Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato

We must say however, directing our attention to the words of Plato, that the Demiurgns intellectually perceives the lite, and motion, and order of the universe, and its possession of form, not in so doing looking to the world itself. Tor nei ther in short, is the world intelligible according to the whole of itself; but is rather according to its Imlk, the object of opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. ISor docs the Demiurgus in his intellections tend to external objects; but I or Ttaaao here, read rairo. Instead of vrtprrpov act tit; o j^poroi, it \t nccrssary to read vrrprtpor ar (17 o \jx>vot. Tim. Plat. VOL. II. Z every intellect ' is converted to itself. Hence, localise he intellectually perceives himself, and contains in himself the generative, ami providential cause of wholes; by In-holding himself, he surveys both the essence and tl>e perfection of his own progeny. But Plato xayt, that the vorld icas generated the statue or resemblance of the perpetual Gods ; not that it is the image of the mundane Gods; for he docs not alone speak alxmt the corporeal-Jonned nature <>J the universe ^ but also about the ani mated and intellectual animal, which comprehends in itself the mundane (wd.i ; but he says ////'v, became it is the resemblance of the intelligible God*. Fur it Is Jilted with deity Jrom them, and the progressions of the mundane God* into it, are, as i/ttr/r, cer tain riiers and illuminations of the intelligible Gods.

The world also, receives thesf progre>sions, not only according to its celestiul part, hut according to the whole of itself. I -'or in the air, in the earth, and in the >ea, there are advents o! 'the terres trial, aquatic, and aerial Cods. The world therefore, is filled with deity accord ing to the whole of itself, and on thi.s account is wholly a resemblance of the intelligible Cods ; not indeed, receiving the intelligible Cods themselves ; for nei ther do .statues receive the exempt essences of the total Cods ; but being fitly adorned, it receives the illuminations derived from thence to secondary orders, to whic'h it has a commensurate subsistence.

That by the perpetual however, he means all the intelligible Gods, and not the Cods that are in the world, he renders c\ideiif. by immediately adding, " Hence as that is an eternal animal," vi/. the intelligible [or animal ilselfj. But who the intelligible Gods are, muy be assumed from division. For it must either be ad mitted that they are prior to animal it>elf ; or in animal itself, In-ing the monads as it wore of the four ideas which are there; or posterior to animal itself. It would be ridiculous therefore, to arrange them prior to animal itself; for they would then comprehend eternity, to which he has not yet said the universe is as>imilated. But it is impossible to arrange them in animal itself. For how could Plato call the universe, the statue or resemblance of those Cods, to which he had not yet according to the order of the discourse, assimilated the plenitudes of the universe ? For he does this afterwards, when he produces the partial plenitudes of the universe. So that be would not have said, that the universe was now gene rated the resemblance of these Cods, but since it -cili be. It remains therefore, that the perpetual Gods, are all those posterior to animal itself, which subsist between the intelligible paradigm and the Demiurgus. For the Demiurgus ren dered the universe similar to all these, so far as each of them comprehends the form of the wholeness of the world. This then is demonstrated.

1 N! 11 it omitted in the original in this place. Honce tin* world is the statue of the intelligible Gods, when it is assumed in con junction with soul and intellect, and the deity which accedes to it. Cut it IN a statue in motion, and full of life,' and deity ; fashioned from all things within itself; pre serving all things, and tilled with an at-once-eullected abundance of all good from the father. It likewise peculiarly receives from nature motion, more than any thin^ else; hut from soul, motion and life ; and from intellect, intelligenceamllife, and the receptacle of the mundane Gods. 1-Yom the mundane Gods however, it receives that which remains, vi/. the heing fashioned in perfection, the most true statue, or resemblance, of the intelligible Gods. And a-ain, from this it is evident, that Plato establishes the Demmrijus conformably to the most consummate of the ini tiators into the mysteries. Fur he exhibits him as llie statuary of the world, just us before lie represented him the maker of divine names, and the cnundator of divine chiracterti through -u-hich he gave perfection to the soul. For these things are effected by those that are telesttr* in rcali'y, ir/w give completion to statues, through eharaetcrs and vital names, and render them liviii'j and moving. With great propriety there fore, was the father of wholes delighted with his fabrication, and being exhilarated with it, endeavoured to render it still more similar to its paradigm.

lie wa-i de lighted with, and admired however, not that which proceeded from, and through him was completely effected a thing of this kind, but with his own povrer, which caused the universe, from bein^ moved in a confused and disorderly manner, to l>ecome orderly, animated, endued with intellect, and divine. And as by know ing himself, he knows the world, so by admiring his own demiurgic power, he makes his fabrication to be admirable, and the true statue or resemblance of the perpetual Cods. For in a certain respect, the unircrse i.v said to be a statue (ajaX/xa) from divinity being delighted irilh it (•*(*$'* rt ayxA?.£<r5a« rov $EOV err' atmo). lie was delighted however, and exulted, not rejoicing in a thing situated externally; for how being intellect can he look outwardly ; but his delight was produced from IK ing filled with his own boniform will, and from his beneficent power proceed ing to the tmcn\yin£ and exuberant communication and supply of more perfect goods. This also Plato sullieiently indicates, by haying that the Demiurgus Lu consequence of being delighted, endeavoured to render the universe still more

1 For cu'i here, it is obviously nccesviry lo irad zurji. * For rfX€ir«i lii-rc, read rr.XeTrnj. 'I lie ttlnt<e wrrc initiator* into the mvMerios, and were fkfurfitti, or capable of perfuraiiog di\ine opernlions. This theurgy, in winch these initiators were deeply skilled, formed the last part nf tlie Mcerdolal science. See an interesting account of it, from a very rare Greek MS. of Pselius, On Of mom according to tht Dogmat of tfir Grreki, in tbc Notes to my Pauuniai, Vol. .1. p. 3'24. PROCIAJS ON Tllli [•««'* "• similar to its paradigm. For he was primarily delighted indeed, through the inward intellection of himself, comprehending and benevolently receiving the intelligible universe, with a siii.pl.-, unimpeded, and collected embrace, through permanency in, and a perfect union w,th it. But he was delighted secondarily, if it |M> lawful so to speak, on account of the aptitude of the natures winch receive the supply of good, externally proceeding from him. An.l here you may see, how Plato delivers th«- three causes of the participation of -ood- proceeding into this world from the lather. One indeed, and the first, is Hiat which proceeds from the purer of the .-ili-dive cause. For it is the Dcmlm-'nis who now generates time; through his own unemying and prolific abundance desiring to lill ^ things uith first, middle, and last goods. Hut the second cause is that which arises from the aptitude of the recemng thing.

1-or the communicator of good is thru delighted, when that whirl, recei.es ,t, ,s aptly opposed to iLs reception. And the third cau>e, i, that «!,ich procerds from the wmmtrv, and as it we con^imti.m and symphony of both pnetr and aptitude. 1 or on account of this, though the ( Jods always extend to all things good co-ordinate to their essences vet it is not always received by all of us ; because we are not ad-ipted to its reception, and Ime not always a subsistence commensurate power If however, we wish that divinity should rejoice in us,1 as he is naturally disposed to rejoice, and he de!i»hted on our account, though be always Assesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, we must render ourselves adapted to the reception ofthe^.od which is extended by him ; in order that theg.lt ol divinity, nnv not w ill, resp,et to us I,,- inellieacious, though he is not impeded by any thing. The>e thmgs therefore it is the business of another discussion to survey more

Now however, let us see how the ,-nnerse becomes ,uo,v similar to its para- ,li.Mn. through the generation of time. Because the paradigm therefore is pnmarilv eternal, if the sensible world did not receive, a secondary perpetuity, .1 evident to every one, that it would be in a less degree assimilated to the mtell •nblc \ud it likewise is not difficult to perce.ve, that the nature which has ,ts Generation in mutation, if it were separate,! from time, wonld be so far from bein" perpetual, that it would not be possible for it to remain for a moment. Hence, a certain perpetuity is necessary to that which is to be m a Mill • |ii»te*il of <rro,xf.<. in llii> pla^. il i» i.ectssarj to r.-ail ffi<7rmXn. » i r If ** »M. t- m-ci»e In, l.tm-fii-ent illu.ninalioi.*. Tor .hot arc»l«a>i eitended, aft. ^'.nanncr.^ause, a, Proc-lu* oUerve,, di»i,,ilv pom**, a. mv.,uble «n,«r» of ^,,encc. Hence ,h.n .r meiv, the Bo«d, »l.ich he ,>cr1,Hua!!> .»Un.l, to us, he i, »..! to be drlifbtcd, )., delight indicating our proper recrjition of this good. H..OK iv.] TINLIXS OF IM.ATO. lit) decree assimilated to tlio intelligible. But to that which is perpetual indeed, yet lias not the perpetuity at once present with it, in the same manner as the intelli gible, the vthole extension of time is necessary. Moreover, lie who considers the nature of time, will more clearly know' how time not only contributes to the perj>etiiity of the \\hole world, and to the great parts of the world, but also to the perfection and felicity of each of thorn, and comprehends all these at once; which in the course of the interpretation we shall endeavour to manifest, by investigating the plentitudes of time.

" The nature indeed of animal itself was eternal, and this it is impos sible to adapt perfectly to that which is generated. Hence he formed the design of producing a certain move-able * image ' of eternity ;* and in consequence of this, while he was adorning the universe, he made this eternal ima^c proceeding according to number, of eternity abiding in one, and which we denominate time." That animal itself is the plenitude of the multitude of intelligible animals, and that it possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, is a thing frequently and fully asserted, and is not considered as at all dubious by the Platonic philosophers. J3ut what eternity is, and the mot cable time which imitates it, are things perfectly ditlicult to understand, and to explain sufficiently to others. At the same time houexer, it is requisite to narrate the more elegant opinions of the ancients about it, and to add, if we are able, any thing which may contribute to the elucidation, .and distinct consideration of the things to be discussed. The multitude therefore, have a conception and co-sensation of time, in conse quence of looking to the sublunary and celestial motions, and are of opinion that time is something pertaining to motion, such for instance as the numl>er, or exten sion of motion, or something else of the like kind. Hut the morn excellent of these, proceeding to the consideration ' of eternity, and perceiving that there is not simply motion, but a perpetual and orderly motion in the universe, and \\hich circulates with invariable sameness,— conceived from hence, that this invariable -amcness, \\an inherent in moveable natures, from a certain other cause, and not

For cirrrai here, it is requisite to read ttatrat. * Tor JT-mrok t,crt, rend «i> i/rrji . ' And for mw rra<l mom. * For aiMi-ii ltkrwi«r, it n nrrr«»ary lo read mwroi. In«irad of r wirattr in ibis placr, it i» rrquiMlf lo read 10-j IMKK'LUS ON Tilt [BOOK IT. from themselves. This cause therefore, will either be immoveable, or moved. Aiul if indeed, it is moved at a certain time only, how will it be the cause of that which al \\.i\s is invariably the hame ? lint if it is moved always, this perpetuity of its mo tion must again be derived from something else, and either1 this will be the case ad infinituin, or there will be something immoveable, which is the cause of perpe tual motion, to things which are always moved. And the energy of tliis being immoveable, is no longer according to time, but is eternal. Tor the peculiarity of tilings which subsist according to time, is to />c aliL\n/s in gtnci'iitio/i, or becoming to Lc ; but of eternal natures, to e.ri$t akctiys. For common conception opines, that eternity is denominated from twisting alictiys, just as it thinks that time derives it-s appellutioii from dancing [iroif,y. ntv ^icet-xv] being a measured motion, and which has its existence in generation. On this account, it appears to me that the multi tude assumed the first conception of time, but the wise of eternity, by the former directing their attention to the nature which is always moved, and the latter to the

nature w Inch is al\\ ays stable. It must now however be shown w hat each of these is, and in a manner most conformable to the doctrine of IMato. Aristotle indeed, admitting time to be the number of motion, asserts that it is so, riot according to that which numbers, but according to that which is numbered. Hence, he very properly inquires what that is which numbers it, if time is that which is numbered. For these are relatives, and the one existing, the other also exists. He solves the inquiry however weakly, by saying that it is a certain soul which numbers time.1 l-Y»r it is necessary, that prior to perpetual number, there should IMJ a perpetual numerator, in order that he may always produce, that which is generated alwa\s existing. Admitting therefore time to be the number of motion, he also says that eternity is intelligible, deriving its appellation from exist ing always, and possessing and comprehending the whole ot time. Hence also he says, the existence and life of all things are siisj>ended from this, of some things more obscurely, but of others more clearly. It is necessary however at present, that we should particularly see what eternity and time are according to Plato, and that we should not admit the image of time to !>e time alone, nor eternity to be simply a certain intelligible God, but in the first place show, in what order of the

' For n tit' uTfipoK 111 this plate, it is necessary to read »"/ «»' a-rtipcv. 1 In defence of Aristotle however, it may be said, that when he averts that it is a certain soul wliiclj numbers time, he doei not «.|>eak of lime according to its tirst bubsisteiice, but the time which i> parti cipated by material natures, aud of which, the multitude, as I'roclus observes, have a conception, ami co-sensation. IMMIK iv.j TIM/ELS OF PLATO. jfl3 intelligibles it subsists. For this is especially the peculiarity of the science of It is manifest then to ercry one, thnt eternity is more venerable, primordial, and as it were more stable than animal itself, though animal itself is the most beautiful, and most perfect of intelligible animals, as Plato lias In-fore said. For if the eternal is said to l>e, and is eternal as participating [of eternity,] but eternity is not said to participate of animal itself, nor to receive its appellation from it, it is evident that the former is secondary, but the latter more simple and more primary. For eternity neither participates of animal itself, l>ecause it is not an animal ; for neither is time a visible animal ; nor is it any other ;mimal. For it has been demonstrated that animal itself is only-lw^otten and eternal, l>ecause. eternity is more excellent. For the eternal is neither thai which eternity is, nor is more excellent than eternity.

But as we all say that the participant of intellect, and the animated, are posterior to intel lect and soul, so likewise the eternal is secondary to eternity. \Vhat then some one may say, will eternity IH\ if it is more venerable than animal itself, which is said to be the most beautiful of intelligible?, and in every respect perfect "! May it not be said, that it is especially most beautiful, in consequence of receiv ing the summit of beauty, on account of excessive participation, but that it does not receive the summit of the good : for it is not said to be most excellent. So that it may be subordinate to that which is the best. To which may lx> added, that it is not simply the most beautiful of all intelligibles, but of intelligible animals. Hence eternity1 is no animal, but if it is life, it is infinite life. In the next place, it is not necessary that what is in every respect perfect should be the first. For the perfect has all things, so that it has things first, middle, and last. But that which is above this division will be super-perfect. Hence nothing prevents eternity from being superior to the animal which is the most beautiful of all intelligible animals, and is in every respect perfect, if eternity is most excellent ami super-perfect. Farther still, animal itself has not* an arrangement prior to the multitude of intelligible animals.

On this account therefore, Plato nays, " For to {/tat which is the most beautiful of intelligibles and in even/ respect perfect.11 But eternity is prior to the multitude of intelligible animals. For these are eternal ; but eternal natures participate of eternity, which is not coarranged with the multitude of them, and has rather an arrangement contrary to them. For it unites multitude, and is paid to abide in one, as l>eing void of mul-

' There u an omission in the original lu tins jilacc of o ncwr. ' O» M omiltrd her* in the original. 1JU 1MIOCLUS ON THE [BOOK iv, titude. Animal itself however, comprehends all such animals as are intelligible ; on which account also, it is in want of eternity, in order that it may participate through it, of union, containing power, and a firm and immutable life. Hence loo, be says that it is eternal, yet does not add, that it has multitude in itself, but speaks of "it in the singular number ; signifying that union is especially present with it from eternity, so that the whole essence of intelligible animals shines forth as one nature, on account of eternity. If therefore, these things are riglitly asserted, eternity will not IM? one certain genus of iM-inir, as SOUK- think it is, such for instance as essence, or permanency, or sameness. For all these are parts of animal itself; and each of them has that to which it is as it were opposed. Thus for instance, essence is opposed to nonIMMIII:, to permanency, motion, and to .sameness, dilli reiice. But to eternity nothing is opposed. All these then fore, are similarly eternal, viz. sameness dif ference, permanency and motion. Tl.is however, would not l>e the case, if eternity was one of these. For motion and permanency are not similarly eternal with eternity. But all intelligible* are similarly perpetual and eternal beings.

Eternity therefore is not opposed to any one, either of these or of the things posterior to it. For time, which may se, m to subsist dissimilarly with reference toil, in the first place is not convoked about the same thin-s as eternity, but about things \\hit h do not receive connexion from eternity. In the ne\t place, it is an image, and not the opposition of it. as we have already observed, and shall demonstrate. Neither therefore, will eternity be one genus of being, nor the whole collection of the genera of it. For again multitude being in it, it would IM- in want of the union of that which abides in one. But eternity is that which abides in one. So that it would both abide, and not abide in one. It would abide indeed, as eternity, and as the cans,- of union to beings. But it would not abide, as consisting of multitude. In addition to all that has IMH-II said likewise, it is intellect which consists of these genera, and perceives their consummation. The conception liuvvvicr, of intellect, is different from that of eternity, just as the conception of soul, is dillereni from that ot time. For the energy of intellect,!* intraiiiitii-c ////</// -</av, but <>f ' ••tcmitii, impartible perpetuity. And after this man ner indeed, the things are distinguished from each other. But those who mingle all things into the same, and assert that there is only one intellect between soul and t lit good, are compelled to acknowledge that intellect and eternity are the

\Vhat then will eternity be, if it is neither one of the genera of being, nor con- 1 Tht w.-idi Ttnirurcu <•> appear to tic wauling in thi« place io tin- original. HOOK iv.] TIM.l-;i;s or PLATO. 1&5 sists of all the five. since all these are eternal, and eternity' is above these ? \Ve reply, what else can it In- than the comprehension1 of tin- intelligible unities ? But I mean liy tin' unities, the ideas of intelligible animals, and the genera of all these intelligible idea-. The one comprehension therefore of these, and of the summit of their multitude, and the rause of the immutable permanency of all of them is eternity, nut c\i-tin:r in the multitude of intelligible*, nor collected from them ; hut heini: present \vith them exempth, disposing and as it were forming them by itself, and making this very tiling to be at the same time a whole. l;or the allvarious idea of intelligible* is not produced immediately after the "w/r/, which is entirely without any representation of multitude, but there are certain intermediate natures, which are indeed more united than all-perfect multitude, but exhibit the parturiency and representation of the progeny of wholes, and of connectedly-con taining power in themsehes. The number however and nature of these, the Gods know divinely, but the my-lic tradition of the I'arinenides teaches us in a human manner, and philosophically, to which we refer the reader for the accurate discus sion of these particulars.

lint now we shall demonstrate through the words themsehes of the philosopher, thai eternity is above all-perfect animal, and that it is pr«\imat< ly aho\e it. For 1 eeause animal itself is said to Ineternal, it \\ill be secondary to eternity. iiut because then- is no eternal nature prior t<> it, it \\ill he proximateiy posterior to eternilv. N\ lience therefore, is tins evident ? \\ e reply, because neither is there any tiling tempural prior to [time] the ima'ze of eternity, but the world primarily participates of time, and animal itself, of eternity. For if as eternity is to time, so is animal itself to the \\orld, then alternately, as geometricians \\ould say, as eternity is to animal itself, so is time to the world. lini linn1 is first participated by the world : for it had no existence whatever, prior to the orderly distribution of the uni\erse. Jiternity therefore, is first participated by animal itself. If likewise, tune is not the. sensible animal which comprehends in itself all other sensible animals [j. <\ if it is not the mmersej; for it is generated together with it; but that which is gene rated with it, is not that with which itis generated ; - if this be the case, neither will eternity be the intelligible animal. Hence neither will it be an animal, lest there should be two [all-comprehending] intelligible animals. F'or it has been liefore demonstrated by Plato, that animal itself is only begotten. So that in short, eternity will not bean animal. For if it were, it would either bean animal ditlcrent from, or the same with animal itself. It is not however, possible to assert

1 For niwint lirrr it i» nrrr»«;iry In r«',i<l cnmr. 1 The word irrfxpy; h <>MIIII.<| lierr in thr original, bill fro in wli.il folluws, ullur lliij word, or aina 'tr fiora t «>r f»wTii ought evidently to IK: iiiMTlnl. Tim. Plat. VOL. II. 2 A ]gfj PHOCLUS ON THE [UOOK tv. either of these, us \\t: have oliown ; partly indeed, because aniiiud itself U only be- •rotten, and parity l>eeaiise time, and Unit which is tcinpoial, an* not the same. Hut if it is participated, mid does not participate of intelligible animal, it will be a (iud prior to animal itself, intelligible indeed, hut not yet an animal ; since animal itself also is a (iod. And this because the \\orld likewise is a (»od. For that Mhich is participated tin-re, Itut dm s not participate of a participated nature, is en tirely more total. It is e\ nli nl ho\\e\er, thai the pai ticipation is not corral in liotli. For (lie n»n • viuniun and ninun nf inU ///;,' ililcx, ic/iic/i nu-.c < ;///>/« (/'",- rccctttl parti&JnltioH, /v ilifici'uit from that «t ^CIIM/'/C tiiitttn-'i. I( appeals therefore, that the order of eternity, is su perior to thai of animal itself, and is proximately su|M-rior, and that it is the cause to in tell i;^il )!«'.•> of an in\ ari.iMe samene.ss of siili>isleiiee. Hence .some one may con sider it as the .same u it h ]nrnui>ii //ci/.

This ho\\i \er, is n <-o-ordinaled cause, and rather imparts a sameness of subsistence about energy. 15nt ( ii'rtiitt/ is an exempt cause. It also appeals, that eternity is the comprehension and union of mans in telligible unities. Jleiiceil is said b\ the | ' 'hald.i an | Oi ,i< les in\n- jiilln'i -lirgutlcn lii^lit, because it illniniiiate.s all thini^.s \\ith nnif\ iit.u li^hl. " l''or this alone, [says the Oracle] by plucking abnndanlly from tin strength of the father, tlie ihmer of intellect is enabled by intellection' to impart a paternal intellect to all the fountains and principles; together \\\(\\ intellectual energy, and a |H-rpetnal permanency, according to an nn.slnn^ish revolution." Tor beinir full of paternal deity, \\ Inch the Oracle calls the lloxser of intellect, it illuminates all things \\ilh intellect, and \\ith intellectual perception invariably the same, and also \\ith the ability ofre\olvin;r and i.-nt>rgi/.ili<r in an amatory manner, about the principle of all things. These things however, 1 e\ol\e in the. inaccessible recessi-s of the reasoning -po\\ er.

A^ain ho\ve\er, on all sitles investigating the concepfions of the philosopher about eternity, let Us consider \\hat is meant by eternity abiding in ai/c. 1'or we ask in what one? Is it in the good, a.s appeared to Ix- the case, to the most theo logical of the interpreters ! Jlut the ^o</</, does not even abide in itself, on account of its simplicity, as \ve may learn in the first hypothesis of the I'armenides, and at< he admits. .Much less therefore, can any tiling else abide in it. For in short, no thing is in it,1 nothing subsists together with it, on account of its being exempt from ji co-ordination with any tiling whatever. To which may be added, that it is not usual to call it either i^ood, or one, but t/ic %«rW, and the one, in order that we may form a conception of its monadic transcendency, which is beyond ' F»r TO »c»i» licrr, itail Tf into. 1 All tilings :«re c(uu|)n lu-n<l«l l»> tfif i»tt, hut iHilliiiij; suh»isl> ptcnliarly in it. Ami the coiiijtrrIllusion of all lhin»s l)y it, i> iiolliinc niori- lli:in the natlalilc union wliiih it imparts to .ill lliin^-,, UIK! through which all thing?, become bvundcd I'V it.

HOOK iv.] TIM.-EIS or PLATO. every known nature. \o\v however, eternity is not said to ahirle in (he one, but in one ; so that it does not abide in the good. J)oe«. therefore, the abiding of eter nity in one, signify tin? united nature as it were of it, and the abiding of it in its own one; and manifest that it is one multitude? Or, in short, does it indicate the number of that which does not proceed, in order that it may be the cause of union to the multitude of intelligible* .' This indeed, we also say is true, in order that it may impart to itself the stable, and the whole, prior to eternal natures. For this i> to abide in one ; \\/.. to have the whole at once present, and the same im mutable hyparxis. K\ery divine nature therefore, begins its energy from itself; so that eternity will establish itself in one, and connectedly contain it-elf after the same manner, prior to eternal beings. Hence it is not l>eini,r, as Strato the physiologist says, which i- the cause of permanency,1 but eternity. And it is the cause of a permanency,' not always in generation, or becoming to IM>, but which immutably e.\ist*< in one, as Tinneus savs.

If however, eternity exhibits a duad, though we frequently endeavour to con ceal it; far the ahcayi is conjoined to bcin^ according to the same, and eternity (etunv) is, tlint irhich ahi'difx is (o an wv) ; it appears that it will have the monad of l>eiii£ prior to itself, and the one beinir; and that it will abide in this one, as our preceptor also thought concerning it ; in order that it may be one prior to the duad, as not departing from unity. And the duad indeed, antecedently exhibitin^ multitude in itself, is united to the one beinir, in which eternity abide* ; but the multitude of infelli^iblex js united to eternity itself, which comprehends exemptly and unically, all the summits of them. For that the conception of the one beinc; and of eternity difler, is evident. For (o />,• c//uw/v, and to be simply, are entirely dillerent. It therefore, a certain ihintr (thraii* is, tliis tiling also /.s; but not vice \ersa, if a certain thiirj is, it likewise ahcai/s is. Hence In rr/V is more total and generic, than to c.ritt a/irm/x. And on this account likewise, it is nearer to the cause of all heiu-s of the unities in bein-s, and of generation and matter. These three things therefore, are successive; vi/.. the one hein«, as the monad of lM-ini«i; clcrnilj/ a^ a duad, haxinir the akcays in conjunction with existence; and the ekrnal, which participates both of existence, and the always, and is not primarily perprtual beini; like eternity. And the one bein- in<leed, is alone the cause of exist ence to all tiling of whatever kind they may IM-, whether they exist truly, or not truly. But eternity is the cause of permanency in existence. Slraio therefore, on-jlit rather to have asserted this, and not to have defined !>ein£ to \K the pi-r-

1 For .Viio/ji/k in ilii- ]il;uc( iti, ncccs«nrv to read tttifiof^i. Here lo« tor .^iaro^^t, read ha/ion^. |>m FIIOCM'S ON THK [BOOK iv. inancncy ' of l>eings ; as lie writes in his treatise Concerning /?<•!««•, thus transfer ring the peculiarity of eternity to being. For neither in generated natures, is it the same tiling to lw> generated, and to remain generated. But the peculiarity of generation is for that which has it to exhibit another and another [condition of sub sistence] ; and the peculiarity of generation remaining, or being permanent, is time in which generation exists. And what time is in generation, that cternit\ is in essence. Concerning the development however, of that mighty dixmitv eternity abiding in one, let thus much suffice. J{nt why doe> Plato say, " (lie nature »f animal itself was eternal,' and not is, though to eternity the mr.c is more adapted than the Jtaxt time? lie employs therefore, clsewln re this form of diction, as when he says of the Demiiirgus who is always ijood, " he jctis good ;" signifying that he is not this from time, but that lie alwa\s was so; and thai in dirinc natui'i*, l/ic cm/s itrf antcccdcnllif assumed timl co-assumed \iitli tfic ln'sfinnin^s, jinur tn all citt/isimi. At present however, the word :«/.» i> more opportunely iisrd. For sim e IM.ito adoru^ the unueise according to hypothec-., but pi iof to the ;M!UI IIIHL;, intelligible^ r\i-lid, though liol m time, yet iu dignity, and als«» siieh things as siib>i-l logi-tlier witli intelli^iblrs ;

— on this account hesavs, " it «v/.v." Hut an.un by employing the \\onl /HUH;' (irxra.), he assists (he imbreilily o! 'the intjn /•/«/ MI!». I m lie uUo make.s it to lie essential, hud no less so than the /TIM/,/. He lilo-ui-e, adapts toeleiinty what he sass conceriiini; it ; to its perfection indeed, lhr«>ugh the wonl was; and to its essen tial ln-ini:, by I'o-intnMliiciiia the word l/<.ing. And thus much concerning the lit. tie words [which I'lato employs.]

NNhy llOWi'icr, was it not possible perfectly t«» adapt the eternal to the gene rated ! Is it not Iwcaiise e\ery thing generate<l, may be said to ha\e its e\istenc(> in mutation ; but that which is perfectly eternal, is immutable and iinbegotteil f These natures therefore being opposed to each other, if some one should violently endeavour to connect the perfectly eternal with that which is generated, lie would not make it immutable, and would destroy its nature. Is then eternity present with that which is sensible, after a certain manner, and not entirely ' ISut how is it possible we should not acknowledge this! For that which participates of the image of eternity, participates also in a certain respect of eternity ; though not in such a way as that which participates of it immediately. And in short superior causes alwa>s adorn the dominion of such as are subordinate, so that eternity 1 And litre ;iKo f\n tiavaftqv, r<atl £ia/jc/i qr. 1 The wortl* ol Pluto are, >i /"»• HW run cu/ou £HTU frvy^itt*' wra U<WIK>, m tthicli, as Proclus ut>brm>, the ini|>t il« rt MI'' i -'•/ \<IKI , !<•«*, is a;>ibtcd l»y the partiviplc won, bring.

HOOK iv.] TIM/Kl'S OF PL,\TO. ]fcf) likewise, is; in a <vrl:iiri respect present \villi the natures that are adorned by time. For according Jo oin- all-perfect boundary indeed, it is present with intelligible* alone; hut il is likewise capable of being present with mundane things nmltitudinously, according to divided perfections and definite measures of life, ami especially according to ihe essences of the celestial souls. The. world itself also receive-; eternity, not :is it is; and on this account neither is it said to he eternal ; hut as f;ir as il is aide, it receives its jinpartihle presence, and illumination. This therefore, i- tin* transcendent ^ood in eternity of a divine, cause and comprehen sion. Hence it comprehends par tilde essences, and such as are as it were contrary to its own nature, according to the concatenation of cause. And thus much for this particular. I'xit how i< time s;nd to he the imam- of eternity? Is liberalise eternity indeed a hides in one, but time proceed* according to number? This however, rather shows the dissimilitude than the similitude of them. For 1'lato nearly opposes all tilings [pertaininir to eternity and time] to all, viz. proceeding, to abiding ; accord' ing to number, to one ; the image, to the thing ifxelf. It is better then-lore to say, that divinity produced these two, I mean eternity and time, as the measures of beings the former of intelligible but the latter of mundane beings.

As therefore, the world is said to be the ima^e of the intelligible, thus also (he mundane, measure is denominated the imajje of the intelligible measure. ICternity however, is indeed a measure as unity, but time as number. For each measures, the. former things v. Inch licc.omc one, but the latter such as are numbered. And the former measures the jtennanency of beings, but tin1 latt(>r the cj:len.<iion' t>( gene rated iialurcx. The apparent oppositions however, of the two, do not exhibit dissimilitude of measures, but indicate that secondary are produced by more venerable and ancient natures. ];or progression is from permanency, and num ber from unity, lint is not time on this account the ima^e of eternity, because it j* effective of the perfection of mundane natures, just as eternity is the container and •juardian of beings ? For MS things which arc unable In Hie according to inlclLct, are brought under the order of Falc, lest by , flying from dirinily, they should become perfectly disorderly, thus also things which proceed f-om eternity, and are not able to participate of a «.t;ibh> perfection, which is at once whole, and always the. same end indeed under the dominion of time, but are excited by it to their own* appropriate energies, by which they are enabled to receive tl«e end adapted to them, through certain apocatastatic periods.

1 For irn^furnffif liriv, read Trafinraiiv. 1 Instead of invrov lirir, it i« necessary to read ruyrux 190 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK iv. It is also well that Plato culls the production of time, the conception or contriranee, (is-ivoia,) of the Dominions. For to impart to beings which are not naturally eternal, an adventitious ami temporal perpetuity, and also to confer inflection on things imperfect, and a circular apocatastasis, on things which proceed in a ri-ht line, does not appear to fall far short of imoition and contrivance. Hence, in what follows, he says that divinity contrived the p-neration of the parts of time. Hut how is the imaue of eternity said to be moxeable?1 ]s it ' because? all of it is moved and the whole is in motion? Or is not this impossible? For nothing is moved according to the whole of itself, nor is this the case, even v\ith such thin»> as are essentially changed : for the subject of the>e remains. Much more there fore, will tilings which are moved according to the other motions, remain accord ing to essence, whether they are incr«-ased, or changed in qnalit), or locally moved. For if they did not remain according to something, their motion like wise would vanish, together with them: for all motion i.s in a certain tiling. TS'othinir therefore, as \\c liave said, is \\holly moved, and this is especially the case with perpetual natures, which ou^lit to !•«• established in their proper princi ples, and to remain in themselves, if they are to be continually preserved.

But it is p-articularly requisite, that the ima-e of eternity should have a perpetual sameness of subsistence, ami stability ; so that it is impossible that time should l»e mo\eable at cording to the whole of itst If, since it is not possible for this to lie the case with any thin:: else. It is necessarily requisite therefore, that something of it should remain; .since e\ery tiling which is moxed, is moved in consequence of ha\iu^ somethiim- of itself which remains. Hence the monad of time remains .suspended from the l)einiur^u>. Hut hein'4 full of measuring power, and wishing to measure the motion- of the psychical ' essence, ai.d the existence, energies and passions of the pliysic.il and corporeal essence, it proceeds according to number. Time therefore abiding by its impartible and inward energy, proceeds according t(» immlN-r by its external enemy and which is participated by the natures which it measures; vi/. it proceeds according to a certain intellectual number, or rather according to the I'uM number, which I'armenides would say, beini; analogous to the one />c:n<j,, presides o\er the intellectual, in ihe same manner as that does o\er the, intelligible orders. It proceeds therefore, according to thai nmiilwr. Hence alsf), it distributes an appropriate- measure to each * of the mundane lorms.

You may likewise say still more proximately, thai true time proceeds accord- ' lor im/rn lim-, n-aiK.iflrvi. 1 1 l,i ic i-> .MI <niii>»ion IKTC in (lie original, ol **/. * lot vl'\';> ll»'l«', f«'"l yVX'*'/»' 4 Iinlt.nl ol tkuirri/. in llii^ I'l.KP, it >•> ncvcss;ir> to read tkiiirri/. HOOK iv.] TIM/LUS OF PLATO. 191 inir to true number, participating' of the numbers of it, and being itself intellectual number, \vliirh Socrates .speaks of, and obscurely signifies, when lit- says, that swiftness itself and slowness itself are in true number, Ity which the things mea sured by time, dilli r, hem1.: moved more svv illly, or more slow ly. 1 Iciire also Tima-ns does nut ' spe.ik iniieli alionl (his niinilier because Socrates on the preceding day had perfeetlv unfolded it, but about that which proceeds from it. I'nr ///<// lirinsr truly existing number, he says this proceeds according to number. It proceeds therefore, according to intelligible numlxT, by which it numbers its participants, juntas, vice \ersa, the time which is in sensible*, proceeds according to that vvhi<h numbers, being itself that which is numbered, and still possessing the ima^e of essential time, through which all things are numbered by greater or less numlxTs of their life. So that an o\ lives for this, but man for that length of time, but the sun is restored to its pristine state in one, and the moon in another period of time, and other things accomplish their periods according to other measures.

Time therefore, is the pleasure of motions, not as that by which we measure ; for this the conception about time ellerts, and not time itself, but as productive, and defi nitive of the existence of tin hie, and every other motion of things in time, and an measuring them and assimilating them according to paradigms. For as it refers itself to the similitude of eternity, which comprehends paradigmatic causes, thus also it refers the things which are perfected by itself, and which are convolved in a circle, to the more venerable imitation of eternal principles. How tb< re fore, being such and so great a (jlo<), will it be the measure of motion, or in short of generation,1 as it appeared to somr that it is, who neither jx Tceived the power of it, nor its demiurgic * prewnce with all things? M hen also, they say that it is rather the cause of corruption, than of generation, and of oblivion than preser vation, and of these according to accident, and not essentially, they very cr.uch resemble those that are asleep, and who are unable to collect by a reasoning pro cess what the benefits are conferred by and through time on the soul and the body, on all heaven through the. whole of itself, and on all lieneraliou. Theitrgists iikr^ise confirm -^hat ttr lutic asserted, when they say, that time is a God, and delirer to us the discipline o/'it, by -dhirh we arc enabled to excite it to become liiiblc ; and •xhcn also, thay celebrate it fis older and younger, and as a circularly revolving and eternal God, not only as the image of'cterniti/, but as eternally receiving it. They

1 Tor firrn/i'\'»rn liorr. Trail jtirt\nyrn. 1 Or iv omitted lirrr in llie original. 1 IriMrml of Kirqitfvi in llii^ placo, it is olmoti*ly ncccssanr to read ycrcffrwi. * For ro« • ^<7/i(oi'py<iioii here, rca<t Tf 192 IMtOCLUS ON THK [BOOK iv. Rkewise add, that it intellectually perceives the whole numfter of all the natures that are moved in the world, according to which it convolves and restores to their pristine stiite all moving substances, In/ swifter or slower periods. And besides this tlicy assert ihatitis infinite in power. For to circulate a 'gain and again , [without end"] is the pro vince ()f inji n't te power. Together with these things lUcticise, they suy thnt it is of a spiral form, as measuring according to one power , both things that are mured in a right line, and those that arc moved in a circle ; just us a spiral line uniformly [or according to onejorm~\ comprehends the right and the circular line. \Ve must not therefore, accede to tin- opinion ot* those, who consider time as subsisting in mere conceptions, or who make it to l»e a certain accident. IN'or must we assent to those \vlioare more venerable than these, and who approaching nearer to the peculanty ol' the things themselves, say that time is generated Iroin tin- total soul eiier^i/iiiu; transitively, or from it encr^i/mi; collectively and without transition, and measuring by time, tin- c< lestial circulations, and the periods of other souls ;

— not even to these must \ve assent, though they are not \er\ remote from the truth. For in the tirst place I'lato, with \\hom \ve all desire lo aeeord al»out divine concerns, says o!' the Deiniur^us, that he constituted time, the world IKMIIU now arranged hoth according to soul, and iicconlin,; t«i hody, and did not produce it within the soul, as he did the harmonic raln>>; nor does he represent tiiMiutv fashioning time in the soul, in the >ame manner a> he sa\s that he fabri cated the corporeal-formed nature within it; hut having spoken concerning ; the esM-nce, harmony, pouer, motions, and the all-various knowledge ol the soul after all thoe, in order to i;i\e perfection hoth to soul and body, he generated the essence of time, as irnardinu', nua^urm^, and a>-inin.itiiii; all these to their para digmatic principles. I'm what advantage would mundane nature?, den\e from possessing all things beautifully, iflh.-y did not p. i petualK remain.' Or from imitating after a certain manner, the idea of the paradigm, but not as much as possible e\ ol\ inu the whole ol 'it, and partibly recemu^ impartible intellection 1 On these accounts therefore, the philosopher places o\er the progression of time, a deiniurific, and not a psychical cause.

In the next place, looking to thmn«» themselves, you may say that if soul gene rated time, it would not so partu'ipate oj it, as to ho perfected bv it. For that the soul is perfected by time, and measured according to its energies, is not nnmanifest ; since e.ver> tiling which docs not nccne collectively, now, and at once, the whole of eiieriiy, re«|uires time, m order to its perfection and apocalastasis, through which every tiling collects the a|mn.priate i;ood, which it i.s inca pable of ncei\i!i'.', nnpartilily, and without time. Hence, a> we have before observed, eternity and time, are the measures of the permanency and perfection nook iv.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. ]«>3 of beings ; the former being the one and unrmilti plied comprehension of the intel ligible unities, hut the latter be-in;; the boundary and demiurgic measure of the perpetuity, or of the more or le.ss permanency of tin1 things which proceed from intelligibles. If, therefore, the soul, after the same manner as intellect and the Gods, apprehended every object of its knowledge by one projecting energy, and by an energy always tlie same, understanding intransitively, it might, perhaps, have generated time, but it would not have l>een in want uf time to its perfection. But since it understands, or perceives intellectually, with transition, and apocatastatically, and one soul requires the whole of time, but another a certain part1 of it, in order to the possession of intellectual and gcnesitirgio lives;

and if, in short, no cause is in want of its offspring to the |>erfection of itself; if this l>e the case, soul would thus l>e both jwrfect and imperfect, prior to constitutm™ that which is .secondary to itself. It would be perfect indeed, in order that it mi^ht generate; since nothing imperfect is generative of another tiling. And it would also be imjM'rfeGt, In-canse it would never participate of that which cau-es it (o IK? perfect. And it is altogether absurd to say, that causes are in want of the thing's which proceed from them. IA-! this, therefore, be considered by you as the greatest argument, that time is not the progeny of soul, but that it is first partici pated by soul.

A Tier this, however, it is mpiisite to understand, that inanimate natures also participate of lime, and that they do not then alone participate of it when they rise into existence, in the same manner as they do, of form and habit ; but even when they appear to IN- deprived of all life, they then participate of time, and not in such a way as they are said to live, because they are co-arranged with wholes, and are co-passive with the universe. For they peculiarly and essentially partici pate of a certain time, and this so far as they are inanimate, and are always in a. perishing condition till their perfect corruption. For time i> every where present. And the architect indeed, is able to say for how lontr a time a wall will endure, and the weaver can tell the extent of the duration of a shirt, or in short of a gar ment.* In a similar manner also, every artist can say what will be the duration of his own work; though he cannot speak so definitely as concerning the pro ductions of nature. Hut the prophet speaks about the duration of alMhinirs, as being able to survey the temporal interval distributed to things from the universe. In addition to these things also, since the psychical and corporeal mutations, motions and rests, and in short all such mundane natures, us are opposed to

For ftvftirv Iif re, read /mpir>t». 1 For mffflijrdi here, it i» n*re*»ar\ to read rvOqroi. Tim. Plat. VOL. II. 2 li u,4 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i». each other, an- measured I>y time, it is necessary tliat time should IMJ exempt from all these. For that which licing one and the same, is participated Its many things, and these dissimilar*;, and always pro-subsists by itself, must be in an exempt manner participated by them. Anil still more being in all things, it is every when- impartible, so that it is every where one l>eing, impartible according to numlK.T, and jx-culiar to no one of the things which are said to subsist accord ing to it ; which Aristotle also perceiving he shuxvs that in partible' natures, there is something incorporeal and impartible, which is every whore the same; assum ing* this to be the iiu'x or an instant. Farther still, if time \\vre not an essence but an accident, it would not thus exhibit a demiurgic power, » so as to make some things to be perpetually generati ••!, but others of a longer or shorter duration, according as their nature is stronger, or weaker; and to distribute (o all things an appropriate measure of duration amoiii; beings. If hoxvevcr, it is a demiurgic essence, it \\ill neither be the whole soul [of the timversej nor a part of soul. For the conception of soul is different from that of time, and each is the cause of different, and not* of the same thing*.

Fur soul imparts life, and moves all things. Hence tin world also, as it approaches, to soul, is tilled with life, and participates of motion. Hut time which5 excites demiurgic ellects to their perfection, and to the measure of them b\ wholes, and which is the supplier of a certain perpetuity, '' will not he subor dinate to soul, since soul likewise participates of it; and though not essentially, vet according to its transitive energies. For the soul of the ii inverse is said to ener^i/c incessantly, and to live wisely through the w hole of time. It remains therefore that time is an essence, and is not secondary to soul. After all how ever, it must be considered, that if eternity was the oll'sprini; ; of intellect, or a certain intellectual power, it would be requisite to say that lime is something of tliis kind pel taming to soul. Hut ifctcrnilx is the exempt measure of the multi tude of intelligible*, and the comprehension of the perjH-Uuty and perfection of all things, how is it possible that tune also should not have this ratio to soul, and the psychical order; dillcrin^ from them in the same way, as all proceeding difil-r from abiding causes f Fur eternity exhibits a greater transcendency than time,

1 The word fUfitoruii i-> omitted m die original. ' Illitrad ol X(i/)(ir lltif. It M H'tj'ii-ilr to n.ul .Xii^w*. * I'or irc^i'ia/ni- liiTt, H'ail IVIMI/.I». * (>i< 1-. oiuiltiil IK re in lli<> i.ri^iua!. * L liki'wiM- is omitted in l\»i jil.icc in the original. <• lor c,,tV, IKT,-, it i» i.rct5»-.ir\ lo nad u.cScrijrei. HOOK iv.] T1M.EUS OF PLATO. i;>5 with respect to the filings that on- measured by it. For the former comprehends exemptly, both tin? essences and tin- unities of intelligibles ; but the latter does not measure the essences of the first s<niU, ' as r,itli« r subsisting co-ordinatelv '.vitli (hem, and lK»ing trenenited together with them. As some ]Matoni*ts likewi>e say, time does not measure tin- intellectual energies of the first souU ; though Plato clearly says, that the soul of the universe leads a divine and wise life through the whole of lime. Intelligible* also, are more united to eternity than mundane natures to time ; and the union of them is so ^reat, that some of the more contemplative phi losophers have apprehended eternity to IK- nothing else than the one and total intellect [ \vhieh comprehends all other intellects]. Hut no one of the more wise is willing to admit that time is the same w.ith the things that are in time, on ac count of the great separation and difference between them.

Y\ hat then wdl time be, if it is neither something belonging to motion, nor a concomitant of the psychical energy, nor in short, the progeny of soul, nor as some innovating in divine concerns say, who conceive time to be the psychical circle of the tliljcrcnt, but eternity the psychical circle of flic seimc ? For 1 have heard that Theodorus philosophized things of this kind. lie however, who endeavours to correct this opinion, will never admit that these parts of the soul are the same as eternity and time; but he will ^rant that the circle of tin- different verges to temporal, but the circle of the .tfitnc, to eternal natures. Since therefore, we do not approve any one of these opinions, what will time be? l;or it is not perhaps sufficient to say, that it is the measure of mundane natures, nor to enu merate the benefits of which it is the cause, but the peculiarity of it is to lie ap prehended to the utmost of our power. Shall we therefore say, that the essence of it bring most excellent, perfective of soul and present with all things, is an intellect not alone abiding, but also moving; abiding indeed, according to the inward energy, by which it is truly eternal; but moved, according to the exter nally proceeding energy, according to which it bounds all transition. For eternity possessing permanency, both according to its inward energy,

and according to that which it exerts towards eternal natures, time adumbrates it, according to one of these, but becomes separated from it according to (he other, in consequence of abiding and being moved. Hence it will be something at once intelligible and generated, and something at once partible and impartible. At the same time, however, we admit all these things in the psychical essence, and we are no otherwise able perfectly to apprehend this middle nature, than by employing i»fter a certain manner opposites in surveying it. >Vhy therefore is it wonderful,

' i. c. of »uperiuundauc J96 l»HOCLUS ON THE [BOOK IT. if we perceiving the nature of time, to IK? partly immoveable ami partly moved, or rather not we, hut prior to us the philosopher, he should exhibit the intellectual monad of it abiding in sameness, through it* beinj; eternal, l>ut should indicate that energy of it which has an external tendency, and is participated by soul, and the whole world, through its Ix-int; m>ved. For we mu.st not imagine that this eternal [of time] merely signifies that it is the imaije of eternity. For what should have hindered him from directly saying, that time is the i/wfl"* of eternity, and not that it is the tU-nial ima«;e of it .' But he wished to manifest this very tiling, that time has an eternal nature, yet that it is not eternal in such away as animal itself. For animal itself is eternal both in essence and in energy. But time by its inward enrrirv indeed, is eternal, but by its externally proceeding pift, is moveabie. Hence thenr^ists also call it eternal, and I'lato very properly denominates it not eternal onlv.1 For one tiling indeed is alone and essentially moveabie, and is alone the cause of motion, according to the participants of it, and such a tiling as this is soul. It alone therefore, moves itself, and other things. But another tiling is alone immoveuble, preser\ \\\£ itself immutable, an<l bein-;

the cause to other things of an invariable sameness of subsistence, and to things that are moved on account of soul. [And this thin- is intellect.] Hence it is necessary that the medium In-twcen these two \vhicharee\treines, viz. between that which is immoveablu both ill essence and energy, and that which is mo\eahle both according to its own nature and ac cording to what it imparts to other things, should Ix- that which is at once im moveable and moved ; immoveable indeed essentially, but moved in its partici pants. And a tiling of this kind is time. For if there is that which is in its participants a> number in that which is numbered,1 what will that U: which subsists according to numherin<; it ? It is absurd, therefore, to say that it is a par tial soid which thus subsists. For that which in this soul nmnlx-r.s time is of pos terior origin, as is that which in us numbers the lingers. Hence this is not effected by him who makes the five finders, but by him who numlR-rs so many ' that are produced by nature. \Ve however, investigate the cause of time l*-inj; that which is numbered. Time therefore is that which remaining immoveable, by itself evolves that which is numbered.

In short, if visible time i* moveahle, but every tiling which is moveabie is moveable, beiiii,' a certain other thini; ; for not motion, but that which is moved, is moveabie; it is necessary that there should be time which subsists by itself, in order that there may l>e moveabie time. So far therefore, as it is truly time, and 1 For /jcm lierp, it i> nect-^ary to rt-ail uv potvt. • Instead of *> ro a^.O*.. 17,0^ a,«0/u-» in thi> j.l.u e, it is necessary to reail. «» tv ry ap J^v/ier 1 For TotovT** here, it is nectibury to read roaouTovt. BOOK iv.] TIMvEUS OF PLATO. I97 so far as it is in itself, it is imtnoveable ;' but so far as it is in its participants it is moveable, and together with them, unfolds itself into thrm. Hence lime is eter nal indeed, and a monad, and a centre essentially, and according to the energy which abides in it. At the same time however, it is continued, and number, and a circle, according to its proceeding and participated energy. // is, therefore, a certain proceeding intellect, established indeed in eternity, and on this account also i* said to In- eternal. For it would not otherwise contribute to the more perfect assimila tion of mundane natures to their paradigms, unless it was itself previously exempt from them. J>«t it proceeds, and flaws abundantly into the things, which are guarded by it.

Whence also 1 think, the most consummate oj thetirgists celebrate it at a God, as Julian in the seventh book of his treatise On the Zones, and venerate it by those names through irhich it is unfolded into light in its participants; causing some things to be more undent, but others to he more recent, and convolving all things in a circle. For it would l>e ridiculous since it is the linage of eternity, that it should alone be this temporal ima^e which subsists in things that are numbered. For how is it possible that a thing of this kind which is in a subject, should l>e the image of no great a deity as eternity ? ^specially since it rather appears to be in a subject [than is so in reality], and is itself an accident of that which is an accident.

If, however, intellect is secondary to eternity, but soul is the resemblance of intellect, how is it possible that time which is the image of eternity, should not be something more excellent, and more essential than soul .' For as intellect is to soul, so will eternity be to time. And alternately, as time is to soul,' so is eter nity to intellect.' And time, does not participate of soul,4 as neither does eternity of intellect ; but vice versa. Time therefore having a certain intellectual nature, convolves its participants, both other things and souls, according to number. For time indeed is eternal, not only in essence, but also in its inward energy, in which it is always the same. But by the energy according to which alone it is participated by external natures, it is moveable, co-extending toge ther with, and adapting to them, its gift. Every soul, however, is moved tran sitively, both according to its inward energies, and also its external energies, through which it moves bodies. And it appears to me, that it was thus denominated time, by those who perceived that this was its nature; and who wished by Ihitt appellation to say, that it is a certain dance,1 and as it were a dancing intellect

1 For unr' (vriikir in tlm place, it is necessary to read nxiytjror. * Instead of *Y>O vl'X'>' nrre> 'l is necessary to read irpot \lv\riv. 1 Here also for •*<•« vov, it i- necessary to read vpoi tout-. * Instead of cat perf\iiTo vr' UITIJI in (his place it it requisite to read, ou /MT«^C< e gp«r«f «rrr^. * For xf0ror bere, read xnP°l>* 198 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK iv. (xou 0*0* %optwt*Ta. *>«*). But by a co-division, they named it for the sake of con cealment time. Perhaps, likewise, they gave it this appellation because it at once abides, and proceeds with a measured motion; and hy one part of itself abides, but by the oilier proceeds ; as if it were half intellect, and half saltant. Hence by a composition of both the parts, they signified the admirable and demiurgic nature of this God. It ap]>ears likewise, that as the Demiurgus being intellectual, began from intellect to adorn the universe, so time being supermundane, l>egan from soul to perfect it. For that time is not only mundane, but by a much greater priority .supermundane, is e\ident; since as eternity is to animal iNelf, so is time to tins world, which is animated and endued with intellect, and is wholly the image of animal itself, iu the same manner as time is of eternity.

If therefore time is, it both abides and proceeds in measured motion. And through its abiding, the harmonious dances are infinite, and apocatastatic. For Ix.-ing the first intellect that dances about the whole fabrication of things, so far indeed as it subsists invariably the same, and is essentially intellect, it is said to l>e eternal ; but so far as it dances, it convolves souls, and natures, and bodies in a circle; and in short, is periodically restored to its pristine state. For the world is moved indeed, as participating of soul ; but it is moved in an orderly manner, because it participates of intellect. For thus also Plato says in the Laws, " that the tout receiving a divine intellect, governs •u'tth rectitude and wisdom." And the world is mo\ed periodically, by the motion of it from the same to the same; in consequence of which, it may be said to mutate the permanency of intellect in sameness, through the imitation of ett rnity by time. And this it is, to make the world more similar to its paradigm which abides in one ; vi/. to be convolved periodically to one ami the same thing, through the circulation according to time. From all these particulars likewise, you have all the causes of time according to Plato. For the Demiurgus indeed, is the effective cause of time; eternity is the paradigm of it ; and the end (or the final cause] of it, i.-> the circumduction to one tiling of the natures that are moved, according to jwriods.

For that which does not abide in one, aspires after the rircumdudion to one ; desiring through this to obtain the one, which is the same with the j,'(W. For that there should not be one certain progression of things in a right line, so as to form a line as it were, infinite both ways, but that the progression should lw» definite and circumscribed, dancing about the father of wholes, and the monad of time, evolving all the ^rength of fabrication, and again returning to its pristine condition, and effecting this fre quently, or rather infinitely, thai which is consentaneous to reason requires, if it is fit to call what is necessary reasonable. For whence do the participants ».f time derive the power of being restored to their pristine condition, unless thai

HOOK iv.] TIM/F.US Of PLATO. ]!n, which they participate had this power and peculiarity of motion? In addition also, to the reasonableness of this, the explanation of the name alone bears witness to its truth, with which likewise, the demonstrations of the most sagacious legislators accord, and the words of 1'lato himself who says, that time in these thinys imitating eternity, and circulating according to numl>er, was now gene rated. For time circulating the first of moveable natures, according to an energy proceeding to externals, and returning to its pristine state, after all the evolution of its povcr, tints also restores the periods of other natures to their pristine condition. And it convolves indeed, through the whole of itself which proceeds, the soid which is the first participant of it; but through certain parts of itself, it convolves other souls and natures, the celestial circulations, and in the last place, all generation. For in consequence of time circulating, all things an? convolved in a circle. Of the circulations however, some are shorter, hut others longer. For again, if the Demiurgus himself, made time to he the tnoveablo image of eternity, and nave subsistence to it, according to his intellection about eternity, it is necessary that the moveable nature of time should be circular, and proceed with a dancing (or measured] motion; in order that it may neither depart from eternity, and may evolve the intellection of the father about it.

For, in short, the moveable nature of time being comprehensive of all motions, oui:ht to be bounded much prior to the tiling which are measured by it. For not the privation of measure, but the first measure, measures beings ; as neither does infinity give bound to things but this is the province of the tir-t bound. But time is moved, neither ac cording to soul, nor according to nature, nor according to the corporeal-formed and visibieessence; for thus the motionsof jt would be partible, and not comprehensive of wholes. Besides this also, they would participate of the anomalous, either more or less, and would be themselves in want of time. For the motions according to soul, nature and body, are all of them surveyed in time, and not in progression like those which measure wholes, but in a certain quality of life, or lation, or passion. The motion of time however, is a pure progression, without difference, impercep tible, unbroken,1 orderly,1 equal, similar and the same. For it is exempt both from equable and unequable motions, and is similarly present with both, not being changed in quality, by the ailiation in their motions, but remaining the same separate from all ineqt. ability ; being efficacious of whole motions according to nature, and measuring them, and restoring them to thrir pristine state. It likewise subsists unminglcd with the natures that are measured by it, conformably

' tor aj^oXairroi INTT, rfa«l aiAaaroi. * lustead of arorroi in Ibis place, it is of crisiry to read cvrawoi. to the peculiarit j of intellectual energy ; but proceeds transitively and selfmotively. And in this respect, it pertains to the psychical order, but is inherent in the things which are defined and perfected by it in a way conformable to the nature of a primordial cause. It is not however, allied in all respects to any one being. For it is necessary that the measure of wholes should be in a certain respect similar and allied to all things, but should not be the same with any one of the natures which it measures. The motion therefore of time proceeds, evolving and dividing impartible and abiding power, and partibly unfolding it into light. For just as a certain numl>er ' receives divisihly all the forms of the monad, and converts, and circularly leads them to itself ; thus also, the motion of time, proceeding according to the mea sures in the temporal monad, conjoins the end to the beginning, and this infi nitely ; having indeed itself a divine order, yet not an arranged, as the philoso pher lamhlichus also says, but an arranging order, nor an order which follows precedaneous natures, but which is the primary leader of things which are JKTfectly effected. At the same time however, it is measured by nothing that has interval. For it would be ridiculous to say, that things which have a more ancient nature and dignity, are measured by such as are of posterior origin.

But the motion of time is alone measured by the temporal monad, winch the progres sion of time is said to evolve, and by a much greater priority, by the Demiurgus, and eternity itself, of which it is said to l>e the image, and vnlh reference to which it is made to be moveable. \Vith reference to eternity therefore, which is perfectly immoveaule, time is said to IK* »,)oveuble ; just as if some one should say, that soul, as with relation to intellect, in partible about bodies. Not that it is this alone, but that when compared with intellect, it may appear to Ix- a thing of this kind ; though it is impartible, with reference to the partible essence. Thus also time, though it is naturally eternal, yet is said to l>e moveable, as with reference to eternity itself. On account of the order likewise of it, and the continuity in its progression, it is by no means proper to think that the prior and posterior in it are such as some apprehend them to be. For it must not !M- definitely surveyed, either alone according to the mutations of motions, as in the celestial motions ; nor in the evolutions of lives, as in the soul ; nor according to the gradual progres sions of corporeal generations, a.s in nature; nor according to any thing else of the like kind : (for these are the |>eculiarities of the orders posterior* to it) but it must be surveyed according to a precedency of causes, and connexion in the continuity

1 i. e. The detail. * lu>tead ul fur' avruv here, it is necessary to read fur' u»rc>. of its progeny, and according to a primordial energy, and a power eilicacious of all-various motions. Time therefore is vio-vcable, not by itself, [or essentially], but according to the partici pation of it which is apparent in motions, and by which motions arc measured and defined.1 Just as if some one should say, that the soul is dirigible about bodies, so far as there is a certain divisible participation of it about bodies, r>f which (he soul compre hends the cause. For thus also time is mo-ccable, as possessing the cause of ths energy proceeding from it, and which is parlibly seen in motions, and is cc-dirided together with them. Hence, as motions become temporal through participation, so like wise time is mo\ cable, through being participated by motions; to which physio logists only looking, think that time is that which is numbered of motion, not lx>ing able to perceive the cause of this. In the first place therefore, it must l>e said, that neither does the universe alone subsist in motion, but it is necessary that something of it should entirely remain, in order that this being permanent, it may be moved. It is demonstrated therefore, in the Thea-tetus, that it is impossible for any thing to be entirely moved in all respects. Hence it is necessary that something .should remain prior to the time which is in participation, and subsists in motion, in consequence of being coextended with motion.

And that this indeed, should be ine'licacious is impos sible. But if it is efiicacious, and is moved, it \\ill again be in uant of another thnig, which may measure its motion, //"/itfawcr, // energizes immoi-cahly, this will be the true peculiarity of time. In the second place, \ve are persuaded from common conceptions, that the Seasons are Goddesses, and that Month is a God, both which we worship in temples. AVe likewise say, that Day and Night are divinities, of whom also we possess invocations, imparted by the Gods them selves. Much more therefore, is it necessary that time it.self should be a God, since it is comprehensive of Month, and the Seasons, of Day and Night. In the third place, if time is something numbered ; but it is necessary that prior to that which is numbered, that which numliors should exist, so that prior to that \\hich is numln-red in capacity, there should l>e that which numbers in capacity, and that which numliers in energy, prior to that which is numbered in energy ; if thi* l>e the case, that is time in reality, which is the number itself, of all periods, and which numbers each of them. In the fourth place, whatever participates of soul, participates also of time, but not vice versa: for inanimate natures participate of time. It must be admitted therefore, that time is beyond soul. But soul is prior

For fjtrttovtinv KOI opx<£ov9ar in tins jilacr, read fitrpnvffav rai ry.izovirar. Tim. Plat. VOL. II. 2 C o02 PHOCLUS ON THE [BOOK iv. to its participants, itself by itself. Much more therefore is time itself by itself beyond the participants of time. How then will a thing of this kind l>e the image of eternity? For again it must l>e discussed, on account of the difficulty with which the knowledge of the things is attended. Because, says the divine lamhlichus, it exhibits the infinity of eternity, (which is now being, is at once all, abides in the now, and is the unmeaMired measure of intelligihles,) in a cireu4fir evolution, in continuity, and in tlrat which is successive; and also in separating beginnings, middles, and ends, and not deserting any one of the things comprehended by it. And as it is not simply movenble, but is moveable as with reference to eternity, so neither is it simply an image, but the whole of this may IM: justly said to be the image of eternity. For being a true essence, and in short, measuring, comprehending, and restoring motions to their pristine state, it is at the same time said to lie an eternal image. It appears also, that it is the first of images. -For all-perfect intellect is not proj)erly said to be the image of the first cause. For what can be assimilated to that which is entirely without form ?

But time will be the first participant of intellect and an impartible nature between all-perfect intellect, and sensibles. And in short, if it is necessary that image should belong to things which participate ; for it \\ishes to preserve the form of another more ancient and \enerable nature, from which it receives the peculiarity of its idea; it is requisite, that image should neither be in the first essences; (for they being first, do not participate, but rather, they are participated by other things, not being ingenerated in their participants, but after another manner, being converted to themselves ;) nor in sensibles alone. For middle also participate of first natures, and not sen<iblrs alone, which " are a similated to first, through the representations of middle natures. Time there fore, is said to be the image of eternity, and the whole world, of animal itself, according to soul, and according to body. Hence, if as Porphyry, and some other Platonists thought, sensibles alone participate of truly-existing beings, we must investigate images in them alone. But if, as Amelius writes, and prior to Amelius, IS umenius, there is also participation in intelligible*, there \\ill likewise be images in them. If however according to the ditine Plato, images are neither in the first of beings, nor in sensibles alone, lamblichus, who nearly surpasses all philosophers in all things, will in these also be victorious, by exhorting us to survey participations, in the middle, and in the last of beings. And thus much may sullice at present concerning eternity, and the image of eternity, which is at

' 'A is omitted in the original. BOOK iv.] TIM/T.US OF PLATO. '203 once movcablc, and always subsists with invariable sameness, and which proceed ing according to intellectual forms, the father of wholes established in his fabrica tions ; as they were not able to sustain the all-perfect measure of eternity. Let us therefore, no\v turn to the investigation of the following words. " He likewise contrived the generation of clays and nights, and months and years, which had no subsistence prior to the universe, but which were constituted together with it. But all these arc parts of time,' and las and Kill he, were generated species of time." That prior to the generation of the universe (but I now speak of the unhorse, a.s surveyed in conjunction with soul, and the whole lite of (lie world) there \r,is an impartible essence abiding in eternity, in the same manner as eternity abides in one, and that it was no part of proceeding and participated time, is perfectly manifest. But what day and night, and month and year are, and how these indeed, are parts of time, but was and trill be are said to be species, and not parts of time, will require a more abundant discussion, and a more profound considera tion. If therefore, we should say that day is air illuminated by the sun, in the first place, we shall speak of something which takes place in the day, and not that which day is.

For when we say a long, and a short day, we do not predi cate an increase or diminution of the air. In the next place, it is dillicult to devise how this will be a part of time. Hut if we should say that day is the temporal interval, according to which the sun proceeds from east to west, we shall perhaps avoid indeed the former objections, but we shall fall into more impervious dilliculties. For if we survey the interval itself without habitude to the sun, and say that it is day, it will appear to be dubious, how the same interval In'ing every where according to the same, day is not every where. But if we survey il in connexion with the solar motion, and this merely so, day will always be in the heavens, and there will not be night. And how is it possible that a part of time should not be every where. For it is here clearly said, that night, day, and month, are parts of time. If however, we do not merely connect the interval with the circulation of the sun, but say that day is the motion of tin: sun from east to west, and night the motion of it from west to east, the universe will neither have days nor nights, which are said to be parts of time. And it is also evident that neither will they have months, nor years. We conceive however that time both according to the

1 'I lif words, rovra £< rarra (itpoi xporov, ire through the fault of the tnntcriben omitted in the tcil of 1'roclus. whole of itself which abides, and according to every part of its progression, is pre sent to the whole world. Tor one and the same now is every where the same. It IH necessary therefore, that day, and Mich other things as we say are parts of time, should IK- every where the same, though they are participated partibly and with dis persion by sensible fabrications; to which also some looking, adopt the more usual rather than the more accurate signification of names. Henri-, as our father [Syrianus] philosophizes, these tilings are not asserted for the purpose of subverting the phenomena: for Tima-ns says what is usually said b> I he multitude, lint our father referring these, as he is accustomed to do, to more principal hypostases says, that dayand nig/it arc demiurgic measures of time, e.tiiting and convulring 'ill the viM' and invisible life and motion, and orderly distribution oj the inerratie sphere. Fur these are the true parts oj time, are essentially present wth all things, tmJ cuinprchcm! the primordial cause uf apparent day and night, each ofvhkh are different in visible time. Ami Tima-ns also looking to this, reminds us how time was generated together with the universe. Hence he says in the plural num ber da\s and nights, as likewise monlhs and years. These therefore, are obvious to all men.

Tor the invisible causes of these, have a uniform subsistence prior to things midiiplii-d.and circulating to infinity. The immoveable causes of these hkexuse^snbMst prior to things that are moved, and the intellectual causes of them prior to sen-ibles. Such, therefore, must day and ni-ht be conceived to be according to their first subsistence. But it mu*t be said, that month is that vhic/t convolves (he lunar sphere, and very termination of the circulation about the zodiac, being truly a divine temporal measure. And year is that -Mi perfects and contains the -Me middle J* Mention, according to xhich the sun is seen posting the greatest /w:ar, and mea.urh," all thing* toother uith time. For neither is day, nor night, nor month, nor much l°ss year Without the sun, nor any thing else pertaining to the vurld. And I do not say this, vith reference to the visible fabrication alone, Jor of thes measures the risible sun is the cause; but in the invisible and superior fabri cation, the more true sun measures all things together u///< time, being in reality time of lime, according to the oracle of the Gods concerning it. For that IMato not only knew these visible parts of time, but also the divine parts homonymous t these, is evident from what he says in the tenth book of the Laws. Tor he there shows, that the sea>ons and months are divine in conjunction with all the other [mundane] (ioils, in consequence of having divine lives and divine intellects preMdm- over them in the same manner as the universe. But it is not wonderful, he now rather speaks about the visible parts of time, because his design at present i> to physiologi" - \^ H«^ therefore be the parts of time, of which some are i'dapted t,- the fixed stars, but others to the stars that revolve about thepol.

HOOK iv.] TIM/TUS OF 1»LATO. 20A tlio zodiac, and others to other Gods, or the attendants of the Gods, or to mortal animals or to tlio more elevated or more low parts of the universe. Plato howexer, says that r»v;,v and tiillbc are species, and not parts of time, in the same manner as days and nights and months and years. For divine orders which ^ive completion to the whole series of time, preside over the latter. Hence, he calls them parts of lime. But irux and icill be, an? entirely suneyed according to each of these. And hence, they are certain species, as not having a jK'cnliar matter; I mean, a diurnal, or nocturnal, or some other such-like matter. If however, these are species of time, which was generated together with the uni- \erse, u-fii had no existence prior to the generation of the universe. But if was had no existence prior to it, neither had motion ; for in all motion, there are TIY/.T and icill be, hecaiise there are prior and posterior. If however, motion was not prior to the universe, neither was disorderly motion. Hence Atticus and his fol lowers speak in vain, when they say, that time was prior to the generation of the world, hut not an arranged time. For where there is time, there are also the past ami the future. And vx here these are, there, the u'<is, and the r» /// fo:

entirely suhsist. Moreover, the rr</,? and (lie •mil be, are species of time generated Ity the Demiurgus. Hence also Plato calls them gcncrcilal. Neither therefore was there a certain time prior to the fabrication of things. It is necessary therefore, that the muchcelehrated disorderly motion of Atticus and his followers, either, if it existed, should not he in time, or that there should not ho in short, a certain time \\hen it was produced. It is necessary however, motion existing, that there should he a time in \\hieli it was generated : one part of it having the past,1 anolherthe present, and another the future. •Hcncejt is not possible that I in 're should have Wen motion prior to the generation of time ; since neither could then- have been disorderly lime. For disorderly time would have tlic ~nin and the \cill be; the former of which would he the past, but the latter the future. Or, if it .alone had the is, without the-e, it would ha\e been eternity, and not time, and disorderly motion would Ix- eternal which is impossible. For Aristotle has snfliciently demonstrated, that all motion is in lime, both that vthich is disorderly, and that which is orderly, each entirely having the prior, and tie posterior ; in order that the motion may bo that which it is said to l>e, and may not be permanency instead of motion. But that the irux and the Kill be, were not prior to the fabrication of things, Plato clearly teaches us, as I have Ix-fore observed by saying that as days and nights were generated as parts, so t/ic teas and l/ic tri/l be, were generated as sjx-cies of time. They how ever say, that the disorderly motion was unl>cgotten. Hence, if there was then

• ' F«»r T/>ofXOor lierc.il is ncccssrrjlo read 200 PROCLUS ON THE [too* IT. n certain tiino, it was unbegotten ; so tliat the vat and the trill be, were nnbegotten. The teas and the will be therefore, were not prior to the generation of the world, but were simultaneous with the world ; time being one and the same, and In-ing the numlxr both of disorderly and of orderly motions, and existing without dillerence. This therefore, is demonstrated through these methods as a co rollary. If however, you wish to suney these as species of time, in the way in which they appeared to be so to our preceptor, assume for me a perfect period, and an entire progression of time, one part having now become the past, but another the future, and behold the van, and the will be as species of time. For if we do not thus, but partihly understand the words of Plato, the venerable and entire idea of time, will not l>e manifested to us, according to each of these species, but that which hap[»ens to some of the things that are in generation, and mutation. i'ti/t\\s indeed, the was indicates the perfective order of time, but the will be, that order of it n Inch unfolds into light, just as the is, indicates its contiectedlu containing order. For time unfolds things which as yet are not, connectedly contains such as are present, and pirjects such as are past, and introduces an appropriate end to their periods. Ant! thus much concerning the parts and the sjH'cies of time.

With respect however, to the word conlrircd, though we have before observed that time is in reality the work of ilivine and demiurgic contrivance, by which natures that are changed remain through the whole, and partake of perfection, perpetuity, defence, measure and comprehension; yet it may lie said, do not divine natures measure themselves,1 and especially do not those that revolve in the hea- \»-ns, define their own motions? This indeed, we must most readily admit. For material and corruptible natures have their existence, and the extent of their du ration from other things; hutdi\ine natures have these, both from primordial causes and themselves. Hence Plato, when he begins to speak about the times that are unfolded into light in the heavens, says " that the stars were generated for tht sake of co-operating in the production of time ;" and again, " that they iccre gene rated as instrument's of time ;n and in the third place, " that they ".cere produced for the purpose of distinguishing and guarding the numbers of time" In what is lierv .said however, the term co-operating .shows that time indeed existed prior to the >tars, but that it is unfolded into light about the world through these. For time being in them, is unfolded through their motion. But the term instruments again after another manner, in a certain respect, indicates the same thing; viz. that the whole of time was produced, both that which abides, and that which proceeds,

1 For cavro here, read tavrii. BOOK iv.] T1M/EUS Or PLATO. 207 by the father and maker of all things, for the purpose of measuring mund.me natures; hut that the bodies which rrvolve in the heavens, are partial measures, and are comprehended in the one time; each in an especial manner, more organically producing in conjunction with time, such things as are appropriate in if. For in short, all the second fabrication has this relation to the one and impartible production of things. For each of the l)odios that revolve in the heavens, is said especially to contribute to the measure of itself. Thus for instance, (he sun tli»u«h it contributes to all tilings, on account of its ruling dignify, yd it particutar/j/ contri butes to the year, ichich it constitutes in conjunction with the Demiurgus, and the whole of time, as the peculiar measure of itself. But t/ic moon contributes to month ; and the inerratic sphere, to day and night. The mode also of operation in the rest of the heavenly bodies, is evident; though neither night, nor much less day, is without the sun, nor year without the inerratic sphere, and the zodiac. At the same time however, some measures are more adapted to some of these, than to others.

The stars also may be said to be the instruments of time, in consequence of time possessing an effective dignity, with reference to and through them, and adorning generation as it were through instruments. By wluVh also it is evident, that time is not only that which is participated, and is the number of motion, since the governors of the world have the order of instruments with reference to it ; but likewise, that it is an invisible CJod, energizing eternally about all motions, and the whole period of the world, but using for instruments these divinities, as more partial measures of itself. But the assertion, that the stars were generated, for the purpose of distinguishing and guarding the numbers of time, clearly shows that the one time proceeds from the Demiurgus, and his will ; and that remaining one, and a whole, and without difference, it becomes through the motion of these stars, multitudinous according to number, and that each of the measures adapted to it, is as it were cut and divided from the whole of time, wl'iieh is always ihe guardian of each, through its equable and orderly motion. In reality however, the celestial (iods, are rather guarded by the numbers of time, and obtain through these, the distinction ot the periods which they make, and of their restitutions to their pristine state • but at the same time, since we endeavour to collect the truth pertaining to invisible from visible natures, we infer that the numl»ers of time are guarded, through the circulation of the stars.

With these things however, not only IMato as. we have before observed, but theurgisLs likewise accord. For they celebrate, time as a mundane CJod, eternal, 1 boundless, young and old, and of a spiral form. And besides this also, as having its essence in eternity, as abiding always the same, and as possessing PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK ir. infinite power. For how could it otherwise comprehend the infinity of apparent time, anil circularly lead all things to thrir former condition, and renovate them, and also recall things which In-come old through it, to their proper measure, us lieing at once comprehensive both of things that are moved in a circle, and ac cording to a right line. For a spiral is a thing of this kind ; and hence, as I have l>efore observed, time is celebrated by theurgists, as bavin- a spiral form. Tor they not only celebrate time as a Cod, but likewise day and night, and month and year, are considered by them as Cods. For of things which circulate perpetually, it is entirely necessary, that there should be an immoveable cause ; and a different cause of things specifically different. On this account therefore, they have deli vered to us, congresses, invocations, and telestic sacred laws. It is necessary likewise, not to survey all these particulars superficially, but to venerate them as divine, invisible, and immoveable causes, prior to those move-able natures which are apparent to all m.-n;

Plato himself in the Laws, hearing testimony, us we have said, to the truth of this, by speaking of these causes as Cods. Fur/rum the Greeks we receice the sacred rites of Month, ami ;, e learn that In/ the Phry gians Month is celebrated as Salmzitt.t, and als» in the. middle mysteries of tiilxizins. For that which they first beheld to In; the measurer of a perpetual circulation, they apprehended to In; a Cod, and this they honoured, through the imsteries, and allsacred worship; in the same manner as (hey also honoured the seasons, lor they were able to perceive [the di\inity of] these, from their effects ; though not similarly the divinity of the year. For men indeed, who were divinely wise, have likewise celebrated this ; but it was not easy for all men to know and worship it, on account of the difliculty of understanding the period which is measured by it. This also is the case with the whole of time, on account of the ignorance ot the one period of all things ; so that the in\ estimation of this whole, as existing, and as a Cod, is attended with ex'.reme difficulty; though if an immoveable cause precedes perj>etual motion, it is necessary that, prior to perpetuity itself, there should exist that which unitedly defines the whole of it, and which numbers it ; periM-tuity itself being that which is numbered.

" These things however, through oblivion, arc not rightly transferred hv us to an eternal essence. For we say that it f«-s and Kill be, though in reality, to this the term it is, alone pertains." In the first place, it deserves to be remarked, that Plato again considers the eternal as the same with the intelligible essence; in order that we may more clearly be persuaded, that when he asserted the world was generated the statue BOOK IT.] T1M.EUS OF I'LATO. >jO&- of the eternal Gods, IIP meant hy the eternal, tin- intelligible (iods. In tlie next place, it must he observed, that in consequence of perceiving that mm conn-he and assert nolhiii^ s;uie about these particulars, lie himself recurs to true concep tions of the things, at the same time purifying the use of words, tlironuh \\hicli the teacher ' necessarily produces recollection in the minds of the well-disposed. What is no\v said therefore, in consequence of the mildness ' of 1'lato's manners, does not seem to accuse severely the assertions of mankind. For the expression not rightly, since ir is common both to the accuser and the accused, is not OCCHStomed to l>rin:r with it threat disgrace. The words of the text howeter, have a sharp' and percussive power. For with respect to those things which the JVmiurmis imparted to the last of brings, in consequence of their incapacity of receiving a more \enerablo. comprehension, if men endeavour to adapt the.-e to the essences which ahide in eternity, they en^a^e in a certain frantic war, de faming the will and power* of the Demiurgus, and in reality, hastening to hurl rocks and oaks ap;ain-t the heavens.

Why therefore, are not Ihc ;, v/.v nnd the Kill be, adapted to intelligible* ! Because the measure of intelli^ililcs is firm and inunovrulilc, and causes the things which are measured hy it to he exempt from all mutation. But why does the it is, in reality alone pertain to them ? Because tlmt which they are, they always are, not losing, nor recehini; any tliinir, neither according to rssence, nor accordinir to life, nor according to intelligence, nor much more accordin- to union. Malice *ay l/nrc/orc, that <>f these t/ine, (lie nas the is, and the r. /// he, the i.rlrcmcx do fiat pertain to tnteHi»thlc.t, init (fie middle alone ' Or is thit //;/ nn menus the ea.\e ? /•'.-/• neither (!»e* the is, iriiich is co-tirnin«ed vil/i tlic u'fts, and the r</// he, per tain t<> intelligible*; but that lehi'-li is e.reinjit from all time, has no nprticnldtion lehainer ij time, and is defined according to the eternal nieaniir itself, must l>e attributed to the Goiix, and to intelligible*. 1'tir a* icith reject to the always, one tea* eternal, bat the other temporal, to li!,e:ei.^e, the is, is twofold, the one being adapt id t<> Irn/ii c.iixtii/g beings, but the other to mundane things. When there fore, he says, that to this in naltty, the term, it is, alone pertains, by transfusing the \\ordalone, ire shall find lehat is taiJ to be more scientific, lor it leill then be, to this, tin. alone is pertains; viz. the is, vhieh is by iltelf exempt from a co-arrangement icith the species of lime.

For (Vriff».-H\u.v.i- l.cro, it i-» ncrc^nry to rr;ul <Sfa^aXo>'. In>t<;nl of ,Ti,^f,,<r in tlm {ilacc, rcj(l nrmuiay. ' Tor fyvfinar hrro, rtud ^H/IM,I> . It ;i|>|>rnn tome tli.it the «orU fvta/in is w.inimg here ill tlic original. Tim. Plat. VOL. II. 21) o,0 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK iv. I f< >\v came men therefore, to err in so threat a degree in this respect, ami to attribute to tin- intelligible Gods tilings which do not at all jKTtain to them? Tin- whole cause indeed, is the oblivion of divine natures, on account of the dcthixion of our wings, our lapse, and our communion with mortal bodies. I It-nee Plato also says, " that these t/iiti^x thnnt«li udlirioii, a renal rightly transferred Inj us to an i-tcrimlfsscnfc." Theur-ists however, are not thus affected ; for it is not lawful for tht-m tit be so. Hut tln-y celebrate time itself as a God, and as we hate said, tlu-v denominate out- time zonie, but another a/onic, which measures the period of the third of the ethereal worlds. They likewise celebrate a certain archanuelic time, in the middle of the ethereal worlds ; and another ni/i/i^ time, which presides over the first of those worlds. And after all the>e, they speak, of another I'onl.d time, which is the leader of the empyrean world, and conducts, and defines iu period, proceeding from the fontal Goddess [Khea] her>elf, who generales all life, and all motion.

For she produces fontal time, and causes it to preside over all mo\eahle natures, and to measure the periods of all things, as far a., to the last of beings. Tor these also are measured according to periods. In things likewise, which are perfectly corruptible,1 Plato teaches us, that every thin^ which h\es is generated from that which is dead, and every thing which is dead, from that which is living; and that there is a period of all things, and an apotataslasis of unierated natures, and n«»t alone of such as are incorruptible, l-'or the individual which was generated from non-being according to a certain p.-iiod, departs into non-being [again], since motion from the same to the same, is. a |H-riotl.

Time then-fort-, measures all things, and defines the periods of all things, as far as tt» the last of bein-s. And the I)emiur-us atbled this tt» inoveable natures, in order that they mi-hl imitate the continued permanency of intellect in eternity l itself, throiiiih the periodical progression from the same to the same, which time imparts to all moveable bein-s. The multitude, however, frequently confound the nature of things, nt.t distin-uishin- betwt-eii what is atlapted to lrilly-c\i»tiii£ IM-'UI-S and to s,ich as are -,-nerat, d. 15ut in a |>articular manner, the i-uorance concerniim t-ternity and time, product s this dire confusion, and ille-aht\. Tlie similitude of the iliin-s likewise, operates somethiu-. KOI last are not separated from fii. it natures, but are suspended from, and proceed according to them, and become invested with the form of images. It is also a dire thin-, for those who 1 I'or irn^opwr LtTf, it IS MeiTb-.ar> to n-ad Tru^-pOnoruir. 1 luiU-ail of uiu»»- m this place, it i* obviously necessary to read aiu/u. have not a scientific knowledge of similitudes, to reason falsely, and transfer some things to others, to 1)0 persuaded to associate with images as if they were para digms, and to think that a primordial essence is nothing else than its visible ima^e. Perceiving therefore, among scnsihles, the mixture of being with non Ix'intr, and. the domination of bring in a certain respect, when we say that a thing is, but of non-being in a certain respect, when we assert concerning it, that it iras, or that it uill /><.-, we transfer these to the eternal order of real Ix-iugs, where nothing is past, nor any thing \\ill be future, nor in short, will IK;

changed, anil where there is no progression of time, nor representation of l>oing according to privation; hut where there is true essence, and truly-existing being, an invariable sameness of subsistence, the all in the now, and the ends subsisting ;it once, not as difierent in ditlerent things, but as the same with their subjects. For in things in which as I may say, the whole of the hyparxis consi.-ts of lM<auty and goodness, well-being does not diller from existence.

" Hut tin- U-Y/.S and the Kill be, arc adapted to be asserted of generation proceeding in lime. For these arc motions. It is not however, lit, that the nature which always subsists with invariable sameness, immoveablv, should become through time, either older, or younger, or should formerly have been generated, or be now generated, or altogether will be hereafter; or should receive any such things as generation adapts to the natures that are borne along in the sensible region, lint these are generated species of time imitating eternity, and circulating according to number." These three things, says Plato, pertain, on account of time, In generation; one, the was and the will l>c ; the second, to btennie younger and older ; and the third, to have been gencrati'd formerly, or to be nan' generated, or to be herealnr. < H the-e, the divine lamblichus s.ivs that time produces thefir>t in the realms of generation, as proceeding from real being; but the second, as being impelled from life; and tiie third, as being suspended from the intellectual order. Hut these things I* Jng asserted with great wisdom, in the first place- he inquires, if it is more proper to sur\e\ them as three, and not as two, understanding by the expression to hare been generated formerly, the younger or older, and also by 1 he expression*, to be natt1 generated, and to thereafter ; in order that it may not only !»<• erroneous to adapt any thins of this kind to the Ciods according to the In-iug generated, but also according to all the parts of time, and generation. In the next place, recurring to the beginning of the whole of what Plato uow says, it must be consi-

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK iv dered, whether we can rightly assert the two alone of generation, I mean the was, and the will be, or that also, which is as it wore the middle of tlu'tn, the is ; which is not now named, because the eternal is pertains to intelli-ibles, lest the homonymy should a-ain produce disturbance in what H said. Moreover, it is e\ ident to every on*-, that each iiua^e participates in a certain respect of its paradigm, but that the whole world, in an especial manner participates of the intelligible. So that :f truly-cxistin- hem- is in the intelli-ible, l>ein- \\ ill :d>o after a certain manner, exist in the sensible world. 7'//r /,v however, is not con-numerated with the \eas, and thc-i-illbe, because that which is properly /v, is not aimm- sensil.les, and because it ha- a secondary subsidence from the intelligible, M» that it is more adapted to it [than to sensihles], and because the de>i-n w as to show \vhat tin p- •cuhanties are of eael. nf tin- natures.and not if the one participate* of a certain thin- li«»m the other, thou-li ///<• ;,-«M, and tin tall he are rather eharacteri/ed b\ mm-hein- .than b\ In-ill-:! tlie former, by the no lunger, hut the latter, by the not i/tl. Do sensibles therefore, alter a eeilain manner eiilih ly participate of bem- ! Or may we not sa\ that they are not denominated according to a «h ll.

ction from it, but Ihuiii-hlhe dninination in them ofnoii-l>em- they are only adapted to generation, but b\ no means pertain to tnily-exislin- l.» in-s ! Besides, the monad, or the is, is more allied to eternity, and intelli-ibles, but the duad of tlic \cus and the \cill Li, to -eiiei-ation and time. 7///,v //or. -er /Wcirr, and strength of temporal energy is great, I hut it co-nrraii^t.'s that u/iic/t nu longer is with beings, and that \chlch is nut yet :,-•//// tiling that arc present. !'<>r all these become continued according to time, and the ],n M nt through tune i v dt^ni^ed to the t.vrv, s» as not even then to he hurried a:raif to that :, hitli in no ic.^ut irh.itevcr t:iists, but OH account of tune, is after a certain jnaninr en-arran^ei! ,i //// beings.

\\u\\ then fore, in -em-rated natures, can the ;.w, and the trill he, be fitly said to br specio of tune ' May \\e not say, that the species of time are one thin:;; for temporal pro-nsvions alone, and the intervals which measure wholes, are more simple; but the ihin-s which are arran-ed in the natures f,'«-nerato<l in time, another! For time was, and the war was, are not the same thin-; as neither is the do \vn\\ aril of place, the same as the downward of the rarth. Hut the former i-, simple and one, hut the latter composite ami twofold. And the one compre hends but the other is comprehended. Thus also in tin :,w.v, the temporal indeed, comprehends and measures ami is simple, but that which is assumed in the jH-neratii.ii \\hich i> in time, is comprehended, and measured, and participates of time, but is nol time. That all »eneration however, is comprehended by time, just as lime itM-ll is by mtelliuibles, U evident. And time is said to proceed from 'intelligible* accurdintj to number, as making its pro-n-ssion according to the BOOK iv.] TJM.El/S OF PLATO. ._>13 form*- and measures licit an- in them. But generation is said to proceed in time, as being measured and perfected by time. Auain, time.on account of its imitation of eternity, i> said to circulate ju^i as (lie hea\en on account of its imitation of intellect, is said to he of a spherical form) and to have as species the was, and the will be, and Mich tilings as are allied to these ;

and i< is evident that these are simple, and llie primary leaders of the natures that are home along in generation. For that which has the measures of all generation in itself, inserts the images and impressions of them, in the things which proceed according to it. (Generation then fore, loses its \igour, and on this account requires the renovating aid of time. It also is imperfect at first, and is in want of time, to make it more perfect, and older. Sut the intelligible is always perfect, and always flourishing, and always has an invariable sameness of subsistence ; whence also something which is older subsists there,

Hut Jove was born llic first, and likewise that which is younger, lit bo august, lor them llic nectar pours. Yet these are not present with them through time. This also is very accurately added by Plato, that it is not lit the intelligible should become cither older or younger through time, nor in short, that the unbegotten should be generated, or hacc I'ccn generated, or will lie generated. And in one word, generation indeed, though it is not essence, yet participates of essence; but it is by no means lawful that essence, should be filled with generation. Hence, neither is it right to intro duce to truly-existing beings, things which are adapted to generation through lime. " And in addition to these things also, we assert that a tiling which tr/.v generated, 15 generated ; that what subsists in becoming to be, in gene rated ; that what nill be, is to be ; and that non-bciny is non-bcinf ; no one of which assertions is accurate. Perhaps however, a perfect discussion of these things, is not adapted to the present discourse." Previously to this, Plato blamed the custom of the (i reeks, for introducing to truly-existing beings, words adapted to things in generation ; but now he accuses the multitude of co-arranging with generation, that which is adapted to intelligi ble1*. For their illegality, is either twofold, or is entirely one ami great. For when they say that a thing which ~uas generated, J.T generated, and that tcill be, u to l>e, they erroneously adapt the peculiarity of eternal essences, to generated

214 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK >v. natures. For this ist pertains to sii|>erior divine l>eings ; just as to !>e generated, or subsist in becoming to l>e, pertains to sensible*. They likewise erroneously confound llie parts of time, and subvert tin? order which is in it, Ijy making the tune, or the present time, the same as the past. But when they say, that what subsists in becoming to bt, ix, they fall into the former error alone. Though this however, is an error of the greatest etmse(juence, yet, if it be law fill so to s|>eak, it is a still greater error to say that non-being is. For if generation is a medium l)etween non-brim; and being, it is a less error, to introduce the pecu liarities of bring to generation, than to non-being. One apologv however, 'or these things, may be made conformably to nature. For in consequence of non-being participating in gent-ration of beurj:, in the same manner as every thing temporal apjx-ars to participate of eternity, it is usual t(» refer these to eternity and truly-existing beiii'_', whi< h are exempt from all interval and distribu tion into parts. And again, il i^ usual to preserve and detain generation, which i- borne along in motion, and exists in time. It is not at all wonderful therefore, if men wi-liing to detain among beings, that which has already been generated, should sav that it is generated ;

and aUo being willing toco-arrange with things in existence, that which is not yet generated, they should >ay, it /,v to be uenerated. For through these two things, non-being is in a certain rcsp<'ct able to accede to, and be co-arranged with beings; M/.. through the participation of being, and through the present temporal interval, both which may appear to introduc existence. And hence indeed, the frequent use of these words in this sense was assumed. Nevertheless the transposition of this perturbation has not anything las Plato says] accurate and scientific, by which he signifies, as far as is adapted to the present speculation, which is more physical, that a more abundant investi gation of these things, pertains to another discussion, which, as most of tin.- inter preters think, is logical. For in logical discus-ions, it is usual to inquire whether non-being is the object of opinion. As lamhhchus says however, and I am per suaded, it is theological. For in the. Sophisia, much is said about all-various non-being, and likewise in the Parmenides, the speculation of which, Tima-us also evinces to be appropriate. \ovv however, as he separates and distinguishes things from each other, vi/., into that which is always being, and that which is generated and perishes, into image and paradigm, the eternal and the temporal, thus also, IIP wishes to give appellations adapted to each of these, so as neither to transfer things which pertain to generation through time, to more simple and dmne essences, nor to mingle the transcendent goods of more excellent natures, Avith things which are borne along in motion and mutation. Hut he refers to more appropriate opportunities, the more profound investigation of these particulars. For this was usual both with 1'lato himself, and prior to Plato, with the Pytha-

BOOK iv.] TIM.i:i S OF PLATO. 215 goreans. Aristotle also, especially emulating this custom, discusses philosophi cal problems in a way adapted to the design of his treatise. " Time therefore, was generated together with the universe, in order that being generated together with it, it may also be dissolved together with it, it" ever a certain dissolution of it should take place. It was also generated according to the paradigm oi' an eternal nature, in order that it might, as much as possible, be similar to it. For the? paradigm of it indeed, is through all eternity [real] bc'itg. But the universe forever through the whole of time, was generated, is, and will be." Plato says that time was generated together with (lie universe, now animated, and endued with intellect ; because the world first participates of time, accord ing to soul, and the corporeal-formed nature. But the words, "that being gene rated together Kit /i it, it nun/ also be dixsnli-L'tl together with it, if ever a certain dis'solution i/fit should take place" clearly show thai the universe is unlttgottcn and incorrnptihle. For it it was generated, it was generated in time. But if it was generated together with time, it was not generated in time. For neither was time generated in time, lest there should be time prior to time. If therefore, the uni verse was generated together with time, it was not generated, [according to the n'sual acceptation of the word.] For it is necessary that everything which was generated, should be posterior to tune.

The universe however is bv no means posterior to time. Airain, if every thing which is dissolved, is dissolved at a certain time, but time cannot Ix; dissolved in a part of itself, time cannot ever be dissolved ; so that neither can the universe?. For it is indissoluble, as long as time is indissoluble. Besides time is indissoluble through a simplicity of nature ; unless some one is willing to denominate the progression of it, and its return to the Deiuiurgus, which are motions contrary to each other, the genera tion and .dissolution of it. Thus also the universe, has dissolution and generation according to cause. Just therefore, as if some one being willing that the revolu tions of the circle of llic different, should be odd in number, should say that the heptad is co-existent, with them, in order that if ever the heptad should In-come an even numl»cr, they also may l>eeome even, nignifjini; by this, that the circula tions will not fall into thee\en number; thus likewise, we must HOW conceive respecting the all-various indissolubility of the world and time, in consequence of time having an indissoluble nature.

One caus>> therefore, of time having Ijcen generated together with the universe, is that the universe may be indissoluble and perpetual. But a second cause is, 21« PROCUIS 0\ Till: [BOOK vv. that it may be most similar to its panuK., .:i. For Plato says that the universe itself, is most similar to its paradigm, How therefore, does the. universe become mure similar to animal itself through time f Because, says he, as intelli^ihles rereive all the power of eternity, which now unites, and connectedly contains them at once, collectively, and unically, — tints also the world, sustains all the measured motion of time partibly, and in a divided manner, through which also it was, and is, and \\ill IMV, not having the three in the whole of time, hut each in a portion of time. It receives however, each of the three in the whole of time, on account ud the past and the future period, and because being of the nature of things geiierated, it has the perfect in generation according to every part of time. And it exists incited, or is, because in the svholeof the present circulation of time, it par ticipates of being. Hut it it-ill be, because the measured motions of the whole of time, will never cease, and the circulations conjoin, and assimilate time to intel ligible causes. If however, the universe exists for ever through the whole of time, and is, and was, and will be, it is, and will be in the time to come, in consequence of lM?ing incorruptible.

Jlence it was generated in </// the pa-t time, as being unbegotten. For it is similarly present \\illiall time according to each of ihe.-e.1 Or if this is not admitted it no longer \\ill be hereafter infinitely, or was generated from infinity. And those are ridiculous l who say that the \\orld was once gene rated, and that it \\ill at a certain time, cease to lie, since Plato ascribes to it the whole of time, on account of both [the past and the future.] And you see, that he now attributes the three parts of time to it, and does not refuse to ascribe Iwing to it. Hence it is evident, that \\henbeforche attributes ihc is to an eter nal nature, and not to generation, the is there, is exempt from all temporal exten sion, and being established according to the eternal itself, pertains to intelligible^ ; since he grants that the whole of the wits and the "U'tll l>c, are forever present with sensible*, according to the participation of truly-existing beinij.

How therefore, if the nature of time, ns the divine lamblichus says, and as I am persuaded, is a medium between eternity and the universe, of the latter of which it is the leader, and is assimilated to the former, — how, if this be tin: case, was time constituted for the sake of the universe? For how was that which iscomprehensive and perfective, and which in a greater degree, assimilates the hnaire toils paradigm, — how Mas this generated for the sake of that which is compre hended and assimilated ? For thus, things which subsist for the sake of some- ' i. »• An orilini,' to tl« irai, tfir if, ;m<l Ifif trill be. ' I'lmln- In.. ;tlluilf> in MU li i't'llio ancient I limli.in>( as vnileavourcd to prove, t'roin tin- authority of I'luto, that the uorM was pruduccil at a certain time, anil uill at a ct-it.iin lime bcdcstrovcd. IJOOK iv.] TI.NLIXS or I'LATO. -217 thing else, will l>e mo iv \enerable than ends, and more excellent natures will make a progression to beings, lor (lie sake of things subordinate. Nothing of this kind Imweter, is to In- found in the arrangements of IMato. For neither was tune u'enei afed, for llie sake ot the um\er>e alone, nor was the universe coiMituted for the sake of time alone, hut each was eonstituted for (ho sake of itself, and of the other, and tor tin- sake of l»oth.

For in order that all the fahrieation of thing1; mi^ht have perfection, surli was the universe, and such was time consummately produced. Moreover, it happens that each greatly contributes to the assimilation of each to its proper paradigm. Fortune would not imitate eternity without the existence of the universe; for after what manner would it proreed, or what is there among beings, that it would ever measure, or connect, or perfect ! nor would the universe, without the existence of time, imitate as much as possible, the all-perfect and eternal nature of animal itself. Kaeh therefore was generated, not for the sake of itself alone, nor for the sake of the other alone, but for the sake of all the fabrication of things, in order that each mijit become most perfect, and most similar to its paradigm, or rather, each was generated for the sake of goodness, and the father of wholes, on account of which also the pro duction of things possesses perfection, lint each being generated that which it is with reference to the other, each contributes greatly to the permanency, order and good condition of all mundane natures. And thus much I'lato philosophiz es concerning time, which is the one and whole measure of all things, and which is moved and proceeds Irom the Deniiiugiis alone, and its proper monad. Hut in what follows, he discusses the lime which is unfolded in the heasens, and is as it were- co-divided with the \arious lations of the stars, which would not have sub.>isted without the revolution of the circle itf the f (line, and the circle n( I he dif ferent, about the invisible and one lime, which cuts oil' from itself, unfolds into light, and always preserves a measure adapted lo each of these circles.

In what fol lows also, in order that this second an lime might proceed into the \i*ible world, and be universally known through the partial measures rf itself, which it imparts, and that it might be more distributed, he constitutes the planets, among which the sun and moon are enumerated. From all which we may infer, what great dignity is allotted by the philosopher, or ralher by the Demiurgus himself of wholes, to the time which is first and one.

" From this reason therefore, and from sueh a discursive energy of divinity about the e/eneralion of time, in order that time might l>c gene rated, he produced the sun and moon, and the other five stars, which have the appellation of planets, for the purpose of distinguishing and guarding the numbers oi" time." T<m.Plat. VOL. II. 2E 21H PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK iv. The fabrication of tiling, as we have frequently observed, taing twofold ; the one invisible, one and wimple, sui>er-tnundane and total ; but the other visible, multitudinous and multiform, distributed into parts' in the world ; and having twofold energies, the one primordial, immoveable, and intellectual ; but the other secondary, proceeding with motion, and revolting about intellect; pud the one beini: exempt from effects, but the other being co-arranged with them ; this being the case, a twofold time also proceeds to beings. .And the one indeed is super mundane, but the other mundane. The one also both abides, and at the same time proceeds; but the other is borne alonu in motion. That also which is participated is twofold, the one subsisting according to simple participation, but the other in the periods of the celestial stars, which produce months and days, and nights and years. Such therefore beini: the difference of times, Plato having delnen-d the conceptions, about the one and simple essence of time, is now about to discuss the \ariety of the time, which is participated parlibly, and to which the theory of the planets contributes.

For through the motion of these dancing round the sun, the time which is known to us is completely effected ; introducing this as a ninth gift to the world. In order however, that from the introduction jtself, you may have an indication of the inferiority of this time to that which is Mijx-r-mundane, he says that it was constituted by l/ic discursive energy of divinity ; and further still, that it di*tin;jui*lies and guards the numbers of time, through the motion of the stars. To both likewise, we must direct our attention, viz. to the distinction of the many temporal measures after the one [super-mundane] time; and to the defence and preservation of the same measures perpetually, for the sake of which he says, the stars were generated. And tin: Demiurgus indeed, produced the former time, looking to eternity, and eueri;i/.iui: according to one simple intelligence ; but he produced tin* second time, as Plato says, from reason, and a discursive energy ; fx«i oiaKoia>] indicating by this, the divisible nature of titamiia, l and its distribution into multitude from one intelligence. For a divine intellect is one thing, and divine reason another; the former being united, but the latter multiplied ; and the former comprehending wholes, but the latter dividing union into multitude; the former also, abiding in itself, but the latter unfolding itself into light. Hence, tin- secondary lime, if it is miners-ally apparent, is very properly said to proceed from the demiurgic reason, which receives as it were its progression from intellect ; reason indeed, manifesting the cause, but dtaiwia, the

* For wfiurept > TJI here, read ^</JiC"/i»vf)». * Di«n0ia, as has becu before observed, when ascribed to the Demiurgus indicate* a diitiibutif* taubt of things, or a caiue, us TruUm expresses it, wbich dividts union iuto multitude. BOOK iv.] TIM.EUS ()!• I'LATO. 2II> knowledge in the Demiurgus, which is of a hiformed nature. Truly-existing lime also, [or the lir>t lnuc] which is tin- number of all the periods in the universe, is one tiling ; hut tin- time which flows from this, and proceeds accordin;; to niimhcr, i< another. Farther still, truly-existing time comprehends all measures uniformly, according to \vhich also the periods Itoth of souls and 1 todies are accomplished, and the one measure of the whole apocatastasis. For there is a period of that which is divinely generated, which a perfect number comprehends, as Socrates says in the Repub lic. 15ut secondary time distinguishes and guards the measures in souls and corporeal natures. For it distributes measures adapted to each of these. And by this indeed, it divides the unical power of the first time, but guards the measure pertaining to each soul, and each corporeal nature. Conformably to this likewise it makes apocatastases. For there is one measure of the solar period, another of the lunar, und another of the period of the meteors. For in these also, there is a certain circle, adumbrating the celestial circle. Of different animals likewise, there is a different period. For of these there are periods, and measures of life, as also the da-moniacal ArMotle says. .Such therefore are the conclusions which may be now assumed from these tilings, concerning the diflerence of these times.

It appears likewise, that Plato does not in vain say, " in order that time misfit began rated" but for the purpose of manifesting, that invisible time was antece dent, being a whole, and one, and an intellectual number, prior to the time which is participated, and which proceeds according to number. Every thing therefore, which is generated, is prior to its generation, invisibly established in its cause. Hence generation signifies a progression into participants, according to which time unfolds into light different forms, ' primarily and secondarily. It likewise signifies that time proceeds from more total to more partial natures, as far as to the last of things »* for instance, animals and plants. To us however, the whole of time becomes known from partial but orderly measures. For the whole is difficult to be known, and that which is disorderly cannot Itecome the measure of other things. But since, as we have said, the period of the planets, and particularly the solar circle, contributes to the generation of secondary time, or rather, to the comprehension of the many measures contained in it, through which lieirig differ ent, as for instance months and years, we are accustomed to measure the whole of time, — hence, Plato says, that the sun and moon, and the five planets, were first generated by the Demiurgus, though each of the fixed stars likewise, being

' For e«f 7 here, it it necessary to read «idwr< •j.jo moci.rs ON TIM: ['BOOK \\. spherical, performs its jH'riod about its own centre, according to a certain temporal measure. To us however, tliese measures are not known, as those of the planets are, according lo which they make their periods about the /odiae. For in the lived stars, \\e do not know the periods of them about their proper centres. Plato iheref.ire, s|n-aks concerning; the planets, and says they were generated, in order that they mi^ht co-operate in the production of visible time; unfolding a di Hi-rent iiieasiire of dilli rent things, the sun In in- allotted a primordial and ruling dignity, and particularly according to the generation of time. IleiiOe, he is called time of time by ideologists, as unfolding into liijil tin- lirstlinie; and the period of the .seasons is accomplished according to him. l>ut the moon lias the second order, as proximate ly moving, increasing, and diminishing, ••very tiling in li'eneralion, by her powers. Ilenre, as the sun is said to change his form-1 e\ en hour, and in each MUII of the /odiae,' so the moon changes her lorin e\ery day ; so that as the theolo-ist sa\s, she undergoes as many elian^es in a month as the MIII in a star. Hut the other planets by their various motions, connect in a regular series, the duetsitv of generation. I 'or different elli-cls follow from the apocatastaMs of dilli-rent planets, \\hich according to different measures, brm^ their own li\ ' - to a period.

/•OK IN.; TIM.i;i:> <>F I'LAIO 2*21 derly motions of tin- sublunary region. ^i/.. the motions there thai are upward and downward, lirluiui and In-fore. Fur a'- Piato savs in (lie Laws, those sin against divinity, who dare to ascriU' wandering lo (lie celestial (jods, in COUH quence of 7iot knowing tin ii- order, their harmonious dance, and the equability of their mo tion. For iir (|ii iliilily is alone apparent in them, through the lalion and contrary circiilalion of their evol\in«j circles, whether on accoiiiit of epicycles, and eccentrics, or from other causes. I'or all the hypotheses have not the same1 proliahilitv. But some of (hem indeed, are remote from the simplicity of divine natures, and others are ;:s it were mechanical contrivances, de\ ised by lln> moderns, to ac-'onnt for the motion of the celestial orbs. And it seems that Plato in the Republic, by making the whirls concentric, and in these the seven circles, and mentioning 'these alone, and not epiryeles, ascribes to the stars themselves inequahility, and this possessing arrangement and order. I'or this inei|iiabilily returns to its pristiii'- slate, in orderly periods of time, in consequence of the planets hein^ media betueen things that are moved \\ilh a motion perfectly equable, and those that are moved anomalously in every respeet. I'or they are allotted a motion vthich is equably anomalous, or anomalously equable.

Time therefoie, is unfolded into light, and makes its progression into the uni verse, tluuimh all lh< celestial orbs, and not .only throiitr-ii the planets, but likewise through tht" fixed stars. Plato ho\ve\er, especially makes mention of the planets, in the generation of time, because they dilli-r from the lixed stars in the \ari<:ty of their period>. and from sublunary natures, in their motions hem- al\va\> iinariably the same; the former of \\hich, the distinction of many temporal measures manifests, and the latter, the perpetual preservation of the same periods, and apccatastases. For it i< necessary to survey the same things, the multitude of mea sures always remaining. These therefore, have an orderly arrangement, after the one mea-ure of the whole period. And the «me monad indeed itself of time, is a perfect and entire number. Hut from thi-, and in each circulation, there is an appropriate measure, Saliirnian, or.fovian, or Lunar, icceivinir its peculiarity from the soul, and motive deity, w IIH h is in i-ach of the spheres, l-'or one number pertains to lit" sun, another to a horse, and another to a plant. But the mundane number is common to all of them. On this account also we say, that th-Te is the same time every where. For the world has one lite, in the same manner as it has one nature, and one intellect. If however it has one iW,, it will also have r'iie 2ifjj. lint it this be the case, il will likewise have one temporal measure. And as each of the parts in it lives according to total nature, so likewise, it in