, he comprehends all the parts of the world. For as in the heavens there are a monad and a heptad, thus also analogously in the sphere of a-ther, some things are co-ordinate to the inerratie circle, but others to the planetary spheres. And the whole etherial order which is there, imitates the heavens. This is likewise the case in the profundity of the air, in the masses of

1 Tor vvfpf \nvjav lirrf, it it ncif»S.irv Id irrf'i i'i«'(>\' I'CiiK. 13<$ PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i*. water, and in the bosoms of the earth. For not only the earth is divided analo gous to the heavens, bnt also the other elements, and in each there an; monads and heptads, comprehensive of the orders that are in them, and of empyrean, aerial, and aquatic plenitudes. The circles then-fore of the j»onl, antecedently com[)rehend all these monads and hebdomads; the circle of the same, containing some of them, but the circle of the di/fi-reiit others. This likewise appeared to be the case, to the most scientific theotttgists llnit en / rm/t</.' Plato also will grant, that scries extend from the inerratic and planetary spheres, as far as to terrestrial natures, \\hether they are divine, or da-moniacal, or those of partial souls; since he is of opinion that series of the twelve liberated leaders extend from on high as far as to the la-l of things. For it is necessary that the less should follow the more principal periods, and that the several snbcelestial should imitate the celestial series. Hence the psychical circles will comprehend the causes of these, as being arranged analogously to them. If these things, how ever, ' are admitted, it is evident we must a^ain say that the plaints which revolve with an equal celerity are arranged in the middle of the wholes of the universe, not only as being analogous to the monads in the vestibules of the »<W, \i/.

to truth, beaut i/, tint! symmetry ; but likewise after another manner, which we before mentioned, as possessing the bond of wholes ; so that they are established accord ing to that which elevates secondary to fust natures, according to that which unfolds into light first to secondary natures, and according to that which similarly binds both of these together. Of the rest, however, we must say that earth and ' ihe inerratic sphere are analogous to the Synwhes Heaven and liarth [of the intel ligible and at the same time intellectual order of Oods] ; but that water and [tlu planet] Saturn are analogous to Hhea and Saturn [of ihe intellectual order]; and air and Jupiter, to the Jupiter and Juno [of that order). After these, it will not be inappropriate to say, that the Moon and Mars* have thi: next order; the latter possessing the power of separating first and masculine from middle natures ; but the former of defining and distinguishing third and as it were feminine natures from those of a middle order, lint in the media, the extremes are, that which possesses an anagogic power [i. e. Mercury], ami that which has the power of unfolding into light [i. e. the Sun]. And the medium between these, is that which con nectedly contains all things in amatory bonds [i. e. Venus]. This also theolopstj.

' I'ruclu*, 1 have no doubt, means by llitse the Chaldean thcologist*. : For £ti here, read £17. ' For tar a 111 this place, it is necessary to read «.ai. 4 Instead of utna. here, it M obviously neco»ary to read apta. DOOK in.] TINLEUS OF PLATO. ]37 manifest. For tlicy call the first of those, the messenger of the Gods ; the second, the gate nf ascent ; and the power \vhirh is in the middle of both, Venus' I>cing the friendship or love, which is the connective medium of the universe ; whether the Sun is prior, and Mercury posterior to her, or vice versa. Perhaps too, Iliey will revolve with e<|iial celerity, so far an all of them look to one thin;;, the bond of wholes; and their energies will have this for their end, to establish all things in one union, so that the universe may lie tilled with its proper causes. All Hiiugs therefore, are in the soul, according to unical comprehension. For the eight circles arc powers, unitedly comprehending things which subsist in a divided manner in sensible.*, both in the heavens, and in each of the elements. And thus much may in short he said concerning all the circles.

Again however, considering the circle of the different by itself, we say that its division into six parts, is most eminently adapted to the soul. For according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans the soul is a he.vad. And they arrange the monad as analogous to a point, but the hc.rad, to that which is animated, and the hcptad, to that which is intellectual. lint how is it possible we should not say, that the number of seven circles is adapted to the soul, which is produced by the vhitie (ioddess [Ilhea], who is a monad, duad, and hcptad, comprehending in herself all the Titannid;r ? Farther still, this maybe considered after another manner; for the hcptad is a number productive of opportunity (xims-jr^ ITTIV apifi<M$}, and is perfective and apocataslatic of periods. In this respect therefore, it subsists appropriately with reference to the soul, which produces and directs all things by its motions. If, however, this be the case, it is evident that these circles of the soul are gnostic, and by a much greater priority, vital powers of it, both tetradic and triadic. For through both, they are comprehensive of all sensible*, and through the triad know all the similitude in them, but through the tetrad, all the dissimilitude, and all the variety and genera which they contain. They know likewise, through these, whether sensible* in their existence, whatever it may be, participate of a certain truth, or symmetry, or beauty, from truly-existing beings.

Moreover, the subsistence of these seven geometrical terms in each of the circles, gives a septuple increase to the ratios. But this is an indication of the self-motive nature of the soul. For it generates and multiplies itself, and is at one and the same time a heptad, and a numl>er proceeding from the heptad. ijK i-s omitted in the original, but both the Tcrsion of Tliomicui and the *ens« of the passage require it thould be inserted. Tim. Plat. VOL. II. S 130 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in. Again, the psychical circles proceeding in a direction contrary to each other manifests that these powers proceed every where, are prolific of all things, and are the causes of the difference which is distributed every where, and of the contra rieties which subsist about generation. For contraries exist in the soul, in the heavens, and in matter. But of material contraries indeed, generation consists. These contraries, however, derive their subsistence from the psychical through the celestial reasons. For some tilings have the relation of from ic/tic/i, others that of through v/iic/i. ami others that of by u'liieh, ' in the things whic'i are generated by them. Moreover the similitude of the three and the dis similitude of the four circles, are. assumed appropriately to the numbers. For the triad indeed is perfective, and con\erti\e to the same form. But the tetrad is prolific, and the cause of all multitude. All the numbers therefore, \i/.

the monad, duad, triad, tetrad, pentad, hexad, and heptad, are entirely in the essence of the soul ; and after all these, the square from the heptad.1 All these likewise terminate in the heptad. Hence, the essence of the soul, is on all .sides hebdomadic. And the circle of Me stunt; indeed, is a monad ; but the circle of Me different is, as we have said, a heptad. Fur the Jurtncr is intellect in motion, but (lie latter is a tig/it according to intellect ; in tlic name manner as the heptad, accord' ing to the Pythagoreans. The. one also is impartible, analogous to intellect, but the other is partible; though it also consists of the impartible essence, and of the r>sence which is divisible alx-ut bodies. [The partible nature however is redun dant]1 in it : for dillerence has dominion in it. Hence, the one is monadic, but the other hebdomadic; not only because the heptad pertains to the essence of the soul through its similitude to the vivilic Goddess ;* (for she is a monad compre hensive of two triads, \\hich she contains in herself") but also because the primary distribution of the soul into parts is hebdomadic as has been before shown. For things which are distributed into parts from one impartible power, have the first number hebdomadic. The number also which is derived from the heptad, is adapted

1 Tor a$' uv hero, it is requisite to read v^>' w. 1 The duuble .UK! triple iuirrt ah that are tilled with the arithmetical and harmonica) middles, are the nuiulKTs (>. S. <). 12. 10. 18. 24. 27- 32. .5(1. 18. 51. 81. 10S. iO'2. And the double and triple inter vals that are lill'.-d both with the above-mentioned middles, and with scsquioclavcsund leimmas, are the numbers, 384. 432. 480". 5 12. 570". 648. 729.768. «6l. <)72. 1021. 1152. rjyo". 1 158. I5JO'. 1728. 1<HI. 2048. 23(H. 2Sy2. 2yi6. 3072. 3 1 36". 38S8. 4374. 460. S. 5184. 5832. 6l4l. 0"yi2. 77?6. S74S. 921(i. 10308. And the >um of the number of the terms of both these series, is 4i>, which is the square of 7. * It appears to me that the word* T\eoKa5ei TO ^tpijrov, ought to be inserted in the original, after the \>ords uXX' tv avry. 4 viz. to llhea. to dividing powers, in the same manner as the heptad. The latter, however, pertains to supermundane, [hut the former to mundane powers.]1 If however, it be requisite to refer all the composition of the soul, to the divine orders, for it has the images of all of thorn, the beginning of the reference, must be assumed from the former part of this dialogue, in which it is said, that the soul was fabricated, not as we say junior to the body, but both in generation and virtue prior to and more ancient, as the mistress and ruler of it.

For Tima-us thence beginning to s|>eak concerning it, gives to it a superior dignity with respect to the generation of the whole corporeal composition. It must be said, therefore, that its progression, so far as it rules, and is the mistress of the body, must be referred to the principle of all things. But so far as it is allotted a triple and united hypostasis, we must refer it to the summit* of intelligible^ ; and as generated from essence, same and different, to the whole of the truly intelligible breadth ; of which essence and being possess the summit ; but eternity which is the cause to all things of permanency in the same, the middle; and intelligible animal, which causes itself to l>e different in its progressions to intelligible animals, the end. For the whole there, as the Parmenides teaches us, consists of dissimilar parts. This triple whole therefore [the soul], which is a mixture of dissimilar elements, is a thing of this kind. But so far as the soul is a self-begotten and intelligible num ber, we must refer it to the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intel lectual orders. For there the first number subsists in conjunction with difference. For as theologists say, we must survey that first order, as being1 the cause of the scries of things, [and of other co-ordinations]4 which are divided according to numlKT. But there also, Parmenides gives subsistence, to the whole of number, and from thence unfolds all things into light.

And so far as the soul is a whole consisting of three elements, we must refer it to the intellectual wholeness, which connectedly contains wholes and parts. For the three middles are derived from those connectedly containing Gods. One [i. e. the geometric middle] proceeding from the first of these Gods, who comprehends the rest, and collects all things ac cording to one reason, into one world, and one union. But another [i. e. the lianuo-

1 Tlio words within the bracket*, are wauling in tlie original, but arc supplied from llie version of ThoniiCUS. Hence it is rnjui.Mtc to add in the original after vwrptoafiiati, the words ovrot tt rait eyi««» fiiais. * For ravrorrp-a here, I rcarl m-porijra: for the summit of intelligible*, which consists of bound, if?/initi/, and that tchich it mind, is the lir-,1 triple and at the same time united li>{M>stasis. ' For ovirwv here, it is requisite to read <ivont>. * The words within the brackets are supplied from the version of Thomieiu ; to that after curwir in the original, the words rai aXXwr <r»<n-fHXi«»-, mutt be added. PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in. nic middle] proceeding from the second of these Gods, who imparts a different bond to different things, a greater bond to such as are greater, but a less to such as aro loss.1 And another [i. e. the arithmetical middle] being derived from the third of these Gods, who imparts by illumination from himself, communion to natures of a third rank ; through whom things tlr.it are less in bulk, are more united, but sueh as are greater, are united in a less degree.1 This however, is the distinguishing properly of the arithmetical middle. So far also, as the soul has an idea and configuration of such a kind, and employs a rectilinear progression, and circular conversion, for the reason we have before-mentioned, we must refer it to the triad of intellectual figure.

For the right, and the circular lino, first subsist in that triad. lit nee in the idea of the soul, lines were assumed, and circles in conjunc tion with, and separate from each other. Again, so far as the sold receives monadic and hebdornadic powers, we must refer it to the intellectual hebdomad. But as ihe medium1 between intelligible* and sensible*, and as assimilating sensible* to intelligibles, we must refer it to the ruling [supermundane] series. For this series assimilates secondary natures to unical summits. And as energizing according to twofold energies, some of which providentially attend to sensible*, but others adhere to intelligibles, we must refer it to the liberated Gods, who touch and do not touch the universe. These observations therefore, which we lunc briefly made, will afford assistance to those who wish to peruse the writings of our preceptor, ii\ which the truly arcane conceptions of 1'lato concerning these things, are unfolded.

I am astonished however at those IMatonisIs, who think that the soul should be divided according to parts into the celestial souls, vix. into the one and the seven of these. For where is it possible in incorporeal natures, that there should be a division of this kind, which abolishes tho whole ? For such a di>tribution into parts as this, is the peculiarity of partible masses. And I also wonder at those, who think that these souls are entirely supercelestial, since Plato in what immediately follows, hhows that in all he has said, lie hjnraks concerning one soul, and this mundane. Hence, I think it is better to assume this as a principle, that it is here necessary, 1 For in the harmonic middle, the greater tenns have a greater ratio to each other than the less. Thus in C. 3. 6. the ratio of 0 to 3 is greater than that of 3 to -2. 1 Of this union the arithmetical middle is an ima^e; for in this, there is a greater ratio in the less, •nd a less ratio in the greater terms. Thus iu 5. 6. 7- &• the ratio of 6 to 5, ii greater than that of 8 to 7.

1 For }i(avv here, read ntar\v. * The F.n-lish reader will find these arcane conceptions of Plato concerning all these ordere of Godi. LtaulifulK unfolded iu my tr.tn»!aliuii of Proclus on the Theology of Plato. the whole should remain in (lie divisions, and that the discussion is concerning mundane animations ; and having assumed this, to say that the one soul of the world is indivisible, and at the same time is divided according to these powers ; first into the duad, secondly into the triad and tetrad, and thirdly into the hebdomad. For the division of it is made according to these number*. And such is our opinion on this subject. Theodorus the philosopher however, of Asine, being full of the doctrines of Numenius, speculates the generation of the soul in a more novel manner, from letters, and characters, and numbers.1 But the divine lamblichus blames every theory of this kind, in his treatise in confutation of the followers of Amelius, and also of jN'umenms, whether lie includes iS'umenius among those who adopted this method, or whether he any where met with writings of the disciples of Amelius, containing similar opinions: for I cannot say. The divine lamblichus therefore says in the first place that it is not proper to make the soul every numlxr, or the geometrical number, on account of the multitude of letters. For the words body (<7«>aa) and non-being itself (i«j ov) consist of an equal number of letters.

Nonbein^ therefore, will al>o be e\ery number. You may also find many other things, consisting of an equal number of letters, which arc of a vile nature, and most con trary to each other ; all which it is not right to confound and mingle together. In the second place, he observes, that it is not safe to argue from characters. For these subsist by position, and the ancient was di!Jerent from the present mode of forming them. Thus for instance the letter /, which he makes the subject of discussion, had not the opposite lines entirely parallel, nor the middle line oblique, but at right angles, as is evident from the ancient letters. In the third place, he adds, that to analy/.e into the primary ratios of numbers, and to dwell on these, transfers the theory from some numl>ers to others. For tho heptad is not the same which is in units, and tens, and hundreds. This however, existing in the name of the soul, why is it requisite to introduce the disquisition of primary ratios? For thus he may transfer all things to all numlH;rs, by dividing, or compounding, or multiplying. In short, he accuses the whole of ibis theory as artificial, and con taining nothing sane. I am also not ignorant of the arguments of Aristotle against the psychogony of Plato, and the solutions of those arguments, by certain 1'latonists; but I have not de<med it requisite to mention them any farther here, as I have elsewhere made thorn the subject of discussion. For the soul is not a

' Proclus gives au epitome of this theory, but as it would Iw very difficult torenderit intelligible, to the English reader, and us in (lie o|>in!ou of Umblichu*, the whole of it it aititicul, and contain* nothing »*ni-, 1 have oiuiltrd lo tramUlc it. H2 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in. circle as magnitude, nor is it requisite to think that to confute this hypothesis, is to embrace the Platonic theory. Hence I have thought fit to omit the farther consi deration of these particulars, as I know that I have published a treatise in answer to the oppositions of Aristotle to the Tinuinis, in which there is no small discussion of these particulars, and where it is shown that magnitude cannot rightly be ascri!>ed to the soul, according to Tima-us, and demonstrating from thence, that the soul cannot by magnitude which is partible, intellectually perceive intelligible* which are impartible; as neither is it possible for the impartible to be adapted to the partible. Nor must it be said that the motions of the heavens [are the motions of the soul of the universe] ;' but that according to the doctrine of the Tima-us, the former subsist from the latter. Nor must it be admitted that it is impossible fre quently to understand the same thing by the same power, but this must neces sarily l>e the case in more transitive intellections since intelligible* are bounded, and intellection subsists in a circle. Omitting then fore, the farther consideration of these things, which are more amply discussed in the above-mentioned Treatise, let us direct our attention to the words of the philosopher, which appear to me to

exhibit the doctrine * of things themselves. '* After, therefore, the waolc composition of the soul was generated, according to the intellect [or intention] of its composer, in the next place, lie fabricated within the soul, the whole of a corporeal-lbnned nature." The first head, as we have before observed, of the discussions concerning the soul, was about its hyparxis, the second, about its harmony, the third, about its figure, the fourth, about its powers, and the fifth, about its energies. In all the other heads therefore, tlie philosopher has most perfectly instructed us. But the last, was that concerning the'cner^res^fjlicjtoul, which In; adds in what is now said. Since however, there is a twofold form of the energy of the soul, I mean \ the gnostic and the motive, he separately discusses each of these ; and shows how the soul by moving itself, moves other things, and how by knowing itself, it knows the natures prior, and also those that are posterior to itself. Such there fore is the scope of the words before us. Hut that;he)did not teach us, in what has been already said, concerning the multitude of souls as those assert, \\\\o say, that his discussion about the essence of the soul, pertained to that soul which is without habitude [to body] ; but about its harmony, to the soul which is called by

1 The words within the brackets are supplied from the rcrsion of Thcmaeus. * Iu>tcad of xapalufft IK here, read napabomir. them in habitude ; and about its figure, to the soul which ranks in a certain order ; and farther still, that lie did not teach us about supermundane souls, according to tlie opinion of others, who assert that he produces one, and seven supermundane, souls, is I think through these things sufficiently manifest. For he conjoins to the universe, the soul which was fabricated according to the intention of the father, and constructs within it the whole of a corporeal-formed nature. And this is indeed evident from the whole design of the dialogue. For the whole discussion • was concerning the world, and not concerning .supermundane progeny. You may also see with what accuracy Tinv.rus adds each of the words. For the words, according to the intellect, manifest that intellect is the paradigm of tin? universe. For all-perfect animal is intelligible intellect, according to which this universe, and the soul of the universe were constituted. They likewise signify that nothing was constituted in vain, nor more nor less [than was fit] ; but that all things requisite to the completion of the psychical essence, were fashioned ill a becoming ' manner, and that the essence of the soul received all the demi urgic will. For material natures, on account of matter, distribute into parts, impartible form, and that which is a whole is received by them as partial, and that which is without interval, as possessing interval.

But the soul receives all the demiurgic fabrication, conformably to the will of the Demiurgus. The words also its composer manifest universal energy. For the words " according to intellect" are indicative of completion ; but its composer of an energy, the whole of which is at once always present.* The words likewise, the whole composition nf the soul, manifest that nothing escapes the demiurgic art, but that the whole pro gression of the soul, is governed by the form and power of the Demiurgus. But the words, " in the nc.rt place" or " after tins' must not l>e apprehended as having a temporal meaning, but as significant of order. For the separate life of the soul is one thing, and the secondary life posterior to this, and which commu nicates with the body, is another. And in a divine essence, things more perfect precede such as are more imperfect. The words likewise, " within the souC evince that the world' is connascent with the soul, and the offspring of it. For if the world proceeds in the soul, she is the mistress of its subsistence, comprehends the whole of its essence, and co-operates with the Demiurgus in the orderly

1 HprrotTvt is wanting here in the original ; but according to the version of Thomxus, ought to I* a rilled. 'Tin? word in (lie original a wirrarri, in which word, an energy whollyjeter present u indicated by the |>rcjK>»ition v»v. 1 It U requisite here, to add ror too par, omitted in the original. 144 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in. distribution of body. For the soul of the universe is not * like partial souls, which receive bodies fashioned by other things, and on this account, at one time rule over them, but at another, are incapable of governing their proper organs. But proceeding from, she produces together with her father, her habitation, or rather her vehicle. Hence also, she governs the universe, and energi/es eternal ly, and without solicitude and labour. For every thing which makes according to essence, makes with facility that which it makes. Moreover, the words he fabricated manifest the production of the Deminrgiis proceeding through solid and resisting substances ; and also the ex ternally adventitious formation of sensible:* ; and does all but l represent him, employing Vulcanian J organs, by which he fashions the whole heaven from brass, depicting all things with forms, giving rotundity to corporeal masses, and figuring each thing with an appropriate form. Since the fabrication however of the universe is triple ; the first Ix-ing that according to which the Demiurgus produced it from the elements bound together by analogy, a whole of wholes ;

but the second being that according to which he adorned it from the whole spheres, since it is impossible, as it consists of the elements, that it should not be divided into the spheres ; and the .thjnj being that which gives completion to the universe from cele.stial, aerial, aquatic and terrestial animals; — this being the case, Plato in what is now said, unfolds to us the middle fabri cation. For he who fabricates the whole of a corporeal-formed nature within the soul which is dixided into circles, evidently fabricated it by dividing it into spheres. For the spheres are images of the circles [in the soul] which the J)omiurgus forming, is said to have fabricated the whole of a corporeal-formed na ture, within the circles of the soul : by which also, it is evident, that the eight cir cles comprehend in themselxes the sublunary region, since the Demiurgus placed in them the whole of a corporeal nature. For if it were not so, I'lato would have said, that the Demiurgus fabricated every thing celestial, and not every thing corporeal within them. Fvery thing subcelestial therefore as being co-divided with the heavens, is in these circles, or as being contained in the circle of the moon; theologists also calling the moon earth, through the alliance of the earth to it. Hence it is common to both of them to conceal the light.

" And collecting middle to middle, he co-harmonized them to each 1 Instead of TO yap in this place, it is necessary to read ov yap. * For /iOKOi'^t here, read fKirvrovyi. 1 luktead of v-jnarnuit in llii» place, it it requisite to read Hpaorroou. BOOK in.] • TIM.EUS OF PLATO. j^ Porphyry, understanding by middle (he physical part of the soul, endeavours to co-adapt it to the middle of the universe, though Plato does not here even in words, assume that which is physical. If, however, we wish to interpret what is now said more agreably to the meaning of Plato, we must say that the Dcmiurgus placed in the soul, which has a middle order between intellect and body, the middle of the world ; and not simply in the soul, but in its most middle part. For this is to collect middle to middle. Cut that this is his meaning is evident from what follows, in which he says that the soul was every way extended from the middle to the extremities of the universe. From these things therefore, we may assume, that the whole of a corporeal nature is every way similarly animated, and that the whole of the mundane soul is on all sides exempt from the body, in order that it may imitate the whole Demiurgus, who is present to all thing*, and separate from all. We may also assume, that the corporeal nature l>eing the middle of the soul, makes the animation of it to proceed everyway similarly.

For if the extremes of (he universe wen? conjoined to the middles themselves, some things would be more remote from, but others nearer to the soul. It is ne cessary however, that all things should remain as it were rooted in, and fdled with life from it. But the adaptation of middle to middle, shows that the soul is similarly exempt from all things, and is equally distant from all. For if it was dis tant from some things more, but from others less, we must ascribe to it a habi tude to secondary natures. Kach of the assertions therefore is true, that body is the middle, and that it is adapted to soul, which is also a middle. Moreover, " to collect" exhibits the demiurgic union, and the bond according to which the universe is perpetual. But to co-harmonize, indicates the harmonious association of the body with the soul ; the latter performing what pertains to itself, and the former preserving its proper order, and neither divulsing, nor drawing downward the intellection of a divine essence. For this is the harmonious form of commu nion. If however, in the association of the less and the more excellent nature, either the former or the latter falls ofl'from its perfection, and causes perturbation in the energies of the more excellent nature ; — in this case, such a communion is unharmonious,' disorderly, and confused. Hence the soul subsists according to harmonic ratios, and the whole of a corporeal -formed nature, is seen to be in friendship with it through analogy, and is harmoniously composed. What bonds therefore, can be more indissoluble, more perpetual, or more divine than these? None, except it should l>e said the will itself of him, by whom the soul is bound, and which is exempt from the tilings that are bound.

' For ttn,if4t,frot litre, it is necessary (o read arap/jorr*!. Tim. Plat. VOL. II. T 140 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in. " But the soul being every way interwoven from the middle to the very extremities of the universe, and circularly covering it as with a veil, at the same time herself revolving in herself, gave rise to the divine commencement of an unceasing and wise life, through the whole of time." The mode of animation according to conversion or regression, beginning, as we have before said, from beneath, proceeds to things on high, and from the last, ends in the summits of things ; and such is the mode now assumed by Plato. For the honl proceeding from on high, as far as to the last recesses of the earth, and illuminating all things with the light of life, the world being converted to it, beginning from the last of things, is animated both according to its middle, and the whole of its interval. Besides this also, it externally enjoys the intellectual illumination of soul. Hence, the: soul is said to occupy the middle of the universe, as placing in it the powers of itself, and a symbol of its proper presence. It is likewise said to extend itself to the extremities of the universe, as vivifying it on all sides ; and to circularly cover it as \vith a veil, in consequence of having powers exempt from partible masses ; in so doing, all but projecting the a-gis of Minerva, from which

llu.t. lib. ii. 443. BOOK in.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. H7 similar. For tlic interweaving exhibits the presence of the soul in the world, through similitude. For all communion of essences, powers, and energies, sub sists from this. But the circularly covering the universe as with a veil, as it signi fies transcendency, represents to us, how the soul is incommensurable to the world, an throng h its incommensurability, is imparticipable. For that which is incommensurable, is certainly dissimilar to that to which it is incommensurable. Perhaps however both have both. For to be interwoven, is the province of things, which are partly similar, and partly dissimilar. And to circularly cover as with a veil, together with the inseparable, exhibits intellectual comprehension, which is secondarily present to the universe. For through this comprehension, the universe imitates intellect, of which it becomes ' the first resemblance. Hence it is present with the universe, in a separate manner, and illuminates all things, without1 being itself converted to the illuminated natures, or receiving habitude, or co-ordination with them. For these things are foreign to the whole soul [or to the soul which ranks as a whole]. Because however body proceeds together with the soul, but not the soul together with body ; and the soul by its infinite power, com prehends the world ; by its non-possession of interval, all interval ; by its impart ible nature, every thing partible; and by its simplicity, that which is composite;

— hence, the fabrication of body is suspended from the generation of the soul, but not vice versa. The essence of the soul therefore, is the leader, as being more allied to intellect, and body is suspended from the soul, as from its cause. Is there then any reason why we should endure to admit such an interweaving, as some adduce, who conceive the soul to be present \\\\\\ body, through partible powers, cnlelcclicicr,* and inseparable lives? By no means. For every distribution of this kind, is secon dary to the one soul [of the universe]. Since in us also, the cntekchcia animates the body in one way, but the separate soul in another; the former indeed, being divided about the corporeal masses ; but the latter being established in itself, and impartibly present everywhere, and containing partible lives, by its own impart ible powers. But if it be requisite to speak in a manner becoming the dignity of the whole soul of the universe, the inlcricctfciiig is an unmingled union of the body with the soul, and a communion, connected comprehension, and vivification of the soul, proceeding from the Demiurgus, and l>eing again converted to him. For as we must not understand the " circularly covering as with a roY," either ac-

1 For ycro/io-t|r here, it is obviously necessary to read ytvoftivov. * OVK is ouiitlrd here, in the original. 1 Tli* cause by which the animal is vitally moved, it tbe rational soul, but tbe cause bv which the animal thus moved, is defined or bounded, is called by Ariitotle tntfltckria. See my tranilatioji of bis treatise On the Soul. 1'KOCLUS ON THE [BOOK in companied with interval, or locally, hut as signifying that the soul is on all sides similarly exempt from the body, and by IKMHI; thus exempt uniformly compre hend* it; thus also, we must not understand the " being interwoven* as accompa nied with contact, but as manifesting the animation which pervades through all tilings, and the union of all things with it. For the soul tilling all things with itself, and connected!) containing all things, contains, prior1 toother things, itself in purity, and converts the world to itself, lli-nee, by a much ureater pri ori tv it is itself converted to itself. On this account, Tima-us adds, that it is itself convolved in itself in order that he may indicate tin; difference between the soul, and the body of the universe, which is indeed convolved, yet not in itself, but in the whole of place which it occupies. For this is convolved locally, but the M>ul \itally and intellectually, understanding itself, and finding itself to be all things. For it is the plenitude of wholes, and contains the images of all things, which intellectually perceiving, it is said to revolve in itself; the revolu tion indicating the intellectual and at the same time apocatastatic ; but its revolv ing in itself, the peculiarity of self motion. For the universe also re\olves, but is moved by another [i. e. by soul].

II. -re, therefore, we ha\e a solution of that which was investigated by us. For we inquired, looking to the whole of the psycho^ony, where I'lato has delivered to us the gnostic peculiarity of the soul, in the same manner as he has the essen tial and the vital peculiarities; the former indeed through tin: triple mixture; but the latter through the motion in the. same. Through the. circular conversion therefore, of the soul to it-elf, tin: Pemiurgiis effected its gnostic peculiarity, and which IMato in what is now said, more clearly manifests. For in order to show how the soid knows all things, he says, that it revolves in itself, and thus re volving, bewail to li\e a wise, and intellectual life. Hence, it is immediately evident, that the conversion to it>elf, is the knowledge of itself, and of every thing in, prior to, and proceeding from itself. Fur all knowledge if a. coni'trsion to the. object of knowledge, and an alliance und adaptation to it. And on this account also, truth is an agreement of that which knows with the tiling known. .Since how ever, con version or regression is two-fold, the one returning as to the ^ood, but the other as to being, hence the vital conversion of all things is directed to the good, but the gnostic to being. Hence too, the former when converted, is said to have the good, but the latter to have being. The apprehension of truth also, is the comprehension of Inim;, whether e.riitingin that by which it is apprehended, or prior to, or posterior to it. This therefore, as 1 have said, becomes evident to us from these things.

' Fur »//oi rut aXXwv in this place, rt-atl *po r*v oXXii/r. BOOK in.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. H!, Since however, in tlio souls of partial animals reason at one timo energizes intellectually, and is converted to itself, l>nt not immediately from the first genera tion [of tin* animal); for in animals, the progression is fmm the imfx'rfect to the perfect, and reminisceucr is after oblivion ; on this account IMalo says, that the soul irave rise to the dhine commencement of a wise life, beginning from on high, and from the first of its energies. For it has some energies, which are divine and separate, hut others, which are motive of the universe. It likewise always has the more perfect, prior to those that are secondary. For proceeding from the Demiurgns, and beginning to energi/.e, it commences from those energies that are more divine; and through these moves the secondary, viz. the intellectual and the doxastic energies. This l>eginning however is entirely divine. But that which commences from things imperfect, is evidently material. [For in the Gods, the more perfect energies precede those that are subordinate ; '] but vice versa in material natures. For generation logins from things imperfect, and proceeds to the perfect. The human soul then fore, though it sometimes energize* divinely, yet it ends in this energy, being satisfied at Jirsl to energise conformably to right opinion, after tiiis scientifically, mid then divinely, exciting* the one of itself, which is more excellent than its intellect.

But a divine soul, has this for its first energy, and on account of this, moves all the secondary gnostic powers of itself, and always the subordinate through the superior powers. By a much greater priority therefore, did the soul of the universe give rise to the divine commencement of a wise, life, energi/ing first according toils divine part [or the one of its essence], but after wards snpernally according to its dianoetic part, moving this, and causing it to be deitorm. Unceasing energy however is the consequence of this. For that which is generated, -and that which exerts a divine energy in time, is naturally adapted to proceed from the imperfect to the perfect. But that which begins from the most perfect and divine energies, neither at any time ceases from this energy, nor ranks among things which have a temporal subsistence. If therefore the soul of the universe gave rise to a divine commencement of energy, it energizes incessantly, and always, and with invariable sameness. For that which receives the perfection of itself in time, begins from the imperfect, and not from a divine commencement. From this also, again it follows, that the lift; of a divine soul is wise. For if the life of this soul is unceasing, it is defined by intellect and wisdom.

' ' The words within the lirarkrts arc omitted in thr original, but are inserted from the versiou of Thomxus. Hence in the original, after thr words AtjXoy wt cxfXoi tent, it is requisite to add, tat y*p roil HiBtt, at tvipytiai rrXciorcpoi »po»jyoviTa< rvr far * For tyipnaa here, il if ucccsjury to read eytiprio !50 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in. For we must admit one of three ' things, either that the life of it is always wise, or always destitute of wisdom, which it is not lawful to say, or that it is at one time wise, but at another time unwise. It remains therefore, that a wise life in a divine soul, in consequence of being incessant, never l fails. In another respect also, wisdom is adapted to this soul, because it participates of divine wisdom ; but life, l>ecause it evolves the impartiality of the intellectual life, and has an extension in its energies, and transition in its motions. For life (3»oj) is most adapted to the soul. .For if at any time, this word is used in speak ing of intellect, as in the Philebus there is said to be a certain (3io>-) life of intellect, it signifies the peculiarity of the life. For the word (3io£ inunijcsts these two things, viz. t he peculiar j or in of each life, and the evolution of the choice from which it has it i pro gression.

It is properly therefore asserted of souls; for in these there is an evolu tion [of choice]. Sometimes also it is asserted of intellect, and then it indicates to us the peculiarity of the life of intellect. It may be said however, that all these particulars, are inherent in all divine souls, viz. to commence a divine beginning, to energize incessantly, and to possess a wise life. In what respect therefore, does the soul of the universe transcend other divine souls? Plato then foreseeing this, adds, " through the whole of time.'" For all souls indeed, energi/e transitively, and have different jx-nods, greater or less. But the soul which ranks as a whole, alone receives the first and the one interval of time, and the whole and first mea sure, which comprehends the periods of other souls. For as of different divine bodies, then; are different periods, but the period of a divine generated ' nature con tains in itself all of them, comprehending apocatastatically, many Saturnian, many Solar, and many Lunar periods ; arid all time exists in the one period of the uni verse; after the same manner also other divine souls, have their apocatastatic periods in more partial times. Since however, the intelligible breadth is bounded, but the apocatastasis is different to different souls, to some being shorter, and to others longer, !>ecaiise the object of intellection to them, is more or less excellent ; and since the apocatastasis of the universe, has for its measure, the whole extension of time, and the whole evolution of it, than which there is no greater, except by the again and again ; for thus time is infinite; and of those beings that in tellectually perceive according to one form, the KOU! of the universe is the first

1 Instead of »<,<•»• here, it i« requisite to read Tptv*. * Mi) 15 omitted in the original. J i. e. Of the body of the whole world. For the epithet a d'u-ine gnterattd nature, is primarily ap plicable to this ; though it alio signifies every body, which is moved perpetually and circularly, w lit ilu r in the heaTcus, or under the moon. DOOK in.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 15| participant of time; this being1 the case, it is necessary that this soul, should receive the whole form and measure1 of time. Hence it is necessary, that th« soul of the universe alone should energize through the whole of time, but other souls according to a part of this whole, conformably to which their apocatastasis is defined ; [in the same manner as may l>e seen to be the case in other forms. For whatever participates of a certain form, primarily* is seen to receive the whole of it.] Supermundane souls therefore, if there arc such, though they percent intellectually with transition (for every soul understands after this manner, according to u-hich also, intellect and soul dij/'er) yet they apprehend more than one object of intellection. For ax they are nearer to intellect, which intellectually perceives all things at once, it is necessary that they should at once understand more than one thing. But the xuul of the universe, is the first which intellectually perceives one object only at once, ichich makes it to be mundane.

In this respect therefore, all mundane differ from supermundane soids. Hence, the soul of the universe, understanding one. thing at once, has its apocatastasis according to the whole of time, which compre hends the period of the divinely generated nature. And according to the former indeed, it is inferior to supermundane ; but according to the latter, it transcends all rmmrlane souls. For all these have their apocatastatic periods in some part of the whole of time;1 but the soul of the universe, intellectually perceiving the one intelligible world, 4 and running as it wen1 round it, completes its period in the whole of time. For it is necessary, being the soul of the world, that its mundane [intellect] should evolve the whole intelligible world, and that on this account it should make the intellective apocatastasis of its mundane period, according to the perfect number, conformably to which it makes the whole corporeal period. For this universe imitates the invisible period of the mundane soul, through its own proper circulation, and makes its apocatastasis locally in conjunction with the apocatastasis of the soul, which is accomplished intellectively. And this is the illustrious peculiarity of the mundane soul, which Plato unfolds in what he now says, to those w ho are able to apprehend his meaning. After this manner therefore, his words are to be understood.

1 The words ICQI oXo^ rovrov rev fttrpov, are omitted in the original, but are supplied from the version of Tiioma-ui. * The words vulhm the brackets, are also omitted in the original, and are added from the version of Tliomacus, except the word primarily, xp*jr«*«, which U not in 1m \ersion, but ought to be inserted. 1 In the original CK /"/"•< row ivoi, rv ry rarri X'""Y' *hich is evidently erroneous ; but ought to be conformably to the version of Tbomttus, and the above translation, tv nri rov o\ov xporov fuptt. * I have here also followed the version of Thomaru*. For the original is, »j if votpa, rov crot ]52 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in. Again however, it roust l>e investigated, what it is which produces in the soul a transitive motion, and an intelligence not fixed like that of intellect, and also time instead of eternity? In answer to which, it must be said, that as the *oul has a partible essence, so likewise it has a life not one, but co-divided with its essence, and this is also the case with its intelligence. For the soul instead of being essence, is essentialli/ed, instead of life, is vitalli/ed, and instead of intellect, is intellectuallized ; participating of these primarily, in consequence of their being prior to the soul. In intellect therefore, the essence is one, and the life is one, and the intelligence of essence is impartible, in the same manner a-> the essence, and being adapted to it, like a point to a point, has no transition.

The intelligence of the soul however, is not impartible alone, but as we have said, is also partible, and not having sufficient strength to be adapted to the impartible, but distributing itself about the impartiality of intel lect, it always applies another and another part of itself to intellect which is fixed, in order that it may wholly apprehend that which is established prior to the AV hole of itself. After this manner therefon-, it produces a transition of energy, that which is partible in it, evolving itself about the impartible, and together with the transition, it generates time. Its transition however is effected in a two-fold way, either by being evolved about the one, and according to all the parts of itself having (he one; for into as many parts as it is divided in so many ways the essential, the same, and the different are contained in it. Applying itself there fore to the one, by each of its parts, and frequently coming into contact with it, it introduces transition to its intellection, in order that the whole of it may intel lectually iH-rceive that which is prior to it. Hut in another way, its transition is effected, by each part of it energi/ing about all things. For every part of it has these three, viz. essence, the same, and the different. Not being adapted there fore to the whole of each, it wholly applies itself to each, so far as it participates of each; to essence indeed, through that which is partially a thing of this kind, and to other things after a similar manner. Thus therefore we solve the doubt.

In addition to this also, it may be inquired how Plato not hav ing yet delivered to us the generation of time, now says that the soul lives through the whole of time? To this inquiry likewise it must be said, that he delivers the generation of that time, of which the animal nature of the world participates. For he says, that the father on beholding the universe moving and liviuir, constituted time, for the purpose of measuring the motion in it. Since then-fore, this life, and this motion to the universe which has a body, is adventitious, so likewise, time is imparted by its generator, from whom it has life and motion through soul. But the soul also has these from the father, I mean life, and the motion which is BOOK in.] TIM^EUS OF PLATO. j53 according to time. Since however, it has something self-subsistcnt, it co-intro duces something to the progression of itself into existence from its generator. As the Demiurgus therefore, moves the soul, and it is also self-motive, after the same manner, the soul likewise is the cause to itself of being moved according to time. Hence before the Demiurgus gave to this universe time, the soul is said to be moved through the whole of time. For thus it gives subsistence in conjunction with the J)emiurgus to animal time, just as in conjunction with him, it constitutes the life, according to which1 motion subsists. It also governs according to nature, that which lives and is moved through it, and has not as it were, a casual inspection of if, imparting nothing to that which it governs. Concerning time however, we shall again speak.

But from these things, thus much may be summarily collected, that the soul of the universe, moves indeed the universe, establishing in the middle of it guardian powers, filling the whole of it with vivification, and intellectually containing it externally ; imitating in this respect its cause which generates three principalities of Gods, vi/. the guardian, the vivilic, and the demiurgic. The soul, however, by a much greater priority moves itself divinely, beginning from its first energies; and on this account moves both itself ami the universe incessantly. Hence like wise it conducts itself, and all heaven wisely. Again, the soul making the one extension of time the measure of its proper period, convolves the universe with invariable sameness. For the- universe accomplishes its apocalastasis in conjunc tion with the apucatastasis of the soul. For it docs not accomplish this prior to the apocatastasis of the soul ; since the same things take place again and again in the world,* and generated nntures are produced according to the intellections of the soul ; nor posterior to it, in order that this restitution to its pristine state may not be without a cause. For what else but the jn-riod of the soul will comprehend the whole of it. If, however, we assert these things rightly, again the soul will have that which is divine from the one being, the unceasing from eternity, wis dom from intellect, and all things from the one cause of all. »

"And the bodv of the universe indeed, was generated visible; but the soul is invisible, participating of the rational energy and harmony, and pertaining to intclligiblcs and perpetual beings, being generated by the best of causes, the best of generated natures." 1 For »aO" iv here, it ii ncce*<nry to read talf riv. * Instend I>I'.T ,<S) *uXir <!• ry Mxr/iiy, in this place in the original, it ii nece»»ary to read, twtiiif TnXir im -uVri ci - -f mnfiij, 1 The version of Lconicu) Thomxus ends here. Tim. Plat. VOL. II. U PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK m- Since Plato gives to the soul afterwards, all such things as he lx«fore save to the body, viz. essence, harmony, figure, powers, and motion, and conjoins both to the completion of one animal ; in order that you may not ignorantly suppose that body and soul arc of a similar dignity, being deceived by homonymous appella tions, lie concisely reminds us of tin- dilli-rcnce between the two, and does not .superfluously say, that body i> viable, but the MMI! in\i<ible; and shows that body is the object of opinion, because it is sensible and generated, but that the soul is nnbegotten, as with reference to the body, but generated, as with reference to intellect. Tor it belongs at one ami the same time to eternal beings, and gene* rated natures, but is the last of the former ; since time has now a place in it.

And that indeed, \\hich is primarily eternal being, is in both respects eternal, vi/. both according to essence, and according to energy. For it lias not an energy different from its essence. Hut that which is gen« -rated, is in both respects generated, always becoming to be, and al \\ays energi/inir, as being in genera tion according to time. The soul, however, in a certain respect participates of eternity, ami in a certain respect of generation ; but it energi/es temporally. And the extremes indeed, [i. e. eternal heinu* and generated nature-*,! are in one way only perpetual, the one eternally, but the other temporally. Hut the medium between the two, is perpetual in a twofold respect, as beiii'j; hiformed, and on this account, of an ambiguous nature; not only according to tin- partible and impar tible, and according to its t\u> circles, but also according to |>erpetual being, and that which is generated. Hence il belongs to eternal beings, and is the best of generated natures, being produced by the best of causes. And again >ou see, the difference of the soul \\ith reference to body. .For IMato had before called body the most In-autiful of generated natures', but now lie calls the soul the- best of things generated. Hut it is common to both to have been generated by the most excellent cause. The soul however, as being nearer to its maker, is t/ic best; but body, as being more remote from him, is indeed most beautiful, yet not the best. For the most beautiful, is secondary to the best, in the same manner as beauty

Ill what is here said, however, IMato may seem to call the Demiurgus the best of intelligible and eternal beings, in the same manner as lie calls the soul the lx-st of generated natures; and thus to bear witness to those who make one God prior to the world.1 But if some one should thus understand the words, by inverting them, yet at the same time it is evident from analogy, that we must not place in- • 1'ioi-lus in what lie Lcrc >ay», alludes to the Chriitians. ROOK in.] TIM. ECS OF PLATO. 15Jj telligihlo and eternal beings, as forms1 in the Demiurgus, hut oilier essences pos terior to him, if soul has the same ratio to all generated natures, that the Demiur gus has to eternal beings. And wo must either make him look to things posterior to him, though in his speech to the junior Gods, when he commits to them the fabrication of mortal natures, he orders them to imitate his power ahout their generation. lie does not, therefore, fabricate immortal animals, by imitatin<r things posterior to him, but things entirely prior to him, in the same manner as he wishes the junior Gods to fabricate mortal natures by imitating him. Or if we avoid this inconvenience, \\c must admit that there are many intelligible. Gods, though they are posterior to the Demiurgus, which those above alluded to, will not grant. Will it not therefore be better to assert, either that the soul is said by Plato, to belong to intelligible* and eternal beings, as being the best of ge nerated natures, and as truly both impartible and partible, in consequence of its middle subsistence between the two;

or that Iwcause he says it participates of rational energy and harmony, it belongs to [or primarily participates of] intelligi ble* and perpetual beings? For the harmony which is in it is generated, not being harmony itself, but harmonized. And its rational energy is not eternal being, but has generation, as sul»i>ting according to time, and Ix-ing transitive. How therefore does the soul participate of the rational energy and harmony? And how does it happen, that harmony and the rational energy, are not primarily in the soul, but according to participation ? I answer, because these have a prior Mib>istence in the Demiurgus. For he produces the Muses, and jlfotisagctcs [or the loader of the Muses, Apollo], and also the Mercurial series. Hence the ra tional demiurgic energy and harmony, subsist in him primarily; the former being Mercurial, but the latter Apolloniacal. And the soul being tilled from these, participates of the rational energy, and of harmony. And if it be requisite to speak clearly, what appears to me to be the case, harmony must be conceived to have a three fold subsistence; so as to l>c, cither harmony itself, or that which is first harmonized; being a thing <j' this kind according to the icholc of itself ; or that which is secondarily harmonized, and in a certain respect participates of harmony. And the first of these tnust be assigned to intellect ; the second to soul; and the third to body.

The rational likewise, or reasoning energy, has a three-fold subsistence ; the first l>cing prim ordial; the second according to participation ; and the third according to re presentation or resemblance. For there is also a certain vestige of the rational energy, in some irrational animals. We likewise understand essence, figure, and power, in a three-fold respect For essence, according to its primary subsistence,

1 For of™ here, it u necessary to read <•£>;. PROCLUS ON TI1K [OOOK m. and the first figure, and the first power, are in intelligible*. But that which partici pates in a certain respect of all these is the corporeal nature. For there is also something [i. c. matter] which is unf.gured, unessential, and powerless. The soul, however, has each of these accord!..- to participation ; but wholly participates of them according to the whole- of itself. For it is wholly corroborated, is wholly invested with figure, and wholly ' e>s,-utialli/ed. For the nnligured in it, does not precede the tiniired ; nor the powerless, power; nor the unessential, essence: since if they di<l, it would not at all diller from material bodies. The soul therefore, participates'of the reasoning energy, of harmony, figure and power, and wholly participates of each of these ; but body participates of them partially. A-ain al>o, from these things, the middle nature of the soul presents itself to the view, and it is also evident that IMato very properly says, that it was generated by the best of causes, the !ir>t and best of generated natures, and that it is in\i>ible, but the first participant of intelligible harmony.

" Since therefore the soul was mingled from these three, vix. from the nature of same and different, and from essence, and was distributed into T>J A. parts, and bound according to analogy, itself at the same time returning bv a circular energy to itself; hence, when it touches on a certain tiling possessing a dissipated essence, and when on that which is impartible, it then speaks concerning it, being moved through the whole of itself." \Ve divide the energies of the soul in a twofold way, the first of which is into the motive and gnostic energies ; for both tlioe are adapted to the soul, as the da-moniacal Aristotle also says. Of the motive energies however, \ve find some inherent in the soul itself; others, proceeding into the universe; and others, subhistin" between both these. For those indeed which extend through the whole world°, from the middle to the extremity of the universe, are mundane alone. But those which convolve the soul, are alone separate. And those that circularly cover the universe as with a veil, are separate- and at the same time inseparable, abiding ;«ml proceeding about the universe. But of the gnostic energies, somepertain to the first of things ; others, to those of a middle nature ; and others, to the lust of things. For the soul knows itself, and the natures prior to, and posterior to itself; since it is the image of things prior, but the paradigm of things posterior to itself. Hence perceiving itself, and evoh ing itself, it knows all things, not at all departing from its own proper power. For it is not proper that it should recur

1 For /jo»fcii in this place it is necessary to read o.\w«. m.oK in.] Tl M.T.US OF PLATO. 157 to any other j)lace, in order to perceive beings, hut that it should intellectually see itself. Enough therefore, has been sai<l concerning the motive energies of the soul. Hut here, and in what follows, he speaks concerning its gnostic energies. And that the soul indeed knows In-ings, and especially the soul of the universe, is evident ; since we see that they are also apprehended l>y our soul. If however it knows, it remains to he considered how it knows, and after what manner it knows intelligible^, and after what manner sensible?, whether by the same, or by different powers, and whether by looking to itself, and the reasons it contains, or by being extended to the objects of knowledge themselves, just as the sight to that which is visible, and which is external to it. In short therefore, Plato denominates these gnostic motions of the soul, con tacts with the objects of knowledge; indicating by this, the immediate nature of their apprehension, and their impartible, communion with the things known. If, however, each knowledge is a contact, the soul will come into contact with both intelligible* and sensibles, according to an appropriate application of itself to them, yet not so as to apprehend both by the same projecting energy. For it does not come into contact with sensibles, through its application of itself to intelligibles, nor with intelligible* through its application to sensibles.

Uoth these however, vi/.. to touch and not to touch, are llie peculiarities of the liberated (iods, as we learn from the Parmenides. Hence, we before rightly asserted, that the soul ac cording to the gnostic energies which it possesses essentially, and through which it knows tilings prior and posterior to itself, is assimilated to those Gods. As PI, ito therefore, iu what he now says, speaks concerning these energies, he first wishes to remind us of what has been before said, the mention of which is not superfluous, but contributes to \\hat follows. For from these and those, the discussion will have an appropriate explication. The particulars however, of which he had before spoken were, concerning the essence, concerning the har mony, concerning the form, and concerning the powers of the soul. Hence Plato recapitulating says, that the soul is entirely mingled from three parts, essence, same, and dilli'rent. And it has been shoun what the mixture is, and that it is vivific. For the uniform cause of souls, constitutes the soul in conjunction with the Demiurgus. It has likewise been shown how the triad pertains to the soul, and from what genera, and that it is from the middle genera. The soul also, was divided by the duple intervals according to the geometric middle, and was again bound through the remaining middles. For he called them bonds. A circular motion likewise, was given to it, through the circles, which comprehend its har mony, and its form. For in the harmony, the distribution into parts preceded the analogy, and in the form, the division preceded the contact. That which

168 PROCLUS ON THE [B00ic m. remains however, is in each. For the colligation has a representation of the solu tion; since binding pertains to things which are loosened. The distribution also of the colligation is analogous. For analogy, as we have ln'foiv observed, is the most beautiful of bonds. And the soul is divided Titannically, but is adapted harmonically, and is mingled \ivilically. Farther still therefore, in the third place, it is divided into those powt rs in it, according to which it returns bv a cir cular energy to itself. For the twofold circles are the powers of it. Hence these things Ijcinir premised, that which follows mu>t be dnnonstntted. Since thrn-fure the soul consists of tliree parts, essence, same and different, and has these genera, as media between impartible and partible natures, it knows both through them. For it is the image of the former, but the paradigm of the lat ter. Hence as Finpedocles says, \\ utt i li\ \\uler, e:irlli bv t urllilv si^lit, Kliicr ilmne uc ifc b\ filler's li:;hl; Tire t-vir splendid w disirin \>\ lire j \ jew love 1>) love, \jy Mnt'c contention dire. After the same manner, we also say, that the soul by its essence, knows all the essences from which it is derived, and all those which it essentially precedes. But by its sameness, it know* t!-.e sameness subsisting in all intelligible, intellec tual, and oensible natures. And by its dillercnce, the dilli rence which proceeds through all things.

.Since likewise it is essentially harmoni/ed, it knows through its own proper harmony, both intelligible and sensible harmony. Since too, it has intellectual powers, through these it knows power when-\er it exists. From what has been before said therefore, the discussion of the gnostic energies of the soul is rendered manifest. For the soul, from the things which it possesses essen tially, knows both tin; paradigms, and the images of them. And through the reasons which the Deiniurgiis imparted to it, it intellectually perceives both the natures that are prior, and those that are posterior to itself. For returning by a circular energy to itself, it comes into contact, as Tinueus says, with both im partible and partible essences; and entering into itself, finds itself to be the rea son of all things. For all knowledge derives its completion through a similitude of that which knows to the thing known. And similitude is completed by the communion of one form. Hence, there is one reason in that which knows and the thing known, and being the same, it conjoins these to each other. Since how ever, the reasons in gnostic essences are different,1 according to the measures and diminutions of the essences, on this account knowledge receives an all-various

lot £ia^Lyw» Ltre, road iiu^ut- and lor ycwm-icqi shortly after, read -yvuiffruot. in.] TIMA:US OF PLATO. i59 diflerenct*. For intellectual knowledge is impartible and rtcrnal, because the reasons in it of things ae of this kind. But psychical knowledge is evolved, and subsists in discurshe mercies; because the reasons of the soul, through which it knows things, have an evolved nature. Farther still, intellectual knowledge is uniform, l>ecause the reasons in it sub sist inonadicidly, for they are primordial. But the psychical knowledge, is biforined ; because the reasons also have a twofold subsistence, the dianoetic sul>- si>ling in one way but the doxastic in another. Knowledge therefore is both one and twofold, according to the essential division of reasons. For if one of the circles knows the intclli-ible, but the other the sensible essence, what is it which says that these are dillcrent from each other, and that the former is a paradigm, but the latter an ima^e? For it is not possible for that which has not a knowledge of both, to speak concerning the difference of them, as we may learn in the Thea-Ietus. Hence, as it is there said, that the nature which knows visiblds and audibles, the former through the siirht, and the latter through the

hearing, and says that these are dill'erent from each other, ought to know both ; so this reason which is different from the two circles, speaking through all the soul, some things concerning intelligible*, but others concerning sensibles, and being common to both the circles, is, as I should say, the energy of the essential part of the soul. For so far as the soul is one essence, according to this, it has this one gnostic energy, which Plato calls reason. Hence also, we simply call the whole soul rational. This reason therefore is the one knowledge of the soul, which through the circle of tin- same knows the impartible, but through the circle of the different the dissipated essence. For though both the circles have a sub sistence between the impartible :md the partible essence, yet the circle of the same participates in a greater decree of the impartible, but the circle of the different of the partible essence. And thi^ is the one essential reason, as the essence is one, prior to ///c same and the different. The lift; of it likewise, is the self-motion, which exist* in the two circles ; but the knowledge of it is transitive, this also being common to both the circles. And on this account, the soul is not only biformed, but also uniform. Thus much therefore, has been said, for the sake of the comprehension of the whole dogma.

Descending however to particulars, it must be observed, that Plato snys the soul consists of three parts, and that it is mingled from these; through the mix ture indeed, indicating the union of the congregated parts; but through the num ber, their unmingled purity. For they would not remain three, unless they pre served their proper essence unconfused. It must also be observed, that speaking of partible natures, he says, " when the soul touches on a certain thing having a dis sipated essence? For the word to hare (TO rt -yap t%nv) pertains to tilings which 160 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in. possess the essential and being, adventitiously, and the subject of which is unes sential and non-lwing. And the word (TO T«VO$) a certain thing, is most adapted to things which in some way or other are partible, and endued with interval. Farther still, to touch is appropriately asserted, because the soul proximately pre sides over (sensible*, and is su>pcndrd from intelligible* ; the contact manifesting a l:nou-led"e which is clear, immediate, and established according to a definite pnjection towards the object ofkmnilfdge. " As a contact" says some one of the Gods. But concerning impartible essences, Plato was satisfied with alone saying, " and irhen on that irliich is impartible." For the simple and the uniform are the peculiaiities of the impartible essence alone. Moreover, to speak, appropriately sig nifies the psychical intelligence. For the soul is reason, but tu speak is the energy (m^ua)1 of reason, in the same manner as to perceive intellectually, is the eneriry of intellect, and to germinate, of nature. For the energies of essences, are paronymously denominated with the essences themselves.

We ought not however to be ignorant of \\hat Porphyry relates concerning the words it speaks, and it ends (T«JJ T&V X.'yfi, x*i Xrysi); and that he met with one interpreter, Amelius,' who instead of " it speaks being moved," reads, " // ends being mtrccd" though it is ditlicult to adapt this reading to the soul, which is moved incessantly, as we have before observed. Porphyry adds, that he saitl to Amelius, it fpeaks should be adopted, and not it ends, and that Amelius was very much hurt [at this emendation], but that he afterwards found one Socrates who reads Xi^n as well as Amelius. It must therefore, be written by us, " /'/ speaks being f/.'oi'n/ through the U'hofc of itself," and not '' it ends being moved,'" as that Socrates and Amelius wrote, according to the narration of Porphyry. I -'or to speak, is the essential1 eneriry of reason. The soul therefore, being reason, and a rational intellect, speaks and sees intellectually through the whole of itself, (when it comes into contact with a partible, or an impartible essence,) what that is which is the object of its perception, because it is itself both impartible and partible. And if indeed, the genera in it, were alone divided from each other, the whole soul would not from essence possessing knowledge, have a knowledge of essence. But if the genera, were entirely corrupted, there would not l)e a definite know ledge of beings,

' As fit-iifta, is we learn from Simplitiut, is the boundary of motion, just a* TO v\>v the now is the boundary of lime, so rrtpyrjfia is the boundary of energy. Thus too xn/^a it (tie boundary of roqffit, or intellectual perception, and aiaUi^a of aiotlqau, or sensible perception. A. id as maOtipa being the termination of sensible perception, is an impression of it in the SITMI: .am, that which is analogous to this must be conceivtd to lake place in ru'r^ia, f)f/>yij/ju, and >cr/»ia. * A/jfXioi is omitted in the original. 1 For oviriwJoi't here, it is necessary to read ovatn^rjt. BOOK in.] T1M.EUS OF PLATO. 1G1 nor would it be possible to say, that essence is one thing, but sameness another. Since however, the middle genera are mingled with eaeh other, yet not so as to he confounded, the soul understands eaeh tiling definitely, and as Plato says, thr gh the whole of itself. But if it speaks, l>eing mo\cd through the whole of itself, it is evident that it is one and not one; that it has a knowledge common to the extremes, and yet differing from them ; and that as one, it wholly speaks about all things, and not wholly, as not being [entirely] one. The circle of the same likewise, in the knowledge of intelligible!*, knows sensible* as from paradigms; and the circle of the different knows intelligible^, as from images. For each having perfectly the object of its knowledge, necessarily sees that one is the para digm of the other, but the other the image ;

or not knowing that the one is a para digm, or that the other is an image, it will not know in a self-perfect manner. Knowing however, that the one is a paradigm, it knows that of which it is the paradigm, and knowing that the other is an image, it knows that of which it is the image. Very properly therefore, is it said that the soul speak* of all things, through the whole of itself. And thus much concerning the things themselves.

Since however, some erroneously read /'/ ends, and not it speaks through the whole of itself, as we have said Porphyry relates, and that Amelius thus reading, was not able to unfold the meaning of the words of Plato, thus much must be added, that to read it spcaks being moved, is attended with less difficulty, but that we may also read // ends ; the word Xr(yfi signifying one apprehension from many conceptions, of things knowable, arriving at the peculiar and definite intui tion of each ; in order that the meaning of the whole may be, the soul being tnoved, ends at the knowledge oj each tiling [with which it conies into contact}. For the end of being moved is to cease to l>e moved, the soul never ceasing to be moved, and always arriving at a certain intelligence. Aristotle also, perceiving this to be the case in the heavens, says that they are always moved in the end. " It also asserts what that is with which any tiling is the same, from what it is (line-rent, to what il is especially related, and in what respect, and how it subsists ; and when any thing of this kind happens either to be, or to suffer, both in things which are generated, with reference to each, and also with reference to such as possess an eternal sameness of being."

There are three interpretations of the proposed words, all which are reasonable, and it is requisite to exhibit the jxiwer of each. For the first interpretation makes the whole to be one sentence; but the second makes it to be two sentences, dividing the words as we do ; and the third makes it to be three, form- Tun. Plat. VOL. II. X J62 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in. ing the division according to each of the colon. The first interpretation also, is as"follows : " When the soul touches on a certain thing which has a dissipated essence, and when on that which i* impartible" here the interpretation making a small stop, [i. e. a comma] it adduces the rest of tlie words, viz. " it says being moved through the whole of itsel)',what that is with which tint/ thing is (lie same, ^r." Tor Plato asserts, that the soul says all tin-so things, la-iug moved through the v>hole of itself, hoth of the impartible and the partil.le essence, coming into contact in both, with samene.ss and difference, liahitudes and finalities, actions and passions. For all these are analogously in intelligililes and si-nobles. Hut the second inter pretation makes one sentence to be that \\hicli we have before mentioned, vu. " II' hen the soul touches on a certain thing which has a disrated essence, and when on that u-hich is impartible" And the second sentence to be, •• // uktmsscrts being moved, what that is with which any thing is the mine, from what it is different, to what it is related, in what respect, and how it subsists, $c" This interpretation however, dillers from the former, localise it separates what is said about essence from what is said about things pertaining to essence.

And the third interpretation makes a rapid division of the colon*. Tor it makes .me division to be that \\hichwo have before mentioned ; the .second, " // also asserts what that is with which any thing is the same, and fi urn what it is dij/ennt ;" and the third, all that follows. As we ha\e said therefore, the words have a threefold interpretation. We should direct our attention however, especially to the thinirs themselves.

That sameness, then, and difference are in intelligibles, is evident. J3ut how arc relation, situation, quality, \\hen, and passion there ? For these are well known to exist in sensible*, but how do they subsist in intelligible* ? May it not be said, that the genera ofU-ing manifestly subsist in intelligililes, becauisc they are pro perly beings ? You may also assume that relation, situation, kc. may be surveyed analogously in intelligibles ; relation indeed, if yon are willing, according to the paternal and maternal, and also the similar and dissimilar, the equal and unequal, only you must not assume unessential habitudes, but such as are adapted to in telligible educes. For the most principal habitude is there, where there is a more abundant communion, and all things subsist primarily. Hence Plato says, " and to what it is especially related." Hut the in a certain respect (GTI;) subsists in intelligibles, so far as each of them is not wholly the one, but after a certain man ner (JTT,) : for the one is simply one. And again, the sai/tc which is there, is also dij/'ercnl, but is not simply different; since if it were, difference ' would be no other than sameness. The like also takes place in the rest. All things

• For tr«jw>rr)roi litre, it is obviously necessary lo read rrf/x/ri/i. BOOK in.] TliNLI'US OF PLATO. Ifj3 therefore, says lie, arc all, and each is one according to essence, but all things according fo participation. And this is what the in a certain respect is in intelli- Airain, the limr it suhsixis, is there according to the differences of participation?. For many things participate differently of the same |>eculiarity. Tims for instance, permaneney patticipates of sameness, and motion also participates of it, yet not after the same manner, l»ut the former more, and the latter less. In the orders of forms likewise, intelligible* participate in one way of the one, or of essence, but intellectuals in another way, and of the<e some differently from others, according to tht1 measures of the essence of each. Hence the /;r/tr it subsists is there, But the iclien i> there, either according to the operations of intelligible* on sublunary natures ; for these sometimes participate of them, and they become sometimes participate by certain things; or it is there, according to the intellections them selves of the soul. For the soul applying itself at different times to different forms, at one time, intellectually perceives these, but at another those. And eternal being sometimes accedes to it, in the same manner as sometimes the intel ligible. Each thing likewise is there, rcit/i reference to each, so far as all things are in each other, and proceed through each other, and all things are allied and adapt ed to all ;

or so far as they are suspended from a certain one, or so far as one is cause, but another tin1 thing caused ; or so far as in some way or other they sub sist differently. And to sit fir is there, so far as they are filled from each other, and all things impart to all their own peculiarities. For Plato frequently mani fests /wr//c//>a//o/j by the word suffering, as we may learn in the Sophista. For he there says, that trAo/c is the suffering one [or that which is passive to the one], but is not (lie one itselj, l>ecause it participates of the one. These things therefore, are in intelligihles and in sensibles, because both in the latter and in the former, it happens that each exists and suffers with reference to each. Plato therefore, [as I have said,] is accustomed to indicate participations by su/fr-ring, and as we have *aid, to call every thing which participates, that which suffers the thing1 of which it participates.

In short, the soul of the universe speaks through the whole of itself according to one knowledge, both of generated natures, and of those which possess an eter nal sameness of being, and asserts of each what that is with which it is the same, and from which it is different, and how each subsists according to existence, or ac tion, or passion. For both among real beings, and generated natures, one thing in a greater degree suffers from another, and one thing in a greater degree acts on ' For * I'o-o here, it is rcijui^itc to read n.uov. 164 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in. another; all which the soul intellectually perceiving, asserts some indeed through the circle of the same, but others through the circle of the different. For it ante cedently comprehends all sensibles, and their actions and passions. For since the universe is one animal, it is copassive with itself, so that all generated natures are parts of the life of the universe, as of one drama. Just as if a tragic poet should compose a drama, in which the gods and heroes, and other persons, are introduced, and in which also he assigns to such of the players as are willing the utterance of heroic or certain other speeches ; the poet himself in the meantime comprehending the one cause of all that is said. It is requisite therefore, to con ceive a thing of this kind in the \\hole soul of the universe.

Forgiving subsistence to all the life of the world, which is one. and various, like a many-headed animal speaking with all its head.s, and uttering partly (Grecian and partly IJarharic lan guage, this sold comprehends the eause* of all generated natures ; and knows particular* by universals, accidents by essences, and parts by \\hules. But it knows all things simply according to its divine part. For a (iod solar as a (iod knows things partial, and preternatural, anil in short all things, even though you should adduce matter itself. For every thing, whatever it may !>e is one, so f.ir as it is nom the one. The knowledge therefore of all things simply and immedi ately, is dm'ne.

" But reason becoming true according to sunte, and also being conver sant with different t and revolving about same without speech and sound, in that which is moved by it." Atticus by reason here, understands the attentive power of the soul; but Por phyry, the charioteer, moving the twofold horses; and lamblichus the whole soul. For the soul movesgthe whole of itself, and through the whole of itself is the reason of beings. And all the interpretations indeed, appear to exhibit the meaning of Plato, but that of Porphyry is more concordant, both with what is here and else where said. For this reason which is now assumed, is neither that which is essential, nor that which subsists in energy, but that which is as Oie one power of the essence of souls, according to which also the soul is one, just as it is Informed according to sameness and dillerence. Or why were there not three circles, one according to each of the elements which are three, but two only, unless there is one essence in both ? The power therefore of this one essence, is Jhis reason, which is neither essence itselfTnor the energy from essence having the third order. Hence this reason Iwing one, knows according to the same. FqiHt does not sometimes know the intelligible, and sometimes the sensible, like our reason, which is not able to apprehend both according to the same. This reason

LOOK in.] TIM .EL'S OF PLATO. IG5 therefore, knows at once both san.e and dij/cnnt about the intelligible, and a)x)ut the sensible essence, not being true, like intellect, but becoming true about both, on account of the transitive nature of its knowledge of both. So that the words according to same, signify the difference between the knowledge of a dhine soul, and our knowledge ; but the word becoming signifies the difference lietween psychical and intellectual knowledge. This reason therefore, knows inlelligibles and sensibles, by coining into contact with intelligible and sensible sameness and dillerence; hut it passes through the whole soul, here indeed, moving the circle of the same, but (here, the circle of the different ; and by the one surveying in telligible*, but by the other sensible*. In this respect likewise, it adumbrates the whole Demiurgus, concerning whom it is said, [by the Chaldean Oracles] " by in tellect he possesses illtelligibles, but he introduces sense to the worlds." For thus also the psychical reason, being borne along in the soul so as to move both itself and the w hole soul, about intelligible and sensible sameness and difference, at one time produces opinions and persuasions, but at another, intellect and wiener, becoming indeed, and not bein^ true, in the same manner as intellect itself, For in tellect is really true, and is true according to same ; either as at once knowing both beings and generated natures, or as always Ix-ing such, and not sometimes, like the reason of partial souls.

For this is not always invariably true, being tilled with error and ignorance through generation. Or this reason is becoming to l»e true, as being transitive in its twofold knowledg • ; but is true according to same, as always comprehending the whole form of each object of knowledge, and not conformably to our reason, evolving each o/ the forms which it beholds, but sun-eying at once the whole of every thing which it sees. For we meeting with a dill'erent part of the same thing, do not see according to name, but we perceive each thing partially. Or it may be said, that this reason is according to same, when conversant with sameness and difference, bteoming simply after the same manner true, both about the intelligi ble and the sensible, as knowing both at once, so far as same, and so far as dif ferent, that it may see and tell that the one has its progression from the other.

To b<- therefore, according to same, manifests that this reason is gnostic, according to one projecting energy, both of that which is truly dijfe'rcnf, and that which is truly same. For possessing at once a transitive knowledge of these, this reason is becoming to be true, and of which the energy is to speak of that which is truly same, and of that which is truly different, in the intelligible,1 and in the sensible nature. For the work of this reason is to see in what intelliziblcs differ from sensibles. For it is necessary that there should IM? a certain thing 1 There is tui omission Lcrc in the origiual of row er rj> 16(j PROCLUS ON THK [BOOK in. whicli is gnostic of l>otli, in order that it may *ay intelligible* • are one tiling, but sensible* another. But " /'/ is borne tilun^ in thu! which is moved by it,"' as proceed ing into tin- twofold circles, and moving l»ot!i itself and them. For the latloti manifests the progression from one knowledge, divided into a twofold knowledge. This rea>on itself however, is a uniform knowledge [or a knowledge having the form of the one], l»otli of intelligible* and seiiMhlcs. Or it may he said, that it speaks in the soul, because the intelligible is our tiling and the sensible another ; or that it knows * both, being prior to both the circles, which know intelligible* and seu>ihles in a divided manner.

For since the soul is both a monad and a duad, according to one knowledge, it unitedly comprehends intelligible* and sensible*; and again, it comprehends some things according to the circle of the same, hut others, according to the circle of the dttj't rent. As therefore, in essence, the monadic precedes the Informed, and this is al>o the ca>e in harmony, in form, and in powers, thus al>o in gnostic energies, the one reason is the primary leader of distributed knowledge. These tiling however, have been frequently repeated by me, through the ambiguity in whicli the interpreters aie involved in explaining them.

Plato therefore, indicating the>e particulars, says that reason itself becoming true is borne along [i. e. revolves) about both the intelligible anil the sensible, in that which is moved by it, i. e. in each of the circles. Hut it is borne along with out s|>eech and sound. For inward reason is not at all in want of either of these ; but they are requisite to that reason wl ich proceeds through the mouth. So that it isju>t as if lie had said, that this reason has a motion more perfect than every1 energy which proceeds externally. For sound and voice are assumed as symbols of sensible motions. Inward reason therefore, as being the charioteer, and moving in it* course each of the circles, produces in us a twofold knowledge, whicli Plato delivers in what follows. But if we read, as we find it written in the most accu rate manuscripts, ;// ///;// n-hiih is moved by itself, and not, in that irhich ix moved by it, \i/. by reason, this will manife>t the whole soul, signifying it from its definition. For the thing defined, is in a certain ropect tin' same w ith the definition of it. Reason therefore, being borne along in the soul ; for it is the soul which is moved by itself; at one time knows the Aiinie and tlij/crent of sensibles, but at another, of intelligibles. And it seems that .\iinit. 'and ilijfl rent especially characterize know ledge, in the same manner as motion and permanency characterize life. Hence

' For utorjra ill this pljiv, it !•» ncitssary to read voiyr«. 1 For ttlo> hcr«', rt'jd fi?wi. ' For irnoav ill this plaic, it is ub\ioti*lv necessary to reU'l *u<rr)i. HOOK in.] TIM.T.l'S OF PLATO. 1,57 also, Plato particularly makes mention of these, because all knowledge lias an alliance to them. " \Vhcn it is conversant with a sensible nature, and the circle of the ' ditjircnl proceeding with rectitude, enunciates what it perceives to the whole soul ; then stable and true oj)inions and belief arc produced." In what is here said, Plato sjw?aks ahout the knowledge of sensihles, and how the reason in tin- soul of the universe generates this knowledge, vi/. by moving the circle of the different, and the reasons in it which preside over the orderly distri bution of wholes, and by preserving this circle in a state of undeviating rectitude. For rectitude manifests right opinion, as Porphyry interprets, and lambliehus admits. It likewise manifests the untamed and the non-verging in providential energies. For unwearied, and rapidly-moving power, are adapted to intelligence ; but the inflexible, and the nninelined, to providence and prolific energies. And to the impartible essence indeed, purity ' of intelligence, is adapted ; but to the partible essence, nndeliled energy. Porph\ry therefore, considers the circle which is moved vviln rectitude to be impartible; but that which is not accurately a circle, but in a certain respect participates of a right line, to be partible.

For the knowledge of sensihles tends to externals, and is again reflected to the soul itself. Hence, that which is not accurately a circle in the soul, is neither a right line alone, such as is the knowledge of sense, nor a circle, such as is the know ledge of dianoia. lamblichus however, rejects all this, as pertaining to human, and not to divine knowledge. When therefore, the charioteer moves the circle of the different, but this remaining undeviating and converted to itself, excites the reasons of scn>ibles, and announces to the whole soul the quality of each sensible object ; (since the whole soul knows according to this, every thing sensible ; for the circle of the xame when it beholds intelligible*, knows also sensihles as from cause, but the circle of the different know s them immediately, and as it were in a co-ordinate manner) — when this is the case, then stable and true opinions and iM'iief, are generated in it. For the. more divine soul judiciously approving, or rather, im parting by illumination, a more intellectual energy to the doxastic circle, this cir cle possesses with purity its own proper life, and the knowledge in it is rendered stable, antecedently comprehending in itself in a stable manner things that are locally moved, but such as are flowing and contingent, faithfully and stably.

' For »nOnporijr«i her*, it is nccfs«ry to read *a0opor?)». J0Q PROCLl'S ON TIIR [BOOK in. For opinion indeed, it the energy and knowledge of the do.rastic soul ; but fail ft is the stable a mlunJcviating judgment of opinion. And thus much concerning this par ticular. It deserves to bo investigated however, how the circle of the different is, as has been said, gnostic of every thing sensible, and the circle of the same, is gnostic of intelligibles, as will be said. For though by dividing the moti\e power.-' from each other, one of the circles is t!ie cause of motion to the right hand, hut the other of motion to the left, yet the gnostic powers must not IM' separated after the same manner, but it must be admitted that they have a knowledge of sensibles or intelligibles. May it not therefore be said, that the \ilal motions pel tain to progressions, but the gnostic to regressions ? And the circle of the same, indeed, as Iwing proximate to intelligibles, proceeding from thence, is by proceeding moved vitally, forms by its progression the first period, and through it moves the whole world. For the less principal follow the more principal periods. The assertion of Aristotle also is true, that generation is moved according to both ; possessing the invariable from the motion to the right hand, but the variable from the circulation to the left hand. The circle of the turn?

then-lore, is converted to the intelligible; and on this account is gno-tic of intelligibles. Hence it is neces sary that every where conversion or regression should follow permanency. But the circle of the different, abiding in the circle of the same ; for it is proximate!) comprehended in this, just as this is by intellect; proceeds through vital motion, to the second tiling, w hich is moved by it, I mean to the second circulation;' and through this also moves generation, just as the circle of the same, through the inerratic sphere, moves the universe. Being converted however, or returning through knowledge, it is converted to the vital motion of the circle of the saint which is proximate!) above it. But returning to it through knowledge, it is gnostically converted to that which the vital motion of the circle of the same administers vitally. And thus it obtains a knowledge of the whole world, conjoining the regression of itself to this circle of sameness, which abides prior to it. Thus too, the one circle U-comes gnostic of intelligibles, but the other of sensibles. For if the latter moves the period of the difjerrnt, it is necessary that it should know this period and also the things of which it is the leader, and what being a medium it follows; just as it is necessary that the circle of the same, if it moves the universe, should know to what being assimilated, it lives this life. So that to the one of circles the regression is through a part to the whole; but to the other,

1 viz. The circulation of the plunclary spheres. BOOK in.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. j(tf through a whole to another whole. ' Ami thus much has been said by us iii answer to this inquiry, winch demands profound consideration. It is not proper therefore, to think that the soul of the universe receives the knowledge of sensibles externally, or that it is in want of organs to the apprehen sion of them. For these things pertain to partial souls. But we ought to con ceive, that being converted to itself, it has the reasons of sensibles, produced in energy from itself. Jlcnre also, Plato accurately says, lh;it the circle of the diHi.-rent energi/es about that which is sensible, but not towards the sensible essence, in order that he might indicate the causal comprehension of sensibles in the reasons of the soul, but not a knowledge co-ordinate with sensibles, and firmly established in them. And thus much concerning the things themselves. The words however, " enunciates to the whole soul,'" are concordant with the words, " // speaks, being moved through the rc/iole of itself" But they indicate, that the circle of the different, proximately comes into contact with sensibles; and that through this the whole soul obtains a knowledge of them. The word eurou how ever [i. e. of it] may, as Porphyry also has observed, be multifariously inter preted, but ought rather to l»e attributed to rcaxon. For opinions, and the belief of the circle proceeding with rectitude, arid enunciating sensibles, are the progeny of reason. For opinions and belief are in the doxastic part of the soul indeed, but pertain to reason, so far as they are moved, excited, and contained by it. And thus much concerning the co-arrangement of reason with the circle of the different. But in the next place, Plato s;>eaks of its co-arrangement with the circle of the same, adding as follows :

J. " But when again, it is conversant with the logistic * power, and the circle of the same revolving with facility indicates its perceptions, then intellect and science are necessarily produced." Pinto entirely opposes ' the rational to the sensible, the revoking witli facility to the straight or right, the is to the generated, indication to enunciation, intellect to opinion, and science to faith. The logistic however, is not that which reasons, as some one may suppose, but the intelligible itself. For this he opposes to the sensible, because reasoning there is more divine than in the soul, as we have 1 i. t. The repression of the circle of the lamr, i* through the world to ill paradigm: each being a trholr, but the former a tenaiblr, and the latter an intelligible irftolt. * For \aynor here, it is necessary to read \oyiirrmv. * Instead of nrtftiprcr io this place, read arrcO^rr. Tim. Plat. VOL. II. Y PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in. frequently observed, and in intt lligible* always submits in energy. And it seems that he thus denominates the rational the logistic, just as he afterwards calls the sensible the sensitive. Tor tin? nensiblc is motive of sense, and the intelligible of the reasoning of the soul, lime*- the logistic1 will be that which is compre hended by the reasoning of the soul ; and this antecedently comprehending cause, is homouymously to reasoning railed logistic. But he calls the intellectual voluble, as having the unimpeded in transition, and also the circular, and the nourishing, likewise perfection in intellections, the energizing about divinity, the boniform, and the revolving about the intelligible as u centre, " hastening to conjoin yourself to the centre of resounding light," says some one of t':e Gods.

The word bans likewise signifies that whirh is filled with truly existing beings, and is united to them. But the word indicate* signifies, to unfold as it were into light, to teach, and to produce from that which is arcane. Farther still, by intclltct here, mu>t be understood the intellect \\hich is according to habit. For intJlect liat a threefold subsistence ; the first indeed, being dirine, such as is the demiurgic intellect ; but the second, being that nhich in participated by soul, and is essential and ieJf-perfect ; and the third, that iJiic/t ml»i&ts according to habit, and on account of which the soul is intellectual. Ami science is the iirst knowledge which is filled from intelliiiibles, and exists with an uninclining, non-verging, and immu table energy. But it differs from intellect, ' so far as the latter is sun eyed in the simple projections alone of the soul. For through it (lie soul at once intellec tually jK.-rceives the whole of each object of intellection; since the at-oncecollected in energies, is the peculiarity of intellect. But science is surveyed in the knowledge, from cause. For this is the peculiarity of science as is also the composition and division of forms. For it is evident, that having a knowledge of beings, it also knows which among them ha\e the order of causes, and which of effects. But all knowledge of this kind is called science, just as the simple appre hension of each object of intellection is called intelligence. And such is our expla nation.

lamhlichus however, conceives this intellect to !»e more ancient than soul, supernally containing, and giving perfection to it. lie also contends against those, who either immediately conjoin the soul to all-perfect intellect, (tor it is necessary that the transition should not be immediate from exempt natures to participants, but that there should be middle essences co-arranged with the things that participate) or who suppose intellect to be a habit of the soul. For it is iie- ' litre also fur Xuyuor, read \uytartkuy. 1 Now is omitted here iu ilit original. cessary that prior to that \vliirh is in another, that should exist which is in it sell'. And this indeed, is rightly asserted with reference to things; but it is more eonsonant to the words of Plato, to survey this intellect as a habit in the soul itself. For Tima-us says it is produced from the energy of the circle of Me same. But that intellect which the Demiurgus constituted, mu^t l>e said to be abo\e soul, when he placed analogously soul in body, and intellect in soul. For it is evident that this intellect in more ancient than soul, just as soul, according to Timauis, is more ancient than body. The intellect however, which is now mentioned, being the effect of the motion of reason about the intelligible, through the circle of the same; for he says it is produced, in consequence of that circle revolving wilh faci lity about that which is apprehended by the reasoning power ;

will not be more ancient than the soul, but a certain habit of it, in the same manner as science. Hence also, he says-, that it is ingenerated in the soul, in the same manner as science, opinion, and faith. From all that has been said therefore, this one thing may be summarily collected, thai uhcn reason is conversant with the intelligible, and the circle of the same unfolds through its intellectual energy, the nature of beings to reason, then intellect and science arc produce/I in the foul. And this indeed, must necessarily be the case. For a perfection adapted to such energies, is consubsistent with them. \\ hat then, some one may say, is reason at one time conversant with intelligibles, but at another with sensibles ? By no means is this the case with the total soul for soul of the universe], but it is always on high, and is always directed to intelligibles. It likewise abides and is established there, and provi dentially attends to sensibles, with an untamed energy; and through the facility of the motion of the circle of th* same, the rectitude of the circle of the different is permanent. But the words when, is generated, and the like, manifest differences of power. For the energy is not every uhere similarly according to all the powers : for this is the peculiarity of divine intelligibles, on. account of the simplicity of their essence. But according to the energy of the circle of the fame, reason is more conversant with intelligibles than with sensibles ;

and from the energy of the circle of the different, is more conversant with .sensibles than with intelligibles. it is requisite also not to overlook this, that Timanis says, u the circle ffthc different proceeding with rectitude," looking in so saying to the circles of a partial soul, of •which, when in a fallen condition he asserts, that the circle of the same is fettered, and the circle of the different distorted. For in saying this he opposes rectitude to distortion, and to the being fettered facility of motion,1 which signifies the unincutubered ; just as rectitude there, indicates a lation uiidistortcd by inferior

' For orpo^oc in this place, it u obviously novrsiary to read objects, and an irreprehensible judgment ; so that lie celebrates appropriately each of the circles. " Whoever therefore asserts, that this is ever ingencralecl in any other being than soul, asserts every thing rather than the truth." What does he intend to signify hy the word this? Is it intellect and science? If so, he does not mean the circle of the different. Or rather does he not speak of the twofold conjunctions, [intellect and science,]1 opinion and faith? For intellect and science arc' one of the conjunctions, and opinion and faith are the second. But through these he comprehends every sonl. Fvery tiling therefore, which is the recipient of intellect and M-ience, opinion and faith,* is soul. For all these knowledges are rational and transitive. And l>ccause indeed, they are ra tional, they are exempt from the irrational powers ; hut hecause they are transitive, they are subordinate to intellectual knowledge. For if science and intellect are in intelligible*, yet they are not in^t aerated in them, as he sa\s they are in the soul. For sciences in the soul sulisi^t according to participation ; since thev participate of science itself, the soul being essentialli/ed according to participation. For the middle proceed from the first genera, and are similarly harmonized ; since the harmony in the soul is from harmony it self. The; soul likewise possesses figure, similarly to the fir>t genera.

For intellectual figure is comprehensive of allvarious figures. The soul also possesses powers after the same manner. For intellectual and intelligible powers are prior to it. It likewise receives motion from the genera of In-ing, and knowledge from the demiurgic intelligence, where also permanency is unfolded into light. For all kndu-lttfae is a certain permanency and comprehension of the thing known, and an apt conjunction with it. The motion therefore of the soul participates of the whole psychical knowledge, so far as it knows itself/ and looking to itself moves ; ami knowledge participates of motion so far as it is transitive. Peculiarly however, the motive energy is defined accord ing* to motion; but the gnostic, according to permanency. And the circle of the different is rather motive than gnostic, hut the circle of the same is rather gnostic than motive; hecause permanency pertains to sameness, but motion to difference. In the circle of (fie different however, there is knowledge, and in the circle of the

1 The words vow «rcu trmrrt^if are omitted in this place in the original. For Tiirtwi \\vtt, read -martm. ' lor tavTrj here, it is ohviouslv necessary tu read «uirrj>. 4 Instead of pcra rr;r lo/joi* in this place, it it requisite to read tura rtjr M»IJ<TI>. HOOK in.] TIM/KUS OF PLATO. 173 same, motion ; just as in the latter there is sameness, and in tlie former difference. But the whole soul participates through the whole of itself of the genera of l>eing. As far therefore, as to these particulars, the psychogony obtains its completion, being divided into the In-fore-mentioned heads. For the hypostasis, harmony, figure, powers and energies of the soul, have been discussed. ••*' Since however the soul is a multitude, and the first of composite natures; hut it is composed, not of infinites, but of things numbered, arid these not without co-arrangement, but harmonized ; this being the case, numbers and harmony were very properly assumed in the generation of it. Since too, it comprehends the principles of all analogy, and all harmony, in consequence of l>eing the soul of the world, no analogy is omitted [in the composition of it]. Because however, it was constituted by divinity, the more divine of the genera was assumed, vi/. the diatonic : for it is entheastic. And at first indeed, Ix-cause essence, same, and different were assumed, that whole of the soul which is prior to parts, was con stituted ;

but now, through the psychogony, the whole which is in the parts. For the Dcmiurgus divides, and unites the parts through analogies. But through the circles, the wholeness in each of the parts, is delivered. It must likewise be assumed, that the Demiurgus in the Tima-us, energi/es in conjunction with all the demiurgic Gods. For he cuts into seven parts Titannically ; unites Apolloniacally; produces body, and invests it \\ith figure, as containing in himself Vu lean; and bounds the measures of ascents and descents, and inscribes the laws of Fate, as possessing Necessity. In the psychogony also, it is necessary to refer what has l>een said, to the essence ol the soul, or to the tilings which are administered by it, or rather to both. For the natures contained in the world, are under the dominion of the powers which are essentially inherent in the sold. It is likewise requisite to investigate what the middles are, what the multiple, sii|>erparticular and superpartient ratios are, what the leimma is, and what the seven parts are; and why the diagram proceeds to a quadruple diapason, and the diapcnte, and tone.

Of the three middles also, the geometrical, arithmetical, and musical, the solid analogy which is composed from the three is the equality of Themis, from whom every order is derived. But the three middles proceed from the three daughters of Themis, viz. l£unomia, Dice, and Irene; the arithmetical from Irene, which surpasses and is surpassed by the equal ; which also we employ in the time of peace in contracts, and through which the elements are quiescent; but the geo metrical from Eunomia which likewise I'lato denominates the judgment of ' There it uufortunatclj an hiatus here in tlie original. PROCLUS Otf THE TIM^EUS OF PLATO. (BOOK in. Jupiter, and through which the world is adorned with geometrical analogies ; and the harmonic from Dice, through which greater things have a greater, hut less a less ratio. Since therefore, the geometrical middle comprehends the other two, AS has been demonstrated, the essence of the soul is adorned by the geometric middle, the soul being the same through the whole of itself, and every where both partible and impartible. But it is adorned according to the arithmetical middle, because the common powers in it, which recur from the impartible to the partible, or from things partible to the impartible, equally surpass and are surpassed by Uiings entirely partible and impartible. And by the harmonic middle,1 because of the powers that are in it, some are in a greater degree separated from their pro ducing causes, and have a greater transcendency, but others a less.

And again, the sameness of forms subsists every where appropriately through the whole world, corporeally and vitally, in a plant, in an animal, and iti a stone; because the whole world is adorned with geometrical proportion. Hut the arithmetical middle presents itself to the view in the sublunary elements, which it equalizer according to powers. And the harmonic middle is seen in the world, according to the [celestial] spheres, their motions, and their intervals. For Ptolemy demon strates, that their intervals are in harmonic proportion.

1 la it cad of >j ?« ojifiuvtfii /jcffori?! iu this place, it is requisite to read rjj i* n^uruy pteorriTt. " BUT when the generating father understood that this generated statue or resemblance of the perpetual Gods, moved and lived,' he was delighted and exhilarated, and in consequence of this delight, considered how he might fabricate it still more similar to its paradigm. J fence, as that is an eternal animal ' he endeavoured also to render this universe such,' to the utmost of his ability." The one Demiurjjus, who also fabricates wholes, generates collectively and at once, according to sameness, ;ind converts, perfects, and assimilates his fabrications to their paradigms ; whether one and the same essence effects this, and one and the same ^enerative, recalling, perfective and assimilative power, as is? asserted by some* of the ancients, or different powers, as appeared to l>e the case to certain others. For there is no small dissension, and as it were opposition, between these men. There are likewise some, who unitiivj:, are at the same time unwilling to ad mit that the one is without the ellicacy of multitude; and there are others who, though they divide, yet cannot endure to say, that the number of powers is unco ordinated and mutilated, but they willingly admit and demonstrate that these powers are. comprehended in iheir proper monad, and are united and preserved by it. Hence it happens, that some assert that these powers are a tetradic mo nad, but others attain, that they are an united tetrad, or as they love to call it, a monadizcd tetrad. It is evident however, that the Demiurgus here mentioned being

1 TLe words T< CIITO i-ui £*», arc omitted in (be tnt ofl'roclus. 1 Tor cwjv here, re;id cwor. 1 The word TOKIVTW it also omitted in the text of I'rorlua. * Instead of ta&otny in lint place, it U ueceswry to read KaOairrp roiair. 170 PROCLUS ON THK [BOOK iv. one, insorfH in the junior Demiurgi posterior to him, nt one nnd the same time an assimilative power when he orders them to imitate his power about their gene ration ; a generatire power, when he orders them to produce and generate ani mals in common ; and an analysing power, when lie commands them to receive back again the parts that were borrowed from the whole elements, the substances composed from them being dissolved, and to recall them to their wholes. And after all these, he inserts in them u guardian power, in consequence of which, ho immediately constitutes the governors of the world, guardians of the numbers of time, and earth the guardian ofday and night. The Pemiurgus therefore, as I be»;m to say, by whom all tilings were produced, generated them consubsistent with himself, and assimilated, and perfected, and converted them to himself; their order not being confounded by the at-once-collected evolution, as it were, of all things into light, but being in a much greater de- •T-ee guarded and connected. For he neither deprives inferior natures of the pro vidential care of more excellent beings;

nor more perfect natures of the dominion pertaining to them over such as are more imperfect. For he does not comprehend one of these prior in time to the other ; nor do either secondary natures remain destitute of the inspection of pro\ idence, nor such as are more ancient, sluggish and unprolific ; as if the former did not yet receive the providential en« rgies of the latter. We ho\ve\er, not U-ing able to understand, and much less to explain the beneficent energy of the father of \\holes from eternity, about the world, must be sirtislied w ith perceiving and speaking of him, as at onetime generating, at another adorning, at another |MTl'ecting, ami at another assimilating, \vhicli also the words of the philosopher now previously MI tiering, are prepared to operate upon us. For the world now participates of motion and life, according to the doctrine of the father.1 For soul that dwells together with it, preserves to itself the different kinds of its own peculiar knowledge, according to which it knows both intelligibles and mundane natures. I5ut motion and life, which do not flourish in itself alone, it also imparts to all the bulk of the body of the universe. And on this very account either alone or es|x-cially, the fabric of the world being completely fashioned a resemblance of the intelligible Cods, the Demiurgus was in a still greater degree Jftightfil and c.r hi Id rated, and ill consequence of this delight and exhilaration, caused it to possess a greater and more perfect similitude to intelligibles. Hence also, he considered how he mi-lit make it as it were perpetual. For the intelligible is properly, and primarily perpetual, but that is secondarily jwrpetual which is co-ex tended with the progression and evolution of time. For the ivtr is twofold, the

' For watrot in thi» |>l"»ec, it n urces»«ry lo read war,>oi. one being eternal, but the other temporal. Why therefore, after .ill the before-men tioned benefits, docs Plato introduce this eighth gift of the Demiurgus ? Because it is the greatest and most perfect, and transfers the image to the highest simili tude to its paradigm, lint it is necessary that he who onee exhihits the ijeneration of wholes in words, should pass from things more imperfect to surh as are more perfect. For conformably to this very tiling, things which subsist />cr sc or essentially, and those which are ingenerated in others, are, as it were, opposed to each other; because in things which are established in themselves, and which in no respect whatever pertain to otlu r>, it is necessary to say that the more ve nerable of these rank as leaders, through winch the final, the demiurgic, and the other causes consequent to these, present themselves to the view. But in thin-'s winch are participated by others, such as are more imperfect occur, which Income as it were subjects to more perfect natures, and show themselves to IK- of pos terior origin. Such therefore, i.s the whole' design of the words before us.

It follows in the next place, that we should show through what causes, and from the possession of what nature, the Demiiirgus of wholes constituted time in conjunction with the soul and the universe; and also what the good is imparted by it, and on account of which it was produced. It is likewise especially requisite that we should show this, because many, even of the friends of I'lato, apprehend time to be a certain obscure form, and nothing more than that which i.s numbered of motions ; not considering, that oftJic ten gifts •xttich the. father imparts to the icorld, each of the following is entirely greater than each oftlie gifts that precedes it. If J herefore, having now animated the world, and rendered it a blessed (iod, he after wards imparts time to it, it is evident that time will be' superior to soul, and to the possession of a blessed life on account of soul, and that a life which is defined according to time will live periodically. Hence time will not be a tiling of such a kind as the multitude say it is, but will have an essence more divine than that of souls, and psychical good. Tins therefore, we shall again more fullv en force.